Ciudad Rodrigo fell on the 11th of July. It was not till September that the great attack began. Then Massena, with an army of 65,000 men, set forward towards Lisbon by the valley of the Mondego, having been informed by friendly Portuguese that the road was easy, and that there was no important position between him and Coimbra, where he believed he could forestall Wellington. An accident lost the English commander the advantage that any opposition from the fortress of Almeida might have given him. The explosion of a magazine rendered the capitulation of the fortress necessary almost immediately. In spite of Massena's attempts to deceive him as to the road he intended to pursue, in spite of the distance at which some of the English troops were stationed, Wellington contrived to collect his army and to place it between Massena and Coimbra. Down the valley of the Mondego the march was continued. The orders for the destruction of the property were carried out as far as possible, and crowds of wretched fugitive peasants accompanied the army. A panic began to spread in Portugal. The intriguing regency did not carry out the orders for destruction with sufficient activity. There was yet enough food left between Mondego and the lines to supply the French during the ensuing winter. To raise the temper of the country, and to excite the people to the voluntary destruction of Battle of Busaco. Sept. 29, 1810. their property, Wellington was compelled (in entire opposition to his original plans) to fight a great battle with the advancing French. He selected the ridge of Busaco, which almost closes the valley of the Mondego, just north of Coimbra, as his battlefield. The English and Portuguese there stood at bay, and the French were completely defeated. The moral effect was all that could be desired—the Portuguese troops thenceforward became fitting comrades for the English, and the waning trust of the people was restored; but as a military operation it effected nothing. Massena found a pass through the hills upon his right, through which he withdrew with his beaten forces, and Wellington, not attempting to attack him, fell back, giving orders to the Portuguese militia to close upon the French rear. Thus harassed in his progress, Massena arrived before the famous lines (of the existence of which he had only heard five days before), only to find them thoroughly occupied by the English troops. Against the works he could do nothing; his operations were in fact reduced to a blockade. Massena's object, therefore, was to feed his army till reinforcements arrived, Wellington's, by closing up the Portuguese militia behind Massena retreats. Nov. the French army, rapidly to reduce it to starvation. The expected reinforcements did not come, and on the 14th of November Massena, who had lost upwards of 30,000 men since he had entered Portugal, was obliged to draw off his army and begin a regular retreat. He moved leisurely, hoping to strike another blow before he finally withdrew, but when reinforcements arrived for the English he proceeded with some haste to Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo. The operations were closed by the combat of Sabugal (April 3, 1811), where Massena was again worsted, and after which he finally withdrew from Portugal.

While Massena was attacking Portugal, Soult had been vigorously prosecuting the siege of Cadiz, and had there made dispositions which would probably have ended in its capture, when he was ordered to assist Massena, for the Emperor was more anxious to put an end to the regular warfare in Portugal than to complete his conquests in Spain. Portugal is assailable either by the northern line from Salamanca, which Massena had already followed, a line covered by the fortress of Ciudad Rodrigo, or by a line south of the Tagus through Estremadura and Alemtejo, which is covered by Badajos and Elvas. In this latter direction Soult had marched; the fruit of his operations were the victory of Gebora (Feb. 19), where the Spaniards were completely defeated, and the capture of Badajos. The two great frontier fortresses between Spain and Portugal were thus in the hands of France. But the departure of Soult from Cadiz encouraged Graham, who commanded the English in that fortress, to attempt to drive Victor, who was left in command, from his lines. A combined force of about 12,000 men sailed from Cadiz southward, intending to march upon the back of the French lines. Victor, marching out to defend them, was defeated at Barosa (March 5) by the vigour and generalship of Graham, La Peña, the Spanish commander, as usual, adding nothing to the victory, and failing when the victory was won to put it to any use. The battle was however so severe a threat that Soult, not wishing to lose all the fruit of his former arrangements, withdrew from his attack on Portugal. Yet, as both Badajos and Ciudad Rodrigo were in the hands of the French, in the following campaign there were two scenes of operation of which those fortresses were the centres.

