It was a war without great events. The attempts of the Americans upon Canada failed. Here and there a slight success attended the English arms, and the deep anger of our enemies was moved by the irksome blockade of their coast, and the employment of the savage Indian tribes as our allies. But if fairly successful on land, the English were to their great astonishment thoroughly worsted upon the sea. Ship after ship was taken by the American frigates. Nor was it till our commanders consented to recognise the fact that the classification of the two navies was wholly different, and that an American frigate was in tonnage and weight of metal a match for an English fifty-gun ship, that these disasters were brought to an end. It was an additional blow to the pride of England that the sailors by whom her ships were defeated were largely drawn from her own people. From the wretchedness prevalent in England, from high taxes, commercial difficulties, and the severe laws of impressment, men fled for refuge to America; and it is said that as many as 16,000 Englishmen were serving on board the American fleet.

The war was really so causeless and so prejudicial to the success of the allies in Europe, that the Emperor of Russia attempted, in 1813, to bring it to a close by mediation, and although his offer was declined, a negotiation was entered into at Ghent which ultimately proved successful. But before the negotiators advanced far in their labours the war threatened to assume a more serious character. On the cessation of hostilities in the south of France, a considerable number of the English troops were embarked at Bordeaux direct for America, without even being allowed to return home, and increased energy began to show itself in all directions. A large fleet under Rear-Admiral Cockburn, and a body of troops under General Ross, were despatched to the Chesapeake, and a combined attack by land and water was made upon Washington, the Federal capital. The success of the expedition, Capture of Washington. which was complete, was stained by the destruction of all public property, offices, and buildings in the city. An outcry was raised, not only in America but in Europe, at what was regarded as an act of vandalism. It is said that the English Government had ordered it as a retaliation for the barbarities of the Americans on the Canadian frontier, and as it is confessed that private property was scrupulously spared, it may well be a question whether in fact such a destruction of national property is not a better manner of exhibiting the severity of war than the destruction of private property which so constantly attends it.

The capture of Washington was followed by other expeditions of a like nature with less satisfactory results. Large and systematic operations against a continent are at all times difficult, and certainly they were beyond the capacity of the English ministry as then constituted. They relapsed into all the old errors of the American War, and the military operations were reduced to mere piratical excursions. An effort was indeed made upon the only side where a base of operations existed, but on so small a scale and so badly directed as to be entirely useless. A combined attack by land and water was arranged against Plattsburg upon Lake Champlain. The dilatoriness of the commander, Sir George Prevost, allowed the flotilla to begin the fight unaided; it was completely beaten, and its destruction putting an end to all hope of success, the army withdrew. An attack on Baltimore met with no better fate, but the greater part of the province of Maine was taken and occupied. The arrival of the Peninsula troops, no longer well commanded, had produced but little effect; the negotiations at Ghent were gradually drawing to a conclusion. The Convention was signed on the 24th of December. It was, as might be expected from the temper of the two nations, little more than a compromise. The real points at issue were scarcely touched, the boundaries were left for future negotiation. Such as it was it came too late to save England from one more disaster. An expedition similar in character to those already mentioned had been directed against New Orleans. The place was vigorously defended by General Jackson. Natural difficulties and mismanagement met the English at every turn. The earth was too sandy to allow of redoubts; while the Americans used cotton bales, which answered admirably as defences, the English found nothing better than barrels of sugar and molasses. When the storming parties reached the enemy's lines they found that their fascines and scaling-ladders had been neglected; the assault became impracticable. As the approach of the town had been completely exposed to the fire of the enemy, very heavy loss had been sustained, three English generals, and among them Sir Edmund Pakenham, had been killed, and Lambert, who had succeeded to the command, thought it better to withdraw the army.

