Funeral of the Duke of Wellington.

CHAPTER XXIV.

SOLE SECRETARYSHIP—FIRST ANNUAL REPORT 1854.

PROGRESS OF IMPROVEMENT, 1855-1859.

The statement which will be found on a subsequent page relative to improvements in hand during the last month of 1854, shows, in some measure, the increased progress consequent on the important change effected within the year. Command of the secretary’s staff—many of them able officers—enabled me more rapidly to devise and mature measures of improvement, relieved me, to a great extent, from the necessity of dealing with details and from the toil of throwing my conceptions into the form of well-considered and elaborate minutes, and allowed me, when due authorization had been obtained, to carry them out without impediment or loss of time, or over-watchful care against the introduction of some thwarting modification. Provided only I could obtain the approval of the Postmaster-General, and, where needful, of the Treasury, my course henceforth would be uninterrupted so long as health of body and mind should be vouchsafed for its continuance. I did not however, expect, though such a notion seemed to be very common abroad, that the approval of the Postmaster-General and the sanction of the Treasury were to be had for the mere asking. These authorities frequently have views of their own, and, though they naturally pay much attention to the advice of their highest permanent officers, nevertheless they occasionally delay or modify action, and sometimes, though very rarely, exercise their absolute veto. All who had the pleasure of knowing Lord Canning, the Postmaster-General of the day, must be aware that he was not a man likely to act upon advice in great matters without being first convinced of its soundness; but, at the same time, they will remember that his great ability, diligence, and candour, were likely to bring the means of substantial conviction within his reach. In working under such a man, though one may be sometimes subjected to delay or disappointment, there is, nevertheless, much profit, as the necessity for convincing often leads to closer investigation and more careful consideration than might, at first sight, appear necessary, and occasionally tends, even where measures are perfectly sound in themselves, to more careful inquiry as to the best mode of presenting them in an acceptable form to the public. I entered now, therefore, upon the most satisfactory period of my whole official career, that in which the course of improvement was steadiest, most rapid, and least chequered. The work of organization, to which I was now able to give most of my time and attention, had long been to me of all occupations the least difficult and the most pleasant; and perhaps, but for the effect of past struggles, the course now opening to me might have continued, though not without some abatement from causes to be mentioned hereafter, unto the present day.

During such a period personal history naturally loses most of its interest. For six years there was peace in the Post Office, and the history of peace, though often most important, is almost proverbially uninteresting. Quitting, therefore, for a time, that which more nearly appertains to myself, I proceed at once to describe the improvements effected or attempted within the period.

ARRANGEMENT OF SECRETARIAL DUTIES.

The private journal from which I have drawn so largely in narrating the occurrences of my official career was suspended soon after my appointment as sole secretary, partly because I now felt myself relieved from the fear of that antagonism which had rendered exact knowledge of past occurrences a matter of painful necessity, partly because I was no longer obliged to build up and maintain a claim for promotion, and partly because the full liberty now allowed for the furtherance of reform required on my part undivided attention to the device and careful consideration of measures, and of the means of carrying them into effect. Henceforward, therefore, I have for some years to depend mainly upon records of a formal and official character, and prominent among these stand the Annual Reports of the Postmaster-General, the first of which relates, so far as it is special, to the year in which I attained my final position. It describes, therefore, occurrences which partly preceded, partly followed, that change. Much, however, in this First Report is naturally of a more general character.

I must premise, that one of my earliest steps on becoming sole secretary was to arrange for the meeting of the chief secretary (myself) and the two assistant-secretaries (Mr. Tilley and my brother) in frequent conference, for the consideration of measures in contemplation or in progress, and also of such suggestions on any subject as any one of the three might offer. This provision proved to be exceedingly useful. Mr. Tilley, who had been between thirty and forty years in the department, and had made good use of his opportunities, was always ready to furnish such information relative to details as occasion might require; while my brother, who had, for seventeen years, been engaged in duties of a higher order and greater difficulty than those now devolving upon him, brought with him a mastery of general principles, a power of origination, and a habit of constantly striving for improvement, which gave him special fitness for the duty to which, indeed, he was more especially appointed, that of aiding me in the work of amelioration. This conference continued its sittings during the whole of my secretaryship; and I felt much concern when I learnt that on my withdrawal it came to an end.

In the division of duties between the assistant-secretaries, I was guided by my knowledge of their respective powers, as well as by a reference to the speciality of my brother’s appointment. Whatever departments required to be efficiently conducted with but moderate change in their arrangements were committed to the charge of Mr. Tilley, while those which seemed most susceptible of great improvement, with the exception of such as I retained in my own hands, were given in charge to my brother. The principal of these were the Money Order Department, already mentioned, the mail conveyance by land and by sea, and the Foreign and Colonial Department generally, including, of course, conventions with foreign countries. I need scarcely add, however, that I exercised a general control over the whole; and as the reader will be but little interested in knowing whether particular reforms owe their origin or execution to my brother or myself, I shall, save in a few more marked cases, sink individuality and speak only of joint action. I wish, however to state here my conviction that without my brother’s able and zealous assistance, the full reform of the Post Office would not and could not have been successfully accomplished.