The ministry in England had at last begun to feel some confidence in their general, but they would have been content with the successful defence of Portugal. Not so Wellington; his mind was full of great projects for the relief of Spain. The two points on which the French pressure was strongest were Catalonia and Cadiz; and Wellington, believing that Massena, although his troops had been again raised to 50,000 men, would not be in a fit state for immediate action, had it now in his mind either to invest Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo, betake himself with much of his army to Badajos, unite with the English and Portuguese troops there, and assault Soult in Andalusia; or to engage in a still more magnificent plan,—to march his army right across Spain, taking Madrid on the way, which would cut off the resources of Soult's army and oblige it to withdraw, and then upon the eastern coast to enter into communications with the English troops at that time in Sicily, and, working from a new base of operations, to attack the French in Catalonia. In either case the capture of Badajos was necessary, as its possession by the French was a constant threat to the Spaniards in Cadiz and to the southern provinces of Portugal. Wellington therefore, leaving the blockade of Almeida in the hands of Spencer, went to Elvas to arrange with Marshal Beresford, who commanded the troops in that direction, for the siege of Badajos. Before his arrangements were completed he was hastily summoned again to the north, where Massena had unexpectedly shown signs of activity, and was moving to relieve Almeida. Wellington was in time to check him at the hard-fought battle of Fuentes Onoro (May 5), which was followed by the evacuation of the fortress. He then returned to superintend the more important Battle of Albuera. May 16, 1811. operation of the siege of Badajos. But before he arrived the operations had been interrupted. Soult had advanced to succour his late prize, and Beresford had thought it necessary to fight a battle with him at Albuera. This battle, one of the bloodiest ever fought, took place on the 16th of May. The English and their allies had about 30,000 infantry and 2000 cavalry, but of these only 7000 were English, and the Spaniards were not to be trusted. Soult had with him only 19,000 good infantry and 4000 cavalry, but Beresford's faulty arrangements almost neutralized the superiority in forces. The English position was a ridge, in front of which ran the Albuera river. In the centre were the village and bridge of Albuera, through which ran the road to Valverde over the ridge. This road being Beresford's only line of retreat, he regarded a hill in the centre which defended it as the key of his position, and there put his best troops, intrusting the right to the Spaniards under Blake. He also neglected to place any troops across the river, and the enemy's movements were entirely hidden by the wooded heights on that side. For a direct attack Beresford's dispositions were correct, but upon his right a tableland stretched so far back as to command the Valverde road and to look along the back of the English position. Soult saw that by mastering this height he would cut off the English from retreat, oblige them to form a wholly new front, and in all probability destroy them. He therefore secretly, under cover of the hills, massed his troops upon his own left, and while a sufficiently important assault was made upon the bridge to attract Beresford's attention, the bulk of the French army rapidly proceeded to place itself at right angles to the English position upon the tableland. The main point of the battle was in the struggle for the possession of this vantage-ground. In vain Beresford entreated Blake to change his front and cover the right. The Spanish general insisted that the real attack was upon the village. Beresford himself took the command of the Spanish troops, the change of front was effected, but even then they could scarcely be induced to move. At length the English second division moved from the centre and mounted the hill. But, brought too recklessly into action, they suffered much. Scarcely a third of the regiments remained standing, and Beresford was already thinking of retreat when Colonel Hardinge induced Cole with the fourth division, and Abercrombie with the third brigade of the second division, neither of whom had been much engaged, to advance to the rescue. At the head of 6000 men Hardinge advanced to cover the hill. The crowded formation of the French, who were in column, impeded their movements, and the advance of the English was so irresistible, that at length, unable to open out, they gave ground, and in the words of Napier, "slowly and with a horrid carnage were pushed by the incessant vigour of the attack to the furthest edge of the hill," and at length "the mighty mass, breaking off like a loosened cliff, went headlong down the steep; the rain flowed in streams discoloured with blood, and 1800 unwounded men, the remnant of 6000 unconquerable British soldiers, stood triumphant on the fatal hill." In four hours nearly 7000 of the allies and 8000 French were struck down. The victory was however won, and after occupying a threatening position during the 17th, on the 18th Soult marched away. The advantages of this bloody battle were little or none.