The American War was thus still at its height when the ministry had been called upon to arrange the fate of the late Conqueror of Europe. When the allies, in their advance towards France, had assembled at Frankfort, not yet certain of success, and conscious that their work would be easy could they separate Napoleon's interests from those of the nation, they had offered to negotiate at a general Congress upon the fixed condition that France should abandon Italy, Holland, Germany and Spain, and confine itself to its natural boundaries. Napoleon, suspecting not without reason their intentions in accepting the Congress, had refused the conditions. His refusal had been followed by a very able proclamation of the allies, separating the interests of the ruler from that of the people, and promising that France should retain its just weight in the balance of nations. Conscious of the effect of this declaration, which exactly suited the feelings of the majority of Frenchmen, Napoleon hastened to accept the conditions. But he was told it was too late. Traitors had already informed the allied sovereigns that they were strong enough to avoid compromise. The great campaign which followed had shown how much could yet be done by the Emperor's genius. Again negotiations were opened at Châtillon; Napoleon expressed the utmost readiness to accept the terms of Frankfort. But the ultimatum of the allies had now risen, the Rhine boundary was no longer to be conceded. Napoleon could not make up his mind to allow France to issue from the war less than when he had first taken possession of the Government. The Treaty of Châtillon was broken off and war was again resumed; and as though to express the completeness of their determination, the allied sovereigns entered into a treaty at Chaumont (March 1), by which they bound themselves together for twenty years, promised each to supply 150,000 men, to which England was to add a subsidy of £5,000,000. The knowledge of this treaty made Napoleon feel that some desperate stroke alone could save him. He passed with his forces into the rear of the allies; he was nearer, as he himself said, to Vienna than they were to Paris. The movement put them in great perplexity. To leave so formidable a person upon their communications seemed too dangerous a step. Again treason served them in good stead. Their friends in Paris, at the head of whom was Talleyrand, urged them at once to move upon the capital. Joseph Bonaparte, who had been left in charge there, with Marmont and Mortier, fought a last battle before the very walls. Joseph lost heart, and ordered the marshals to capitulate, the army was withdrawn behind the city, and Paris was in the hands of the allies. This was fatal to all Napoleon's hopes. He came to Fontainebleau, there found himself gradually deserted, heard how his marshals one after the other had joined the victorious allies, and on the 4th of April signed his abdication, consenting to withdraw to the Isle of Elba, which was to be constituted into a principality for his convenience. He was to be allowed 400 soldiers, his wife and child were to be placed in possession of Placentia and Parma, and he was to retain the title of Emperor. In the settlement of the affairs of France and Europe he was to have no voice. The last stroke of ill-fortune seemed to have come upon him when his Austrian wife, overpersuaded by her relations, deserted him, and set off with his young son to Vienna. During his ten months' residence in the Isle of Elba the settlement of Europe was being carried on by the diplomatists of all the powers assembled at Vienna.

Thus the Tory ministry seemed at last to have reaped the fruit of their lengthened efforts, and to have justified their long retention of office. But we shall look in vain for any merit in their policy but General sketch of the Tory policy. one, and that is steadfastness. The accidental discovery, for it was little more, of a general of surpassing genius had enabled them to hide under his greatness their own mediocrity; his skill had covered their constantly-repeated blunders, and fortune had supplied them with an enemy whose enthusiastic self-confidence, arbitrary temper, and insatiable ambition, had neutralized his transcendent genius, had forced upon them allies whom their own skill could not have secured, and had even alienated the people whose natural representative he was. With these advantages they had been able to obtain that success which a fixed line of policy even when itself erroneous not unfrequently secures. They had raised England to a position of the highest importance, the success of Europe against Napoleon was indisputably due to her. Yet it cannot be said that they were urged by patriotic motives. Throughout their conduct had been dictated by the interests of their class. They had recognized in Napoleon the great subverter of old institutions, the arch-enemy of the aristocratic order. It was in this capacity chiefly that they had pursued him with such firm and undeviating hostility. Of the events which took place during their ministry, of the successful skill and bravery of soldiers and sailors, of the establishment of national independence whether in England or on the Continent, all Englishmen may be proud. Those who, reading history by the light of subsequent events, still hold that a strong aristocratic element is a necessary ingredient of constitutional liberty will admire their motives. But to those who feel that growth and advance is the essential principle of the life of a nation, and that those only are good governors who are capable of understanding and of carrying out the necessities of advancing civilization, their sole claim to respect (and that is after all no small one) will be that they knew their own minds, and in spite of all difficulties realized their object.

The same motive of class aggrandizement which detracts from the virtue of the foreign policy of this ministry underlay the whole administration of home affairs. There was an incapacity to look at public affairs from any but a class or aristocratic point of view. The natural consequence was a constantly increasing mass of discontent among the lower orders, only kept in restraint by an overmastering fear felt by all those higher in rank of the possible revolutionary tendencies of any attempt at change. Much of the discontent was of course the inevitable consequence of the circumstances in which England was placed, and for which the Government was only answerable in so far as it created those circumstances. At the same time it is impossible not to blame the complacent manner in which the misery was ignored and the occasional success of individual merchants and contractors regarded as evidences of national prosperity. At the beginning of the year 1810, Perceval, who in the interest of the Government had been preventing as far as possible all inquiry into the Walcheren failure, was bold enough at the opening of the session to take credit to himself for that expedition, and to declare that the national prosperity was great, and that public works had been carried out as successfully as in the times of profound peace. Such assertions could not have been made without some slight foundation. While the Continental System and the Orders in Council had together almost closed the European trade, certain other irregular doors had been opened; the removal of the Portuguese court to the Brazils had given hopes of an enlarged South American trade, and the two islands of Heligoland and Anholt had been fortified and turned into smuggling centres with some success. Certain public works, as the Waterloo and Vauxhall bridges, had been opened. But before the year was over the condition of the country surely proved that the prosperity boasted of was a mere phantom. The American trade proved ruinous to those who had rushed into it; the British goods on the Baltic had been seized and confiscated; the public works had been carried on by a lavish issue of paper money, which was now rapidly depreciating. A bad harvest came to increase the difficulties of the time. Early in the spring wheat was already at 102s. a quarter: though £7,000,000 worth was imported, it rose in August to 116s. But then, under the influence of a good harvest, it suddenly dropped to 94s.—thus the agricultural interest was also involved in ruin.

