[289] Ibid., I. p. 129.
[290] Zevort, p. 136.
[291] Ibid., p. 137.
[292] Ibid., Appendix, p. 350.
[293] De Broglie, "Marie Thérèse," I. p. 131.
[294] But three lines appearing in a despatch drafted by him (January 31, 1745. Zevort, Appendix, p. 352) are sufficient to prove what might have been suspected:
"En effet n'en aurions-nous tant fait en faveur de la liberté germanique que pour la revoir tombée dans son ancien esclavage."
Only one hand could have written the word "esclavage."
[295] "Where we should look for the breadth of view and the decision of the statesman, we find but the emotion of a doctrinaire who has attained to office full of confidence in his theories, and who finds himself suddenly thrown into a confused medley of practical complications which he had not even suspected; it is the bewilderment of a solitary who issues from obscurity and is blinded by the unexpected play of light" (De Broglie, "Marie Thérèse," I. p. 208).
Upon this we remark that the above is based upon "the first instructions which he sends after the unforeseen event of Munich;" that that event destroyed a great system, and created what Frederick described as "a terrible crisis"; and that it was just because d'Argenson realised, with a statesman's breadth of view, the appalling consequences either at home or abroad, that he hesitated to take his choice of disasters. When grave issues are so nicely balanced, precipitation is a sign, not of strength, but of weakness.
Frederick, it is true, did not hesitate; and M. de Broglie aptly supplies the reason. A man does not hesitate about the next move when he has no alternative but to throw up the game (De Broglie, "Marie Thérèse," I. p. 219, &c., cf. Zevort, pp. 137, 138).
[296] On the evidence of a certain note, M. de Broglie suggests ("Marie Thérèse," I. p. 213) that d'Argenson was by no means at one with the Council, and that he accepted with reluctance a policy which was forced upon him.
The note may be read with equanimity, for it only marks the reappearance of an ideal regret, to be met with occasionally in d'Argenson's Journal—a regret for the policy of merely indirect interference which he sometimes mentions in connection with "un habile homme tel que M. Chauvelin." His true feeling with regard to the crisis is conveyed by some important words in the note immediately preceding:
"Il en arrivera ce qui pourra, bien, j'espère; mais pour la paix et un armistice dans le statu quo, il n'y faut plus penser" (De Broglie, "Marie Thérèse." I. p. 211).
It is admitted that d'Argenson was not the prime mover in the policy of the Council; he looked upon that policy as little short of desperate; but he accepted it as a choice between two evil alternatives; and, as we shall find, he did everything mortal man could do to make it a success.
[297] Zevort, Appendix, p. 351.
[298] Ibid., pp. 138, 139.
[299] Valori, "Mémoires," I. p. 207. "Il me semble que le parti que le roi de Pologne avait à prendre pour sa gloire, sa grandeur, son interêt et celui de sa maison, était en premier lieu de se prêter aux desseins que les rois de France et de Prusse avaient de l'élever à la dignité impériale," &c.
[300] Zevort, p. 140.
[301] That this was d'Argenson's real attitude is suggested by a multitude of minute hints to be found in nearly all the available documents. It is the only attitude consistent with his known opinions and with his subsequent conduct.
[302] Zevort, p. 139.
[303] Ibid, p. 140.
[304] Had Frederick imagined for a moment that Valori's mission had the slightest prospect of success, his action as regards both France and Saxony might have changed in a very startling fashion. Every principle of policy would have engaged him to withstand the elevation of Augustus to the Empire.
[305] De Broglie, "Marie Thérèse," I. p. 228.
[306] M. de Broglie is perhaps a little premature in describing this as "the beginning of the old game" ("Marie Thérèse," I. pp. 219, 220). Frederick, with the knowledge and concurrence of the French Government (Zevort, p. 142), was already in communication with England; he had not yet heard the intentions of France; he could have no assurance that she meant to prosecute the war; and thinking his position perilous, he took immediate steps to extricate himself with as little loss as possible. Allowing time for the courier to travel from Munich to Berlin, it is clear that these instructions were despatched within a couple of days after the news of the Emperor's death first reached him. Certainly it was a scuttling policy; and there is no reason to suppose it would have been pursued had the war policy of France been loyally supported.