The heads of departments—the immediate subordinates of the secretaries—were, for the most part, men whose selection did credit to my predecessor, Colonel Maberly, on whose recommendation they had been appointed. They were, in short, an able staff of officers. I took advantage of their ability to make what proved a valuable change in their mode of proceeding; for whereas the practice had been for these officers simply to select the cases requiring the judgment of the secretary, and to await his instructions before writing their minutes thereon, I gradually induced them to come prepared with an opinion of their own, which might serve in a measure for my guidance. This soon led to a further improvement; for, as the most convenient way of giving such opinion clearly was to throw it into the form of a minute, it became not uncommon, at least in ordinary cases, to draw the minutes, even before any reference to me. This arrangement not only saved me much valuable time, but also procured for the matters in question a much closer investigation, and more careful consideration from those whose position was most advantageous for the task, than could be without the responsibility pertaining to men called on to advise.

The Annual Reports already mentioned were intended to supply such information to the public as might tend to prevent misapprehension and avert complaint, and at the same time to describe the course of improvement.

Construction of Reports.

The Reports themselves, though always perused and often curtailed or otherwise modified by the Postmaster-General, were, from the beginning to the close of my secretaryship, substantially the work of my brother, with whom indeed the plan originated, being but the application to the Post Office of a practice which he had very fully maintained during sixteen years as an Inspector of Prisons. It must be observed that the surveyors and heads of departments were called on to supply the necessary materials by reporting each on his own division of the service. This arrangement obviously supplied an additional motive for exertion, and more especially for bringing all matters in hand to a speedy completion. It may be added that in the year 1856, that is to say within two years from our first issue, a letter was addressed by the Treasury to the other departments of the public service, calling attention to the Post Office Reports, and inviting similar reports from them, and that in the following year there appeared a First Annual Report from the Board of Customs, and from the Commissioners of Inland Revenue, each containing a mass of valuable information.

RATE OF IMPROVEMENT.

The following passage in the First Report throws light on the rates of improvement:—

BUILDING.

At various towns correspondence having far outgrown the space provided for dealing with it, existing offices were enlarged or new offices erected. Though, at times, there was more or less of contest with influential corporations, naturally inclined to adorn their respective towns at the national expense, yet, so long as the matter was left in our hands, we were able, upon the whole, to effect these changes at moderate cost.

A far larger outlay than was involved in all these provincial erections and enlargements, however lavishly made, had already been staved off by my brother. He learning, soon after his appointment to the department, that there was a great demand for room at the chief office (a building originally erected with far more regard to outward appearance than inward convenience, as was found out as work increased), and that the purchase of Smithfield had been suggested, together with the erection of an entirely new building, examined the present office from the roof to the basement. He found several rooms filled with old and useless papers, and one large apartment, in the immediate neighbourhood of others where clerks were working, employed as a laundry; while for extinguishing fire, of which the risk was thus thoughtlessly incurred, there was not then in the whole building any provision whatever. He also found a great deal of unoccupied space available for the construction of large additional rooms. With the assistance of Mr. Gould, the intelligent clerk of the works, he recommended alterations which, being carried into effect, greatly added to the capacity of the office. While the danger of fire was diminished, provision was made against its occurrence by the erection of tanks on the roof, with a provision of pipes, cocks, hose, and buckets, in different parts of the building, and by appointing firemen to be on duty, by relays, throughout the day and night. In short, the improvement in the building was so effectual, that when I resigned my post, more than twelve years afterwards, there appeared every reason to hope, especially considering the relief afforded by the district offices, that the erection of a new chief office might be indefinitely postponed; though I learn now (1868) that such expectation is disappointed, and that land in the immediate neighbourhood has actually been purchased as an additional site.

Long before my resignation, however, a change had been made, the benefit of which I have never been able to discover,—the construction and alteration of Post Office buildings being transferred by the Treasury, in the year 1858, from the Post Office to the Board of Works. I attempted to obtain a reversal of this order, knowing that the change by no means tended to economy; and, in support of my view, I produced the following striking contrast. A new post office had lately been erected at Brighton, the cost, excluding a very moderate sum expended in fitting up a portion of it as a residence, being no more than £1,600. A similar erection had now to be made at Dundee; and as the correspondence of this town is not more than about half that of Brighton, the least to be expected was that the cost here should be within the cost there; instead of which, the estimate sent in by the Board of Works raised it to four-or five-fold the amount; nor could all the remonstrance I made, and I was not sparing in my representations, bring it lower than £5,700. My general pleading availed no more than my special remonstrance, and the duty in question is still attached to the Board of Works, with what æsthetic advantages I cannot pretend to say, but certainly at a greatly increased expense.

FREE DELIVERY.

Free delivery was rapidly extending throughout the United Kingdom. At the present day (1868) the work is so far advanced that to many readers the very term “free delivery” must have lost its significance. Formerly, to every office there were limits, sometimes narrow ones, beyond which delivery was either not made at all, or made only at an additional charge, generally of one penny per letter, an arrangement nowise interfered with by the simple establishment of penny postage. During the period now under consideration, however, in addition to much previously done, this immunity was extended to several thousand places, without counting a widening of range or other improvement at places where it already existed in an imperfect state. In short, by the end of this period free delivery was extended so far as to include ninety-three per cent. of the whole correspondence.[123]

LONDON DELIVERY.

