It has been already pointed out that both the social and constitutional condition of England afforded a good ground on which sympathy for the Revolution might take root. Not only were the numbers of the labouring classes largely increased, not only was the condition of the labouring class changing for the worse, the relations between capital and labour were in a much less satisfactory state than they now are, every form of combination among workmen was regarded as a crime, the line between class and class was very strongly drawn. Country people were complaining, in England as in France, of the absenteeism of landlords, the employment of harsh middlemen, and the general resort of all gentry to London. The Test Act and the penal laws were regarded by those who were affected by them as relics of persecution, all efforts to relax them were generally met with scornful rejection, and, before all, the representation was in a condition which, but for its evil effects, might be regarded as simply ridiculous. The sympathy which might thus have been naturally felt was not left without Revolutionary societies. instruction or direction. Those who most strongly felt its influence speedily formed themselves into societies, by whose means, in conjunction it seems pretty certain with assistance from the French themselves, writings and pamphlets, pointing out every flaw in the condition of England, and often using language which was certainly seditious, were spread broadcast among the people, and even among the soldiers. Of these societies by far the most respectable was one known by the name of the "Friends of the People." Its object was to excite and keep alive an agitation for the removal of the inequalities of the representation. It included many men of the greatest respectability, numbering twenty-eight members of Parliament in its lists, and such names as Lord John Russell, Grey, Sheridan, Erskine, and Lord Lauderdale. Far more dangerous were two societies which arose early in 1792, with branches in many of the chief towns of England. These were the London Corresponding Society, numbering between 6000 and 7000 members, organized as a secret society, and governed by a small secret committee of five, and a Society for Constitutional Information, consisting of the more advanced and thoroughgoing educated men of the time, and holding opinions of so dangerous a character that the Society of the Friends of the People thought it necessary to disclaim all connection with it. It was to check the action of these societies that the two first retrograde actions of Pitt were directed.

The outcome of the work of the Society of the Friends of the People was a motion brought in by Grey for a general reform of the representation. To this Pitt refused his support. Two things were necessary, he said, to induce a man to support a measure—the possibility of carrying it, and the possibility, when carried, of putting it into execution to the advantage of the people; both these conditions were now absent, not only did he believe that in the present state of feeling the Bill would infallibly be rejected by the House, but also it could not now be carried out without the greatest danger. The Bill was accordingly lost, and all chance of carrying reform disappeared. Yet the necessity for it was made very clear by a petition from the same society presented by Grey in the following year, which exhibited in all its nakedness the inefficiency of the representation, and proved that a decided majority of the House was returned in fact by no more than 154 individuals.

But while the respectable reformers were carrying out their efforts by parliamentary means, the two less scrupulous societies went on issuing papers and pamphlets to such an extent, that at length it seemed good to Government to issue a royal proclamation warning the people against seditious writings, and then to proceed to take legal measures against them. This proclamation was issued on the 21st of May, and the address moved in Parliament to thank the King for issuing it may be regarded as the exact point at which the new division of parties sprang into existence, for it was supported by many of the chief leaders of the Whigs, and though an effort made by Pitt to strengthen his party by a coalition with the Whigs failed for personal reasons, the Duke of Portland, Wyndham, Thomas Grenville, and others, came back to their allegiance to the wisdom of Burke, and joined henceforward in Diplomacy of M. Chauvelin. the united Conservative party. It is remarkable also for a second point which connects it with the international aspect of the French Revolution. M. Chauvelin had lately been sent over to England, with his far abler secretary Talleyrand, as minister accredited by the French King. But Louis' authority was little more than a shadow, and M. Chauvelin already thought fit to enter upon that peculiar course of foreign diplomacy which was characteristic of the revolutionists; he drew up a strong protest against the Proclamation, and demanded that it should be laid before Parliament. Of course Grenville, the Foreign Minister, had no alternative but to send back the letter, with a sharp rebuke, explaining to him what he seemed to have forgotten, the true position of a foreign minister. This was the beginning of that diplomatic squabble which ended in M. Chauvelin being dismissed from England.