Yet though the battles of Fuentes Onoro and Albuera produced little result, although the French continued their successes in Catalonia, and Spain seemed entirely at their disposal, their position was by no means wholly prosperous. The broken armies of the Spanish had formed themselves into guerilla bands, their useless generals were superseded by daring partisan commanders, and troops wholly untrustworthy in pitched battles proved masters of the art of wild irregular warfare. It was only in large masses that the French were safe; yet, as Napoleon always acted on the principle that war should support war, and allowed only £80,000 for the maintenance of his armies in Spain, which at that time amounted to more than 300,000 men, the dispersion of the forces was an absolute necessity in order that food might be procured. No courier could be despatched except under escort; letters to Paris were guarded at first by 1400 dragoons, subsequently by 3000. Moreover, Joseph, and the Emperor were not at one. The Spanish King did not wish to rule only as the agent of his brother in a conquered country, and at length the vexatious tyranny of Napoleon pressed so heavily upon him, that he went to Paris and resigned his crown. He was induced to take it back again, but the mere fact of his visit, coupled with Wellington's success and the late victories, which were complete if not decisive, raised the spirits of the patriots and increased the energy and number of the guerillas. Moreover, affairs in Europe were beginning to take a turn which compelled Napoleon to act with less vigour in the Peninsula. His marriage with the Austrian archduchess was a deadly insult to the Czar, for a princess of whose house he had previously been negotiating; the Continental System was becoming almost unbearable, coupled as it was with the French occupation of the northern ports of Germany; and the addition of territory to the Duchy of Warsaw seemed to threaten a restoration of the Polish kingdom, and to be a violation of the Treaty of Tilsitt. The estrangement of the Czar was becoming so evident that Napoleon's mind began to turn more and more towards an expedition against Russia. The number of troops in Spain was lessened, and first-rate soldiers withdrawn to give place to new conscripts.

But, in spite of this relaxation, this year forms in the opinion of the great historian of the war its most critical period. For Wellington was miserably supplied from home, and sickness was rife among his troops, so that he could not bring more than 8000 men into the field, while the Portuguese Government, quarrelling with him, frequently refused supplies, and so starved their own troops, that instead of 40,000 soldiers who had been available on Massena's advance, only 19,000 badly-fed men were now with the army, and against this weakened force a new combination of the French had been arranged. The battle of Albuera had been followed by a renewal of the siege of Badajos. Want of proper material rendered the progress of the siege slow, and Marmont, who had succeeded Massena in command of the army of Portugal, was ordered to co-operate with Soult coming from the south to relieve it. Their junction was effected and the siege was raised. To all appearance therefore the battle of Albuera had been a French victory, and two armies instead of one appeared to threaten Portugal by the southern line. Wellington had brought his troops down and The French refuse the battle at Caya. June, 1811. offered the combined generals battle upon the Caya. But, ignorant of the weakness of the English, and imposed upon by the confident front which Wellington with astonishing boldness showed them, the battle, which might easily have been decisive of the fate of the Peninsula, was refused by the French generals, and Soult moved southward, while Marmont returned to occupy the valley of the Tagus.

This critical year of 1811 was a bitter disappointment to Wellington. He had hoped that his period of inactivity was over, that the defensive might have been changed to an offensive warfare. The blunders of his subordinates, the wretched jealousies of the Portuguese regency, and the poor support he received from home, had rendered his efforts futile. He still found himself when the year closed obliged to be contented with preserving his defensive attitude in Portugal. It was even worse than this. The French had succeeded in completing the conquest of the east of Spain, and the army of Suchet had advanced as far as Valencia; while in the north Asturias and Galicia had again fallen into their hands. Some gleam of success had indeed been visible in the south, where Hill had checked Drouet in Estremadura, and where Soult had been beaten off in his attack upon the little fortress of Tarifa. But the reorganization of the French army (especially of the great army of the centre), and the threatened reappearance of Napoleon upon the scene, rendered the close of the year one of gloom and despair.

Yet events were occurring in Europe which allowed Wellington still to hope. Already, as early as the beginning of 1810, the appropriation by Napoleon of the estates of the Duke of Oldenburg, a relative of Alexander, had induced the Czar to declare his freedom from the Continental System. It had become evident to him that, sooner or later, war would be forced upon him, and he had entered into open preparations. Under one pretext or another Napoleon had also been strengthening his troops upon the eastern frontier of his dominions, and though the forms of friendship were still kept up, it was plain that before long the two empires would be plunged into hostilities. During the whole of 1811 remonstrances and recriminations had passed between the courts. Alexander had at first intended to re-establish the kingdom of Poland, where the influence of Napoleon was still great, and to begin offensive movements. The success of Wellington at Torres Vedras is said to have suggested to him and to his counsellors the more prudent method of attracting the French into the heart of Russia, and of allowing the weather and the natural difficulties of the country to have their full force as his allies. He knew that, in spite of the marriage of the Austrian archduchess with Napoleon, he could rely upon the friendship of the Court of Vienna should any opportunity arise of successful opposition to France. Prussia likewise, since the battle of Jena, had undergone a complete though silent revolution; feudalism had been almost destroyed, the peasants given a share in the property of the land, and bourgeois and peasant alike endowed with self-government; the people and the government were absolutely at one. While ostensibly restricted to the treaty number of 42,000, the army had been practically increased to 150,000 men; and, by an extraordinary effort of patience and good administration, the broken nation had been re-established. There, too, it was certain that any successful effort to check Napoleon would be hailed with delight. But Napoleon, observing that Russia did not take the initiative, and seeing that both Austria and Prussia were to all appearance still at his service, forgetting the lesson which he should have learnt from Spain, that the enmity of the people is more to be feared than the enmity of the government, seemed irresistibly led to the war which was to complete his ruin. In August 1811 there took place another of those scenes which had so frequently preluded war. At a public meeting of ministers in the Tuileries the Russian ambassador had to undergo a violent attack from the Emperor. From that moment all Europe knew that the war with Russia was determined on. It was upon the certainty of the approach of this event and the nature of the French warfare in Spain that Wellington rested his hopes.

