[411] Journal (Rathery), VI. p. 197. May 2, 1750.
[412] See Scherer, "Études," vol. III.
[413] Of M. Aubertin's notice ("L'esprit public") it is but
little to say that it is by far the ablest criticism of d'Argenson at
present existing. It is presumption even to praise a work so admirably
performed. It presents one or two features which one may do oneself the
honour to note.
(a) M. Aubertin seems to accept a little too readily the idea of
d'Argenson's practical incapacity. He has not of course examined
the events of his ministry.
(b) He regrets that d'Argenson should have occupied himself
with his practical ambitions, instead of confining himself to
the region of Speculation. It seems clear that to a man of
d'Argenson's temperament, speculative was dependent on practical
activity; and that had he resigned himself to be a mere thinker,
his power as a thinker would have been destroyed completely.
We have to accept d'Argenson upon his own terms as a practical
reformer before we can hope to do him justice.
[414] Note to the "Contrat Social" (Book iv.).
[415] Both editions were afterwards reprinted.
[416] Bibliothèque de l'Arsenal, MSS. 2334, 2335, 2337, and 2338.
[417] Other notable features of the scheme are:—
(a) Principles of taxation. Total exemption for raw materials;
light taxes upon permanent stock and plant; the burden of taxation
to fall upon articles of consumption (Article XV.).
(b) Distribution of Revenue. Three-fourths of all revenue to go
to the Government, one-fourth to be retained for local purposes
(Article XV.).
(c) The reduction of the Intendancies, to an extent "smaller
than the present 'Généralités'"; if the present reduction
succeeds, it may proceed further, until the Intendancy shall
comprise no more than two hundred parishes, and the Sub-delegacy
no more than twenty.
(d) The Intendant shall retain a single post no longer than
three years; by this means he will be prevented from establishing
local connections to the prejudice of the public service, and
be inspired to exert what ability he possesses by the hope of
obtaining a more lucrative place. #/
[418] We have to guard against confounding d'Argenson's philosophical disquisitions with his definite project of reform. He held himself bound to establish principles as well as to formulate proposals, and he expressly declares that the writer of such a work as his must seek the counsels of perfection, however distant they may seem at the moment from the realm of practical politics. And herein is d'Argenson's greatness as a political thinker, that he never fails to see, or to see the distinction between, what is best in principle and what is possible in practice.
Thus, he denounces the "pernicious system" of the traffic in judicial positions; but in his definite Plan of 1764 (1737) he says not a word of it, owing to the practical difficulty of reimbursing those whose interests would be sacrificed to the reform. He goes no further than to provide, in Article 51, against the growth of the abuse in connection with the new municipal offices which he proposes to create. In course of time however he became convinced that the nation would be benefitted, and that funds might be raised for compensating office-holders, by the sale of the Crown lands; and accordingly in the Plan of 1784 (1755), the practical difficulty being overcome, the "pernicious system," untouched by the project of 1764 (1737), is swept away at a stroke.
Again, as to the nobility. It is true that in Chapter VIII. Article 2, pp. 305-8 [1764 (1737)], d'Argenson formulates certain objections to the principle of a hereditary noble class; and further, that he dilates elsewhere upon the harm done by the survival of the vexatious feudal privileges exacted by the noblesse. Yet in his definite Plan he neither touches the nobility as a class, nor does he lay a finger upon any of the privileges pertaining to it. On the contrary, the continuance of the seigneurial jurisdictions, which are deliberately abolished in the later scheme of 1784 (1755), is incidentally recognised, p. 221 (1764).
The facts with regard to the three classes mentioned by M. Martin may
be stated as follows:—
(a) The bureaucracy.
By the Plan of 1764 (1737) the ministry, the administrative councils,
the Intendants, the Sub-delegates, in a word, the great standing
bureaucratic organisation, was to continue intact. It was even
strengthened. It is true that in the scheme of 1784 (1755) its lower
ranks were relaxed; but with that scheme we are not concerned, as it is
not noticed by M. Martin.
(b) The judicial aristocracy.