But before the breaking off of diplomatic intercourse, the open sympathy expressed for the changes which had taken place in France had begun to rouse the fear of the governing classes in England. The proclamation against seditious writings had but Congratulatory addresses sent to France by the societies. Sept. little effect compared with the exciting news of the 10th of August, the massacres of September, and the retreat of the allies. The societies thought fit to send deputations with addresses of sympathy to the National Convention. The Revolution Society sent a present of a thousand pairs of shoes for the army, and the Corresponding Society, with four or five others of a similar character, sent a joint address, congratulating the French upon their republican form of government, especially admiring the outrageous conduct of the mob on the 10th of August, and even approving the sad events of September. Nor was their energy confined to words. Riots broke out in several towns both in England and Scotland. The most important were those in Sheffield and Dundee. At Sheffield the disturbances took the form of a regular Riots in Sheffield and Dundee. Nov. revolutionary riot. It was on a day appointed for rejoicing for the success of the French arms; a tree of Liberty was planted, and the procession passed through the streets, headed by an enormous picture of Dundas and Burke plunging their daggers into the heart of Liberty. "They are as resolute and determined a set of villains as ever I saw," writes an officer who was quartered in the place, "and will gain their object if it is to be gained; they have debating societies and correspondence with other towns; they have purchased firearms, and are trying to corrupt the soldiers." At Dundee almost the same events took place; again a tree of Liberty was planted, and the cries of "Liberty," "Equality," "No excise," "No King," were soon universally heard, though the ostensible cause of the riot had been the high price of corn.

This state of affairs—the seditious conduct of the societies, and the obvious tendency to riot—induced Pitt, in the beginning of December, to call out the militia. This he could only do legally by alleging insurrection as the excuse, and it was a somewhat strained construction of the word to apply it to these outbreaks. But Pitt had now made up his mind not only for repression in England but for war abroad, and the summoning of the militia was intended in fact as a first step in that direction. It was under these circumstances that an autumnal Parliament was summoned. The discussions naturally turned upon the conduct of the Government in calling out the militia, but Fox was unable to collect more than fifty votes to disapprove of the vigilance of the Government in internal matters.

Some slight pretence was still kept up on the part of the French of a desire to keep the peace. M. Maret, well known afterwards as the Duc de Bassano, was sent over to take M. Chauvelin's place. The object of his mission is really unknown; he simply notified his arrival to Grenville, held no communications with him, and very shortly returned to France to find war already declared. At the same time another indirect offer of negotiation arose, strangely enough in Belgium, where Dumouriez desired an opportunity for a diplomatic meeting with Lord Auckland, our ambassador. It speaks well for Pitt's real desire to treat if treating were possible, that he at once accepted this proposition, holding that a general in command of an army might treat, without any implied recognition of the legitimacy or the stability of the Government which employed him. But though the required leave was immediately sent to Lord Auckland, it arrived too late, war had been already declared. It is a further proof of Pitt's pacific tendencies, that when he agreed to Dumouriez' proposal an embargo had already been laid upon English shipping in the French ports, an act of war which he was willing to overlook as long as any hope of negotiation remained.

But it may be fairly asserted, in spite of all that Fox and his friends urged, that there was no real opportunity after the massacres of September of treating with dignity with France. While M. Chauvelin was attempting on the 27th of December to explain away the November decree, on the 31st of the same month the Minister of the Marine wrote thus to the seaports of France: "The Government of England is arming, and the King of Spain, encouraged by this, is preparing to attack us. These two tyrannical powers, after persecuting the patriots in their own territories, think no doubt that they will be able to influence the judgment about to be pronounced on the tyrant Louis. They hope to frighten us. But no; a people that has made itself free, a people that has driven out of the bosom of France the terrible army of the Prussians and Austrians, this people will not suffer laws to be dictated to them by a tyrant. The King and his Parliament mean to make war upon us. Will the republicans of England permit this? Already these freemen show their discontent, and the repugnance they have to bear arms against their brothers the French; well, we will fly to their succour, we will make a descent upon their island, we will lodge there 50,000 caps of liberty, we will plant the sacred tree, and we will stretch out our arms to our republican brethren; the tyranny of their government will be immediately overthrown." In fact, as has more than once happened in our history, the disturbance of a few reckless men, which our free constitution permits to show itself without repression, was construed to mean what it might mean in less free countries. Misinformed by their emissary Chauvelin who saw but one party, willing to believe what they liked to believe, and ignorant of the character of the English nation, the French had persuaded themselves that there was a real division between the Government and the people of England, and were eager for the war.