While due attention was thus paid to the provinces, the department did not neglect the interests of London, whose population is one-tenth, and whose correspondence is even one-fourth of that of the United Kingdom. Much as had already been done in accelerating the delivery of letters coming into the district, we saw that additional improvements might be made to carry this acceleration still further. As early as January, 1856, a hope was expressed, in the Report on the previous year, that the first delivery of the day throughout the metropolis might eventually be completed by nine a.m.,[124] instead of eleven, or even later. To effect this, however, and no less to obtain rapid intercommunication between the different parts of the metropolis, required changes so complicated, that their details could not be set forth without wearying the reader. At the same time, the greatest caution and foresight were required to prevent derangement in transition; and this, combined with other difficulties, greatly delayed the completion of the plan. Briefly stated, the changes involved were as follows; and I may remark that they are almost identical with those proposed in my evidence before the Post Office Commissioners in 1837, already mentioned in this narrative. We had to unite the two corps of letter-carriers (the impracticability of which, under divided authority, had so long delayed the whole measure[125]); to rearrange their “walks”; to divide London into districts, each to be treated in some respects as a separate town; to procure suitable buildings for district offices, or, failing this, to erect such buildings, first obtaining proper sites (no easy matter); to adopt a new plan of sorting at the chief office; and lastly, to provide for the sorting of mails according to the new districts before reaching London.[126] That everything might be done with the utmost circumspection, I nominated a committee of officers to consider the details involved in the necessary changes, which committee made a very elaborate and able Report.[127] In about three years from the first positive movement the district system, though still imperfect, was in some sort established throughout. The beneficial effect had already distinctly appeared in the augmented rate of increase in the number of district letters; the annual increment rising from somewhat less than a million and a half to somewhat more than six millions and a quarter.[128] Early delivery, meantime, so far advanced as to bring the completion of the first round of the day nearly to the point aimed at, viz., 9 a.m.[129] The number of deliveries, too, was raised to ten, and communication within the whole suburban district rendered much more frequent and rapid.[130] These improvements had received some aid from the public in the multiplication of street-door boxes,[131] and yet more in the use in addresses of initial letters indicating districts,[132] while the Metropolitan Board of Works also had somewhat amended the nomenclature of streets and the numbering of houses;[133] but on all three points very much remained then, and, I must add, remains still, to be done.

Shortly afterwards a similar system was applied to Liverpool, by which means not only the deliveries were much improved, but the cost of erecting a new chief office was avoided.[134]

RAILWAY SERVICE.

Acceleration of Mails.

While these important improvements were going forward within the London district, measures were also in steady progress for improved communication with all parts of the United Kingdom, partly by the extended use of day mails, partly by an acceleration of speed, and partly by measures for securing greater punctuality. For the further attainment of the latter object, attempts were again made to induce the companies to enter into engagements by which they and the Post Office should be mutually bound to penalties in case of unpunctuality, coupled with rewards to the companies (though, of course, not to the Post Office) for punctual performance.[135] In the year 1855 one company, viz., the North British, accepted this proposal, and the beneficial effect soon showed itself, the instances of irregularity being brought down in one half year from a hundred and twelve to nine, while the company received within the same time £400 in the way of reward.[136] Notwithstanding this result, however, the Post Office never succeeded in inducing the railway companies generally to agree to the adoption of the plan.

After awhile, nevertheless, we prevailed on the companies conveying the night mail between London and Edinburgh to limit the ordinary traffic of the mail trains, and at the same time to effect a material acceleration.[137] Mainly by these means, the interval between London, on the one hand, and Edinburgh and Glasgow on the other—previously reduced from time to time—was brought down to less than eleven hours; and this, with other aids, enabled the department to deliver the letters at these important cities before business hours in the morning, and to despatch the return mails after business hours in the evening. To effect this improvement we had to make an additional payment of about £15,000 a year to the railway companies alone; but the benefit was so great to Edinburgh and Glasgow—indeed to the whole of Scotland—that we did not grudge the outlay.

I cannot say so much for another acceleration effected during this period, viz., that of the mails between London and Dublin; not that this was less important, but that the annual expense entailed by the change is every way greatly in excess. The object was that the night and day mails should reach Dublin, the one in time for the first delivery of the day and for despatch onwards by the Dublin day mail, the other in time for delivery the same night and for despatch onwards by the Dublin night mail; and in order that these operations might be regular, it was obviously necessary that there should be a margin of time at Dublin to allow for occasional late arrival there. In 1853 a committee of the House of Commons had been appointed to report upon the best means of improving the service in question. The evidence of Captain Huish and other authorities connected with the existing service was to the effect that it might be greatly accelerated, and that at a not very immoderate addition to the actual cost. In consequence, the committee reported in favour of the measure,[138] and Government decided to give effect to their recommendation; but, when negotiations were commenced, the companies concerned, disregarding their own evidence, demanded at once more time for the trip and a higher rate of remuneration. I strongly urged resistance to both demands, and as the Postmaster-General backed my views, I have little doubt that, had the negotiations been left with the Post Office, the quicker and less costly service would have been secured. Unfortunately, the Treasury had taken the matter into its own hands, and we were overruled; so that for insufficient advantages the country has to pay an annual subsidy of upwards of £100,000, in addition to the cost—necessary, however, on either plan—of provision for sorting the letters both on the railway and on board the mail steamers. Unfortunately, too, unpunctuality is not so rare as might be desired, the appointed penalties having been suspended on the ground of insufficient pier accommodation at Holyhead. Still, with every drawback, the improvement was important, reducing the ordinary time of the journey to eleven hours and a half, and obtaining, so far as time was duly kept, all or nearly all the advantages aimed at—advantages extending even to Irish letters for the continental mails.[139] The following extract from the Tenth Annual Report, exemplifies the benefit of the change:—

General Contracts.