Marmont's army had been moved for the sake of procuring food into the valley of the Tagus, which was thus called upon to support two armies, that of the centre and that of Portugal. Wellington did not believe that it could do this for long, but while the armies were there barring the valley of the Tagus offensive movements of any importance were impossible, as Soult and Drouet occupied the south, and the northern army in Asturias, capable of being reinforced by Marmont, prevented action in the valley of the Douro. But meanwhile Ciudad Rodrigo was not itself within immediate reach of the covering army; a sudden attack and capture of this fortress would almost certainly bring Marmont northward to save the neighbouring country and to relieve the valley of the Tagus. Even a weak army covered by the fortress would probably be able to make good its position, while Wellington himself marching southward might also capture Badajos, and thence defeat Soult and Drouet in Andalusia. With infinite pains to avoid discovery he ripened his plan; preparations were secretly made at Almeida and at Elvas for the two sieges, and the first rapid blow was successfully struck, and Ciudad Rodrigo captured (Jan. 19). It had the effect expected; Marmont collected his troops at Salamanca, the scattered detachments of the French were everywhere drawn in, Hill's southern army was moved towards the north, and Wellington was sufficiently strong to fight a battle if necessary. Marmont for the present resigned the fortress and again distributed Capture of Rodrigo and Badajos. his troops. Wellington then proceeded to strike his second blow. Leaving one division behind him, with some Spanish troops and Portuguese militia, he moved southward, and at length succeeded in storming Badajos also, though with fearful loss (April 6). He acted with unusual skill, and the charge against him of having foolishly wasted life in the siege proves upon examination to be utterly groundless; for it was the extreme rapidity with which the fortress was captured which prevented Soult from coming to its relief. But again the fruits of his success were snatched from him; he was unable to follow out his plan of driving Soult from Estremadura, for he was badly seconded by the troops he had left in the north; Marmont, though somewhat slowly, had begun to carry out Napoleon's orders to regain Ciudad Rodrigo and to invade Portugal, and Wellington had to make all haste back to re-establish his affairs there. His rapid appearance from the south on Marmont's flank compelled that general to retreat, but the opportunity of a southern war was over, and the English army was again spread along the whole line of Portugal, but with this important advantage that the two key fortresses of Spain were now in its hands.

It was as yet only the spring, Wellington had to choose in which direction he would arrange the ensuing campaign. He determined to make his attack on the northern line; a victory over Marmont would throw open the road to Madrid, and Soult would either have to retire from the south or be cut off from his communications. A portion of his army might indeed be sent to assist Marmont; but the harvest in the valley of the Douro is considerably later than in the south, and it was impossible that a large additional number of troops should be subsisted for at least a fortnight to come. Thus for a while he could act against Marmont alone. Further to secure his position, he strengthened the army under Hill in the south, planned and executed an extraordinary capture of the French lines of communication at Almaraz, thus rendering the intercourse between the two armies lengthy, and at the same time re-established the bridge of Alcantara, close to the Portuguese frontier, by which his own communications with Hill were rendered ten days nearer. It was thus against an army of about equal numbers with his own, but isolated for the present at all events from reinforcements, that Wellington advanced. Salamanca and its forts were captured, and Marmont fell back before him.