That war they declared on the 8th of February, and by thus forestalling what must have been sooner or later the action of the English ministry, saved them from much difficulty. For there was considerable difference of opinion as to what should be the casus belli. England was pledged to neutrality, and was bound to France by a close commercial treaty. The only two grounds on which, technically, war could be declared, were the opening of the Scheldt and the destruction of the balance of power by the appropriation of Savoy. England being under distinct pledge not to interfere with the internal condition of France, neither the massacres of September, the establishment of the Republic, nor the death of the King, could with any justice be alleged as a ground of war. The appropriation of Savoy was an evident fact, but it was very plausibly urged that England, being in a state of professed neutrality, had entirely disregarded the invasion of France by the great Eastern powers, and had allowed to pass, without observation, the second partition of Poland. The opening of the Scheldt was no doubt contrary to treaties with Holland which England had guaranteed, but it was very reasonably urged that England was not called upon to plunge into a war unless Holland requested her to do so, and Holland remained studiously quiet. The guarantee of the treaty had been to save Holland from war; it might well seem a distortion of duty to force Holland into war for the preservation of the treaty. There can be no doubt that the Opposition was right in asserting that the war was declared against opinion; the point in which they were wrong was this, that they did not recognize the fact that opinion grown to a religion, a religion become propagandist in its nature, and that propagandist religion in arms was the greatest social danger which could threaten the world. Pitt and Burke saw this; the whole body of Tories and conservative Whigs dimly felt it. But the trammels of ages of diplomacy were too strong to allow of the fact being openly recognized. It was then with joy that the ministry found themselves released from their difficulties by the French declaration of war.

When England engaged in the war a campaign had already been fought to the entire disadvantage of the allies. The close of the year 1792 had seen the retirement of the allies from French soil, the battle of Jemmappes, and the occupation of Belgium and Savoy. The accession of England, Spain and Holland to the coalition so far invigorated it that its members believed that a campaign of a few months would complete their work; for dangers surrounded the French Convention on all sides. Dumouriez, a member of the Girondin party, displeased with the conduct of the Jacobin Convention, was meditating defection; the excesses of the governing party in Paris had aroused all the slumbering loyalty of France; La Vendée was in arms for constitutional monarchy and the Catholic religion; and both at Lyons and Toulon the reaction was for the moment triumphant. Dumouriez' treason had an immediate effect. Directly upon the declaration of war he invaded Holland, but seeking rather popularity with his army and the prestige of victory than the success of the plans of Government, he turned aside from Holland, and risked a battle at Neerwinden on the Gheet, in which he suffered a complete defeat from the Prince of Saxe-Coburg; and thus as a defeated general, and without his army, he gave himself up to the Austrians. His defeat and defection allowed the allies to advance along the whole frontier. But their movements were dilatory; instead of marching upon Paris they wasted their time in taking Mayence, Condé, and Valenciennes; they even committed the mistake of binding the captured troops to refrain from war only against themselves; they were therefore available to suppress the insurrection in La Vendée, and the troops hitherto employed there could be sent to the eastern frontier. The same want of energy continually marked the progress of the allies. The Prussians and Austrians were in fact too jealous of each other, and too much bent upon their interests nearer home to act with vigour. Time was again wasted in sieges. While the Austrians sat down before Cambrai, the Duke of York with the English troops besieged Dunkirk. Their communications were kept open by the Dutch at Menin and Hoondschoote. But the French army, under the vigorous management of the Jacobins, and guided by the military genius of Carnot, was no longer to be trifled with; Houchard fell upon the weak position of the Dutch, and York was driven to a disastrous defeat with the loss of all his artillery. The success was indeed only momentary; a panic seized the French troops, and they fell back to Lille, thus affording the allies an opportunity of advancing to the attack of the fortress of Maubeuge, which closed the road to Paris; but Jourdan, who had succeeded Houchard, now put in practice Carnot's principles. Hastily gathering 50,000 men, he fell upon half that number of Austrians, and completely defeated them at Wattigny. Success had also attended the French against the Prussians on the Upper Rhine. There, too, the terrible rigour of the new Government had restored the aspect of affairs. St. Just and Lebas had appeared as conventional commissioners in Alsace, bringing terror with them. The beaten armies were supplied and organized. Two young generals of the revolutionary school, Hoche and Pichegru, were placed in command, and the tide of victory was turned; the Prussians had to fall back, compromising the advanced position of the Austrians, and before the close of the year the French army, which had begun the campaign with a series of disasters, found itself victorious along the whole frontier line.