[307] De Broglie, "Marie Thérèse," I. p. 280.
[308] Zevort, pp. 137, 138.
[309] In the French despatch of January 31: see p. 110.
[310] Zevort, pp. 138, 141, 142, 145, 146. Appendix, pp. 254-7, 257-9.
[311] See p. 104.
[312] The memoir is neglected by M. Zevort. It is noticed by M. de Broglie ("Marie Thérèse," I. p. 202, note) and rejected as possibly spurious and certainly unimportant. His principal reason is that he has not been able to find it among the ordinary sources, or to discover any reference to it by d'Argenson himself.
The writer believes that there is ample evidence to show where it might have been found; and also that, by M. de Broglie's own criterion, it should be one of the most important records of the time. The evidence is such as the historian, upon his own admission, would probably accept as conclusive. It is the critical question of d'Argenson's ministry, and is dealt with fully in Appendix A.
[313] D'Argenson became minister on November 18, 1744. The note of time given by Flassan is "au mois de février" (1745). From the references to the hesitation of the King of Poland, it may perhaps be placed immediately after the reception of Valori's first letters from Dresden, February 17 (Zevort, p. 140).
[314] Apart from the policy set forth in it, this memoir
contains some important critical suggestions:
(a) The minister's determination to maintain Frederick in
Silesia.
(b) His conception of peace as the primary object to which all
others must contribute.
(c) His perfect knowledge of the real conditions of his
negotiations with Augustus. It throws a new light upon the
desperate persistency with which he tried to win over the Court of
Dresden.
[315] Flassan, "Histoire de la Diplomatie Française," V. pp. 242-5.
[316] Zevort, Appendix, pp. 254-7.
[317] Ibid., p. 257.
[318] Ibid., Appendix, p. 361.
[319] At the end of April, when he had been pressing the negotiation for three months, d'Argenson had absolutely no faith in its success. See a very significant passage in Zevort, p. 280, which throws a light more than usually clear upon d'Argenson's view of his own position.
[320] Zevort, Appendix, p. 362.
[321] Cf. Zevort, p. 143, where d'Argenson is quoted as saying in March: "La sagesse et l'honneur veulent que nous soutenions le roi de Prusse avec toute l'ardeur la plus grande que nous ayons jamais embrassée aucune vue d'État."
[322] Ibid., p. 145.
[323] De Broglie, "Marie Thérèse," I. p. 311.
[324] Ibid., I. p. 131.
[325] Ibid., I. pp. 290-3.
[326] Zevort, p. 145.
[327] De Broglie, "Marie Thérèse," I. p. 303.
[328] Ibid., I. pp. 307-13.
[329] Ibid., I. p. 317.
[330] Ibid., I. p. 318.
[331] Zevort, pp. 144, 154.
[332] De Broglie, "Marie Thérèse," I. p. 309.
[333] Zevort, Appendix, p. 364, Frederick to Louis XV., May 2, 1745.
[334] Zevort, Appendix, p. 366, Memoir of Frederick, May 16.
[335] Ibid., Appendix, p. 367.
[336] Ibid., Appendix, p. 364.
[337] See p. 110.
[338] De Broglie, "Marie Thérèse," II. p. 58.
[339] Ibid., II. p. 90.
[340] Ibid., II. p. 93.
[341] Zevort, Appendix, p. 368.
[342] De Broglie, "Marie Thérèse," II. pp. 102-29.
[343] Ibid., II. pp. 130-42.
[344] Ibid., II. p. 144.
[345] Ibid., II. pp. 196, 197.
[346] Ibid., II. pp. 188, 189.
[347] As an example of the straits to which d'Argenson was reduced through the failure of the French Government to support his policy, we may cite some remarks of his to the French representative at Frankfort in reference to the retreat of Conti.
"It appears that the King of Poland, having always regarded the continuance of the French army in the neighbourhood of Frankfort as an obstacle to the success of the views which he has formed from the beginning in regard to the imperial crown, is on the point of declaring himself a candidate."
