Meanwhile, but a few days after the victory of Alexandria, the cloud which had risen in the Baltic was also dispersed. The renewal of the Armed Neutrality, and the general conduct of Russia, made it evident that that country was engaged in the French interests. A fleet under Sir Hyde Parker, with Nelson as second in command, was despatched to the Baltic. Negotiation was tried with the Danes, but wholly unsuccessfully, and Parker, a dilatory commander, was induced by Nelson's energy to consent to an attack upon Copenhagen. The passage of the Sound was forced without loss, but an examination of the enemy's position showed that they had used the delay which had been given them to great advantage. Shore batteries had been erected and put into fighting trim; floating batteries established, and the harbour covered with a line of vessels of all sorts four miles in length. Within this lay the Danish fleet. Nelson offered to attack with ten sail of the line; he was allowed twelve. The attack was made from the south, Sir Hyde Parker on the outside threatening the batteries and the vessels at the mouth of the harbour. At ten o'clock on the 2nd of April, Nelson began his attack. Several vessels grounded and were rendered useless, and so hot was the engagement that Sir Hyde Parker thought it better to hoist the signal for discontinuing action. Nelson declined to obey it, and the other captains took their orders from him. Many of the Danish ships had struck, but being constantly reinforced from the shore, continued the fight, it is said, even after they had surrendered. This was probably an accident; but Nelson took advantage of it to write a friendly letter to the Crown Prince. "The Vice-Admiral Lord Nelson," he said, "has been commanded to spare Denmark when she no longer resists. The line of defence which covered her shores has struck to the British flag; but if the firing is continued on the part of Denmark, he must set on fire all the prizes he has taken without having the power of saving the men who have so nobly defended them. The brave Danes are the brothers, and should never be the enemies, of the English." He then agreed to a truce while the wounded were moved from the prizes. Having taken advantage of the lull to withdraw his fleet from the difficult channel in which they were entangled, he went on shore to negotiate a treaty. To enable him to attack the Russians, he insisted on a long armistice, which a threat of immediate bombardment induced the Danes to grant. The English fleet then sailed against the Swedes, who withdrew, and were left unmolested, while the fleet proceeded against the Russians. On his way, however, Nelson received the news that the capricious despotism of Paul had excited his courtiers to a conspiracy, which, though apparently aimed only at the deposition of the Emperor, had in fact ended in his assassination. The accession of the young Emperor Alexander I. completely changed the policy of Russia. The embargo was removed from the British shipping and the merchant seamen liberated. As the Armed Neutrality still existed, Nelson would have proceeded to strong measures; but Sir Hyde Parker was satisfied, and though he was recalled, the complete change in Russian policy Peace between England and Russia. rendered further action unnecessary. In June a treaty of peace was signed in St. Petersburg, by which the Armed Neutrality, with its claims, was given up, but the right of search accurately defined. It was also agreed that blockades must henceforward be really efficient in order to be valid. Blockades by proclamation were thus abolished, and could be only sustained when the blockading force was sufficient to enforce them.

Bonaparte was still threatening an invasion of England, and gunboats and rafts had been collected at Boulogne. These the Government ordered Nelson to attack, but the attempt was on the whole unsuccessful. However, the supremacy of England on the sea was so great that there could not be much fear of the landing of a foreign army, and the French, defeated in Egypt and thwarted in their Northern policy, were ready to come to terms. In October the preliminaries of a treaty were signed. By this England gave up all its conquests except Trinidad and Ceylon. "The Cape of Good Hope was to be restored to the Batavian Republic, and to be used as a free port. Malta was to be restored to the Knights of St. John,[17] under the guarantee of one of the great powers; Porto Ferrajo was to be evacuated. On the other side, the Republic of the Ionian Islands was to be acknowledged, and the French were to withdraw from Naples and the Roman States; the integrity of Portugal was to be secured; Egypt was to be restored to the Porte, and the Newfoundland fisheries to be placed on the same footing as before the war."[18]

