But the Spaniards, especially the Castilians, were a people of high temper; in spite of a century's degradation, certain remembrances of a former greatness hung about them. They saw with scorn and disgust the treacherous conduct of their own rulers, who were handing them over, bound hand and foot, to a foreign prince, whose very virtues rendered him doubly detestable to them; for the rule of the French meant splendid and centralized organization, restraint, self-denial, and wise government, very much opposed to Spanish feeling. While their rulers were basely truckling to the invader the people rose; the flame of insurrection spread far and wide; great riots in Toledo and Madrid were followed by similar exhibitions of national anger throughout the country, and Napoleon's armies, though they found no regular opposition, though intrigue and treachery had apparently removed all obstacles, found themselves in the midst of a hostile population, and masters only of the ground on which they stood. To meet this new difficulty the fertile mind of the Emperor had at once a plan ready. Madrid was to be a centre from which should radiate in all directions expeditionary armies to suppress the insurrections, Operations of Napoleon's three armies from Madrid. Madrid itself resting for support on France. To hold the communications between Madrid and France therefore became a prime object. This work was intrusted to Bessières, while Duhesme operated in Catalonia, and expeditions were sent out from Madrid against Valencia under Moncey, and against Andalusia under Dupont. Bessières, though his general Lefèbvre failed before the desperate energy of the Saragossans, thoroughly defeated the Gallician troops under Blake and Cuesta at the Rio Seco. Duhesme effected nothing, and was obliged to raise the siege of Gerona. Moncey, though he reached the town of Valencia with success, was unable to take it, and had to retreat. Dupont pushed at first as far as Cordova, but losing heart, and badly supplied from Madrid, also attempted to retreat, was pursued by the Spaniards, and compelled to lay down his arms with 18,000 men, Joseph evacuates Madrid. Aug. 1, 1808. after the battle of Baylen, before he could recross the Sierra Morena. Unsuccessful, therefore, on all sides, and though victorious yet hard pressed upon the North, the French were obliged to retire, and King Joseph, evacuating Madrid, withdrew to France.

Meanwhile Junot's army had proceeded direct to Portugal with orders to occupy it by the 30th of November 1807. As Junot approached the capital, the Prince Regent, acting under the advice of Lord Strangford, the English ambassador, determined to leave his European dominions and to transfer the apparatus and seat of government to Brazil. On the 29th of November as many as 15,000 persons were carried by the English fleet down the Tagus. The last ship had hardly sailed when Junot arrived. He had wished to stop and reorganize his troops in Salamanca, but pressed by the Emperor, Junot's army occupies Lisbon. Nov. 30. he hurried forward in spite of the difficulties of the way, and marched upon Lisbon with only a few thousand weary and travel-worn soldiers. He however met with no opposition there, and after the manner of Napoleon's lieutenants, at once set about Gallicizing the country. The Portuguese army was chiefly sent away to France. The police in the hands of the French was well administered, and though the people of Lisbon obeyed unwillingly, order was successfully maintained. The position of Spain and Portugal was thus closely analogous; in both cases the people had been deserted by their natural rulers, in both cases the consequences were the same. The insurrections in Spain were followed by similar movements in Portugal. The people took the government into their own hands, and a popular Junta was established at Oporto under the influence of the Bishop.

The insurrection in Spain had been observed with enthusiastic admiration by the people of England. It seemed at last as if that popular insurrection against the tyranny of Napoleon, which had long been expected, had arrived. Nevertheless, the total absence of central authority produced its inevitable effects upon a country so ill ruled and so ignorant of self-government as Spain. Ambitious men everywhere laid hold of the local authority, and irresponsible juntas arose. The provincial feeling, always unreasonably strong in the Peninsula, found full vent. Junta disputed with junta, and the whole country was involved in the wildest anarchy. None the less the feeling of the English people was a true one. Napoleon had reached the point when he came into collision with that very power which formed the basis of his own success—the power of the people. Already his behaviour in Germany had excited among the lower classes enthusiastic feelings of hatred to their conquerors and of desire for national liberty; and the outbreak of the Spanish insurrection added fresh vigour and raised Asturian envoys arrive in England. June 1808. fresh hopes in the lovers of liberty throughout the whole of Europe. To the English Government the arrival of two Asturian envoys in the month of June seemed to offer an opportunity which had long been wanted of giving a national and unselfish character to our opposition to the great conqueror. In the course of time it afforded also a battle-ground on which at length the military power of the country found room to move in larger and more combined action, than in the feeble expeditions of the earlier part of the war. But as yet this was not foreseen. For some years the great war in the Peninsula was starved, while money was lavished upon useless and isolated efforts in other parts of the Continent; it was only slowly and by degrees that the genius, the steadfastness, the success, of Wellington taught England the necessity of large and well-continued efforts in one direction. The Asturian envoys were received with enthusiasm not only by the Opposition but by the Government. But the opportunity offered was not wisely made use of. Spain was inundated with agents of no political ability, who were deceived by the boasting assertions of the Spaniards. Money and arms were sent over in lavish quantities to be left unopened on the quays, appropriated by the rival juntas for their own personal or local advantage, or to fall into the hands of the enemy, and the Spaniards, who did little or nothing for themselves, were taught to demand the assistance of England as a right.