Under all these influences there was a collapse of credit. There were 273 stoppages of payment instead of the ordinary average of 100, and before the year was out no less than 2314 commissions of bankruptcy were issued. This misery and depression lasted till the end of the war. Indeed, in the following years, 1811 and 1812, it was constantly increasing. The depression of commerce was so great and the collapse of credit so general that an advance of £6,000,000 to the merchants on due security was authorized by Parliament. The withdrawal of Russia from the Continental System, and its apparent inclination to throw off Napoleon's influence, slightly revived business. But this improvement was neutralized by the fearful winter and spring, which destroyed much of the harvest, and again raised the price of wheat. The apparent opposition between the interests of the manufacturing and agricultural classes was very curiously marked. A plentiful harvest in 1813, and the opening of many continental ports, did much to revive both trade and manufactures; but it was accompanied by a fall in the price of corn from 17ls. to 75s. The consequence was widespread distress among the agriculturists, which involved the country banks, so that in the two following years 240 of them stopped payment. So great a crash could not fail to affect the manufacturing interest also; apparently for the instant the very restoration of peace brought widespread ruin.

But whether for the moment it was the agriculturists or the merchants who suffered most, the lower classes were quite sure to suffer. Not only did the Continental System injure the great branches of English industry, the foreign corn ports were also closed. The increase of population since the large introduction of machinery in the last century had gone beyond the resources of home production. The high price of wheat has been already mentioned. Meat also went up from 4d. or 5d. to 10d. a pound. Considering the enormous rate of the price of corn, it was impossible to give wages sufficient to keep the operatives alive. Before the end of the year 1811, wages had sunk to 7s. 6d. a week. The manufacturing operatives were therefore in a state of absolute misery. Petitions signed by 40,000 or 50,000 men urged upon Parliament that they were starving; but there was another class which fared still worse. Machinery had by no means superseded hand-work. In thousands of hamlets and cottages handlooms still existed. The work was neither so good nor so rapid as work done by machinery; even at the best of times used chiefly as an auxiliary to agriculture, this hand labour could now scarcely find employment at all. Not unnaturally, without work and without food, these handworkers The Luddite riots. were very ready to believe that it was the machinery which caused their ruin, and so in fact it was; the change, though on the whole beneficial, had brought much individual misery. The people were not wise enough to see this. They rose in riot in many parts of England, chiefly about Nottingham, calling themselves Luddites (from the name of a certain idiot lad who some thirty years before had broken stocking-frames), gathered round them many of the disbanded soldiery with whom the country was thronged, and with a very perfect secret organization, carried out their object of machine-breaking. The unexpected thronging of the village at nightfall, a crowd of men with blackened faces, armed sentinels holding every approach, silence on all sides, the village inhabitants cowering behind their closed doors, an hour or two's work of smashing and burning, and the disappearance of the crowd as rapidly as it had arrived—such were the incidents of the night riots.

Perhaps, however, the agricultural labourer was still worse off. While farmers were selling their corn at 112s., or even at 170s., the quarter—while it paid to take in bits of open down land, get three Misery of the agricultural labourer. crops off it without manuring, and then pass on to the next piece,—the wretched labourers were told that prices were so high that but little could be given them for their wages. The misery was therefore exceedingly great among them; and even worse than this, the Poor Law stepped in and destroyed their characters. For the wages were so low that they could not live on them, and they were forced to come upon the parish; and the old Poor Law, in the hands of the farmer guardians, enabled those very employers who kept the wages low to levy a rate upon their parishes to support those people whom they were starving, and to give outdoor relief in aid of wages. In other words, the employer had the right to compel the country to give him the money to pay his labourers enough to keep them alive. Selfish views, too, were mixed with false political economy. Many labourers made cheap labour; many hands, it was thought, made a strong country. So this strange grant in aid of wages came to be apportioned according to the number of the family of the recipient; and when the whole state of the nation pointed to the necessity of a curtailed population, a premium was given for its increase.