Although the preliminary treaty had been signed, it cost some time and much anxious negotiation before its final ratification in the March of the following year. These negotiations were held at Amiens, on the part of England by Lord Cornwallis, on that of France by Joseph Bonaparte, assisted by Talleyrand. At the opening of Parliament, on the 29th of October 1801, the minister had been able to mention in the King's speech with satisfaction both the Opinions in England concerning the peace. preliminary treaty with France and the arrangements with the Northern powers which put an end to the threatened Armed Neutrality. By the bulk of the people the return of peace had been hailed with extreme delight. General Lauriston, who had brought the authority for signing the preliminaries, had been received with a public ovation, the populace had dragged his carriage through the streets, and London and other towns had been illuminated. In completing these preliminaries Addington and his friends had acted with the entire approbation of Pitt, who, at heart cordially disliking war, had brought himself to believe that Bonaparte, having now obtained the supreme power in France, would probably be satisfied; at the same time, as he himself pointed out, Jacobinism had been already checked in England, and the lesson taught to the world that the fruit of Jacobin principles was terrorism and anarchy, and its end a military despotism. Seeing the isolated position which England now occupied, and believing the causes for further war removed, Pitt accepted the terms of the peace, although the concessions on the part of England, especially the surrender of the Cape of Good Hope, were no doubt great. With the support then of Pitt and of the general feeling of the country, the ministry found in Parliament large majorities in favour of their peace. But Pitt's views were by no means shared by a considerable number of his late colleagues. Grenville, Windham, and Spencer clung tenaciously to their old view that Bonaparte's career was but beginning, that his policy would continue to be one of aggression, that his present offers of peace were delusive, and that for the honour of England and the safety of Europe the war should be continued.

Before the preliminaries were ratified abundant proofs were given that they were right and that Pitt was wrong. Taking advantage of the exhausted condition of the Continent, of the eager desire of Addington to secure peace, and of the position of England, which was not only without allies, but unable while negotiations were still pending to make objections upon the score of treaty rights, Bonaparte Napoleon appropriates Holland, Switzerland, and Italy. hastened to complete his ambitious projects—by the appropriation of those smaller States which had already fallen into a state of dependence upon France (the Republics of Holland, Switzerland, and the North of Italy, now called the Cisalpine Republic), and by the re-establishment of the French colonial power by means of a great expedition to reconquer St. Domingo. His method of proceeding with regard to the Republics was craftily arranged so as to give to the assumption of French supremacy the appearance of voluntary action on the part of the people themselves. For Holland a constitution was drawn up in France of a strongly republican character, which, when rejected by the National Assemblies of Holland, was put to the vote of the whole body of the people, and being accepted by a very small minority, while the rest abstained from voting, was declared established by the national will (Oct. 17, 1801). In Switzerland, not yet ripe for annexation, instructions were given to the French minister to thwart all efforts at the formation of a stable constitution, and to keep things so unsettled that an appeal to France was certain sooner or later to be made, while French troops garrisoned the Republic ostensibly for the purpose of keeping order. Less delicacy was used with regard to Italy. The chief rulers of the Cisalpine Republic were summoned to Lyons, a constitution of Bonaparte's creation given them, and they were ordered to elect as their President Bonaparte himself (Jan. 1802). The expedition to St. Domingo was made still further to advance Napoleon's projects; for thither was sent, to be destroyed by the climate, almost the whole of the army of the Rhine, the only part of the military establishment of France not wholly devoted to him.

Meanwhile the projects for the ultimate annexation of Piedmont and Genoa were carried on, and distinct orders sent to the negotiators at Amiens to withdraw entirely from discussion the affairs of Holland, Switzerland, and the Italian Republics, in other words, to treat with England as if the affairs of Europe were entirely beyond her cognizance. The withdrawal of these points of discussion left little to be settled except minute points with regard to fisheries and prisoners, for Bonaparte also entirely refused to entertain the idea of a commercial treaty with England. The only point of interest left was Malta. According to the preliminaries this island was to be evacuated and to be restored to the Knights under the guarantee of Russia. But a new sovereign was now upon the Russian throne less likely to be under the immediate influence of France. Bonaparte therefore wished to change the terms, to destroy the fortifications of the island, thus rendering it useless in a military point of view, and to place it under the guardianship of the King of Naples; in other words, to render it at once worthless to the English and an easy prey to the French whenever they should desire to reoccupy it. In their eagerness for peace the English ministry consented to be blind to Bonaparte's aggressions, though firm upon the point of Malta, and though they refused to acknowledge the existence of the newly-organized republics. No doubt, what the English meant was that, for the sake of peace, they would bear what Bonaparte had already done, but that any further step would produce war. Bonaparte, on the other hand, argued that the refusal to acknowledge these Peace concluded. March 27, 1802. republics was in fact a resignation on the part of England of the right of interference with them; henceforward that country could not complain although they were incorporated with France. There were thus a number of outstanding questions left unsettled at the peace, which was finally completed on the 27th of March 1802.