The position of Portugal seemed to offer a more favourable ground for action, and thither it was determined to send an English armament. But the Government could not yet conceive of war upon a large scale, and in entire ignorance of the real condition of Spain believed that a mere handful of English troops, aided by the boasted enthusiasm of the Spanish nation, would be able to withstand the enormous armies Napoleon was ready to pour into the Peninsula. The army at first sent was little better than an expeditionary force. A body of troops ready at Cork for war in South America were despatched under Sir Arthur Wellesley, at that time Secretary for Ireland; but by some ridiculous mismanagement two senior officers, Sir Harry Burrard, and Sir Hugh Dalrymple, Governor of Gibraltar, were put over his head, and Sir John Moore, who was despatched with a second body of troops to reinforce him, though he had served as commander-in-chief both in Sicily and Sweden, also found himself in a subordinate position. The expedition touched first at Corunna, but was persuaded by the members of the local junta to proceed to Portugal, where they declared the numerous Spanish army was already collected, and whither they promised speedily to send reinforcements. Upon reaching Oporto, however, the commander found that there were no Spanish troops in the north of Portugal, neither were there any Portuguese troops; but upon the river Mondego there appeared to be a disorganized body of about 5000 men, representing 40,000 for whom the Bishop of Oporto had received accoutrements. With them there were some 10,000 peasants without arms. Wellesley had now a choice left. He might land north of Lisbon and act against Junot, or proceed to Cadiz, and joining Spencer, who had a small command Wellesley lands at Figueras. Aug. 1, 1808. there, act against the French in Spain. He preferred the first alternative, and determined to land at the mouth of the Mondego, near Figueras. He sent to Cadiz for Spencer's troops, but fortunately that general, on hearing of the victory of Baylen, had already determined to sail for the Tagus. The two corps when joined amounted to about 12,000 men. The landing of the English at the Mondego confined the operations to that tongue of land which lies between the sea and the Tagus in its south-westerly course, and which is terminated by the city of Lisbon.

Wellesley determined to strike rapidly, and bring affairs in Portugal to a crisis at once. Therefore, although deserted by the Portuguese troops, he advanced directly southward towards Lisbon. Junot's troops were somewhat scattered, and the temper of the people prevented him from energetic action. He proceeded, however, to concentrate his troops, and while this movement was going forward the English army came into contact with one of his divisions Combat of Rorica. Aug. 17. under Laborde, occupying a strong position at the end of a valley leading from Obidos to Rorica. Here, after a sharp contest, the French general found himself outflanked by the hills which line the valley, and withdrew, allowing Wellesley to proceed. Meanwhile Junot had been continuing his concentration, and had collected 14,000 men at Torres Vedras, to bar the road to Lisbon. Sir Harry Burrard, Wellesley's superior officer, had now arrived at the coast, and Wellesley begged him to allow Sir John Moore's division, on its arrival from England, to land on the Mondego river, and cross the tongue of land to the Tagus, thus cutting off the natural line of retreat into Spain, which would be up the valley of that river. He then proceeded to advance against Junot. But Burrard, a commonplace general, disregarding his advice, determined to bring Sir John Moore up as a reinforcement, and forbad Wellesley to undertake any offensive movement till that general's arrival.

Wellesley was therefore obliged to return to his army, which was in position at Vimiero. A little hill covered the village to the front. On either side of it ran a chain of heights, from which on the east a branch ran off southwards. There was a direct road between Vimiero and Torres Vedras, and a second road from Torres Vedras to a place called Lourinham ran along the top of the branch ridge crossing the main ridge. On the hill before the village and upon the ridge to the west Wellesley took up his position, expecting to be attacked on his right. But early on the 21st the French Battle of Vimiero. Aug. 21, 1808. came into view on the Lourinham road, and as they pressed forward evidently threatened the left, and not the right, of the English position. A considerable body of troops was therefore moved from the right to the left ridge, a movement unobserved by the French, for the valley between the armies was thickly wooded. For the same reason a ravine which rendered the left wing nearly unassailable was unobserved by the French. Junot directed two main attacks, upon the central hill and upon the left ridge. The attack upon the centre was defeated, for it was open on the flank to the fire of an English brigade moving to the left, which halted half-way up the hill when the strength of the central attack was seen; the left attack was ruined by the ravine. Meanwhile troops had been sent to turn the English left by the Lourinham road and to advance along the left ridge, which the French believed almost unoccupied; but, as has been mentioned, it was now covered with troops, and Ferguson's brigade beat the assailants back, and pursued them along the ridge till he had wholly separated them from the rest of the French army. They must have capitulated had not an unexpected order arrived to halt. Sir Harry Burrard, who had been on the field all day, had just assumed the command, and the change of leaders became at once perceptible. When the battle was over, thirteen guns, and many prisoners, including a general, were in the hands of the English, and the French had lost between 2000 and 3000 men.

