[262] Ibid., p. 100.

[263] Science of Ethics, p. 120.

[264] Simcox, Natural Law, p. 104.

[265] Ibid., p. 103.

[266] Ibid., p. 89; cf. J. T. Punnet, Mind, x. 91: "What the progress-principle makes its aim and end is not complexity, but the highest and choicest fruits of complexity—the harmonious unfolding of all the latent capacities of man."

[267] "Of real tendencies"—Natural Law, p. 98. But what tendencies are not real?

[268] Natural Law, p. 98.

[269] Cf. Trendelenburg, Naturrecht, p. 45: "Von der philosophischen Seite kann es kein anderes Princip der Ethik geben als das menschliche Wesen an sich, d. h., das menschliche Wesen in der Tiefe seiner Idee und im Reichthum seiner historischen Entwickelung. Beides gehört zusammen. Denn das nur Historische würde blind und das nur Ideale leer."

[270] The empirical interpretation of evolution is that adopted by the majority of evolutionists, but is not essential to the truth of the theory. A protest against it is entered by Mr Wallace, though in the somewhat crude form of postulating supernatural interference for the production of certain classes of phenomena (cf. Contributions to the Theory of Natural Selection, p. 359), at the same time that his conception of nature does not seem to differ otherwise from that of Häckel.

[271] The reference in the above to Kant, Werke, iii. 438 ff., is obvious; but it is nevertheless a true account of the principles involved in the theory of evolution.

[272] Cf. Stirling, Secret of Hegel, ii. 615: "One grand system, unity of type, all this must be postulated from the very constitution of human reason; but from the very constitution of experience as well, it can never be realised in experience."

[273] Bau und Leben des socialen Körpers, ii. 68.

[274] Cf. Fouillée, Critique des systèmes de morale contemporains, p. 13 ff.

[275] Boswell's Life of Johnson, chap. liv.

[276] Kant, Werke, v. 187 (Kr. d. Urt., Einl. iv.)

[277] Descartes, Princ. phil., iii. 3, i. 28; Bacon, De augm., iii. 5, Novum organum, ii. 2.

[278] Cf. Kant, Werke, v. 387 (Kr. d. Urt., § 65).

[279] Historische Beiträge zur Philosophie, iii. 165.

[280] Cf. Hegel, Wissenschaft der Logik, iii. 228.

[281] First Principles, § 194, p. 556.

[282] Principles of Psychology, § 56, i. 140.

[283] Ibid., §§ 272, 273, i. 624 ff.

[284] Mind, ix. 21.

[285] From "action" in this its ultimate meaning as equivalent to origination by the subject, it is necessary to distinguish "action" as a phenomenon in the external world. The latter is one of the modes in which the relation of objects is known to us, the former a characteristic of knowing. The active nature of knowledge is worked out in an interesting way in Professor S. S. Laurie's 'Metaphysica nova et vetusta,' by "Scotus Novanticus" (1884).

[286] Werke, iii. 538; cf. Adamson, Philosophy of Kant, p. 138.

[287] Prolegomena to Ethics, p. 161.

[288] Prolegomena to Ethics, p. 165.

[289] Sidgwick, "Green's Ethics," Mind, ix. 180.

[290] This is implied in Hegel's well-known imperative, "Be a person and respect others as persons."—Phil. d. Rechts, p. 73.

[291] Thus Höffding maintains that "the highest ethical idea" is "the idea of the human race as a realm of personalities."—Grundlage der humanen Ethik (aus dem dänischen), p. 74.

[292] Bau und Leben des socialen Körpers, i. 173.

[293] Cf. H. Siebeck, Philosophische Monatshefte, xx. 340.