During this period, also, many additional companies entered into general contracts, such as have already been spoken of; binding themselves, for a fixed sum per annum, not only to perform certain specified services at appointed hours and at a given speed, but to place all their trains, without exception, at the service of the department.

Need of Legislation.

Nevertheless, all that we could effect as respects railway conveyance of the mails left, and I must add still leaves, much to be desired; the law being, to this day, in such a state as is exceedingly injurious not only to public convenience and to economy in the Post Office, but, as I conscientiously believe, to the true interests of the companies themselves. The following instances may serve for illustration:—

Application was made to the Post Office for a day mail to Alton; and the concession was offered on condition that the London and South Western Company would consent, according to a practice established on some other lines, to carry the bag at the ordinary parcel rate, the Post Office undertaking (contrary to the usual practice in respect of parcels) to convey it to and from the stations. Our offer could hardly be considered unreasonable, seeing that the Post Office, as compared with an ordinary customer, would have to pay equally high for less service and for regular instead of occasional custom. The offer, however, was refused; the Post Office had no power to enforce the demand; and, as the correspondence would not justify the expense of a regular mail train, the desired convenience was delayed for years; the company thereby losing an increase to its parcel traffic, every penny paid for which would, in effect, have been clear profit.

In the year 1856, I received an application from Sir George Cornewall Lewis, then Chancellor of the Exchequer, for such an acceleration of the mail to Hereford as would enable letters to reach Kington (Radnorshire), near which he resided, in time for an early morning delivery. As the readiest means of effecting this was by the use of the Gloucester and Hereford Railway, I applied to the company to know on what terms they would perform the duty, the distance upon their line being twenty-three miles. The answer was a very heavy demand (according to my recollection, £3,000 per annum); the reason given for this enormous charge being that the line, which was ordinarily closed during the night, would have to be kept open for the special service. Though Sir Cornewall Lewis forbore to urge a demand involving so large a sacrifice, I could not but desire to attain the end, if practicable, knowing how inconvenient it must be for important official correspondence to be delayed. Taking advantage, therefore, of the clearness of the line by night, I proposed that the Post Office should itself run a train (as by law any one is entitled to do), paying, however, the appointed tolls, though legally exempted therefrom. This, however, was obviously impracticable without supplies of coal and water, and standing room for the engine and carriage, which the company alone had the means of furnishing; and for these I offered to pay according to arbitration. This offer the company absolutely declined, though, as a further inducement, I had included in it the tender to the company of a carriage for passengers. Other means being sought for, it was at length suggested that Kington might be reached in sufficient time by another route, if the Shrewsbury and Hereford Company would allow the use of their line on moderate terms; and, this company agreeing to perform the duty for £1000 a year, the very circuitous route viâ Shrewsbury was adopted, and is still followed; the longer route involving, however, no inconvenience, as the conveyance is effected in the night.

Again, the importance of some definite rule of charge for specific duty, even as a means of facilitating improvement, is shown by reference to the multiplicity of contracts sometimes requiring to be made or modified before a change can be completed. The following is from the Report of 1859:—

Conciliatory Devices—Loans.

In my anxiety to place our relations with the railway companies on a satisfactory footing, and amidst doubt as to success in any attempt to procure efficient legislation on the subject, I devised, in the beginning of 1857, what I hoped might prove a means of winning from the companies that which, in spite of what I believed and still believe to be to their true interests, they have almost all refused to concede. My plan was that Government should, on ample security and to a limited extent, advance loans, on the terms on which it could itself borrow, to such companies as were willing to adopt a reasonable tariff of charge for postal services. This arrangement, while costing in effect nothing to Government, would enable the companies to borrow at a rate much lower than ordinary. As I still consider this suggestion important, I give my memorandum on the subject at length in the Appendix (J). I may state here that I proposed to make the arrangement terminable at the end of three years, and that I hoped to reduce our annual payments for railway service by about £250,000. An inquiry from the Duke of Argyll, then Postmaster-General, led me to add a representation, setting forth strong additional reasons for seeking to obtain, of course on equitable terms, unlimited use of the railways. The following is the most important passage:—

My memorandum was sent by the Duke of Argyll to the Treasury, with a somewhat guarded recommendation that it should be favourably considered. By his permission, I also laid it before Mr. Hutchinson, chairman of the Stock Exchange, who, with some valuable recommendations as to the best mode of giving it effect, expressed his entire approbation of the plan. This being reported in a second memorandum, the whole matter was referred by the Treasury to Sir Alexander Spearman, though with what result I do not know. Meanwhile His Grace suggested that I should obtain also the opinion of Mr. Gladstone, who, it must be remembered, was not then in the Government, having seceded on a question relative to the Russian war; and on this advice, with the ready permission of Sir G. Cornewall Lewis, Mr. Gladstone’s successor in office, I was only too happy to act. The result—which, however, I first communicated to the Chancellor of the Exchequer—I subsequently stated in the following letter to the Postmaster-General. The reader will here see something of the practical difficulties which even Government, after giving its approbation to a measure, has to apprehend in carrying it, however cautiously, through Parliament:—