The Convention had also been successful in its wars in the interior of France. After six weeks of bombardment, on the 9th of October, Lyons yielded, without conditions, to be given up to the fearful cruelty of Collot d'Herbois; and the victorious troops hurried southwards to besiege Toulon, which had placed itself in the hands of the English, and had admitted the allied fleet to its roadstead. The genius of Bonaparte is said to have secured its capture. He saw that one fort called the Equilette commanded the roadstead, and that its possession would oblige the English, who were the soul of the defence, to withdraw. The capture of the fort answered his expectation; Lord Hood, without making terms for the inhabitants, collected such of the royalists as could crowd on board his ships, and sailed away, having first set fire to all the stores, and to forty ships of war which were in the harbour (Aug. 27, 1793). The insurrection of La Vendée had also been suppressed. Intrusted at first to ignorant men, with no claim to command except the strength of their revolutionary principles, the Convention troops had been everywhere defeated. But when Kleber was put in practical command the course of victory changed. Terribly defeated, and with all their chiefs of importance mortally wounded, the insurgents determined to try the fortune of war upon the other side of the Loire. They marched northwards towards Laval, defeated their pursuers, and had they made common cause with the Bretons might still have been successful. But trusting to help from England, which never came, they undertook a fruitless assault upon Granville in Normandy. Thinking themselves betrayed, and longing for their homes, the ill-organized mass of peasants insisted on being led southwards: even then there was some life in them. They defeated the republican General Rossignol and threw him back upon Rennes; but failing in an attack upon Angers, they marched pointlessly towards Le Mans. They were there received with terrible slaughter by Westermann, Kleber and Marçeau; 18,000 men, women and children were killed, and the rest fled, pursued by the pitiless Westermann. The fugitives reached the Loire, fought one final battle at Savenay near its mouth, where they were all, with the exception of some eight or ten thousand men, either put to death or captured.

Thus revolutionary France had proved itself no contemptible enemy to the united troops of Europe, and established its rule unquestioned in France. It was plain that all hope of an easy subjugation of France was over, and it was with the greatest difficulty that Pitt was able to keep the coalition together; the eyes of Prussia were eagerly bent upon Poland, an easier prey than France. Of increase of territory England had no hope; the war had been forced on her, and was honestly a war of opinion. But any cessation of her efforts would have placed her in a worse position than when the war began, and Pitt and the upper classes of England were not blind to the fact that the occupation of the continental nations in the great war afforded England immense advantages both at sea and in the colonies; it was worth making great efforts to gain the undisputed mastery of the sea both in commerce and in arms. Nor did the large sums of money, raised chiefly by way of loan, appear so ruinous as they really were. The effect of large loans is to increase the wealth of the capitalist at the expense of the working man; nor, as the chief weight of the accumulating taxation falls on posterity, does it become immediately evident. Thus supplied with almost unlimited means, Pitt succeeded in keeping up the coalition, taking into English pay, it is almost true to say, the whole of the Prussian army, and doing nearly as much for the Austrians.