It is absurd to suppose that d'Argenson really meant this, or looked upon the retreat as a subject of congratulation. It was simply one of the kaleidoscopic movements by which events, affected as they were by successive disasters, might still be made to look beautiful.
The resource, perhaps, was a little ridiculous; but it is hard to see what he would have done without it.
[348] De Broglie, "Marie Thérèse," Appendix, II. pp. 407, 408.
[349] Ibid., II. p. 195.
[350] Ibid., II. p. 201.
[351] Ibid., II. p. 223.
[352] Ibid., I. p. 261.
[353] Ibid., II. p. 340.
[354] With this compare Zevort, p. 105, where d'Argenson is made the prime mover in measures which M. de Broglie proves he was deliberately doing his utmost to frustrate.
[355] De Broglie, "Marie Thérèse," II. p. 341.
[356] Ibid., II. p. 342.
[357] Ibid., II. p. 298, &c.
[358] Ibid., II. p. 352.
[359] Ibid., II. p. 354, and Appendix, 410-13.
[360] Ibid., II. Appendix, pp. 408, 409. Reading this letter in the light of d'Argenson's general policy and of subsequent events, it is hard to find in it "the proof of the strange illusions by which d'Argenson was possessed" (Ibid., Appendix, II. p. 407).
[361] Ibid., II. p. 391.
[362] The principal authorities are: Zevort, "Le Ministère"; de Broglie, "Maurice de Saxe et le Marquis d'Argenson"; and d'Argenson, "Mémoires du Ministère" (Rathery, IV. and V.). Henceforth the references need not be given in detail.
[363] In particular, M. de Broglie's account becomes as excellent as it formerly seemed to be exceptionable. He is no longer fretted by d'Argenson's anti-Austrian policy.
[364] Even in one of the Balleroy letters he speaks of "une méchante confédération comme celle d'Italie"; and his ideal of Italian independence was inspired, partly at least, by the man who had introduced him to the study of foreign politics, the fallen minister Chauvelin.
[365] Journal (Rathery), II., III., passim.
[366] Champeaux, at this time agent at Geneva, was a friend of d'Argenson, and one of his old companions at the Entresol.
[367] The hope was perhaps suggested by Voltaire (de Broglie), who had sent to the Minister the few cheering words he received during the storm created by the disaster. The poet was in busy correspondence with d'Argenson, and upon documents demanding elegance and finish his accomplished pen was frequently employed.
[368] This account of Maurice's share in the incident is derived mainly from Count Vitzthum d'Eckstaedt's work, "Maurice de Saxe et Marie Josephe," 1867.
[369] Brühl to Saxe, November 16, 1746: Vitzthum, p. 93. Maurice's letters give some interesting glimpses of d'Argenson; e.g., he describes him to his brother, the King of Poland, as a man "not at all easy to govern" (p. 95), and again to the Queen as "a kind of bear" (p. 101). He tells Brühl that d'Argenson is "so 'bête' that the King [Louis XV.] is ashamed of him" (p. 109).
[370] Vitzthum, p. 110.
[371] In certain letters of doubtful authority, the ill-feeling is accounted for by the suggestion that Maria Theresa was corresponding with Madame de Pompadour, and that d'Argenson had intercepted the letters ("Correspondance sur la cour de Louis XV." Gaçon-Dufour, Paris. 1808).
[372] See "Correspondance de Louis XV. et le Maréchal de Noailles," ed. Camille Rousset. The Madame de Chatelus mentioned by Noailles was the lady to whom d'Argenson had been attached for sixteen years. He has left a rather striking description of her (see Journal, under date 1728). They occupied adjoining houses in the Rue de Gros Chenet, some drawings of which are to be found among d'Argenson's sketches (Bibliothèque de l'Arsenal, MS. 6164).
[373] M. Vitzthum d'Eckstaedt concludes his account as follows:
"It was not for general incapacity that the Marquis d'Argenson was dismissed, nor for having forgotten one day to open the despatches from Genoa. It was because he was obstinately attached to a false policy, to a policy disapproved by Maurice de Saxe, who at this moment was governing France" (p. 152).