While this matter remained under consideration at the Treasury, or, in other words, was forgotten amidst the demands of more pressing business, another attempt was made at general legislation, as will hereafter appear, but still without success; and in the beginning of 1858 I again called the Postmaster-General’s attention to the subject. The Chancellor of the Exchequer had suggested, meantime, that Government, instead of lending money, as I had originally proposed, or Consols, according to Mr. Hutchinson’s judicious modification, might yield the necessary aid by giving its guarantee for loans to be raised by the companies themselves; but this suggestion had been condemned by Mr. Hutchinson, as far less beneficial to the companies, and as raising what would be felt as an injurious distinction between loan and loan, i.e., guaranteed and unguaranteed. The matter was now referred by the Treasury to the Board of Trade, then presided over by Lord Stanley of Alderley, who called for the opinion of the Secretary, Mr. Booth, which was in effect adverse. I had also, with permission, consulted Mr. Locke, the eminent engineer, then M.P. for Honiton; who, however, though approving of the principle, demanded that it should be carried out to its full extent, so as not merely to cover £30,000,000, as I had proposed, but to include loans generally. He also required a further amalgamation of companies, and what it may be remembered I had previously urged, but in vain, viz., the concession to each great company of a district or territory, into which other companies should, except in specified contingencies, be forbidden to intrude. In short, through excessive caution on the one hand, and excessive demands on the other, combined with the ordinary difficulties attending innovation, nothing was done.

Ten years[142] have now elapsed since my attempt was abandoned, but my estimate of its value remains undiminished; I see no intrinsic difficulty in the plan, no counterbalancing evil to its benefit, nor any obstacle to its adoption, but the want of a more general and accurate knowledge on the subject; for lack of this, supposing my view to be correct, Government has been and still is constantly expending a quarter of a million per annum more than necessary, the railway companies are deprived of a valuable relief, and the postal service is cramped to a degree seriously affecting the interests of the public at large.

Attempts to procure Legislation.

My attempt in the same year (1857) to obtain satisfactory legislation was not more successful than my previous efforts. The bill was prepared with every just consideration for railway interests, which, indeed, I was little likely to neglect, but was introduced too late in the session to give it any chance of passing against the opposition which, to my great disappointment, it encountered.[143]

Two years later, thinking I had found a favourable conjuncture, I proposed a measure on new terms, which I hoped would prove more acceptable. A bill being drawn accordingly at the Post Office, with the sanction of the Treasury, I hoped that it would be introduced early in the session of 1860; but before the time arrived, my increasing illness took so serious a form that many months elapsed before I was able to do work of any kind; and, in short, my direct attempts to obtain railway legislation here came to an end.

To what form the relation between the Post Office and the railways will eventually be brought, by legislation or otherwise, must for the present remain matter of conjecture. The purchase of the whole railway system by the State has of late been much talked of; and, of course, if this should be effected, all such legislation as I sought to procure would be superseded; but the difficulties to be surmounted are very great. Reference has been made to a Royal Commission on Railways, of which I was a member. This was appointed in 1865, and I joined it at the earnest request of Mr. Gladstone. Though unable, through the state of my health, to attend all the meetings, I was careful to examine the report of all such evidence as I did not hear, and both evidence and discussion confirmed the opinions I had previously formed on the subject. These had in the main been put forth some time before by my brother Frederic, who also frequently discussed them with me in conversation, and finally gave them concise but distinct expression in his evidence before the commission. I may add that our joint view was supported by evidence from Mr. Edward Page, Inspector-General of Mails, and Mr. Gregory, C.E., the Arbitrator for the Post Office, and afterwards President of the Society of Civil Engineers.

Adopting the suggestion of Government purchase (originally made, I believe by Mr. Galt, as early as the year 1844), but differing from him as to the mode of proceeding, my brother recommended that the purchase should be made gradually; and this not by compulsion, save in a few exceptional cases, but by free covenant between the railway proprietors and the Government; that the purchase should be effected, not by any increase of the National Debt, but on some such arrangement as is now generally adopted when one company becomes possessed of the line of another; lastly, that Government should not attempt to work the railways itself, but lease them to companies or individuals on such conditions as would most tend to public benefit. These views will be found expressed in my separate Report (for I did not succeed in bringing over my brother Commissioners to my opinion) at pp. cxii. and cxxvi.[144] Mr. Monsell, M.P. for the county of Limerick also made a separate report concurring in great measure with my own. It is foreign to the purpose of this narrative to dwell on the general advantages that might be expected to follow the great change in question; suffice it to repeat that, if effected, it would put it in the power of the Government to secure to the Post Office the prompt and unimpeded command of all railway facilities, and that on terms at once equitable in themselves and beneficial to all parties.

Arbitration with Railway Companies.

In the absence of those fixed rules which legislation alone can establish, frequent recourse is necessarily had to arbitration; which, however, is unsatisfactory in its results, owing, no doubt, chiefly to the difficulty of procuring an umpire at once sufficiently conversant with the facts and principles that should form the basis of judgment, sufficiently unbiassed to deal with them dispassionately, and at the same time acceptable to the railway companies. In cases of difference between individuals and large companies, the public feeling, as shown by the decision of juries and otherwise, is for the most part unduly favourable towards individuals; and, in like manner, in cases between companies and that largest of corporations the State, the feeling is unduly favourable to the companies; the more so as the companies can address ex parte statements to the public, while even the highest fixed officers in any Government department are bound by official etiquette to silence.