The road to Torres Vedras from Lourinham, on which the beaten French army had collected, was two miles longer than the direct road from Vimiero. Wellesley designed to push forward with his victorious army, part of which had not been engaged, to forestall the French at Torres Vedras, and cut them off from Lisbon, a measure which, had Sir John Moore been landed from Mondego, must have completed their ruin. Again the prudence of Sir Harry Burrard thwarted Wellesley's plan. He was compelled to allow his army to rest in their old position. Sir Harry Burrard having thus spoilt a great victory, was almost immediately superseded by the arrival of Sir Hugh Dalrymple. Their combined wisdom allowed an advance upon Lisbon, but insisted on bringing Sir John Moore to join the Convention of Cintra. Aug. 30. army. While this was being settled, an envoy arrived from the French offering to treat, and finally the convention known as the Convention of Cintra was entered into, in many points against Wellesley's advice. It stipulated for the evacuation of Portugal, but for the transport of the whole French army, with their guns and horses, to France. It was likewise arranged that the Russian fleet, at that time in Lisbon, should be regarded as in a neutral port; but as some English regiments had got possession of the mouth of the river, and had hoisted the English flag, this clause was overruled, and Siniavin, the Russian admiral, with his fleet, passed into the hands of the English.

It was not to be supposed that Napoleon would calmly watch the defeat of his troops even in an obscure corner of Europe, still less when their defeat seemed to thwart the completeness of his system, and was connected with events which had driven his brother from his throne. Though he knew that conquered Prussia beneath the surface was glowing with inextinguishable hatred, and though Austria, in spite of the war against England in which she was nominally engaged, was strengthening her army and re-establishing her finances in a way which seemed to threaten fresh efforts at freedom on her part, he determined to turn the full strength of his Empire upon the devoted Peninsula. He felt that so long as his friendship with Russia existed, so long as the Peace of Tilsitt held firm, his position was tolerably secure. He therefore renewed his alliance with Russia at a meeting with the Czar at Erfurth (Oct. 12), and suddenly ordered the widely scattered divisions of the grand army to concentrate on Paris preparatory to marching into Spain.

Unconscious of the coming danger and of the vast strength of its enemy, the central Junta at Madrid went on with its ill-arranged preparations to secure the freedom of Spain, and with its idle boasts as to the strength of the national armies. The English Government had not yet lost faith in Spanish assertions, nor learnt the absolute worthlessness of Spanish generals and armies; the fables of the Junta gained credence, and while all the other generals who had gone to Portugal were recalled, some 25,000 men were intrusted to Sir John Moore, with orders to advance into Spain and assist the Spanish troops, which were now occupying the valley of the Ebro and closing the French frontier. Even had the Spanish troops been worth anything, there was an absurd disproportion between the forces prepared and the scene of action for which they were intended. Nor did this weakness fail to strike military men. The Duke of York, though by no means a first-rate general, called the attention of Government to the wide dissipation of the Spanish troops, and the great distance of Portugal from the scene of action, and gave it as his opinion that to employ less than 60,000 men was merely to waste them. The Government refused to listen to his advice, Lord Castlereagh, the War Minister, was unmoved, and Moore was sent forward to certain failure. With a raw commissariat, and ill supplied with money, although it was at that very time being lavished upon the Spaniards, he embarked upon his dangerous march through a country where the roads were so bad that his Sir John Moore's march to Salamanca. Oct. artillery to reach Salamanca had to proceed all up the valley of the Tagus almost to Madrid and come back to meet him at Salamanca, where he was to be joined by reinforcements from England under Sir David Baird. Moore's concentration at Salamanca was wholly based on the supposition that the Spanish armies were strong enough at all events to retard, if not wholly to resist, the invasion of the French. Yet the grand army was rapidly approaching, and before long the forces collected upon the frontier rendered resistance hopeless. In September arrangements were made for the incorporation of the troops coming from Germany with those already in Spain, and eight great corps d'armée, commanded by six French marshals and Generals Junot and St. Cyr, besides the Imperial Guard, were collected to bear down all opposition.

While Moore was painfully completing his concentration at Salamanca, Napoleon himself arrived at Vittoria, and almost immediately the Spanish troops, which the English general was to support, were scattered to the winds.

From his central position the Emperor was able to concentrate his chief force now on his right, now on his left. In a rapid succession of victories Lefèbvre and Soult destroyed the armies upon the left and centre of the Spanish line, and on the 11th of November Blake was entirely ruined at Espinosa. Immediately the whole strength of the French army was turned against the right, and on the 23rd of the same month Lannes crushed Palafox and Castaños at Tudela. All the boasted armies of Spain were thus swept away as it were in a moment, and Napoleon advanced upon Madrid, forced the passage of the Somo-Sierra, and after some slight opposition took possession of the capital on the 4th of December. The news of the defeats of Espinosa and Tudela reached Moore at Salamanca before his artillery had joined him. He resolved to await its arrival, and then to retreat.