But his advance was not all triumphant, Marmont succeeded in turn in obtaining the ascendant. By a series of clever movements he compelled Wellington to retire, and moving towards the Battle of Salamanca. July 22, 1812. right flank of the English, seemed to threaten the communications between Salamanca and Ciudad Rodrigo, while he kept himself in communication with the central army under the king. Wellington saw that retreat was necessary, and he intended to return to Portugal. But Marmont was not contented with this success. He was eager to fight before his junction with the king, and brought on a battle beyond the Tormes, just south of Salamanca. The English occupied a sort of basin in a loop of the river; about the centre was a hill called the Arapiles; round the southern edge was a ridge which led to the point where the road by which the English must retreat ran. Marmont, hoping to envelop the English, sent forward his left along the ridge. Wellington saw the advantage thus offered. Holding the Arapiles with his left, he fell on the flank of the advancing column, while Pakenham faced it upon the ridge. The French left was thus entirely destroyed, their attacks upon the central hill were unsuccessful, their confusion was increased by the loss of their commander, who was wounded early in the day, and it was only because a Spanish garrison which should have cut off their retreat across the Tormes at Alba had been withdrawn without Wellington's knowledge that their army escaped destruction. As it was, Clausel, who had succeeded Marmont, was able to bring off the greater part of his troops in safety.

The arrival of reinforcements under Sir Home Popham on the north of Spain had drawn a certain portion of the French troops in that direction, and against a weakened and defeated army Wellington proceeded in his triumphant advance toward Madrid. Joseph again left the city and retreated to Valencia, and with all the signs of wild rejoicing the conqueror was received in the capital of Spain. The effect of the late battle was exactly such as had been anticipated—King Joseph, acting as commander-in-chief, ordered Soult to evacuate Andalusia and the south. It was in vain that that general pointed out the possibility of holding his position there, and intreated the king to come with the other armies to his rescue: the orders were peremptory, and much against his will Soult withdrew and effected a junction with Joseph and Suchet in Valencia. The south and centre of Spain thus seemed clear of enemies, but the hold of the French was as yet shaken only, not broken; for in fact though Wellington's march had forced his enemies in two directions (Clausel, with the remainder of Marmont's army, having retired north, while the king withdrew south-east), such were their numbers that each division became the centre of an army as powerful as his own. Indeed, the very effect of his victory in drawing Soult from Andalusia had concentrated a vast power in Joseph's hands. Wellington was, however, aided by two circumstances. An expedition had been sent to Sicily under Sir William Bentinck; a portion of it under Maitland was landed at Alicante, and kept Suchet and the Catalonian army in play, while Sir Home Popham did the like for the army of the north.

Of the two armies against which Wellington had to contend by far the largest was the army of Soult and the king, on the south-east. On the other hand, Clausel's forces were beaten and retreating, so that it appeared to the general better to leave a detachment under Hill to cover Madrid, while he himself repaired with the bulk of his army to strike a final blow at Clausel by the capture of Burgos, intending to return at once and with his whole combined forces fight a great battle with Soult and the king before the capital. Again events occurred, upon which he could scarcely have calculated, which thwarted his purpose. The Spanish army, which had been intrusted with the duty of guarding his communications with Salamanca and of completing the capture of the fortresses of the Douro, and some English forces which had been left to assist it, were so badly handled that the retreating army was in fact left unmolested, while extreme want of money and political difficulties hampered Wellington's own march. Clausel, too, proved a general of great ability; his retreat up the valley of the Arlanzon towards Burgos was a masterpiece; while, to crown all, the resistance offered by Burgos and the deficiency of proper artillery proved greater obstacles than had been expected. The delay thus caused allowed the French to recover; the crisis was met with energy, fresh troops were poured across the frontier; Souham, who took the chief command, found himself at the head of a force almost double that of Wellington; and as Soult began to draw towards Madrid from Valencia, thus threatening the safety of Hill, there was no course left but to summon that He retreats to Portugal. general northward, and to make a combined retreat towards Salamanca and Portugal. It was not the most glorious passage of our arms. Want of pay and some other causes had somewhat slackened the discipline of the troops, and though no disaster occurred, and though the French were more than once checked, there were scenes of wild disorder and insubordination which called forth stern reprimands from the general.