Further indication as to the true interest of railway companies in relation to the Post Office will be found in the following passage:—It may be remembered that I had, when chairman of the Brighton Railway Company, induced the directors to offer to the Post Office the almost gratuitous conveyance of an additional mail by every train between London and Brighton not already retained for postal service, and that this offer had been in part accepted. In the beginning of 1859, however, I learnt that the company, then under the chairmanship of Mr. Schuster, demanded payment for this additional service. Sincerely believing the demand to be contrary to the company’s true interests. I wrote to the chairman in earnest deprecation. I give the essential part of my letter:—

The consequence, I am happy to say, was the abandonment of the demand, and the maintenance of the previous practice; which, I understand, remains unchanged to the present time (1868).

MONEY ORDERS.

The amount annually transmitted, which before the establishment of penny postage had been less than one-third of a million, but in the fourteen following years had risen to nearly ten millions, rose between 1854 and 1859 to more than thirteen millions;[145] and the profit, which had been gradually substituted for a loss, and had risen by 1854 to somewhat more than £16,000, rose by the end of 1859 to more than £29,000.[146]

Obstacles to Economy.

Further economy, to the extent of about £1000 a year, might have been effected by the adoption of an arrangement prepared by my brother for farming out what is called “the window duty” (that is, the direct transaction of ordinary post office business with the public) at the chief money order office, on a plan already in very general use elsewhere; but, though this was recommended to three several Postmasters-General, its adoption was not obtained.[147] Success would have led to a great extension of the recommendation; our joint conviction being that all the duties of postmasters and their subordinates, together with much other business of the department, might be most economically and effectually performed under a system of contracts. At the same time the obstacle to the change was then, as now, far from inconsiderable; the manifest effect being to diminish, in proportion to its extent, the amount of that patronage on which every Administration counts as a means of influence. It must not be forgotten, indeed, that the Liberal Administration under the Earl of Aberdeen made a very handsome sacrifice of patronage, in relation to the appointment of provincial postmasters; and there is ground for believing that this change, instead of being disliked by Members of Parliament, had from most a hearty approval; relieving them as it did, so far, from the importunities of place-hunting constituents. At the same time, it must be admitted that, until there be a more general enlightenment in the public itself, combined with a more resolute discontinuance of everything like corrupt practice, it will be difficult for any administration, however liberal, to take those bold steps which alone can put the public service on a sound footing.

With regard to the economic tendency of the plan of contracts, I do not think it would be an over-sanguine estimate to fix the annual saving of public money to be ultimately derived from its full adoption and careful administration, in the Post Office alone, at a quarter of a million sterling.

PACKET SERVICE.

Post Office versus Admiralty.

As the packet service remained during the whole of this period in the hands of the Admiralty, the action of the Post Office upon it was necessarily indirect and limited; as is strikingly exemplified by the fact that in the year 1857 the contract with the West Indian Packet Company was renewed not only without my knowledge, but without that even of the Postmaster-General. The inconvenience of such a course appeared distinctly enough two years later when Mr. Anthony Trollope, being sent out to the West Indies on other business, was able, although a landsman, to propose a scheme of routes for the mail-packet at once more convenient and more economical than the existing routes, and, in the opinion of the hydrographer to the Admiralty, superior to them even in a nautical point of view. This scheme nevertheless had to wait long for adoption, because no satisfactory arrangement could be made with the directors of the company; and their renewed contract had yet four years to run.[148]

Moreover, the omission to introduce into the renewed contract efficient stipulations to secure punctuality led to its natural consequence; some of the packets worked by this company, viz., those between St. Thomas, Colon, and Greytown, being the least punctual in all the mail-packet service; while the most punctual were those between Devonport and the Cape of Good Hope, belonging to the Union Steamship Company, into whose contract such stipulations had been introduced in their strongest form, and which in the year 1859 made every one of its voyages within the appointed time.[149]

The unwise renewal of the West Indian Mail Packet contract naturally led to demands for similar facilities elsewhere. The fact is, as already intimated, that the West Indian packet service was established not for postal, but for political purposes, and the term Royal mail-packets was a misnomer, which, while it could not blind our neighbours, tended much, as has already been shown, to mystify ourselves. The chief effect at this period was that other colonies, less favoured hitherto, began to put in claims to which, under the circumstances, it was difficult to reply; those of Australia, then rapidly rising in importance through the discovery of their gold-fields, naturally taking the lead. In the consideration of this matter the Post Office was called on to take a part, and it was at length decided that a monthly line of steamers in each direction should be maintained, half the very heavy expense to be defrayed by the mother country, and the other half by the colonies conjointly; the several contributions of these latter to be proportionate to their respective amounts of correspondence and the distance performed in their respective services. South Australia, indeed, refused at first to bear any part of this expense, save on conditions which we deemed quite inadmissible; but, as the Home Government stood firm, resistance was eventually abandoned.

Panama route to Australia.