Meanwhile, although Napoleon at the head of nearly 400,000 men was pressing onward rapidly to Madrid, in a few days to drive the members of the supreme Junta fugitives to Badajos, the old system of misrepresentation was kept up. Mr. Frere, the English plenipotentiary, had been persuaded to share in the illusions of the Junta, and he wrote peremptory letters, urging Moore to advance, and to rally the Spanish armies around him behind the Tagus. But news had at length reached Moore that those Spanish armies did not exist; the national excitement he had been taught to expect was nowhere visible, and he presently heard that the capital itself was in the hands of Napoleon. For 25,000 or 30,000 English soldiers to oppose the grand army with Napoleon at its head was simply ridiculous; their retreat was a matter of necessity. But Moore determined before Sir John Moore's retreat. retreating to relieve if possible the pressure upon the south of Spain, by pushing forward against Soult and threatening the French communications with France. In acting thus he judged that Napoleon was far more likely to direct his efforts against the English force than to spend his time in subduing the southern provinces, which would easily fall into his hands afterwards. He therefore advanced towards the Carrion river, where Soult had collected his army. The measure succeeded. Napoleon heard of the advance on the 21st; dismissing all thought of the Spaniards, he checked the further advance of his troops, and turned all his attention to crushing the English. On receipt of the news that Napoleon had left Madrid, Moore, who had been hoping to strike a blow before the arrival of Napoleon, at once began his retreat. He was closely followed by Soult, while Napoleon, forcing the passes of the Guadarama, which were deep in snow, came up from the south upon his flank. The retreat was attended with great difficulty. Moore's troops were young, the subordination was not perfect, and the enemy pressed him close; and at length, on the 1st of January, Napoleon and Soult formed a junction at Astorga, and their combined army amounted to 70,000 men. In ten days Napoleon had moved in the depth of winter 50,000 men across 200 miles of hostile country. But Moore's rapidity had spoilt the effect of even this stupendous march; he had already passed Astorga.

There news reached the Emperor of the approaching declaration of war from Austria, and he found it necessary to resign the command to Soult. Some of his troops he took with him; but Soult himself, and Ney, who supported him, still commanded upwards of 60,000 men, by whom the pursuit was recommenced. Amid many scenes of disorder the English army pursued its career towards Vigo, where it was expected that the fleet would be ready to receive it. But information was brought that the harbour was not fit for the embarkation of troops. The line of retreat was therefore changed to Corunna. At Lugo, so close was the pursuit that Moore thought it necessary to prepare for battle, and the troops, though they had suffered much and become disorderly in retreat, at once showed that their spirit was unbroken. To the number of 16,000 they formed willingly and regularly in array of battle. But as the French did not attack, and as the supplies would not permit of more than one great battle, the army being now concentrated and encouraged, Moore marched off at night, and resumed his course towards the sea. Although the movement was executed in the midst of a heavy storm, and though Moore reaches Corunna. Jan. 10. so much disorganization followed that the loss between Lugo and Betangos was more than in all the former part of the retreat, from thence to Corunna, the army being collected, marched in good order. As they approached the port, to their horror they discovered that the fleet had not arrived. Contrary winds were still detaining it at Vigo, "and the last consuming exertion made by the army was rendered fruitless." Battle was after all necessary. Large magazines of arms and ammunition left unappropriated and undistributed by the Spanish authorities, though their armies were in desperate want, were found and destroyed. The horses, many of them already broken down, were put to death. Soult's army, almost as exhausted by pursuit as Moore's by retreat, did not assemble till the 12th, but it was not till the 14th that the English transports arrived. The cavalry, who had lost their horses, the sick, and fifty pieces of artillery, were put on board, and preparations made for covering the embarkation of the troops. The ridge on which Soult's army was drawn up overlooked and commanded the position of the English, and some generals were desirous even then of entering into negotiations to secure the safe withdrawal of the army. Moore would not hear of it.

It was determined that upon the evening of the 16th the embarkation should take place, but about the middle of the day the French army began the attack. Even in the last hour of retreat the English showed their strength; the assaults of the French were repulsed on all sides, and when night closed they were everywhere falling back in confusion. Moore had fallen in the battle, and the command devolved on Hope. Had he known that Soult's ammunition was nearly exhausted he would have continued the strife, and the disaster of the French would have been complete. As it was, he held it wiser to embark the English army during the night, an operation which was performed successfully and without confusion. The loss of the English was estimated at 800, that of the French at between 2000 and 3000. But though, no doubt, the battle of Corunna was an English victory, it was advantageous only in allowing the army to be withdrawn, and left the north-west provinces of Spain and the north of Portugal open to the French. Sir John Moore, whose character as a soldier had already been acknowledged, decoyed by false hopes and misled by false information, had yet nobly succeeded in withdrawing for a time the pressure of the French from the south of Spain, and in the midst of overwhelming difficulties had saved the British army and closed his career with a brilliant victory.