Pitt's energy was equalled by that of France, and the Convention had the additional advantage of being free from constitutional rules. Vast conscriptions filled their armies, forced requisitions supplied them with arms and equipments. It was with the army of the North, 160,000 strong, under Pichegru, that the English had most to do. On each side the armies were divided into three divisions, and the duty of marching with 100,000 men on Paris was intrusted to Coburg. Defeated in the centre, the French had met with unexpected success on the left, Clairfait, the Austrian general, having been twice beaten at Moucron and at Courtray. Upon this, Pichegru almost destroyed his centre to strengthen his wings, and the threefold manœuvres became twofold. The key of the campaign was the possession of the Sambre; the Austrians lay in an advancing angle with their left upon that river from Mons to Charleroi. If the French could cross the Sambre they would be virtually in the rear of the Austrians. To this point, therefore, the Commissioners of the Convention, St. Just and Lebas, repaired, and attempted to inspire the troops with something of their own enthusiasm. Again and again the French were driven back. But Carnot's plan of massing troops was at length employed; the greater part of the army, which under Jourdan had been facing the Prussians on the Moselle, was turned northward, and Jourdan took command of 100,000, well known as the army of the Sambre and Meuse, just as the Commissioners had been driven back for the fifth time behind the river. After a sixth failure, the Commissioners insisting upon a seventh effort, the river was successfully crossed, and on the heights of Fleurus a battle was fought in which, though it was not completed, the Austrians were practically defeated. Step by step the English and the Austrians retired, the one towards Holland, the other towards the Rhine. By July the English were behind Breda, the Austrians beyond the Meuse. Want of supplies checked the French advance for a few weeks, but by October the English were driven into the corner between the Yssel and the Rhine, and the army of the Sambre and Meuse had captured Cologne and Coblenz. The occupation of Belgium by the French compelled the Prussians further south also to fall behind the Rhine, the left bank of which was thus in possession of the French army from Basle to the sea. Even south of that point successes had been won. The Sardinian position of Saorgio had been turned, and the passes of the Alps were opened to the French, who were thus in a position to invade Italy on the one hand and Holland on the other. The lateness of the season, and the wretched state of the equipment and commissariat, might have induced the French to be satisfied with these conquests, and few armies would have thought of facing an unusually severe winter shoeless and in rags, for to such a plight had the bad management of the Revolutionary Government brought them. But to this army of enthusiasts the winter was but a useful ally for the conquest of Holland, where a strong feeling in their favour already existed among that large section of the people, who had seen with anger their attempted Revolution of 1787 suppressed by the arms of Prussia, and to whom the Government of the Stadtholder was very distasteful. The failure of the preceding campaign had obliged Pitt to insist upon the recall of the Duke of York, much to the King's displeasure, and Pichegru now found himself opposed to General Walmoden, the Hanoverian commander. But of opposition there was really none. The lines of the three great rivers, the Meuse, the Waal and the Lech, were abandoned without a fight, and crossed by the French, either upon the ice or by means of pontoons; and finally Walmoden left Holland to its fate, and retreated across the Yssel and the Ems to embark his army safely in Bremen. The The French capture Amsterdam and the Dutch fleet. 1795. Stadtholder had already fled from the Hague and taken refuge in England. Amsterdam was occupied by the French without difficulty, the ragged regiments waiting patiently in the bitter snow in the streets of the rich city till their quarters were arranged for them without the least attempt at disorder. A striking finish was put to the campaign by the capture of the Dutch fleet in the Texel. The ships were ice-bound, and fell into the hands of a regiment of cavalry, who galloped across the ice to secure them. Holland was at once erected into a republic upon the French model.

But in spite of these continual reverses of the allies, in spite of the perpetual failure of the British arms in the Low Countries, Pitt had not been mistaken in the indirect advantages which the war would give him. The conflagration at Toulon had inflicted an almost irreparable loss upon the French fleet. In Corsica the veteran patriot Paoli had aroused the feeling of his countrymen against France. Nelson and Hood, with 1000 British soldiers serving as marines in their ships, had taken Bastia, which was regarded as almost impregnable, and the people of Corsica had begged King George to accept their crown. While thus in the Mediterranean English supremacy had been established, a still greater success had attended her fleet off the coast of France. By immense exertions a powerful and well-equipped fleet of twenty-six ships had been assembled by Bon St. André and placed under the command of Villaret Joyeuse. It left the harbour of Brest for the purpose of convoying a large fleet laden with flour from America. The English Channel fleet, under Lord Howe, sailed to meet it. In number of ships and weight of metal the English fleet was somewhat inferior, but the Revolution had stripped the French marine of its best officers, who had habitually been supplied by Brittany, now royalist in its tendencies. Bon St. André, originally Defeat of the French fleet. June 1, 1794. a Calvinistic clergyman, had all the fearful energy belonging to the Conventional Commissioners, but little of the skill of a seaman, yet he frequently overruled the commands of Villaret Joyeuse. Thus, when the fleets met upon the 1st of June, the French were unable to prevent Admiral Howe from repeating Rodney's well-known manœuvre of breaking the line. The defeat of the French was complete; several ships went down, and five line of battle-ships remained as English prizes.