But it had begun to be plain to all thinking men that it could be but a short truce; and indeed Napoleon was already writing that "a renewal of war was necessary for his existence, as the memory Napoleon mistakes the temper of England. of old victories was likely speedily to pass away." In fact, he totally mistook the temper of England. Addington's ministry, no doubt, was pledged to peace, and was anxious at all hazards to make it durable. The people of England were indeed weary of the war and eagerly desirous for peace; but they had lost none of their independence and pride, and anything which should prove either that their honour was attacked, their commercial activity trammelled, or their independence of action limited, would easily produce a reaction, and bring them back to their warlike temper. Bonaparte, while intending to renew the war sooner or later, meant to keep the occasion in his own hands, but, trusting to the weakness of Addington, he pursued a line of conduct exactly fitted to prove to England the absolute necessity for an immediate renewal of hostilities, and which touched the sensitive nation in its most tender points. He never ceased from his course of aggression, Continues his aggressions. thus treating the remonstrances of England as if they were completely worthless and beside the point. In August he annexed the island of Elba, in September the whole of Piedmont, in October Parma and Placentia; and at length, taking advantage of the carefully fostered disorders in Switzerland, he suddenly occupied that most important military point with an army of 30,000 men under Marshal Ney, and took to himself the title of Mediator of the Swiss Republic. It has been mentioned that he refused a commercial treaty with England at the Peace of Amiens; this under the plea of a desire for the protection of native commerce he undoubtedly had a right to do; but he now obliged all the countries dependent on him to adopt a similar course, to exclude English productions, and thus closed half Europe to English trade.

Not content with this conduct abroad, he took upon himself to interfere with the internal affairs of England. His course of policy was such as to be wholly incompatible with a free press; his underhand machinations were certain to be exposed where such a press existed. On the Continent he had succeeded in enforcing silence; in England alone an unfettered press was able to direct its assaults both on his policy and his character. No doubt some of the attacks were sharp enough; especially had an emigrant, one Jean Peltier, established a French paper in London called L'Ambigu, which was full of strong invective against the First Consul. Again, the emigrants had not ceased from forming conspiracies against the French Government, conspiracies and the expulsion of the emigrants from England. which Bonaparte delighted to exaggerate, to mingle with doubtful charges of assassination, and to connect (wholly without grounds) with the English ministry. Those emigrants were enjoying the hospitality of England: Otto, the French agent in London, was therefore instructed to bring the matter to the notice of Lord Hawkesbury, and to demand the suppression of the obnoxious papers, and the dismissal of the emigrants from England. Hawkesbury's answers were at first of a peaceful and conciliatory character. He replied that he would consult the law officers on the matter of the press, and would go so far in the matter of the emigrants as to withdraw them from the isle of Guernsey. This answer was followed by still more peremptory demands, requiring effective measures of repression with regard to the press, the withdrawal of the emigrants from Jersey, the removal from England of the Bourbon princes, and the expulsion of all emigrants wearing the orders or distinctions of the old régime. What rendered these demands more grotesque was the fact that the Moniteur, the official paper of France, was constantly full of assertions of the complicity of the Government with the attempts of assassins in France, and of libels on the English Constitution; there was even an English paper, the Argus, published in Paris, a counterpart of the Ambigu of Peltier. To demands thus formulated no English Government could afford to give a temporizing answer, and Hawkesbury replied that the freedom of the English press was limited by English law alone, and that the exercise of hospitality could not be curtailed. At the same time, as Peltier appeared to have exceeded all legal license in his writing, an action was commenced against him, and in spite of a brilliant defence by Macintosh he was found guilty.[19]

Such conduct on the part of Bonaparte was rapidly changing the feeling of England and rendering war inevitable. It became evident that, no longer to uphold an aristocratic government, but for our very existence as an independent country, we must plunge into war. Consequent change of feeling in England. As this feeling gained ground, so did the desire that when that war should come it should find England in the hands of its ablest statesmen, and not in those of an incapable man like Addington. Even from the first, as soon as it was understood that Pitt, in deference to the King's weak state of health, had consented to forego the support of the Roman Catholics, his immediate friends had desired his return to office, and had regarded as false his position as the supporter out of office of Addington's weak ministry. Already, in November 1802, Canning, Negotiations for Pitt's return. Nov. 1802. the most eager of his supporters, in conjunction with Lord Malmesbury, had set on foot an address to Addington begging him to resign. This plan had been peremptorily closed by Pitt himself. Indeed, the obstacles in the way of his resumption of office were very awkward. In some sort the creator of the present ministry, and known to have had a share in most of their earlier measures, Pitt could not come forward in opposition till some flagrant instance of incapacity or some great national crisis should justify such a step. The only other hope was that modesty (which was not one of his characteristics) might induce Addington to acknowledge his incompetence, and himself advise the restoration of Pitt to the ministry. Fully aware of these obstacles, and feeling his position an anomalous one, Pitt withdrew for a time from Parliament.