By neither of d'Argenson's Plans was the existence of the judicial
aristocracies affected in the least. In that of 1764 (1737) the
functions of the Parlements are even extended (Article 42). It is true
that he attacks the system of purchase upon which the Companies were
organised; but that system is untouched by the earlier Plan, and is
only abolished [in 1784 (1755)] when means have been found of replacing
it, and of compensating those who were subjected to forfeiture.
(c) The noblesse.
Under the scheme of 1764 (1737) the nobility had nothing to fear. Their
privileges, even those which d'Argenson disliked most strongly, are
maintained intact. It is only in the Plan of 1784 (1755) that the high
seigneurial jurisdictions are suppressed, and that the nobles are made
to share with the roturiers in the ordinary burdens of the state. Even
then their honorary distinctions are scrupulously conserved; the more
powerful of them are created Peers of their several Provinces; and
express provision is made for the continued magnificence of the Royal
Household.
As to the destruction of the nobility, nothing could have been further from d'Argenson's mind. He was himself a nobleman; and, if he had none of the prejudice, he had all the pride of his class. He advocates the suppression of old feudal privileges in the belief that they can be regretted by none but those whose devotion to the dignity of their order amounts to madness, "jusqu'à la folie" [p. 126 (1784)]. He repudiates the intention of debasing an aristocracy; in his own words, "il n'est question que d'extirper une satrapie roturière et odieuse" [p. 312 (1764)]. His only quarrel is with the nobleman's claims to "le droit de chasse sur ses voisins, source de querelles et d'insultes; les droits considérables de mutation et de reliefs en cas de vente et même de succession collatérale, par où les terres mal administrées passent plus difficilement dans des mains qui les cultiveroient mieux; l'exercice de la justice seigneuriale négligé partout et pratiqué par une race de gens avides, toujours occupés à exciter l'habitant simple à plaider; enfin tous ces différens droits, procés, chicanes, vieilles recherches, empèchement à la bonne culture des terres, rétrécissement de l'abondance, obstacle au bonheur de la campagne" [pp. 120-21 (1784), cf. pp. 119-20 (1764)]. These d'Argenson would have swept away; and in doing so he would have reduced the French nobility, or rather he would have raised it, to the position actually occupied by one of the most powerful aristocracies in the world, the nobility of England.
No more cruelly keen-sighted man than d'Argenson ever lived. He only differs from most men of equal vision in that his clear perception of life as it was did not breed in him disgust and cynical acceptance. His mind could command two worlds, the real and the ideal; but only intimate knowledge can follow him at will into either, or avoid the critical gaucherie of mistaking aspiration for illusion.
[419] Perhaps one source of obscurity is d'Argenson's unhappy title. By "la démocratie" he means, not "democracy," but "the democratic element." He was early taken to task for this ambiguity of phrase. Bound up with one of the manuscripts in the Arsenal are half-a-dozen sheets of criticism returned to d'Argenson by St. Pierre in the spring of 1738. St. Pierre begins by saying that democracy is a form of government in which the final voice on public questions rests with the majority of the people, and that the author has really no right to speak of "democracy" in connection with his scheme. Attached to these sheets is a pretty little letter, which is interesting enough to reproduce.
"Mardi, 8 avril, 1738, au Palais Roial.
"M. de Fontenelle a lu plusieurs chapitres du manuscrit; il panse comme vous sur les elexions des officiers municipaux, et trouve que sans y panser vous parlez fort eloquemment et fortement, et souvent avec des alluzions très justes et très gracieuses.
"Pour moi, je panse aussi très souvent comme vous, et que vous pouvez aller loin si vous continuez à méditer et à écrire.
"Vous verrez dans le petit cahier (above referred to) les observations que j'ai faites en lizant vôtre manuscrit, que je vous invite à perfexionner de plus en plus; et surtout à l'accusation de notre extrême indolence sur la pernicieuse métode de la vénalité des emplois publics.
"M. de Fontenelle croit que M. d'Aube serait bien aize de lire vôtre manuscrit; il en est digne, et est de vos amis; il écrit aussi sur quelques matières de gouvernement.
"C'est à vous de juger de mes observations, at à les rectifier.
"L'ABÉ DE ST. PIERRE."