[374] "Le système des ridicules poursuit de même le ministre des affaires étrangères, qui, estimant peu les courtisans, est très reservé avec eux. Ces messieurs, pour le distinguer de son frère, l'appellent 'd'Argenson le Bête.' Les gens honnêtes ont nommé le ministre de la guerre 'd'Argenson l'intrigant'" ("Correspondance," Gaçon-Dufour, p. 90).
These letters are far from reflecting the very poor opinion of d'Argenson which is said to have been prevalent at Court. Such may have been the opinion of his political rivals and of the circle of Madame de Pompadour, to which d'Argenson, in person and principle, was consistently opposed. It might well have acquired the substance of a tradition, and have affected later criticism unduly.
[375] It is necessary to grasp this point if we are to avoid a frequent prejudice against d'Argenson, a prejudice which arises from regarding him as a man of very large pretensions and of very inadequate performance. There is no good ground for believing in his utter failure, or consequently in the hollowness of his pretensions.
[376] Perhaps it is necessary to reinforce this point. It is to be remembered that in any acutely critical period, wisdom is a matter of months or weeks. Never even for seven days can opinion safely be divorced from circumstance. It is quite true that a general view of the relations of France with the German powers during the last century and a half suggests that at the time with which we are concerned her traditional anti-Austrian policy was tending to become an anachronism; but we must be careful about making that general view the basis of particular conclusions. The available documents prove conclusively that whenever that tendency began to approach perceptibility and power, it was never in the course of d'Argenson's ministry, still less during the critical year 1745.
In and throughout that year France had but one competitor on the continent—Austria. The position of Prussia—if in connection with France and Austria we may assign her the dignity of a position—was in the highest degree precarious. No one knew it better than the Prussian king himself. There was probably not a moment in the course of the year when he did not feel himself to be within an ace of destruction; not an episode but betrays his anxiety for escape with honour. His efforts for peace in January; his desperate overtures at London after the death of the Emperor; his earnest, eloquent entreaties to maintain the Elector of Bavaria and the Prince of Conti; his dull bitterness and despair at the Convention of Augsburg and the withdrawal of the French from Germany; his continued pressure upon England, ending in the Treaty of Hanover; finally, his studious moderation when he appeared as a conqueror in Dresden; all point to but one conclusion. His position was, and he knew it be, desperate; and it was only the headlong courage of desperation that enabled him to see the year out safely.
The definitive rise of Prussia is probably to be dated from the Peace of Dresden, and not one moment before. Moreover it cannot have been immediately apparent. One year after the treaty of peace d'Argenson fell; and during that year Prussia was recovering from the effects of the war, and her ambitions and prospective power can have been present to the mind of Frederick alone. At what particular period her advance must have become sufficiently evident to affect the views of statesmen, only a profound study of that single question can disclose. Certain it is that it cannot have been at any period during d'Argenson's ministry, or more especially during the year 1745.
The truth of the matter appears to be this. Events were rapidly tending towards, though they had not yet reached, a condition of which d'Argenson had often dreamed. Prussia, if her power developed, might one day be strong enough to stand alone against the Austrian House; and France would be free to watch the contest, and might leave the rivals to ruin each other. But this was still in the future; and the time was yet apparently distant when a responsible French minister could entertain the idea of an Austrian alliance.
It is true that there was already an Austrian party in the Council; there is always such a party in any council. There are men who cannot resist the fascination of cheap success, who are devoted to a policy of ease with honour. They are not prominent in the ranks of statesmen.
[377] "Un grand homme qui manque" (De Broglie, "Marie Thérèse," II. Appendix, p. 2).
[378] The aspiration was not so absurd as it might seem. Could d'Argenson have acquired, by long acquaintance with affairs, that practical aptitude which his brother possessed, he might have been one of the greatest among men. He had a range of mind and a depth of character to which Count d'Argenson could lay no claim.
[379] Journal (Rathery), V. p. 142.
[380] Ibid., V. p. 314. December, 1748.
[381] The best account of the whole movement is to be found in Felix Rocquain, "L'esprit révolutionnaire avant la révolution."
[382] "La Philosophie."