During his absence the difficulties with France continued to increase, and the signs of Bonaparte's intention of making war sooner or later became more obvious. At length, in January 1803, was published a report of Colonel Sebastiani, who had been sent by Napoleon, nominally for commercial purposes, to examine the resources of Egypt and the East; in fact, so far from being commercial in its character, the report was devoted almost entirely to show with what ease Egypt could be again conquered by the French. It was impossible that such an official document could be issued by a power which was really friendly. At the same time Bonaparte had sent both to England and to Ireland agents who, under the same commercial pretext, were really minutely examining the resources of England and instigating Irish rebellion. Nor was the question of Malta as yet at rest. The project of obtaining a guarantee from the European powers had failed, and in face of the constant aggressions of Bonaparte, it was impossible for England to evacuate the island with the certainty that it would be immediately occupied by the French. But Bonaparte was still anxious to keep the occasion of war in his own hands, and still hoped to impose His interview with Lord Whitworth. Feb. 18, 1803. upon the feeble ministry of England. He summoned Lord Whitworth, the English ambassador, to an interview, in which he declared that he did not desire war, but that he would rather see England in possession of the Faubourg St. Antoine than of Malta, that he was ready to attempt a descent upon England if necessary, but how much better would it be for England to join with him and share his spoils and his greatness. Two things only were necessary for this,—the suppression of the press, and the removal of Georges, a Chouan leader and emigrant, from English protection. As for the counter-charges of the appropriation of Piedmont and of Switzerland, they were but trifles not worth mentioning. Almost immediately after this the Moniteur declared, in its annual account of the condition of the nation, that as long as party government existed in England an army of 500,000 must be kept on foot for defence and vengeance.

This was too much even for Addington, and on the 8th of March a message was brought down from the King to the Commons, declaring it necessary that measures of precaution should be adopted, alleging for this the great military preparations which were going on both in Holland and in France, which were in fact intended for St. Domingo, but which in the feverish state of international feeling were a just cause of uneasiness. In accordance with this message the militia were on the 11th ordered to be embodied. In spite of all that Bonaparte had done he pretended to be indignant at this step; and at a public reception at the Tuileries accosted Lord Whitworth with passionate words, Failure of renewed negotiations for Pitt's return. accusing England of driving him into war. Then at length Addington began to yield to public feeling, and through Lord Melville opened negotiations for the return of Pitt to office. But a frank resignation and an open acknowledgment that Pitt was the better man of the two was beyond him. He stipulated that Grenville and Windham, who had throughout opposed him, should be excluded from the new arrangements. He wished Lord Chatham to assume the position of nominal Prime Minister, while he and Pitt should be equal Secretaries. Pitt was not a man to accept a position of even nominal subordination; he did not even hear Lord Melville's proposition to the end. "Upon my word," said he, "I had not the curiosity to ask what I was to be." And thus England plunged afresh into war, while all her best statesmen were still excluded from office. For the crisis came rapidly nearer. The feeling of the nation was aroused, and Addington could no longer withstand it. An ultimatum with regard to Malta was drawn up, demanding its retention for ten years, its surrender after that period to the inhabitants, and the cession to England in its stead of the island of Lampedusa. Bonaparte was somewhat taken aback by this exhibition of vigour, but as his answer to the ultimatum was not satisfactory, Lord Whitworth demanded his passports, and War declared. May 18, 1803. withdrew from Paris on the 12th of May. The French ambassador left London on the 16th, and on the 18th a declaration of war was published.

This war was of a distinctly different character from that which preceded it. The one had been undertaken in the interest of aristocracy and of property, in a panic of fear of the growth of the liberty of the people; now the whole nation was driven to defend itself, and, while defending itself, Europe also, from the aggressions of a gigantic and all-absorbing ambition. The outbreak of this war marks a change in the career of Napoleon. He had hitherto acted, nominally at all events, as an agent for the propagation of national liberty. He had pretended throughout to be spreading the principles of the French Revolution; he had met with much sympathy from downtrodden nations; he had found it easy to overwhelm effete and unpopular dynasties. He was now entering upon a war against the people themselves, and, though success at first attended his arms, when it became evident that it was not assistance against tyrants but subjugation to a foreign power that he brought, the efforts to oppose him became national, and before the uprising of nations he ultimately succumbed. Bonaparte's first step after war was declared corresponded exactly with this Napoleon arrests all the English in France. change. Crowds of Englishmen had thronged to see with their own eyes the condition of revolutionized France. All the English in France between the age of eighteen and sixty, numbering it is believed about 12,000, were suddenly by a single decree taken prisoners, and kept confined till the close of the war, thus spreading sorrow and discomfort broadcast through England. The pretext was the capture of two ships before war was declared; they were not however captured till after the ambassadors had withdrawn, nor, as has subsequently been made evident, till Bonaparte had himself ordered an embargo to be laid on the English shipping.