This was the last of Wellington's retreats. Events in Europe lessened the power of his enemies; while fighting for his very existence on the main continent of Europe, Napoleon could not but regard the war in Spain as a very secondary concern, and a great many old and valuable soldiers were withdrawn. The jealousy which existed between Joseph and the generals, and the dislike of the great generals to take upon themselves the Spanish war, threw it into inferior hands for some little while, and there is little more to chronicle than a succession of hard-won victories. Moreover, Wellington's position was in other ways much strengthened; he had received from the Brazils full power of action in Portugal, at Burgos he had been made commander-in-chief of the Spanish army, while the changes in the ministry at home, though they had deprived him of his brother's assistance, had yet been on the whole favourable to him; his greatness and success had become the chief support of the ministry. He had, moreover, by his personal authority established discipline in the Portuguese army, had used his power and influence to supply the commissariat and other trains, and even the Spanish troops which had been placed at his disposal had been brought into something like order. The whole active force of the French had been reduced to 197,000 men, while Wellington had contrived to prepare 200,000 allied troops for the campaign, although it was chiefly upon the 70,000 Anglo-Portuguese that he relied. The English fleets covered the coast, and every port thus became a little centre of action. A vigorous insurrection had arisen all along the northern provinces; and it was this more than anything else which decided Wellington's course of action. While leaving troops to occupy the attention of the French in the valley of the Tagus, he intended to march by his own left (thus avoiding the difficulties offered by the Douro and the Carrion rivers), connect himself with the northern insurgents, and directly threaten the communications with France, either fighting for or turning every position in which the king might try to intercept him.

His movements, which had to be effected with considerable secresy, were well carried out; the various divisions of his army met at Toro on the Douro. As he had expected, the French had to fall back before him; he compelled them to evacuate Burgos and attempt to defend the Ebro. Their position there was turned, and they had again to fall back into the basin of Vittoria. This is the plain of the Battle of Vittoria. June 21, 1813. river Zadora, which forms in its course almost a right angle at the south-west corner of the plain, which it thus surrounds on two sides. Across the plain and through Vittoria runs the high road to France, the only one in the neighbourhood sufficiently large to allow of the retreat of the French army, encumbered with all its stores and baggage, and the accumulated wealth of some years of occupation of Spain. While Wellington forced the passage of the river in front south of the great bend, and drove the enemy back to the town of Vittoria, Graham beyond the town closed this road. The beaten enemy had to retreat as best he could towards Salvatierra, leaving behind all the artillery, stores, baggage, and equipments.

The offensive armies of France had now to assume the defensive and to guard their own frontier. Before advancing to attack them in the mountains, Wellington undertook the blockade of Pampeluna and the siege of St. Sebastian. It was impossible for the French any longer to regard diplomatic or dynastic niceties. Joseph was superseded, and the defence of France intrusted to Soult, with whom Battles of the Pyrenees. 1813. the king had hopelessly quarrelled. He proved himself worthy of the charge. A series of terrible battles was fought in the Pyrenees, but one by one his positions were forced. With fearful bloodshed, St. Sebastian was taken, the Bidasoa was crossed (Oct. 7), the battle of the Nivelle fought and won (Nov. 10), and at length, in January, Soult was driven even from the Adour and forced to surrender Bayonne.

But by this time events on the other side of France had changed the appearance of the war. Napoleon's threatened invasion of Russia had taken place; the defensive plan adopted by the Russians proved successful. The Emperor had himself hastened back to Paris after the conflagration of Moscow, while his ruined and broken army struggled home through the terrible suffering of the Russian winter. As Alexander had foreseen, the reverse of the French had been followed by the defection at first of Prussia and shortly afterwards of Austria. The powers of Europe were thus again formed in a coalition. With such troops as he could collect, Napoleon had hurried, in the summer of 1813, to the very furthest confines of Germany, and fought the great battles of Lutzen and Bautzen. But the flower of his troops had been lost in Russia, his armies were no longer what they had been. His enemies in vast numbers began to gather round him. Though victorious at the gigantic battle of Dresden (Aug. 24, 1813), he was unable to make a final stand against the vast armaments of the coalition. Several of his lieutenants were defeated, and at length, on the 19th of October, the battle of Leipsic was fought, which ended in his complete defeat. It is said that on the two sides the killed and wounded amounted to 110,000 men. The victorious allies swept onwards, and just at the close of the year 1813 entered France. The spring of the following year was occupied by the brilliant campaign in which Napoleon exerted all his genius in vain to check the huge masses of the invaders. While Wellington was making good his position in the south of France, in spite of the ability which he displayed, Napoleon was being constantly driven backward upon the east. The effect could not but be felt by the southern army, and Soult deserves great credit for the skill with which he still held at bay the victorious English. He was however defeated at Orthes (Feb. 27), lost Bordeaux (March 8), and was finally driven eastward towards Toulouse, intending to act in union with Suchet, whose army in Catalonia was as yet unbeaten. On the heights upon the east of Toulouse, for Wellington had brought his army across the Garonne, was fought, with somewhat Battle of Toulouse. April 10, 1814. doubtful result, the great battle of Toulouse. The victory has been claimed by both parties; the aim of the English general was however won, the Garonne was passed, the French position taken, Toulouse evacuated and occupied by the victors. The triumph such as it was had cost the victors 7000 or 8000 men, a loss of life which might have been spared, for Napoleon had already abdicated, and the battle was entirely useless. This was the last action of the Peninsula War, in which, after years of steadfast resistance, the English had at length triumphantly swept the French from the Peninsula, and done their full share in the great events which temporarily closed the career of Napoleon.