The Convention of Cintra and the retreat of Sir John Moore, the greatness of which was not understood, discouraged the English ministry with regard to its policy in the Peninsula. The cause of the Spaniards was however so popular that it was not deemed advisable wholly to desert them. For three months after the convention Portugal had been left a prey to its own anarchy, but in December Sir John Cradock was sent out to command the English troops. The armaments which had been sent to Cadiz having failed to effect anything there, collected at Lisbon. The Portuguese were at length wise enough to demand an Beresford made commander of the Portuguese army. English general for their army, and Beresford was sent out to take the command, and thus something like order was re-established. But Napoleon had commanded the conquest of Portugal, the troops of Victor threatened it in the valley of the Tagus, while Soult had entered it from the north and mastered Oporto. Refusing to act with insufficient troops, and waiting for reinforcements, Sir John Cradock had wisely taken the position to defend Lisbon from the advance of Victor, and was stationed at Lumiar and Sacavem just above Lisbon. It was Wellesley arrives. April 22, 1809. in this position that Wellesley found the English army when he came to take the command on the 22nd of April. With his arrival begins what is properly called the Peninsula War, a war which, by constantly sapping the strength of Napoleon, by exhibiting the possibility of his defeat, and by showing him and his rule, in opposition not to a government, but to a people, was to do more than anything else to complete his final overthrow.

But the English ministry, even while continuing the war, by no means regarded it in this light. Their hopes were not unnaturally turned rather to political coalitions in Europe and to expeditions which appeared more directly to attack the heart of the French empire. Moreover, political feeling in England was strongly excited. Though Division of opinion in England. there was a general desire for the continuation of the war, there was no unanimity as to the means of carrying it on, or as to the people by whom it should be carried on. Every disaster was exaggerated for political purposes, every obstacle thrown in the way of ministerial action. Our system of party government is not well suited either to great European combinations (because the open hostility exhibited to the ministry of necessity gives an appearance of uncertainty to our engagements) or to the carrying on of war where secresy is necessary, and where reliance upon those to whom the war is intrusted is required. In domestic affairs its effect is different, and at this time the Opposition was doing good service in bringing abuses to light and rendering salutary reforms necessary. Early in the spring they found grounds for assaulting the ministry in the conduct of the Duke of York, the commander-in-chief, who was accused by a certain militia colonel, Wardle by name, of being influenced by his mistress, Mrs. Clark, in his appointments, while her favour was said to be procured by money. Scandal of the Duke of York. The scandal excited was great, and the immoral details of the story were in everybody's mouth. The inquiry made it evident that Mrs. Clark's influence had been used, but it was not so clear that the Duke had ever himself acted otherwise than conscientiously. The majorities in his favour, however, were so small, that he felt it necessary to resign his office, and Sir David Dundas was appointed in his place. Before long his accuser was himself sued by a tradesman for the price of goods with which he had furnished a house for Mrs. Clark. This gave such an air of malice to the charge, and displayed Colonel Wardle's desire for purity in so strange a light, that it greatly lessened the feeling against the Duke, who was before long restored to his office.

This quarrel, in addition to the case of Lord Melville, excited attention as to the general purity of the administration. Considerable sums of money, amounting to nearly £20,000,000, were unaccounted for. Nor did a committee of inquiry, though it sent in its report, throw much light on the matter. But in March the Chancellor of the Exchequer brought in a Bill to prevent the sale and brokerage of office. Among other matters, attention was drawn to patronage in Charges against Lord Castlereagh, May. India, and Lord Castlereagh confessed to having purchased a seat in Parliament for a friend by a gift of an Indian writership. Lord Castlereagh's frank confession induced the House to resolve that no criminating resolution was necessary. Again in May a fresh charge was brought involving Lord Castlereagh and Mr. Perceval also. They were charged with procuring the election of a certain Mr. Quintin Dick, and of afterwards influencing his vote. They were acquitted by a large majority. None the less, Romilly remarks in his Memoirs, "the decision of this night, coupled with some that had lately taken place, will do more towards disposing the nation in favour of a parliamentary reform than all the speeches that have been or will be made in popular assemblies." This question of parliamentary reform was now again beginning to occupy the public mind. Though still commanding majorities, the Cabinet was not at one with itself, and before the year was over the ministry had to be reorganized.