Bonaparte's interference in the affairs of Ireland had also its share in rendering the war truly national. It had been hoped that the great work of the Union, following the suppression of the Rebellion of 1798, would have introduced peace and prosperity into the island. Nor at first did the hopes appear ill founded. Both Lord Hardwicke, the Lord-Lieutenant, and Lord Redesdale the Chancellor, appear to have believed in the rapid improvement both of the physical and political condition of the country. The Catholics, although disappointed of their hopes, seem to have understood the state of affairs which obliged Pitt to refrain from the further prosecution of their claims, and to have postponed all idea of present agitation.

But the miserable cultivation and the prevalence of waste lands in Ireland allowed of the existence of an extremely ignorant and prejudiced peasantry, and among them it was not difficult to excite again their old animosity to England. Bonaparte took advantage of this opening, and while the Peace of Amiens lasted many French agents seem to have been poured into Ireland, both for the purpose of inquiring minutely into the resources of the English Government there and of establishing a connection with the discontented peasantry. Many intercepted letters proved to Government the existence of these agents; their presence in Ireland was excused, like Sebastiani's mission to Egypt, by the assertion that they were merely commercial agents, following a system which had obtained in France ever since the time of Colbert. Their success was limited by the distaste of the Catholics for the French Revolution. In spite of Bonaparte's intercourse with Rome and the establishment of the Concordat with Pius VII., by which he established Roman Catholic Christianity as the religion of France, the Catholics could not forget the destructive doctrines which had attended all the former steps of the Revolution. It was therefore among the republicans only (not an influential body) and the ignorant mob that the agitation took any hold. A leader was found in Robert Emmett, the son of a Dublin Emmett's Rebellion. 1803. physician, who with his brother had been more or less implicated in the affairs of 1798. He visited Paris early in the Peace, had personal interviews with the First Consul, and returned home ready to instigate the rebellion. The other leaders were Russell, a religious enthusiast, and Quigley, a professional agitator. About Christmas 1802 the conspirators began their operations. Arms and powder were collected at depôts in Dublin, and members of the conspiracy were enrolled. Some of these informed the police of what was going on. The explosion of the powder in one of the depôts, and the discovery of pikes there, still further warned the Government, and Emmett considered it necessary to hasten the outbreak. Saturday the 23rd of July was the day fixed for the rising. It proved to be little more than a city riot. As no soldiery had been brought into Dublin, it was for some time in the hands of the mob, who plundered and got drunk. The only important incident of the riot was the murder of Lord Kilwarden, the Chief Justice, who, returning from his country-seat with his daughter and nephew, was met in the streets by a part of the mob and brutally murdered. The arrival at the castle of his daughter, who had contrived to make her escape from the murderers, at length set the military in motion, and the mob was dispersed without much difficulty. The depôt was discovered, with the supply of arms, green uniforms, and the proclamation of the provisional government which was to have been established. Emmett sought safety by pretending to be a French officer; but the French were not liked; his flight was not favoured by the people; he was captured and hanged. The importance of the outbreak lies chiefly in the disclosure of the deepseated hostility of the Irish, and the necessity laid upon the English of establishing a series of coercive laws, which remained in force for many years, and went far to neutralize the healing effect which it was hoped the Union would have exercised.

The declaration of war called Pitt from his retirement, for the war, in the form it had now assumed, seemed to demand the co-operation of all patriotic men. Pitt therefore again appeared in the House; he thought it his duty to see, now that war had come, that no laxity was displayed in its support, and returned to his place, intending, as he himself said, not to join in any opposition to the ministry so long as their measures seemed energetic, but to forget all that was past (and many things had been done of which he could not fully approve) and devote himself to insuring vigour and activity for the future. Few positions could now be more embarrassing than that of Addington. His peaceful plans had come to nothing; and conscious, as he could not but have been, of his own inferiority, and of the general desire under present Difficulty of Addington's position. circumstances for Pitt's return to office, he had now to withstand the powerful attacks of an unusually able Opposition, and the damaging criticism of a so-called friend whom all the world regarded as his rival. And it must be owned that Pitt's views were far more in accordance with the views of the Opposition than with those of the minister. Grenville, Windham, and Spencer, the consistent supporters of the preceding war, had entered into a close alliance with Fox, its consistent opponent. Their common view, which was shared by Pitt, was that the condition of the country was so critical that nothing but the ablest possible ministry could be tolerated—that the present ministry, consisting as it for the most part did of the least able members of Pitt's old Government, was wholly incompetent to meet the present dangers, and that the one thing necessary was a great combined arrangement by which the administration of affairs should be intrusted to men of all parties of the widest experience and the greatest talents. They were naturally anxious that Pitt, whose views they knew to be almost identical with their own, should openly join them, but, as has been seen, although he shared their views, he felt himself still bound to give some sort of support to a ministry which he had himself created, and which nominally upheld the same principles which he had always advocated. In this trying position Addington's Government showed His vigorous measures inefficiently carried out. very creditable activity. Their budgets, with which Pitt had at first been discontented, were now conceived in accordance with his own principles. A considerable portion of the increased burden was borne by taxation, especially by the reimposition of a property tax, and loans were contracted only as far as needful. Militia to the number of about 70,000 were embodied; an army of reserve 50,000 strong, raised by ballot to serve for four years, voted; and by a Bill, known as the Military Service Bill, the enrolment as volunteers of all men between the ages of seventeen and fifty-five provided for. The number of these volunteers speedily rose to beyond 300,000. As the standing army was kept at about 120,000, there must have been of one sort or other upwards of 500,000 armed men for the purposes of defence. The temper of the nation was thoroughly roused. Pitt himself, as Warden of the Cinque Ports, raised and commanded 3000 volunteers, and caused considerable offers of gunboats to be sent in to the Government from the maritime towns.