Upon the Continent, however, success had been wholly on the side of the French; the campaign of 1794 and the winter of 1795 had added Belgium, Holland, the left bank of the Rhine, part of Piedmont, Catalonia, and Navarre, to their dominions. The coalition began at once to fall to pieces. As it was plain that there was no further hope of a military promenade to Paris or of territory to be gained at an easy price, the King of Prussia, who had been only kept up to the mark by enormous subsidies from England, made his Prussia, Spain and Holland leave the coalition. peace with the French. It was the pressure of England alone which had driven Spain and Holland into the war. Although Pitt had procured a change of ministry in Spain in accordance with his own views, and the substitution of Godoy for Miranda, the Spanish Government now awoke to its true interests. All the advantages of a maritime war of necessity fell to the lot of the English, and Spain saw herself aiding in the destruction of the only efficient rival to the English upon the sea, and thus in fact rendering certain her own insignificance on that element. The Spanish Government was therefore willing to treat. Holland, completely conquered, and with half its population preferring the French rule to that of the Prince of Orange, who had been forced upon the country, obtained peace by giving up its chief fortresses, paying a large indemnity, and making an offensive alliance with France against England, by which thirty ships of war were placed at the disposal of the French. Many of the smaller states both of Germany and Italy declared themselves neutral. England was thus practically left without allies, with the single exception of Austria, which was only induced to continue its engagements by a subsidy of four millions and a half. This series of treaties was completed in the course of the year 1795, chiefly by Barthélemy at Basle; the treaty with Tuscany, Feb. 9; with Holland [at the Hague], May 15; with Prussia, April 5; and with Spain, July 14.

The campaign of the following year, 1795, was confined to the Rhine, where Pichegru commanded the army of the Rhine and Moselle, Jourdan that of the Sambre and Meuse. Pichegru was meditating treachery, and lay idle opposite the Black Forest till the advance of Jourdan from the North to co-operate with him for the purpose of retaking Mayence forced him into action. He took Mannheim, and might have taken Heidelberg, but he wilfully resigned this advantage, and fell back in disorder upon the lines of Weissembourg, where he signed an armistice with the Austrians preparatory to joining them. His retreat had compelled that of Jourdan also.

The English meanwhile had engaged in a lukewarm way in an expedition which, had it been carried out with vigour, might have changed the face of affairs. After the great destruction of the Vendéan army at Savenay, the war continued to smoulder both in La Vendée itself and in Brittany. But north of the Loire it assumed a somewhat different character; the open, simple and heroic devotion of the Vendéan peasantry, who had followed their priests, gentry, and leaders of their own rank to battle, was wanting, and the hostilities of Brittany assumed rather the form of brigandage than warfare. The country was infested with small bands, who kept up connection with one another by means of private signals, but who seldom appeared in large numbers, and worked chiefly by night-surprises and by rapid and secret cutting off of detached posts. The chief man of the Chouans, as the Breton insurgents were called, was Cormatin. But certain men of higher rank were also among them; the chief of these was Count Joseph de Puisaye, a man of considerable energy and ability, who had been a member of the National Assembly. De Puisaye saw that irregular warfare could produce but little effect, and desired to obtain assistance from England, where the Government was supposed to be ready to assist any endeavour against the French Republic; an impression kept alive by the rumours, probably much exaggerated, spread by agents who were constantly passing and repassing through the Channel Islands between France and England.