[420] Voltaire to d'Argenson, June 21, 1739 (Garnier). In speaking of this letter, M. de Broglie represents that Voltaire regarded d'Argenson's book merely as the lucubration of an influential fool, and that his congratulations and criticism were utterly insincere ("Marie Thérèse," I. pp. 187-90).
The origin of this, at first sight, astonishing suggestion is not very hard to discover. The historian happened to have read the "Considérations" in the edition of 1784. Unaware of the divergencies between the two editions, he of course assumed that it was the Plan published in 1784 in reference to which Voltaire was writing; and failing very naturally to understand how, in regard to it, Voltaire could have meant what he said, was driven to suggest that he said what he did not mean; that, in short, Voltaire thought d'Argenson a fool, and chose to flatter him for his own purposes.
This is a grave imputation upon both men; and the grounds for it disappear entirely when Voltaire's letters are read in connection with the Plan of 1764 (1737), of which he was actually writing. His meaning at once becomes natural and clear. D'Argenson had been arguing against over-centralisation, and had advocated the introduction of local government upon a very modest scale. Voltaire replies that a system not dissimilar in effect, was already at work in England; that there local affairs proceeded without the intervention of a Council of State; and that the law-abiding character of the English people was largely due to their habit of local self-government. The argument is quite clear, and is simply destroyed by equivocal interpretation.
Voltaire's feeling on receiving the book was one of keen surprise and warm admiration. For months afterwards his letters are witness to the impression it produced upon him. So cordial and frank are they that it was at first difficult to conceive by what process the idea of insincerity could have been fathered upon them.
Had Voltaire really written in such a spirit, not only his reputation as a critic but his honour as a man would have suffered very gravely. For months past d'Argenson had been straining every nerve to defend him from "the literary police;" and to have written to his protector as the historian suggests, would have been an act of black dishonour. It is true that there were men before whom Voltaire could abase and debase himself; but d'Argenson the philosophe, his old school friend, was not one of them. With the exception of Count d'Argental, there is not one of his correspondents to whom Voltaire writes with such openness and freedom.
[421] Voltaire to d'Argenson, May 8, 1739 (Garnier).
[422] "Ce Traité de Politique a esté composé à l'occasion de ceux de M. de Boulainvilliers, touchant l'ancien gouvernement féodal de la France, 1737" (title-page of manuscripts in the Bibliothèque de l'Arsenal).
[423] "Considérations," edition of 1764, article 41.
[424] See "Considérations," p. 189 (1764).
[425] Voltaire to d'Argenson, July 28, 1739 (Garnier).
[426] So far as is known to the writer, the only full account of it is that of M. de Broglie ("Marie Thérèse," I. pp. 187-90), which is open to grave objection. The scheme is not noticed by, or apparently known to, M. Martin ("Histoire de France"), who examines the Plan of 1764 (1737).
[427] This article portrays in brief the spirit of the whole scheme.
[428] I.e., each district receiver.
[429] De Broglie, "Marie Thérèse," I. chap. ii. § 2.
[430] See pp. 156-66.
[431] See p. 182-3.
[432] See Martin, "Histoire de France," XVI.
[433] See Plan (above), article XI. There were four from each of the Estates and they had no common organisation.
[434] The popular attacks (see Chap. V.) were directed against the person of the monarch and the ministers. The tradition of the monarchy survived the disasters of the Seven Years' War, and only began to crumble with the dismissal of Turgot. The danger to it threatened by the popular attacks was only understood by a few men like d'Argenson.
[435] And this wise man knew it. He writes in March, 1756:—
"Cependant le Roi est très mal conseillé; il se donne toujours tort et donne toujours raison au parlement. On le dégrade peu à peu, surtout dans le siécle lumineux et philosophique où nous vivons. Si Henri III. fut obligé de se mettre à la tête de la Ligue, Louis XV. devrait se mettre à la tête de la philosophie, de la justice et de la raison pour rétablir son pouvoir et son bonheur; qu'il se constitue hardiment le chef des réformateurs de l'État pour conduire mieux qu'eux les réparations que demande la situation de la France" (Journal, Rathery, IX. p. 222).
[436] See one of her thrice delightful letters to the Comtesse de Baschi ("Lettres de Madame de Pompadour," I. pp. 71-6. Owen. London, 1771).