But meanwhile the war was proceeding in its course. The threatening news from Austria which checked Napoleon in his pursuit of Moore proved true. The cruelty and injustice of the attack upon Spain, and the spectacle of a people in revolt, had strongly excited the feelings of Germany. Earnest men of all ranks had enrolled themselves in the secret society known as the Tugendbund, which was shortly to show its strength. The same feeling of hostility to France had shown itself in irresistible force in Austria, smarting under its repeated disgraces. There the Court and Government put itself at the head of the movement, and the Archduke Charles, who was regarded as a military genius, issued a proclamation declaring that the liberty of Europe rested with the Austrian arms. There was no regular coalition formed, but Austria felt that it could rely upon the friendship of England (although still nominally at war with it), of Prussia, where the popular feeling ran high, and probably even of Russia. Armies numbering more than 200,000 men were set on foot, and on the 9th of April Austria declared war against Bavaria, an ally of France. The generals left in charge of Napoleon's army in Germany somewhat mistook his orders, and the Archduke succeeded in forming a partial concentration of his troops and occupying Ratisbon. The arrival of the Emperor on the field soon changed the face of affairs. A series of battles was fought; the left wing of Charles's army was separated from the right, and his forward advance entirely frustrated by defeats at Abendsberg (April 20), Eckmühl (April 21), and Ratisbon (April 22). Napoleon again advanced to Vienna. But there he found the Archduke Charles still fronting him upon the northern side of the Danube, and the great bridge which crosses the river at Vienna broken down. Near that city the course of the Danube is divided by an island called Lobau, about three miles in length. Napoleon constructed bridges at the Battle of Aspern. May 22, 1809. island, and brought his army across them into the level called the Marchefeldt on the northern side. There was fought the great battle of Aspern. Victory declared for neither party, and Napoleon found himself in an awkward situation, for the river had risen, and aided by the efforts of the Austrians, had swept away the bridge, and he was thus cut off from reinforcements. He contrived to get back to Lobau, and there awaited his opportunity.

His position was indeed precarious. The secret societies had shown themselves, and a partisan insurrection had broken out under Colonel Schill and the Duke of Brunswick in Saxony and Westphalia. It was premature, and without much difficulty suppressed. Revolt of the Tyrolese. The Tyrolese too, headed by Andrew Hofer, an inn-keeper of the valley of Passeyr, had burst into revolt; 25,000 Bavarians which marched to suppress them had been beaten back. Again and again in the mountain passes they encountered and defeated both the French and Bavarian troops. The revolt was unsuppressed, when Napoleon determined to break from his difficult position. In July, while pretending to build a massive bridge across the river, he brought his army rapidly across it on a temporary structure. The Archduke, who had expected to attack the French while crossing, had now to fight another pitched Battle of Wagram. July 6, 1809. battle, and two vast armies, numbering together between 300,000 and 400,000 men, encountered each other upon the tableland of Wagram. The French gained a hard-won victory. The Archduke was pursued to Zmaim, Peace of Vienna. Oct. 14, 1809. in Moravia, and there an armistice was made which ripened subsequently into the Peace of Vienna, signed on the 14th of October, by which fresh territory was torn from Austria for the advantage of Bavaria, France, and Russia; the kingdom of Spain was recognized; the insurgents of the Tyrol deserted, and a further pledge for the maintenance of the Continental System given. The close of the year was marked by a still further act of wickedness on the part of Napoleon, and a stronger proof of how completely he had deserted the principles of the Revolution. On the 6th of December he divorced his wife Josephine, and entered into negotiations, which were completed the following year, for his marriage with Maria Louisa, an Austrian princess.

The armistice of Zmaim was entered into on the 12th of July. On the 27th of that month, the very day on which the news of the armistice reached England, a great expedition left for the mouth of the Scheldt, for the English ministry had not deceived the hopes of The Walcheren expedition. July 1809. the Austrians, and were determined to undertake what they hoped would prove a diversion in their favour. For this purpose all the strength of England was to be employed. 40,000 soldiers were to be carried across in 400 transports under the charge of no less than 245 ships of war. Yet, great as was the effort, the commonest precautions were neglected. Although it was well known that the climate of the islands at the mouth of the Scheldt was pestiferous, the medical officers were not consulted, none of the proper medicines were sent, and the force was accompanied, in spite of the protest of the surgeon-general, by only one hospital ship. Moreover, the pomp and publicity with which the expedition, which was intended to be secret, was prepared deprived it of much of its value; and lastly, Court and ministerial favour secured the command for Lord Chatham, Master-General of the Ordnance, a man wholly unfitted for an important command. At length, after much delay caused by the want of harmony between the two branches of the service, the fleet set sail. It was the opinion of the best officers of the army that Antwerp might have been at once secured by a coup de main, yet it was determined to proceed more regularly and with deliberation; and Flushing (which, as the dykes had been cut, was Flushing taken. Aug. 15. regarded as impregnable) was taken in two days after the arrangements for the attack had been completed. It was not till the 21st of August that Lord Chatham began to think of moving towards Antwerp. But, as by that time the enemy's squadron had been withdrawn up the river to the city, and the intermediate fortresses had been so strengthened as to render the advance difficult, absolutely nothing further was even attempted. The army was kept lying in the plague-stricken swamps of Walcheren. Fever began to make fearful ravages. On the 29th Chatham wrote home that he could do no more—that already 3000 of the troops were sick. By September 11,000 men were stricken, and the great bulk of the army was ordered home. Lord Chatham, taking with him as many of the sick as he could, accompanied it. 15,000 men were left to occupy the island. Though the fever still spread with fearful rapidity, the only remedy supplied was a quantity of Thames water, which was constantly sent out. The roofs of the huts had fallen in, the men were removed to the churches, and the churches proved damp and worse than the roofless huts. At last 100 bricklayers were sent from England to repair the huts; the bricklayers were speedily themselves in hospital. The death rate was now 200 or 300 a week; and so terrible was the effect of the fever, that before the next June, of the 40,000 troops sent out 35,000 had been in hospital. Nor did this great folly produce the smallest effect on the general war. Even had the expedition not been so delayed that the Austrian armistice was already signed when it sailed, it could have done no good. Napoleon himself wrote of it, "Before six weeks, of the 15,000 troops which are in the Isle of Walcheren not 1500 will be left, the rest will be in hospital. The expedition has been undertaken under false expectations and planned in ignorance."