In the autumn of 1794 De Puisaye betook himself to England and laid his plans before Pitt. It was suggested that 10,000 British troops should be joined with the corps of emigrants, and should land in Brittany and seize Rennes, and thence push forward at once over Normandy, Maine and Poitou. It was thought advisable that a prince of the blood should either accompany the expedition or shortly appear upon the scene, and the Count of Artois was selected for the purpose. Lord Moira, favourably known in the American War as Lord Rawdon, was to take command of the English troops. But though speed and secresy were of the first necessity, the expedition hung fire, and news of it reached the ears of the French Government. The reason for this delay was partly jealousy and disunion among the emigrants themselves, partly Pitt's mistrust of the readiness of the French to join him, and his knowledge of the danger of relying on the assertions of sanguine exiles, and partly the discovery of the feeling existing among the royalists themselves in La Vendée and Brittany against the introduction of any large foreign army; for the belief seems to have been prevalent that Pitt's objects were selfish, and that an English army would be rather a danger than an assistance. It is at all events certain that the royalists in Paris, in their dislike that the reaction should be brought about by any means but their own, did their best to injure the expedition. The consequences of the delay were serious. In spite of considerable sums of money sent from England, and a good deal more much cheaper money, consisting of forged assignats, which were exported largely, in the spring of 1795 the skill of Hoche and Canclaux, the generals opposed to the insurgents, and the very favourable terms offered by the Convention, induced the chiefs both of the Vendéans and of the Chouans to accept an amnesty. The terms offered were certainly unusually tempting. A large indemnity of several millions of francs was to be given to the people to repay them for their losses; the houses that had been burnt were to be rebuilt; ten millions were to be given to the chiefs to take up the bonds that had been issued in their names during the insurrection; Charette was to be allowed to keep up 2000 men in the pay of the Government, freedom of religion was to be granted, and there were to be no requisitions in La Vendée for five years. The agreement was made as solemn as possible. The first to accept it was Charette, with whom the treaty was signed with great pomp in the city of Nantes in February. Subsequently, in April, Stofflet gave in his adhesion to the same arrangement, and finally the Chouans did the same. It seemed a proof of their sincerity that they gave up into the hands of the Commissioner of the Convention nearly a million of forged assignats, which they had received from the English fleet round the coast; but on the part of the insurgents it appears that this treaty was illusory, forced upon them by the delay of the English. It was used however as an additional ground for refusing large assistance, and it was an army of emigrants only, with a considerable quantity Destruction of the expedition to Quiberon. of stores and money, which in July of 1795 at length set sail from England. Even then the plan of De Puisaye was overruled for the worse. For the sake of a good roadstead for the English fleet, it was arranged that the landing should be upon the peninsula of Quiberon, close to Carnac, instead of in the north of Brittany; and again, apparently in mistrust of De Puisaye's partisan system of warfare, it was thought necessary to give him as second in command a royalist emigrant of the name of D'Hervilly, a red tape soldier, who had displayed considerable courage on the 10th of August, but who was a very bad man for the present irregular warfare. It even seemed doubtful whether his authority did not supersede De Puisaye's, and after Quiberon was reached, it was thought necessary to send an appeal to England to settle this weighty question. Meanwhile, after two days of delay, the troops were landed at Carnac. They were received with an enthusiasm so riotous and irregular, that the commander's love of discipline received a severe shock, and he ceased to trust his wild allies. However, in three days they were joined by some 10,000 men, and De Puisaye was eager to rush forward and raise the whole of the neighbouring country, but the answer from England had not yet been received, and the troops waited on in inactivity. At length something was done. A small fort called Port Penthièvre covers the little isthmus which joins the peninsula of Quiberon to the shore. D'Hervilly proceeded to bring up all his artillery, but before his operations were completed, De Puisaye and a few hundred Chouans had gained possession of the place without difficulty. With his regular troops in the peninsula and holding the fort, and with his Chouans spread along the mainland, De Puisaye was compelled to remain inactive. All the jealousies which existed among the royalists burst out, and even worse than that, time was allowed for General Hoche to increase his 5000 troops, which might easily have been routed, to double that number. He suddenly attacked the invaders, and drove the whole mass, Chouans, emigrants, and all, to the narrow confined peninsula. Their efforts to break loose were unavailing; fresh emigrant troops under Sombreuil came from England. De Puisaye's authority was confirmed, but it was too late. Some republican troops taken in Fort Penthièvre had been admitted to the emigrant ranks. They entered into treacherous correspondence with Hoche's army, and by their assistance the fort was recaptured. The exit from their peninsula was thus entirely closed to them, the enemy's cannon was placed along the corresponding shore, and swept the isthmus and the roadstead, while the republican troops, advancing from the fort, drove the invaders backward into the corner of the tongue of land. They were literally driven into the sea. The scene was a fearful one. Many in despair threw themselves upon their own swords, many tried to reach the boats of the fleet, and were a ready mark for the republican musketry. Some thought themselves fortunate in reaching fishing-boats which were hovering about the coast, but in zeal for their own preservation the boatmen lopped off their hands and suffered them to sink. Some 900, with De Puisaye at their head, reached the English squadron and were saved. About 700, under De Sombreuil, made, as they thought, terms with General Humbert, but the conditions were only verbal, and included, as the French asserted probably with truth, a reference to the Convention. The reactionaries in power were glad of the chance of freeing themselves of the charge of favouring the royalists. Orders were given that the law against emigrants taken in arms should be carried out to the letter. The prisoners were brought out in batches and shot upon the seashore till 700 of them had been killed. After this the fate of the insurgents was sealed. In the following year (1796) the Count of Artois again appeared upon the coast, and Charette and Stofflet were again in arms, but the Count of Artois was content to remain in idleness at L'Ile Dieu, and Hoche succeeded in the difficult work of at once conquering and conciliating all that remained of the insurrection. Charette and Stofflet were both captured and shot.