The termination of a war so new in its character, and so universal as that which for the last eleven years had been wasting Europe, brought with it great difficulties. On the one hand arose the question of the position to be taken up by the allies with regard to France; on the other, the reconstitution of Europe, completely dislocated by the policy of Napoleon. Both questions were rendered difficult of solution by the various interests and mutual jealousies of the powers of the victorious coalition. But,—while those European powers who had suffered most severely from the French arms, and especially Prussia, on which the vengeance of Napoleon had fallen most heavily, were desirous to treat France as a conquered nation, so to curtail its dimensions as to render it harmless for the future, and to lay such burdens upon it as might in some degree recompense them for their losses,—England, which had never felt the sword of the conqueror, and Russia, ruled by a Czar much influenced by notions of chivalry and magnanimity, had already determined upon an opposite course. Following the opinion of the founder of their party, the Tory Government which had succeeded Pitt declared its intention of acting towards France as towards a friendly power, and of allowing it to retain the same frontiers as in 1790. There was not much magnanimity in such conduct; the Tory party, the champions of legitimacy, could scarcely avoid restoring the Bourbons; their view of the balance of Europe rendered a powerful France almost a necessity; they could look for no continental acquisitions for England, and took care to secure the advantages they required for their maritime and commercial superiority in other directions. But, while restoring the Bourbons, the English Government found itself compelled by the temper of the time, the course of circumstances, and the liberal views of the Emperor of Russia, to restore them only upon conditions. A constitutional government was granted to France, ratified by a charter securing the chief personal and political rights of the people, such as the maintenance of the public sales during the Revolution, freedom of religion, and freedom of the press.

A France thus reconstituted, and holding friendly relations with the other powers of Europe, would naturally claim its share in the arrangements of the forthcoming Congress. It would probably have been wiser had the French Government postponed all definite settlements as to its future limits till that Congress met; the jealousies which existed between the allies and their conflicting claims would have afforded opportunity for securing favourable terms, for by the Convention, by which France had surrendered the territories held by her armies in Europe, her troops had been allowed to withdraw unmolested, and a powerful army could have been rapidly reconstituted. But the allies, guided by Metternich, the Austrian minister, and determined to keep as far as possible the management of the Congress in their own hands, insisted on the immediate conclusion Treaty of Paris. May 1814. of the treaty with France. Eager to gain popularity by the establishment of peace, the French Government yielded, and in May the Treaty of Paris was concluded. It was upon the whole more favourable than France, as a conquered nation, could have expected. The frontier of 1790 was even slightly increased: towards the north and towards the Rhine it was advanced so as to include several important fortresses, especially the strong place of Landau, and towards the Alps about half of Savoy was also included. The demands of Prussia for a contribution towards the expenses of the war were rejected by the influence of Austria and England, and the treasures of art collected by Napoleon's armies were allowed to remain in Paris. The one great loss sustained was the Isle of France. It was upon the sea and among the colonies that England looked for its reward; it retained Malta, to secure its influence in the Mediterranean, the Cape of Good Hope, which it had won from the Dutch, and now, to complete its naval stations on the road to India, it insisted on the surrender of the Isle of France. The bases for the forthcoming Treaty of Vienna were also roughly laid by this peace. The published articles declared the independence of the States of Germany, the augmentation of Holland under the rule of the Prince of Orange, the independence of Switzerland and of the Italian States outside the limits of the Austrian possessions. Secret articles explained what these loose expressions meant. Belgium was to form the promised increase of Holland, and thus form with it a kingdom absolutely in the interest of England; the left bank of the Rhine was to supply compensations for the German princes (which meant that it was to be given to Bavaria in exchange for the Tyrol); the Po, the Ticino, and Lago Maggiore were to form the boundaries of Austrian Italy, which thus included the territory of Venice; and Sardinia was to receive Genoa in exchange for the portion of Savoy ceded to France.

The difficulties which were sure to attend the forthcoming Congress were already felt, and it was thought that the solution would be rendered easier by the establishment of personal relations between the powers of the coalition. The great monarchs of Eastern Europe were therefore invited to visit the Prince Regent in England. The Emperor of Austria declined to come, but the Czar and the King of Prussia accepted the invitation, and were received with great pomp and enthusiasm. Several weeks were passed in universal gaiety, but the political object of the visit was not attained. The Czar seemed more than ever to occupy the first place among crowned heads; and the dread of Russian influence, and the determination to oppose its claims in the Congress, were thus only rendered stronger.

The meetings at Vienna, at first appointed for August, had been postponed to September, and thither, after their visit to England, the monarchs themselves, and the ministers who represented the various countries of the Congress, betook themselves. The interests of England were intrusted to Lord Castlereagh, a man of considerable firmness, but of mediocre ability, without accurate knowledge or broad views of the politics of Europe, and deficient in the conciliatory deportment so necessary for a successful diplomatist. The negotiators approached their difficult work in a spirit which promised no very good results. Almost of necessity the character of the Congress, and of the treaty it produced, belonged rather to the past than to the future. It was rendered necessary by the changes created by the French Revolution, and was in the hands of a coalition called into existence to oppose the Revolution, and consisting chiefly of monarchs whose views were both absolutist and dynastic. The Czar alone had certain liberal tendencies, but they were so mixed with personal ambition as to excite mistrust instead of co-operation among the assembled negotiators. The Congress therefore assumed the form of an old European congress. It was occupied with the personal and peculiar interest of each sovereign, the increase of territory and influence of each nation, instead of attempting a settlement of Europe in accordance with any enlarged or general theory suitable to the great change and growth of ideas which had been at once the cause and effect of the Revolution.