[383] Journal (Rathery), VI. p. 201, cf. Ibid., VI. p. 208. The sentence displays his frequent disregard of syntax in directness and force of expression.
[384] Ibid., VII. p. 199. April, 1752.
[385] Ibid., VI. p. 320. December, 1750.
[386] Ibid., VII. p. 23. November, 1751.
[387] Ibid., VII. p. 294. September, 1752.
[388] Ibid., VIII. p. 315. June, 1754.
[389] Ibid., VI. p. 26. August, 1749.
[390] Ibid., VI. p. 81. December, 1749.
[391] Ibid., VI. p. 390. April, 1751.
[392] Ibid., VII. p. 457. April, 1753.
[393] Ibid., VIII. p. 60. June, 1753.
[394] Ibid., VII. p. 106., cf. Ibid., 110, 111. February, 1752.
[395] The "Considérations." See Chap. VI.
[396] The "advanced" views privately held among the wealthier clergy are well known. On hearing of a diocesan sermon on the subject of "infidelity, d'Argenson observes that it is an absurd theme upon which to preach to the clergy of France. It was very necessary, however.
[397] D'Argenson did not disguise his sympathy with the "philosophers." When the Abbé de Prades was fleeing the country he took refuge in the neighbourhood of d'Argenson's château; and the latter wrote to his powerful brother to intercede for the indiscreet ecclesiastic (Journal, Rathery, VII. p. 57, note). D'Argenson was naturally proud too of his friendship with d'Alembert.
[398] Journal (Rathery), VII. p. 424. March, 1758.
[399] D'Argenson had a personal reason for ill-feeling against the Sorbonne. It proposed to condemn a "Histoire du droit public ecclésiastique français," published (1737) in two large quarto volumes by a Jesuit, de la Motte. It was based upon some papers which had been read by d'Argenson before the Entresol (Journal, Rathery, VI. p. 168), and afterwards given as an act of charity to la Motte, who was one of d'Argenson's old masters at the Collège Louis-le-Grand. The book was published without d'Argenson's sanction, but his share in the work was pretty generally known—far too generally for his peace of mind. Cf. p. 57.
[400] Journal (Rathery), VIII. p. 289. May, 1754.
[401] "Les deux philosophies."
[402] Journal (Rathery), VIII. p. 291.
[403] References to what appear to be the most important passages bearing on the great public questions of the time are given in Appendix D.
[404] As a brief and excellent example, we may take a criticism of sinking funds which English statesmen might have read with advantage:—
"Ces rentes tournantes qu'a introduites ici Duverney, à l'imitation de l'Angleterre, sont des précautions que le maître prend contre le maître; emprunteur, il fait impôt, et destine tous les ans une partie de cet impôt pour rembourser; par là il charge davantage ses finances et ses peuples tout à la fois; et, comme il ne dépense pas avec moins de facilité et de légèreté, il charge toujours davantage et les maltôtes ne cessent plus. Un prince sage devrait prendre le fond d'amortissement sur ses épargnes seules" (Journal, Rathery, V. p. 442).
D'Argenson's ideas on economics are marked by his usual acuteness and independence. He was not a member of the physiocratic school; and though he joined the Economists in deploring the sacrifice of agriculture to manufacturing industry, he did not share their peculiar views as to the exclusive value of land. He was one of the earliest and soundest of Free Traders, maintaining that commerce should not be interfered with except for purely fiscal purposes.
[405] See his sketches of Segrez in the Bibliothèque de l'Arsenal, MS. 6164.
[406] Journal (édit. Jannet), V. p. 245.
[407] Journal (Rathery), VI. p. 57.
[408] "L'esprit public," p. 231.
[409] Journal (Rathery), VI. p. 182. "Quoi qu'il n'y ait rien que de vertueux dans ce petit roman anglais."
[410] In January, 1747, d'Argenson was nominated by the King President of the "Académie des Inscriptions et des Belles-Lettres" (Journal, Rathery, V. p. 349). He gives an amusing account of his original election (Journal, Rathery, I. pp. 165-75). The only contribution of his we have been able to discover in the Journals of the Academy is a paper on French historians and the writing of history (XXVIII. pp. 626-46).