The negotiations which had terminated in the abdication of Napoleon had, as far as England was concerned, been carried on by the same ministry which had had the duty of conducting the war. The Tory party which the French Revolution and the policy of Pitt had called into existence, robbed of the better and more liberal elements which the presence of Pitt himself and his friends had introduced into it, had succeeded in spite of its defects and of various opportunities for a change in continuing its hold upon the Government. There was at first one important member of it who kept up something Policy of Canning. of the views of Pitt. This was Canning, the Foreign Minister. But the presence of so incongruous an element tended rather to the weakness than to the strength of the administration; nor is it certain that in the present crisis of Europe his views were such as to render him the most efficient minister. Castlereagh, a man of narrower views and of much inferior talent, acted as War Minister. Between him and Canning a strong antagonism arose. Canning's errors were those of a liberal and noble mind. He was anxious to see the Spaniards carry out their insurrection as much as possible by their own means, and the wish led him to believe the false tales of their patriotism and resources with which the braggart spirit of the Spaniards supplied him. This credulity was strengthened by the reports of Mr. Frere, whom he had sent to the Peninsula as ambassador, and he was thus induced to misapply the wealth of England, and to misuse the opportunities which his position as Foreign Minister gave him, so as seriously to weaken the hands of Wellington. His desire for the political regeneration of Spain blinded him somewhat to the military necessities of the time, which required that our general should be invested with almost absolute authority, and the arrangement of political matters postponed till after the favourable conclusion of the war. But though he thus not unfrequently Canning's quarrel with Castlereagh. threw obstacles in Wellington's way, Canning by no means approved of the inefficient administration of Castlereagh, and the constant starvation of the military side of the Peninsula War. So far had the quarrel with the War Minister extended that Canning had contrived, not perhaps so openly and straightforwardly as could be wished, to extort from the Prime Minister a promise that Lord Castlereagh should be removed from his responsible situation, failing which he declared that he would himself withdraw. His support was so necessary to the Prime Minister that he had persuaded him to remain in office. But Canning had throughout privately expressed the strongest disapprobation of the Walcheren expedition, and when its failure became known, and when inquiries upon the subject brought to light the fact that, while sitting in the same Cabinet with Castlereagh, he had been in fact intriguing for his dismissal, the quarrel came to a point. Sharp words were exchanged between the ministers, and the consequence was a duel (Sept. 22), in which Canning was slightly wounded. It was of course impossible for the antagonists to serve longer in the same ministry. They both resigned, and their example was followed by the Duke of Portland, whose failing health had from the first rendered him unfit for his position, and whose weakness was exhibited in allowing so grave a quarrel to spring up within the limits of his Cabinet. It became necessary to reconstitute the ministry, and after a fruitless negotiation with Reconstruction of the ministry. Oct. 1809. Lords Grey and Grenville—with so little reality in it that Grey did not think it worth his while to come to London on the subject—Perceval, who had long been the most important person in the Cabinet, assumed the nominal direction, and Lord Wellesley, who had lately been serving as ambassador in Spain, where he had superseded Mr. Frere, was induced to accept the ministry of foreign affairs. Lord Castlereagh was succeeded by Lord Liverpool at the War Office, with Lord Palmerston as under secretary. The reconstruction of the ministry made no difference in its general tendencies. The introduction of Lord Wellesley was indeed a slight improvement; he entered the ministry chiefly for the purpose of supporting his brother's views in the Peninsula. This to the best of his abilities he did, but he was constantly thwarted by the mediocre men with whom he was joined, and with whom he was never able to work comfortably. By far the ablest and best writer in the Cabinet, his despatches were constantly criticised and altered. His colleagues could not understand the greatness of the openings afforded in the Peninsula, and after two years of office he withdrew (Feb. 19, 1812). The opportunity occurred in a great ministerial crisis caused by the renewed insanity Continuation of the same ministry till 1827. of the King, which it was believed must have produced a change of ministry. The Regent, however, retained Mr. Perceval in office, and upon his death Lord Liverpool was called to succeed him, and continued in office till 1827, so that in fact from the fall of the Grenville ministry to that date, though with some change in the personnel, there was a continuance of the Tory rule.