As far as England was concerned, its interests had already been chiefly secured by the Treaty of Paris. The new kingdom of the Netherlands, it was thought, would be strong enough to hold the mouths of the great rivers of that country, and thus prevent any revival of the Continental System; the road to India was rendered safe by the possession of the Cape of Good Hope and the Mauritius, while Malta guarded English influence in the Mediterranean. The maintenance of the old European balance was therefore the chief object which Castlereagh had now in view, endangered chiefly by the overwhelming power of Russia, threatening alike the countries of Europe and our own Asiatic dominions. The haste with which the Treaty of Paris had been concluded tied the hands of France, which was represented by Talleyrand; and the very moderate ambition of Louis XVIII. limited the claims of that country to the completion of the downfall of the Napoleonic system by the removal of Murat from the kingdom of Naples, and the establishment of the Spanish Princess, the Queen of Etruria, in the Duchy of Parma, which had been promised to Maria Louisa, Napoleon's wife. Louis was also anxious to save if possible the kingdom of Saxony from annihilation. The really important questions at issue regarded the settlement of the East of Europe and the fate of Poland and Saxony, which appeared indissolubly connected, so closely were the Courts of Russia and Prussia united. The Emperor of Russia was a man of enthusiastic temperament and liberal theories, and at the same time of great ambition. He found satisfaction for both sides of his character in a plan for the reconstitution of the kingdom of Poland, with a liberal constitution, either under his own rule as king or under some prince of his house acknowledging his supremacy. To complete this project he required the possession of the whole of Poland, a reward which the overweening value he set on his own services to the coalition induced him to regard as by no means more than his due. Both Prussia and Austria would have been called upon to restore certain portions of Poland which had fallen to their lot in the different partition treaties, but he supposed that his own resignation of certain portions would counterbalance these sacrifices, while Austria would be well rewarded by the possession of Lombardy and Venice, and Prussia by the whole of Saxony. The adhesion of the Saxon king to Napoleon was thought to justify the sovereigns of the coalition in confiscating his country, which, with the approbation of Russia, was claimed in its entirety by the Prussian Government. It is plain that the claims of Russia and Prussia could not but be in the last degree objectionable to Austria. Absolutist in its tendencies, it cared nothing for the freedom of Poland, while the possession of territory conterminous with the hereditary states of Austria would render Russia a most dangerous rival. At the same time, Prussia, the constant object of Austrian jealousy, if Saxony passed into its hands, would at once lose that broken and dislocated shape which had hitherto been its weakness, and would acquire a position in Germany which Austria could scarcely hope to equal. The policy of Austria was therefore clearly marked.

The position of England was not so obvious. It is possible to say now, guided by the light of subsequent events, and led by the spirit of freedom and nationality which has made such vast strides of late years, that the Government of England, the home of free institutions and avowedly the champion of national liberty, should have come forward even then in that capacity, should have rejoiced at the reconstitution of Poland, and have sought the unification of Germany by supporting the power of Prussia, and should have objected to the establishment of Austria in Italy, a country where her rule was certain to be disliked by the population. But the English Government at the time was a Tory Government, bent rather upon restraining than increasing popular tendencies, and under the dominion of three overmastering influences—the desire to secure England from any possibility of a renewal of the Continental System, an extreme jealousy of the pretensions and power of the Russian Emperor, and the wish to establish for some years at all events the peace of Europe. Its policy was therefore inconsistent and shortsighted, but sensible and practical; the fear of the advance of Russia made the English ministry blind to its duties towards Poland; the satisfaction and friendship of France were more important than the rights of Genoa; the immediate balance of the powers of Germany was more important than the national aspirations either of Italy or of Germany.

It so happened that the views of France were at this instant similar to those of England. Before the formal opening of the Congress an attempt had been made by the four great powers to get the management of it entirely into their own hands. France would thus have been excluded from the settlement of Europe; but Talleyrand was not a man to hear quietly such an exclusion; he appeared as the champion of the smaller states, and succeeded in thwarting the efforts of the great powers. This, with other less important causes, had embroiled him with the Emperor of Russia, whose objects he was thus bent on thwarting. The King of Saxony was a friend and relative of Louis XVIII.; to save him and his country from destruction was a part of the French programme. It therefore suited Talleyrand to adopt the views of Castlereagh.