While wasting their strength in this idle display, the ministry were being taught, had they been willing to learn, where English forces might have been wisely employed. In Portugal, Wellesley, on taking Wellesley victorious in Portugal. the command, had marched against Soult in the north, had brought his army across the Douro in face of the French, who were occupying Oporto, had recaptured that city, and driven Soult to a desperate retreat. By extraordinary vigour and good fortune, Soult, though there were traitors in his camp, contrived to extricate his army, but Portugal was free. And Wellesley, victorious in the north, and deceived by the constant false information of the Spaniards as to the weakness of his enemies, determined to turn his arms against the other French army which was threatening Portugal in the valley of the Tagus. He was there to act with the Spanish army under Cuesta, an old man of crabbed temper and of great self-conceit. Victor's army fell back before the advancing English from Talavera behind the Alberche river.

By this march Madrid was threatened, and Joseph collected for its defence the troops of Victor, Sebastiani, and his own guard, amounting to about 50,000 men. As Wellesley had with him less than 20,000 English troops, and as he could place no reliance upon the Spaniards of Cuesta though they were nearly 40,000 in number, it was a bold resolve to march against Victor. But Wellesley was ignorant of the extreme danger of his movement. Constantly misinformed by the Spaniards, he believed Soult's army in Castile and the plain of the Douro to consist of about 15,000 men; in reality it was more than 50,000 strong. With these it was possible, collecting them at Salamanca, to cross the mountains separating the plains of the Douro and the Tagus, to pass between Wellesley's troops and Portugal, and thus placing him between two armies, each virtually superior to his own, entirely ruin him. Ignorant as yet of the character of the Spaniards, Wellesley could not believe that he should be kept uninformed, nor could he believe that the Spanish troops supplied to occupy the passes of the mountains, and restrain, or at least check, Soult's movements, would give ground without striking a blow; nor, before entering on his enterprise, could he have conceived that his army would have been systematically kept without food. It is nevertheless true that the greatest difficulty was found in procuring rations, which often consisted merely of a few handfuls of grain, while the Spanish troops were very fairly fed. Victor and the King had taken up a position beyond the Alberche stream, a little river flowing from the north into the Tagus above Talavera. Beyond that stream, Wellesley, when he found how he was treated, positively refused to move. Beginning to appreciate the character of the Spanish troops, he urged Cuesta not to venture on a forward movement without him; but the obstinate old man persisting in passing the Alberche, was roughly handled by Victor, and only saved from the consequences of his rashness by English assistance.

Soult had informed Joseph of his great plan. All the King had to do was to remain quiet, and check the advance of the English till Wellesley was caught in the trap. But there was a second Spanish army apparently threatening Madrid from the south. It might well be that before Soult's arrival the capital would be lost, although, if Soult's plan answered, it would be immediately regained. The King could not bring himself to bear even the temporary loss of his capital, especially as the hospitals and supplies for his army were there. He therefore rashly listened to the advice of Victor, which was contrary Battle of Talavera. July 28, 1809. to that of Jourdan, his proper military adviser, and determined to attack the English. The position of Talavera is about two miles in length, crossing the plain from the river Tagus to a small range of hills which bounds the valley; beyond this range is a second valley of about half a mile in extent, and then come the mountains. The key of the position is the highest of the secondary hills, and this Wellesley occupied. The Spaniards he placed behind entrenchments in Talavera. Victor made a second error in making two preliminary attacks upon the key hill. Though these attacks failed, he still believed he could carry the position, and Joseph yielded to his desire for a general engagement. This was fought on the 28th of July. The advance of the French light dragoons so frightened the Spaniards that many regiments at once turned and fled, carrying the news down the valley that the English army was destroyed. Such as remained in their strong position proved sufficient to hold it, and were not seriously molested. The whole brunt of the battle fell upon the English in the centre and left wing. At one moment the centre was broken through, and disaster might have followed had not Wellesley at once seen what was wanted, and sent the 48th regiment down from the hill, though the fighting there was severe, and re-established the battle in the centre. An extraordinary and reckless charge of the 23rd light dragoons across an apparently impassable ravine, though carried out with the loss of almost half their number, had the effect of paralyzing a whole division of the French army, which was attempting to turn the English left by the valley between the hills and the mountains. When the evening closed the French had been defeated at all points, and the English remained masters of their position.