In November 1810 the King, who had never thoroughly got over the failure of the Walcheren expedition, and the disgrace of Lord Chatham and the Duke of York, was still further shaken by the death of the Princess Amelia, and before long it appeared that he had become hopelessly insane. After several prorogations it was resolved (December 20) that it was the duty of Parliament to supply the existing defect in the organization of Government. A precedent for the action of the ministry was drawn from Pitt's conduct under similar circumstances in 1788. It was determined to reproduce, though in a somewhat modified form, The Regency Bill. Feb. 1811. the restrictions then laid upon the power of the Regent. But the Prince of Wales was by no means disposed to submit to these restrictions, and induced his brothers to join in a protest against them. Nor did the Opposition fail to see the probable advantage which would accrue to them from a more unlimited regency; they regarded it as certain that Grenville and Grey would be called to office, and they had no wish to curtail the power of the Crown when wielded by men ready to rectify the mismanagement under which they thought the country was suffering. But their hopes were destined to be speedily extinguished. In spite of his protest the Bill restricting the Regent was passed (Feb. 5), and the Prince took the oaths before the Privy Council. He had already made up his mind that it would be better to continue the present ministry, for a personal quarrel had arisen between him and his Whig friends. He had requested Grenville and Grey to draw up a reply to addresses from the two Houses which had been presented to him in January. They had found considerable difficulty in complying with his request, for Grenville had been a member of Pitt's ministry when he restricted the regency in 1788, while Grey then as now was a member of the Opposition; but by careful suppression of the difficulties, a reply was drawn out and submitted to the Prince. Such a compromise was not what he had expected; he summoned his friend Sheridan to assist him in criticising the reply. The paper was returned with pungent and witty marginal remarks, and a wholly different form of reply suggested. The Whig Lords took umbrage at the levity and rudeness of the Prince, and did not refrain from expressing their anger, a line of conduct which, as might have been expected, in the case of a man of such selfish and merely personal politics as the Prince, was warmly resented. Moreover, the flattery of the Queen, and the adhesion to him of his brothers, who wished for the The Perceval ministry continued. continuation of the Perceval ministry, together with the falsely hopeful reports of the physicians, which led him to think that his regency would be a short one, induced him to accept the situation; and immediately after having taken the oaths he declared his intention to retain Mr. Perceval. Although at first expressing his dislike to his ministers, before long entirely won over by their courtly language, he began to speak of his old friends as "the wicked politicians." The regency was at first fixed for one year only. At the end of that time, that is, in February 1812, after a few more overtures to the Whig Lords to form a coalition with his present ministry, which he must have known was impossible, the Prince allowed the ministry to continue as before, Castlereagh being readmitted to office, and Lord Sidmouth becoming President of the Assassination of Mr. Perceval. May 1812. Council. The joy of Mr. Perceval at the happy issue of the affair was proportionate to the fear he had felt at the thought of losing office; but it was destined to be shortlived, for on the 11th of May, as he entered the House of Commons, he was assassinated by a lunatic of the name of Bellingham.

Before the day of triumph of this ministry arrived, while Napoleon was still at the height of his power, and the success of Wellington as yet uncertain, England had drifted into war with America. It is difficult to believe that this useless war might not have been avoided had the ministers been men of ability. It arose from the obstinate manner in which the Government clung to the execution of their retaliatory measures against France, regardless of the practical injury they were inflicting upon all neutrals. The causes of irritation have already been mentioned. America, adopting the policy of England, had proceeded to retaliate; an embargo was laid upon trade both with England and France, and commercial relations with Europe practically broken off. An attempted arrangement between the two countries in 1809 had produced but little result. But though foreign trade had diminished, the demand for home manufactures in America had largely increased; the populations of the Northern and Eastern States were therefore satisfied with the existing state of things and decidedly averse to war, with its certain expenditure and probable injury to their manufactures. In the South the case was different. Without manufactures to supply the loss sustained by the restricted export of their tobacco and sugar, not in immediate contact with English territory, as were the Northern States, and led by an aristocratic and slave-owning race, the Whites of the South were inclined to war. The Presidents were Virginians, the Southerners had a superiority in Congress, and in May of 1812 it became plain that war must result unless the Orders in Council were repealed. But England was in confusion owing to the assassination of Perceval, and it was not till the middle of June, when war had been already declared, that Brougham's motion for the withdrawal of the Orders was carried. The concession, awkwardly made in the face of the American threats, came too late. The Americans had already made up their minds, and planned an invasion of Canada.