But great though these preparations were, they were carried out with a dilatoriness and want of energy in which Pitt and the Opposition found much cause of complaint. Windham was an enthusiast for the regular army and disliked the volunteers. Pitt pointed out, that although volunteers were exempted from serving in the militia, they could only claim their exemption when properly enrolled and armed, and the issue of arms was so slow as to throw a great damp upon volunteering, which this exemption was intended to encourage. There was also a great blot in the administration which afforded plentiful room for attack. Lord St. Vincent, great Increasing opposition. as an admiral, had proved himself incompetent as the head of the Admiralty. In the desire of the ministry for economy many of the gunboats and other ships had been rapidly broken up, and the stores in the dockyards sold, much of them to the French themselves. Attacks directed on these points began to tell. Other circumstances combined to drive Pitt to declare himself. He was perfectly conscious of his own greatness, and of the universal feeling that his present position was unworthy of him, and he believed that he was the right man to be intrusted with the Government in the present crisis. It was with much alarm that he heard that the King's health was again failing. There seemed every prospect that a regency would be necessary. If that regency were established, it was understood that Lord Moira, the Prince of Wales' chief adviser, would be called upon to form a Government. Pitt declared that under those circumstances he should be compelled to decline office; fearful of being thus permanently removed from the ministry, he thought the time for action had arrived; if he was to be minister at all he must take steps to become so; he therefore declared his total want of confidence in the present ministry, and stated his intention, Pitt offers to undertake the Government. should the state of the King's health permit, of writing to him, stating his views, and putting himself at his Majesty's service; he desired, if possible, a broad Government, but that if the King objected to that he should state his willingness to attempt to form one even upon a narrow basis. He further declared his belief that after the recess the combined Opposition would be sufficiently strong to compel the ministers to resign. Addington also was so conscious of this, that when, on the reopening of Parliament on the 5th of April, the Opposition assault began, he authorized Lord Eldon to enter into communication with Pitt. Through the Chancellor the letter before alluded to was laid before the King. Meanwhile the ministerial majorities were diminishing. The Irish Militia Bill was carried by a majority of twenty-one only, at that time regarded as very small. On the 23rd Fox moved to refer all Army Bills to a committee of the whole House. His motion was rejected by only fifty-two; while, Addington resigns. April 26, 1804. two days afterwards, on his attack on the Army of Reserve Bill, the ministerial majority again sunk to thirty-seven in a House of 443 members. Upon this Addington resigned.