Thus Austria, France, and England, in conjunction with the smaller German powers, who looked with great dislike to the annihilation of one of the chief among them, were thrown upon one side, in opposition to Russia and Prussia. The arrogant and high-handed manner in which those two powers proceeded to take temporary possession of the countries which they claimed still further excited the anger of their opponents. So severe did the dispute grow, so indissoluble did the knot appear, that war between the powers themselves seemed threatening. The Treaty of Ghent and the conclusion of the English war with America allowed Castlereagh to act with more vigour, and in January a secret treaty was entered into between France, Austria, and England, by which each country agreed to supply troops to compel, if necessary, the adoption of their combined policy. Although this treaty was kept a secret, the firm attitude and the combination of the three powers were so evident Compromise agreed to. that, as neither party really wished for war, a compromise was discovered. About half of Saxony, with a third of its population, was taken from the King and given to Prussia, while the Czar, withdrawing from his extreme demand with regard to Poland, allowed the Duchy of Posen to remain in the hands of the Prussians, and a considerable portion of Gallicia, together with the district of Tarnopol, to be retained by Austria, while Krakow was to become a free and neutral republic. Poland was thus in part reconstituted, but entirely in the hands of Russia. These great questions being settled, the arrangements upon the minor points proceeded with some rapidity; the left bank of the Rhine was given to Bavaria; Genoa passed into the hands of Sardinia; the two houses of Hesse were re-established; Luxemburg was given to the Low Countries; Mayence became a Federal fortress; the Tyrol was restored to Austria; Switzerland was reorganized chiefly in accordance with the arrangements France had made there; the conduct of Murat, who began to show a tendency towards Napoleonism, facilitated the restoration of the Bourbons in Naples; Parma was given to Maria Louisa for her life; and the Congress completed its work by two great declarations of principle, one securing the freedom of the navigation of rivers, the other expressing, what was very dear to Englishmen at the time, a universal disapprobation of the slave trade.

Before the conclusion of these questions Castlereagh had been compelled by the meeting of Parliament to return to England, and the Duke of Wellington had taken his place at Vienna. His work there was not completed when the news arrived that Napoleon had Escape of Napoleon from Elba. broken loose from Elba, and the Duke was wanted to take command of the allied army in Belgium. The renewal of the common danger produced a temporary harmony among the negotiators at Vienna. The chief questions were rapidly settled, and a joint proclamation, issued by the eight powers which had signed the Peace of Paris, declared Napoleon the public enemy of Europe. The Congress continued its sittings, but military preparations for the time absorbed all attention.

It was agreed to act in accordance with the Treaty of Chaumont, each of the four great powers supplying its quota of troops, or in the case of England an equivalent in money. While the Prussians and the English with their allies were to advance into France and the Netherlands, the other powers were to pass the Rhine and join in a great advance upon Paris. It was hoped that by the end of April 500,000 men would be ready for the great movement. The French Court had taken refuge in the Netherlands, and as the people of that country were already half inclined to join the French, it seemed certain that that country would be the chief seat of operations; the war there was intrusted to the Anglo-allies under Wellington, and the Prussians under Prince Blücher. The hope of speedy action was quickly seen to be vain. Since the peace many countries had disbanded their troops, many of the best English regiments had been sent to America, and in spite of its long experience, the English Government showed its usual weakness in the war administration. Wellington was convinced of the necessity of postponing the opening of the campaign till June or July.

This delay gave Napoleon an opportunity of striking the first blow, and although he could immediately dispose of not more than 125,000 men, and although the English and Prussian armies amounted to 220,000, the arrangement of the allied troops gave him much hope of a successful campaign. Bent upon covering Napoleon enters Belgium. Brussels, uncertain where the blow which he felt sure would soon be struck would fall and in order to facilitate the subsistence of his troops, Wellington had spread his army over a long line of frontier, from the neighbourhood of Charleroi to Antwerp and Ostend. In like manner the Prussian corps were spread eastward from Charleroi to Liège. Trusting to the wide dissemination of the allied troops to render concentration difficult, Napoleon thought to push between the English and Prussian armies, and to crush them one after the other. With all his old skill, he rapidly collected his army on the Sambre, issued on the 14th June a stirring general order, and on the 15th attacked the Prussians at Charleroi, passed the Sambre, and drove them back along the Namur road to a position near Sombreffe, which Blücher had already appointed as a point of concentration should he be attacked from Charleroi. At the same time the left of the French army under Ney was sent directly northward along the road to Brussels, to clear it of English and prevent the junction of the allies.