But by that time Soult had come almost unopposed through the mountains from Salamanca to Placentia and the direct road to Portugal was closed. All hopes of rendering the victory useful were therefore gone, and Wellesley was compelled to cross to the south of the Tagus, and take refuge among the mountains. After considerable loss and much suffering from the abominable usage he endured from the hands of the Spaniards, he came to a fixed determination that he would never again act in concert with them, that henceforward his first duty lay in saving Portugal, from which, if events favoured him, he might ultimately advance with an English and Portuguese army, and do for the Spaniards what they were totally unable to do for themselves.

The victory of Talavera was a great one, and the English ministry recognized it as such by raising Wellesley to the Peerage as Viscount Wellington. Nevertheless it was open to the cavils of the Opposition, for it could be truly urged that it had not produced any permanent advantage, and had been followed by a somewhat disastrous retreat. In Parliament some Opposition speakers even went so far as to urge that the name of the commander should be omitted from the vote of thanks to be given to the army. But it was in fact the weak war administration in England which rendered it useless. Our resources had been wasted in the pompous and ridiculous Walcheren expedition, and in a second expedition, almost as useless, which was despatched to Italy, where it was unable to effect anything, and had to withdraw to Sicily.

When Wellington withdrew from Talavera, after waiting some time on the Guadiana, he took up his position in the more northern part of Portugal, near Almeida, preparing for the defence of the country. During his inactivity there the advance of the French was nearly unchecked. They marched into Aragon and Catalonia, and defeated an army of 50,000 Spaniards at Ocana (Nov. 20), thus throwing open the province of La Mancha, and obtaining an opportunity for further advance into Andalusia. This province was also overrun, with the exception of Cadiz, which was saved by General Albuquerque. The invasion thus formed itself into three defined divisions; an army for the invasion of Portugal, an army for the completion of the conquest of Andalusia, and an army in Catalonia, while the King and his Imperial Guards formed an army in the centre. Having thus borne down all opposition in Spain, Napoleon's intention was to overrun Portugal in the following year. His army for the purpose was placed under the command of Massena, while Soult was intrusted with the operations next in importance, and directed against Cadiz.

The assault which Wellington had been long preparing to resist was now to come. The ministers in England—in part despairing of his success, in part unable to comprehend the greatness of his schemes—distinctly told him that he must rely upon himself. But, with extraordinary steadfastness and courage, he undertook the task. Ever since the October of the preceding year he had foreseen what would happen; he had known that in all probability his troops would be outnumbered, and that he should be unable to make head against the vast armies which Napoleon might set at motion against him. He had therefore designed a great defensive scheme, so that if the worst came to the worst he might still have some place to which to retire and avoid the necessity of evacuating Lisbon. He had therefore turned the promontory between the Tagus and the sea into a vast fortification. During the time of his delay on the Wellington fortifies the Lisbon promontory. 1810. Guadiana, and while wintering near Almeida, thousands of Portuguese workmen were turning the hills into impregnable fortresses. This great work, known as the lines of Torres Vedras, was threefold. The outer line, twenty-nine miles in length, extended from Alhandra on the Tagus to the mouth of the little river Zizandra close to Torres Vedras. The second, twenty-four miles in length, and which was intended originally to be the strongest of the two, was from six to ten miles in rear of the first, reaching from the Tagus at Quintella to the mouth of the St. Lorenza. In addition to this, a small fortification was erected to cover an embarkation in case the other two lines were forced. It enclosed an entrenched camp and Fort St. Julian, and was two marches in rear of the first line. Time had allowed Wellington so to strengthen the first line that it subsequently proved sufficient for all purposes. The General's great cares during the winter had been,—first, to instruct the Portuguese authorities to insist upon the inhabitants destroying all villages, mills, and crops in the course of the invading force when it should appear; secondly, to get the half-trained militia of the country over which he held command employed in such a manner as to oblige the French to act in a mass and prevent detailed fighting; and thirdly, so to arrange his troops that while spread abroad, for greater ease in procuring provisions, they should yet be within easy distance for concentration. He thus waited, fully prepared to carry out his great scheme when Massena should think fit to strike the first blow. So determined was he to adopt a waiting policy, that he even allowed the great fortress of Ciudad Rodrigo, the key of that part of Spain, to be taken before his eyes. Meanwhile he had to listen calmly to the assertions of the Opposition in Parliament, that no British soldier would leave the Peninsula but as a prisoner, and to see the City of London addressing the throne to inquire into his conduct, and protesting against conferring honours and distinctions on a general who had exhibited nothing but useless valour.