On the 30th Mr. Pitt was informed of the King's desire that he should draw up a plan for a new administration; he accordingly stated, first in writing, and subsequently (May 7) in a long interview, Pitt desires a broad ministry. what he considered best for the country. On three grounds he strongly urged a large and comprehensive ministry. The war was a national one, and promised to be both long and expensive; to induce the nation to make the required sacrifice unanimity was most desirable. To wage war singlehanded was beyond the power of England; but while party divisions were rife in Parliament the confidence of foreign nations could not be gained. And lastly, if the King wished to keep the question of the Catholic emancipation from discussion, it was desirable that there should be no formidable Opposition certain to make use of the Catholic claims as a means of offence against Government. On these grounds the new minister urged the admission of both Grenville and Fox to the ministry; but he here found the King obstinate. Grenville he would admit, Fox never. The course that statesman had followed with regard to the American War, his strong language in favour of the Revolution, his strenuous opposition to the last French war, had rendered him politically hateful to the King. His friendship for the Prince of Wales, and the share which the King believed he had taken in the Pitt yields to the King's opposition. direction of the Prince's conduct, had excited his strong personal dislike. To these prejudices Pitt, in an evil hour for himself, yielded. He had indeed, as he had already stated, intended to do so. He consented to exclude Fox from his arrangements. But he still hoped to win the support of his old colleague Grenville, and since Fox, with great magnanimity, told his partisans that he had no wish that the King's personal prejudice against himself should influence their conduct, he was not without hopes of strengthening his Government by the addition of some of the Whigs. These hopes were disappointed. The two sections of the Opposition held separate but simultaneous meetings. In one Grenville declared he would not take office without Fox, and his followers accepted his decision; in the other the friends of Fox He forms a Tory ministry. determined to decline office if their chief was excluded. No resource was therefore left to Pitt but to form his government as best he could upon a narrow Tory basis. The political sections from which he was enabled to draw were his own immediate followers, and such of the late minister's as did not feel themselves pledged to follow Addington in his retirement. The result was not wholly satisfactory. Lord Eldon, the Duke of Portland, Lord Westmoreland, Lord Castlereagh, and Lord Hawkesbury, continued to hold office, Lord Hawkesbury surrendering the important post of Foreign Secretary to Lord Harrowby, and receiving in exchange the Home Office. Dundas, who had been created a Peer as Lord Melville, became First Lord of the Admiralty, while Lord Camden, Lord Mulgrave, and the Duke of Montrose, also became members of the Cabinet, which consisted of twelve, all of whom, with the exception of Pitt and Castlereagh, were in the Upper House. Several other men of importance were admitted to subordinate offices; Canning became Treasurer of the Navy, Huskisson one of the Secretaries of the Treasury, and Mr. Perceval, the future Prime Minister, remained in the position of Attorney-General.[20]

The change of ministry implied a complete change of policy. As Addington's ministry had been from the first intended as a peace ministry, so the accession of Pitt to office implied a vigorous prosecution of the war. But it was with very maimed influence that it entered upon its work; all hope of acting in foreign affairs with the full weight of a great combined national party behind him had disappeared from Pitt's view. The same opposition which had opposed Addington was ready to oppose him; while Addington himself, unable to act in any great or magnanimous manner, had also joined its ranks, and was in open opposition to his old friend. It was with a majority scarcely larger than that of the ministry he had succeeded, supported by the same mediocre men, and aided in the Commons by one minister alone, that Pitt found himself obliged to encounter the bitter enmity of Bonaparte.

The necessity for energy Pitt probably felt more strongly than any of his contemporaries. Strange incredulity was expressed both by Fox and Grenville as to the reality of the invasion with which Bonaparte was threatening England. Yet it is certain that the intention of invasion was perfectly real. Bonaparte had determined to carry out the threat he had let drop to Lord Whitworth. In the first place it suited his policy to keep his army together and thoroughly employed. The temper of the Parisians was lukewarm; he felt that some pressure was necessary to induce them to give him the support his ambition required, and such coercion could in no way be more certainly procured than by exciting the personal devotion and enthusiasm of his soldiers by unfolding before them constant visions of glory. At the same time his exasperation against the English led him to underrate the difficulties which lay in his way, and to believe in the real practicability of his scheme. The minute and careful preparations in which he engaged are incompatible with the idea that the invasion was a mere feint. In all the ports of the Channel boats were being built; even inland towns with any water communication with the sea were busily employed in the same labour. A great basin was constructed at Boulogne, of a peculiar shape, intended to allow of an extremely rapid embarkation of the army, which was encamped upon the neighbouring heights, and fortifications were raised to render the flotilla secure from the sea. Yet in all probability, had the plan been tried, it would have proved a failure. The boats used to transport the troops were to be of several classes and sizes, and the mere action of the tides, which are of great strength and complexity in the Channel, would have been exerted quite differently on these different sized vessels, and would almost of necessity have separated the flotilla; yet the whole success of the movement depended on the simultaneous landing of the army at one point. Moreover, for the passage of heavily-laden and flat-bottomed boats an absolute calm of two days would have been necessary, and a calm of two days is a phenomenon of rare occurrence in the Channel; while, thirdly, success presupposed the complete absence or idleness of the British fleet.

However, whether practicable or impracticable, Napoleon intended to make the effort, and Pitt, in common with the English nation, believed in his intention. The excitement was universal. The country was entirely occupied in drilling and warlike preparations; martello towers were built along the southern coast, beacons rose on every hilltop, a great canal or ditch was dug along the coast of Kent, and Pitt excited the ridicule of Grenville by the energy with which he superintended the numerous reviews which he set on foot through his brother Lord Chatham. Such defences have been derided as ridiculously inefficient, and certainly neither the Kentish ditch nor a few round towers mounting one gun each, nor a half-disciplined militia, could have checked the French army had a landing been effected. The real value of such preparations was the life and energy and courage which they roused in the people. The more real work of the minister was the restoration of the national forces to their full efficiency, and the effort to induce the other countries of Europe to combine in withstanding the dangerous ambition of the French usurper.