Up to this point Napoleon's plans seemed thoroughly successful. He had already rendered any immediate junction of the armies difficult, if not impossible; with one part of his army he had already reached the chosen ground of the Prussians, and found it occupied by one only out of their four corps; with his left he had advanced to the position of Quatre Bras against the English, where as yet no considerable portion of the allies had arrived. But a strange slowness marks his course in this campaign. Instead of bringing up all his troops for an attack in both directions, in the early morning of the 16th, he allowed his main body to pass the night on the Sambre, while there was an interval of twelve miles between Battle of Ligny. Ney's position and that of his rear. Consequently all the morning was passed in bringing up these troops, and it was past noon before either at Quatre Bras or Ligny any formidable attacks were made on the enemy. During that time two more Prussian corps had arrived at Ligny, and Wellington's troops were hastening to support the small force at Quatre Bras. Napoleon therefore, instead of being able to destroy a single Prussian corps, found himself involved in a bloody and hard-contested battle. He was indeed victorious, but the victory was not of that crushing and decisive character which his precarious position rendered necessary Battle of Quatre Bras. for him. At Quatre Bras, instead of a brief skirmish which would have enabled him to give assistance to Napoleon at Ligny, Ney found it necessary to fight a battle, and that not a successful one. The Allies, who in the morning were scarcely 8000 strong, made good their position till reinforcements arrived. When evening closed their preponderance was such that Ney was compelled to withdraw his troops to Frasnes. So hard had he been pressed that he had found it necessary to summon to his aid the corps of D'Erlon, which almost at the same time received orders from Napoleon to fall on the Prussian right flank, and thus complete the victory of Ligny. Confused by these contradictory orders, D'Erlon's corps of 20,000 men passed the day, without striking a blow, between the two battlefields, in either of which his presence might have had a decisive effect. As it was, Napoleon overrated the success against the Prussians, and fell into a fatal error with regard to the line of their retreat. Convinced that they would fall back towards Namur and Liège, he detached Marshal Grouchy with 30,000 men to follow Retreat of Blücher's army. them in that direction, while he himself brought his main body to join Ney, with the intention of following and destroying the English, who were compelled by Blücher's defeat to fall back towards Brussels. But the Prussian generals, Blücher and Gneisenau, the chief of his staff, were not so easily shaken off. Determined still to afford assistance to their allies, they withdrew northwards towards Wavre, while Grouchy and his troops were in vain seeking them towards the east. From Wavre, which was reached late in the evening of the 17th, Blücher was enabled to assure Wellington of his approach, and to promise the assistance not of two divisions only, for which the English general had asked, but of his whole army. Relying on this promise, Wellington determined to fight.

To give time for the arrival of the Prussians it was necessary that his battle should be a defensive one. The position, which he had long before studied and selected, was admirably adapted for the purpose. Nearly two miles south of Waterloo is the village of St. Jean, where the highroads from Charleroi and Nivelle towards Brussels join. Just south of this the undulating country forms a somewhat continuous ridge, lying east and west, crossed at right angles by the Charleroi road. Along the south of the ridge lies a rich and cultivated valley, which in about a mile swells again into a corresponding range of elevated ground. Three or four farmhouses lie on the foot or on the southern slope of the northern line of hills, so that the position resembles, as Wellington said, a wall of a bastion with advancing angles. The English troops were placed along the ridge, and occupied the farmhouses. The centre was placed between the two highroads, having in front the farm of La Haye Sainte standing on the western side of the Charleroi road. The right was covered by the château of Hougomont, with stone buildings and enclosures, while the left stretched to the farms of Papelotte and La Haye. Wavre is about seven miles from St. Jean, directly to the east, and expecting the arrival of Blücher, Wellington allowed his left to be the weakest part of his line. His care for his right was indeed exaggerated; he thought it possible that an attempt might be made to reach Brussels by outflanking him in that direction, and before all things desirous of preserving the capital, he detached a body of 17,000 men to Hal (eight miles to the west of his position), and thus seriously and uselessly weakened his line of battle. The French position corresponded to the English. Its centre also lay on the Charleroi road and the range of heights parallel to those occupied by the English, on which is the farmhouse of La Belle Alliance. Its right extended to Frischermont, opposite to La Haye, having somewhat in its rear the village of Planchenoit; the left reached beyond Hougomont. In number the armies were not unequally matched. Wellington commanded about 68,000 men, Napoleon 70,000, but the English army consisted of troops of various nations, some of whom were thoroughly untrustworthy, and was inferior in cavalry by at least 3000 men, and in artillery by upwards of 100 guns.