There can be but little doubt that when war was first declared the feeling of the English people was very strongly in favour of it. Accustomed for years to trust to Pitt, they continued their perfect confidence in him though his policy had changed, and, as we have seen, the opposition in the House of Commons was virtually destroyed. The confidence of the nation was chiefly exhibited in the readiness with which it met all the demands for increased taxation and for immense loans; in fact, Pitt was strongly supported by the commercial classes. With them the war was in itself popular, they were clearsighted enough to see how vast was the opening likely to be afforded them by the increase of English power upon the sea.

In the year 1793 Pitt gained a fresh right to their gratitude by the assistance he afforded them during a brief monetary crisis which threatened to be very destructive. The year had been one of great financial difficulty. The sudden expansion of manufacturing industry which had followed upon the great inventions at the beginning of the reign, and the increase of commerce which followed the close of the American War, had rendered necessary a large amount of capital. The want had been met by a largely increased paper currency. Reckless banking had become prevalent, and provincial banks issued notes far beyond their capital. A very slight panic would be enough to cause the collapse of such a system. It was found that to meet the necessities of the exchange between England and the rest of the world bullion would have to leave England. Bullion was already scarce, and the Bank of England therefore thought it necessary to restrict its issues. This was enough to cause the failure of a few great houses; a panic ensued; there was a run upon the provincial banks; out of 350 more than 100 failed. Yet there was in reality quite enough property both in securities and in goods to enable merchants to meet all demands. It was only for the moment that there was a deficiency of money, that is, of the means of exchange. Pitt, with admirable clearness, recognized the real solvency of the country, and authorized the issue of bills on the Exchequer to the value of five millions. These were advanced to merchants, who could prove their solvency, against securities or goods. As these bills rested on the credit of the nation, they were readily received, the engagements of the merchants were satisfied by their means, and credit was restored. As it proved, not more than four millions was borrowed, and the whole sum was speedily repaid without loss to the nation.

The effect of the complete trust placed in Pitt was to allow him to give full rein to his new policy. Now that policy was one entirely of repression, and the effect of it in the long run, indeed before the year was out, was to divide England much more sharply into the propertied and non-propertied classes, and to bring into existence a state of feeling highly undesirable, and which tended much to produce those very evils it was intended to prevent. While every movement in a liberal direction was certain to be checked, laws of the most stringent description were willingly passed, and at first the execution of existing laws, especially with regard to seditious writing, received great public The Traitorous Correspondence Bill. March 15, 1793. support. In this class may be mentioned the Traitorous Correspondence Act. There has always been great dislike to tampering with or extending the law of treason, yet there were but fifty-three members of the House of Commons who could be found to lift their voices against this Bill, which declared guilty of high treason, firstly, all those who supplied any arms or military or naval stores to the enemy; secondly, all those who purchased lands in France, for the use of assignats rendered the sale of land the chief support of French finance, and the purchase of land was therefore regarded as indirectly strengthening the hands of the enemy; thirdly, it prohibited all intercourse with France without special license under the Great Seal; and fourthly, the insurance of French vessels by English merchants. The two first of these offences were to fall directly under the old law of Edward III., and to deprive those who were guilty of them of the advantages secured to them by the ameliorations of the law which had since been made, such as the right to employ counsel, and to be furnished with the list of the jury, the necessity of two witnesses to secure conviction, and the lapse of a certain period between the indictment and the trial.