Another controversy relative to the Australian service was as follows:—

About the year 1857 a demand arose in this country for sending the Australian mails by way of Panama, a line of steamers across the Pacific having been projected. The projectors hoped to divert a portion of the mail service to that route, which of course it became their interest to extol above all others. Their recommendation was based on two alleged advantages; first, that the new route was the shortest, and second, that its adoption in addition to the existing communication would turn the monthly mail into a bi-monthly one. The comparative shortness of the route seemed to be received by the public as a fact too obvious to admit of question; and as it was in connection with this route that the suggestion of an intermediate mail was originally made, the two projects became so associated in the popular mind, that the adoption of the one seemed essential to the establishment of the other. Besides the new company, there were other parties interested in the plan, viz., the colonies of New Zealand and New South Wales, which, lying eastward of the other Australian settlements, would, by the proposed arrangement, receive their mails earlier than their neighbours; thus obtaining whatever advantage attaches to priority of information. Whether these colonies urged upon their friends in England agitation in favour of the new route, I cannot say. At all events, the demand was strongly backed at home, some of the newspapers becoming quite clamorous for the change, the Government being strongly pressed for immediate action, and all hesitation denounced as imbecility or red-tapism. It really seemed as if globes, maps, and gazetteers were unknown or inaccessible, and common sense fast asleep. The outcry increasing in volume and intensity, Government at length expressed its intention to call for tenders. How wide-spread was the delusion was curiously exemplified by the following incident. Happening to meet at the Athenæum a friend, who had long held an important office in the far East, almost on the shores of the Pacific, a man of great acquirements and extended information, I was at once challenged with the inquiry of the day, “Why do you not establish an Australian mail by the Panama route?” and upon putting the counter-question, “Why should we?” was promptly answered, “Because it is the shortest.” I proposed that we should forthwith submit this allegation to the test of measurement, and, obtaining a piece of string, we repaired to the large globe in the drawing-room, where a few moments settled the question. So far as I was able to analyze the popular error, it consisted mainly in practical ignorance of the enormous breadth of the Pacific Ocean.

Of course it was not sufficient to convince private friends; my business being to act upon Government, which seemed to be upon the point of incurring a very large and very useless expense. I accordingly wrote a report on the subject, which, as the project may some day be revived, I give in the Appendix (K). This, being backed by Lord Colchester, was sent to the Treasury, and the plan was given up. A line of steamers across the Pacific was, indeed, afterwards established by a special company subsidised by the New Zealand Government, and to this were of course consigned the mails to New Zealand, and such other letters, &c., as were specifically directed for conveyance by that route. The enterprise, however, was the reverse of profitable, and has at length been abandoned.[150]

Peninsular and Oriental Company.

It must be added that, in the year 1858, the conveyance of the Australian mails by the usual route was transferred, with no small public benefit, to the Peninsular and Oriental Company,[151] by which it has ever since been well performed, the passage to Melbourne viâ Marseilles being brought within fifty days, while a punctuality is maintained, which, considering the vast distance to be traversed, is extraordinary. This remarkable regularity, however, while proceeding in great measure from the excellent management of the company, is, in this case, as in several others, due in part to the gradual introduction of that system of fines and rewards[152] to which we so long strove in vain to induce railway companies to consent.

Indian Mutiny.

It may well be supposed, however, that during the critical period of the Indian mutiny, when all thoughts were directed to one great end, and when the rapid conveyance of intelligence was of the utmost importance, the Post Office, so far from being left unconsulted, was called on for every effort that could be made. After careful examination of the packet service as it stood, we discovered the means of doubling the number of mails to Calcutta and Madras (then two per month), with but moderate change of existing arrangements, and at comparatively small additional expense.[153] I wrote (Sept. 12th, 1857) to the chairman of the Peninsular and Oriental Company, informing him of our plan, and inviting him to a conference on the subject. I also wrote (Sept. 16th) to Mr. Wilson, then Secretary to the Treasury, to mention what we had done, and to advise the postponement of all other negotiations for the same purpose. Little time was lost in the matter, the company thankfully adopting our recommendation, and the new arrangement being at once approved by the Treasury; and thus was obtained, at the annual cost of £16,000, a duplication of service, which but for the expedient employed would scarcely have been procured at the rate of £100,000. Every effort was also made, even at considerable expense, to shorten the journey between London and Paris. By the cordial assistance of the French Post Office, and the zealous co-operation of the directors of the English and French railway companies, this was frequently brought within nine hours;[154] no easy matter, perhaps, even now in 1868, but certainly very difficult in 1857.

The general result of our efforts during the Indian troubles was briefly stated in a letter to Lord Canning, which I give in the Appendix (L), as it may now perhaps be considered to derive some historic value from the crisis during which it was written, and the great statesman to whom it was addressed.

ACCELERATION OF NEWS.

In addition to the measures taken for accelerating the mails, efforts were made to increase, as much as possible, postal facilities to the public journals. I had previously made various arrangements for this general purpose, but the universal demand for early intelligence at the time of the Indian mutiny led us to seek further improvement.

The mode of proceeding, when application was made to me on the subject, was, so far as I remember, for the managers of the morning journals to send a special messenger to Marseilles to receive there such part of the mail as pertained to them. On arriving at Boulogne the messenger took this on board a steamer specially hired for the purpose, and immediately upon reaching Dover handed it over to writers sent down from London, who returned by a special train, making their abstracts and extracts by the way. The proceeding on this side Dover may, for aught I know, remain unaltered to the present time; but, with some trouble, I devised and established such an arrangement as dispensed with the special messenger to Marseilles, and that in such a manner as to avoid the delay which had led to the employment of the special steamer; so that, thenceforth, without trouble or expense to the journalists, their despatches were received at Dover at least as early as before, the saving to each paper being, as I was informed by the editor of one, no less than about £2,000 per annum.