By eight o'clock on the morning of the 18th the English were under arms, but Napoleon, ignorant of the movements of the Prussians, and anxious probably to excite the temper of his own troops, and display his power to those of the allies who were already wavering in their allegiance, delayed his attack till nearly mid-day, and employed the morning in a great review of his troops. The weather also on the 17th had been very stormy, the ground was saturated and heavy; and though this difficulty would likewise have affected his opponents, firm ground was no doubt more important for the attack than for the defence. It is probable that those wasted hours saved the English army, for the same condition of the ground told with terrible force upon the advance of the Prussians, who had to make their way through swampy defiles, where the artillery could scarcely be moved. Their advance was very slow, and nothing but the firm determination of their leaders to keep their word to Wellington would have enabled them to overcome the obstacles in their way. The battle began about half-past eleven by an assault upon Hougomont, which Napoleon intended to carry, and thus mask his real great attack upon the centre and left of the English. The firm resistance of the garrison, consisting of a portion of the English Guards and the troops of Nassau and Hanover, frustrated this first move. The capture of the château, which should have been a mere preliminary step in the great plan, became an object in itself; fresh troops were constantly brought against it, it was as constantly reinforced from the English line, and throughout the whole day its defence neutralized a considerable portion of the French infantry. It was not till five o'clock that Napoleon brought a couple of howitzers to bear upon it. Though the buildings were speedily in flames, the defence was continued, and it remained throughout the day uncaptured. During the first attack upon Hougomont skirmishing and firing had been going on along the whole line preparatory to the great movement against the left. That movement was rather hastened than postponed by a discovery which was made about one o'clock. About that time troops were seen moving near a wood to the north-east of the English position between Wavre and Ohain. At first Napoleon took them for the troops of Grouchy, to whom he had sent information of the true direction of the Prussian retreat. They proved however to be the foremost troops of Bülow's Prussian corps. But the Emperor, still believing that Grouchy would at all events prevent the arrival of the main body of the Prussians, determined if possible to complete the destruction of the English before taking notice of the approaching troops. At half-past one, under a furious cannonade, the first corps, D'Erlon's, marched against the English left between Papelotte and La Haye Sainte. Although their peculiar formation, in great closely-packed masses, exposed them fearfully to the fire of the English artillery, they pressed forward up the English slope, threw the first line, consisting of allies, into confusion, and were not repulsed till Picton brought up the main body of the English left, who charged them with the bayonet and drove them backward. As they were already shaken, the English heavy cavalry, the Household Brigade, and what is known as the Union Brigade, consisting of the Scotch Greys, the Enniskillen Dragoons, and Royals, charged with fearful effect. Carried away by their energy, they rode right up the French slope to the battery of La Belle Alliance; scattered and exhausted by their charge, they were fallen upon and very roughly handled by the French Lancers, and only saved from destruction by the advance of the English light cavalry. However, the first great attack of the French had been triumphantly repulsed, though with terrible loss. Both Picton and Ponsonby, who commanded the cavalry, were killed. It was not long before a second attack was made. Apparently about four o'clock, Ney was ordered to assault the centre and right centre of the English to the west of the Charleroi road. The attack was made chiefly with cavalry. Much of the infantry were indeed employed round Hougomont and in the attack of La Haye Sainte, which never ceased. For two hours the cavalry charges continued; they were opposed by the allied troops thrown into square, the squares being placed checkerwise behind the crest of the ridge. It is uncertain whether any squares were broken; it is certain at all events that though the line on the whole held firm, reinforcements had to be brought from the right, and that there was a moment between five and six o'clock when the centre was in the greatest danger. After an heroic defence La Haye Sainte had been abandoned for want of ammunition. The French held therefore a position close to the English ridge, and the infantry of Donzelot's division were gradually making their way to the line which the cavalry charge had shattered. But to complete the lodgment effected in the line on the ridge more infantry were absolutely necessary, and these were not forthcoming. When Ney sent to demand them of the Emperor, his messenger was met with the reply, "Does he want me to make them?" In fact, since about half-past four o'clock the advance of the Prussians had made itself clearly felt. General Lobau had been sent to check them, and with him some battalions of the Imperial Guard. But the numbers of the Prussians constantly increased; it was in vain that they were more than once driven out of Planchenois by the Guard, at six o'clock they had established themselves there, threatening even the rear of the French and the Charleroi road, their line of retreat; and by seven o'clock Ziethen's corps, which had pushed directly westward, had joined the left of the English army, so that the French troops in Papelotte occupied an advanced angle, surrounded both in front and flank by the enemy. It was thus that reinforcements could not be sent to Ney, and the second great effort of the French was rendered useless. But Napoleon did not yet give up all for lost. He knew that the English must be much exhausted, and determined to try one great effort more with that portion of the Imperial Guard which had still been kept in reserve. It was a general assault along the whole line, but the most important part of it was the advance of the Guard upon the English centre. To oppose them the English brigade of Guards under Maitland had been brought forward. As the French columns topped the ridge the Guards sprang to their feet, and at a distance of fifty paces poured in a fire which shook the advancing masses, and charged them with the bayonet. The columns of the Guard rolled backward to the valley. At the same time a second column had met with the same fate; the 52nd regiment under Colborne had advanced so as to form an angle with the main line; as the French column passed them they poured in a destructive fire, and charged directly upon their flank. The course of that charge was unchecked, the 52nd regiment continued to follow the flying French right across the valley. Almost at the same time, the French in the angle at Papelotte had also been driven back by the Prussians; and the English light cavalry under Vandelour and Vivian had likewise charged, overthrowing the troops opposed to them; thus in three parts of the field the French were in flight. A general order to advance was given, and after a short but broken resistance, the whole mass of the French army fled in complete rout. About nine o'clock Wellington and Blücher met at the farmhouse of La Belle Alliance, lately the French headquarters. The pursuit was intrusted to the Prussians, less exhausted than their English allies, and was followed up by Gneisenau along the Charleroi road as far as Frasnes. The loss in this great battle was very heavy on all sides; that of England is put at 13,000, that of Prussia at 7000, and of France between 23,000 and 30,000. It was however decisive.