With regard to the army the great ministerial measure was the Additional Force Bill. There existed at this time two systems of enlistment, the one for a limited term, the other for the general service; the recruiting officers in these two branches had entered into a sort of competition, the effect of which was that very large and quite unnecessary bounties were offered to induce men to enlist on one or other of the two systems. A second difficulty was one which constantly attends a volunteer army, the difficulty of procuring a constant and regular supply of recruits. The intention of the Additional Force Bill was to obviate these two difficulties. Pitt thought that this might be done by raising an additional force of 50,000 men, whence a supply of trained soldiers could be constantly passed into the regular army. There already existed an army of reserve, collected under the Reserve Bill passed by the late ministry, but its full complement of 50,000 had not been reached; there was a deficiency of 9000 men. At the same time the militia had risen much beyond its usual numbers. It was at present 74,000 strong, instead of 40,000 for England and 8000 for Scotland, which was regarded as its normal strength. The present Bill reduced the militia to its old dimensions. The remainder, with the 9000 as yet unraised men of the army of reserve, was to form the additional force from which 12,000 annually were to pass into the army. Parishes were to be assessed at a certain number of men, and if they failed to supply them a moderate fine was to be laid upon them, to go to the general recruiting fund. It was an attempt, in fact, to introduce in some degree the principle of compulsory service, already slightly recognized in the militia. The newly-organized body had this also in common with the militia, that it was connected with the regular army by forming second battalions not bound to serve abroad, but to be used to supply the place of the regular army when it was required for foreign service. It was supposed that there would be no difficulty, when military habits were once formed, in finding the annual 12,000 to feed the regular troops. The whole strength of the Opposition was brought to bear against the Bill, which certainly, in its compulsory clauses, introduced a new principle into the English military system, and it was only with the comparatively weak majority of forty that it was Increase of the navy. carried through the House. As far as the naval forces were concerned energy and activity were all that was required, and these were supplied by Lord Melville. In the first year of his administration he could boast that he had added to the fleet no less than 166 vessels, either completed or in a state of forwardness, while during the same period 600 ships had been docked and repaired.

With regard to foreign affairs Pitt's position did not at first seem hopeful. He wished to follow out the policy of the last war, and to form a third coalition. But Bonaparte was engaged in almost the same process in opposition to England, and the chances at first seemed all in favour of the success of the French in this vast competition. By the Treaty of Lunéville those German princes who had been dispossessed by the advance of the French to the Rhine, and by the withdrawal of Tuscany from the House of Austria, were to be indemnified at the expense of the ecclesiastical principalities of the Empire. This arrangement might have been carried out without much difficulty by the Germans themselves, but the avarice of the great powers Prussia and Austria, and the difficulty which the smaller princes found in obtaining their restitutions, rendered mediation necessary, and by a strange act of folly the arbitration of Bonaparte himself was sought. He had used this opportunity to flatter Russia by suggesting that the Emperor should be joined with himself in the duty of arbitration, to please Prussia by unduly favouring its claims, and to foment all the rivalries of the Germanic body. He had further, on the rupture of the Peace of Amiens, suggested that some of the points at issue should be decided by the arbitration of Russia, hoping thereby to silence for ever any complaints Alexander might have to urge against him, so that neither that power nor Prussia was disposed to be unfriendly to him, while Austria was exhausted under the late heavy blow which had been dealt her, and much occupied by the rivalry of the other German powers. But in spite of this appearance of friendship of both Russia and Prussia for France there were secret causes of hostility between them. Alexander had seen through the somewhat barefaced attempt to purchase his favour by the offer of the position of arbitrator, and while consenting to act as mediator, had continued to urge the injustice of the conduct of the French with regard both to Piedmont and to Germany. To such an extent had the angry correspondence been carried, that a scene had taken place (July 29, 1803) between Bonaparte and the Russian ambassador very similar to that with Lord Whitworth. With Prussia also the ambition of the first Consul had prevented him from completing his work of conciliation. He had displeased that Court by a persistent refusal to withdraw his troops from Hanover. On the whole, the feeling of Lord Harrowby, when he entered upon the plan of forming a coalition, was that his best hope lay in the direction of Russia; but that all Europe would remain quiet till the great invasion of England should either have destroyed that power or by its repulse offer a favourable opportunity for assaulting France.