About the same time also we revived an arrangement, which had fallen into disuse, whereby other foreign correspondence for the newspapers, from whatever quarter, might be obtained on application at the office before any delivery could be made to the general public. The only condition required was that the envelopes used should be of a peculiar tint, so that in sorting they might easily be selected.

REVENUE AND EXPENDITURE.

Revenue.

Following, as heretofore, that mode of accounting which for the purpose of comparison it was still necessary to retain, viz., the one in use at the time when penny postage was established, the results, in round numbers, may be briefly stated thus:—

The gross revenue increased from £2,700,000 in 1854 to £3,300,000 in 1859; but as the cost of management increased in the same period from £1,500,000 to somewhat more than £1,900,000, the increase in the net revenue was somewhat less than £200,000.[155]

Expenditure: Causes of Increase.

As already shown, the chief increase in the cost of management was referable to the following causes—increase in the staff, consequent on the great multiplication of correspondence (by that time seven-fold its original amount); increased salaries and allowances; the extension and ramification of the postal system (already affording collection and delivery to almost every village in the United Kingdom); the expense of increased facilities and conveniences afforded to the public; the costly acceleration of the more important mails; and, lastly, increase in the charge for mail conveyance consequent upon its transfer from mail-coaches to railway trains. It is obvious that several of these causes of expenditure have no reference whatever to Penny Postage, but must have arisen had the old rates been maintained.

It must be remarked here that the multiplication of sub-post offices and receiving-houses, implied in what has just been mentioned, would have been very much more costly had not the expense been controlled by established rules based on sound principles. It has already been shown that the old plan of considering every case “according to its merits,” to use the official expression, that is to say, of fixing the salary of A without ever inquiring how much was paid to B, C, or D, for equal service, had been to a considerable extent superseded by fixed scales. But we now went fully into the matter and brought the system to completion, thus providing a satisfactory guide available not only for new offices but also for any increase of duty at those already established; an arrangement which removed many anomalies and also saved much valuable time. The care with which the work was done is attested by the fact that up to the present time the scales, so far as I am aware, have undergone little or no modification, and have even been used for higher offices than those for which they were originally intended. Like benefit was derived from a scale prepared, about the same time, for regulating the amount of security demanded from postmasters according to the extent and frequency of their opportunities for defrauding the revenue; a scale which is, I believe, still in force.

Predictions Fulfilled.

It may be remembered that, in my evidence before the Parliamentary Committee of 1838, I expressed a confident anticipation that, if penny postage were adopted, the public would, after a while, expend as much in postage as under the old system, and consequently that the gross revenue would, in the end, be made good. This anticipation was more than realized in the year 1851.[156]

As regards net revenue, I expressed an opinion to the effect that the great increase of letters necessary to make good the gross revenue would require an additional expenditure of about £300,000 per annum, and, consequently, that the net revenue would be reduced by that amount, or to about £1,300,000 a year. The actual increase of expenditure, however, owing to causes already mentioned, far exceeded my estimate; consequently the net revenue of the same year (1851) was only £1,118,000,[157] and it was not till six years later that it rose to £1,300,000.[158] And though, as must be obvious to the attentive peruser of the foregoing pages, these results, but for almost endless obstructions, would have occurred at a much earlier date, it was with deep satisfaction that I at length saw my predictions fulfilled. I may add here that in the year 1862, the net revenue so far exceeded any expectation that I had held out as nearly to equal the largest amount obtained under the old high rates;[159] and that ever since that year it has greatly exceeded that amount. Of course these comparative statements are all based on the mode of calculation which was in use at the time when penny postage was adopted.

When, however, my predictions with regard to revenue were fulfilled beyond all question, we thought it would be well, while retaining the old mode of reckoning for the purpose of showing progress under the new system as compared with the old, to introduce a more accurate mode, for the purpose of exhibiting as nearly as possible, the actual financial results of postal operations; and the results thus arrived at were given, for the first time, in the Report for 1859. By this changed mode of reckoning, which is set forth in some detail in its proper place,[160] it appears that the amount to which the Treasury was actually benefited by the Post Office, though rather less than that arrived at by the old mode of reckoning, was still more than £1,100,000. Of course, when comparison with the past is not in question, the amount thus ascertained is the one which it is best to take. It may be added that the substantial part of this revenue, viz., about £1,000,000, was derived from inland correspondence; to which, as the reader may remember, I had always pointed as the main source of actual income.

STAFF.

Promotion by Merit.

During this period the system of promotion by merit was brought into full operation. In the three metropolitan offices, when a vacancy occurred, application for appointment was open to all; the respective claims were carefully compared, and without the admission of any other consideration whatever, the claim which was adjudged to be best carried the day. How strict our practice was may be shown by the following incident. To keep our course free from disturbing influence, it had been laid down that any intercession from without in favour of individual officers should act, if not injuriously, at least not beneficially, on the advancement of those concerned; and, as the rule had been sanctioned by the Treasury, it certainly was not from that quarter that I should have expected its breach. It is much easier, however, to authorize the establishment of a rule than to bend old habits in conformity with its tenour, or even to remember its very existence; and, not a little to my amusement, I received an interceding letter from the very Secretary of the Treasury, my friend Mr. (now Sir William) Hayter. The following was my reply:—