MR. PRESIDENT,—Whatever the Senator from New York [Mr. Seward] touches he handles with a completeness to render anything superfluous from one who follows on the same side; but the opposition which his views have encountered from the Senator from Virginia [Mr. Hunter], and also from the Senator from Georgia [Mr. Toombs], as well as the intrinsic importance of the question, may justify the attempt to state the argument anew.

We are carried first to the words of the Constitution, which are as follows:—

Under this provision, the annual appropriation bills for the Army, Navy, Post-Office, and civil and diplomatic service, from the beginning of the Government, have originated in the House of Representatives; and this has always been so, I believe, without question. It is now proposed to reverse the standing policy, and to originate such bills in the Senate; and this proposition has the sanction of the Committee on Finance.

The proposition is a clear departure from usage, and on this account must be regarded with suspicion. A slight examination will demonstrate that it tends to subvert well-established landmarks.

By looking at the debates in the Convention which framed the National Constitution, it will be found that this clause was not hastily or carelessly adopted,—that it was the subject of much discussion, and was viewed as essentially important in establishing the system of checks and balances peculiar to our Republic. It was, indeed, part of the compromise between the small States and the large States.

After much consideration, the equality of the States was recognized in the Constitution of the Senate, and small States, like Delaware and Rhode Island, were allowed, in this body, equal power with large States, like Virginia and Massachusetts. But this great concession to the small States was coupled at the time with a condition that “money bills” should originate in the House of Representatives, where the people were represented according to numbers. The language finally employed was, “All bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives.” This was adopted, as compensation to the large and populous States for their comparative weakness in the Senate.

That I do not go too far, when I call it part of the compromise between the great States and small States, I proceed to show, from the debates in the National Convention, as reported by Mr. Madison, how it was regarded there.

The provision owes its authoritative introduction to Dr. Franklin, who moved it in the committee which subsequently reported it.[30] Afterwards, in Convention, when the clause relating to equality of votes was under consideration, we have this report of what he said.

Colonel Mason, of Virginia, was of the same opinion, and desired “that the whole might be brought into one view.”[32]

Mr. Gerry, of Massachusetts, followed up the idea of the mutual dependence of the two propositions, remarking,—

Please, Sir, to mark the breadth of this expression.

Mr. Pinckney, of South Carolina, followed, saying,—

At a later stage of the debates the subject was resumed, and the two propositions still appear together.

At a still later stage Mr. Pinckney moved to strike out the section on money bills, “as giving no peculiar advantage to the House of Representatives, and as clogging the Government.” Mr. Gorham “was against allowing the Senate to originate, but was for allowing it only to amend.” Mr. Gouverneur Morris urged, that it was “particularly proper that the Senate should have the right of originating money bills. They will sit constantly, will consist of a smaller number, and will be able to prepare such bills with due correctness, and so as to prevent delay of business in the other House.” To all this Colonel Mason replied, in the strong language which seems to have been natural to him, that he “was unwilling to travel over this ground again. To strike out the section was to unhinge the compromise of which it made a part.”[36]

I might adduce other authorities; but here surely is enough to show that the provision was in reality one of the important compromises of the Constitution.

This brings me, Sir, to the precise meaning of the provision. The seeming indefiniteness of the term, “bills for raising revenue,” may alone furnish apology for the present debate. It may be argued, that, while the Senate is placed under certain restrictions, it may nevertheless originate “appropriation bills.” This, of course, is a question of interpretation. Does this interdict upon the Senate extend to bills by which money is appropriated to the support of Government, as well as to bills by which it is directly obtained? Are appropriation bills included under the term, “bills for raising revenue”? Now I cannot accord with opinions so confidently expressed by the Senator from Virginia [Mr. Hunter], and the Senator from Georgia [Mr. Toombs], that it was clearly the intention of the Constitution to concede to the Senate the power of originating all appropriation bills; nor, on the other hand, do I assert that such exercise of power is in the strict sense unconstitutional. I approach the question as an inquirer anxious to find the real purpose.

Several considerations seem to shed light on the path to our conclusion.

First. The compromise between the small States and large States can be made completely effective, according to obvious intent of the authors of the Constitution, only by interdicting the Senate from originating the great appropriation bills. If this interdict is restricted simply to tariff bills, which occur only at rare intervals, it becomes a very inadequate compensation for the surrender by the large States to the small States in the constitution of the Senate. According to the reason of the rule, the great appropriation bills must be equally within its intendment. The reason is as strong in one case as in the other.

In the debates of the Convention, Dr. Franklin said:—

Please, Sir, to mark these words.

Mr. Gerry, in urging the restraint upon the Senate, said:—

How, Sir, can the people hold the purse-strings, unless they hold the bills by which the purse is appropriated?

And Colonel Mason broke forth in language clearly revealing his sense of danger against which to guard.

I repeat, then, according to the reason of the rule, the great appropriation bills must be embraced by the prohibition.

Secondly. There is a further consideration, founded on the familiar use of the term money bills throughout the debates in the Convention, as applicable to bills which the Senate cannot originate. I need not occupy time by reference to instances; but whoever takes the trouble to investigate the matter in Mr. Madison’s report of the debates, and also in the report of the Virginia Convention, will find that this term is universally employed,—unless, indeed, where Mr. Gouverneur Morris uses the broader term “money plans,”[40] and Mr. Gerry “money matters.”[41] Now all these phrases are clearly applicable to “appropriation bills,” by which the Government is carried on; and the inference seems irresistible, that the parties who used them must have had such bills in mind.

In the Virginia Convention objection was made by Mr. Grayson “to the power of the Senate to propose or concur with amendments to money bills.” The objection is even to “amendments.” He pronounced this “a departure from that great principle which required that the immediate representatives of the people only should interfere with money bills.… The Lords in England had never been allowed to intermeddle with money bills. He knew not why the Senate should.”[42]

Thirdly. This brings me to another consideration, founded on the example of England, which was obviously present to the framers of the Constitution. The Senator from Virginia [Mr. Hunter] is clearly mistaken on this point. It was often adduced in debate in the National Convention, and, as we have just seen, in the Virginia Convention also. In England the rule is explicit, and of ancient date. As early as July 3, 1678, the Commons resolved:—

In pursuance of this rule, estimates for the annual expenditure are submitted by the Ministry to the House of Commons, sitting as a Committee of Supply. This process is explained as follows.

At the close of the session all the grants are embodied in a bill, which is known as “Appropriation Bill,” and, as it is kindred in character to that under our system, doubtless has given its name to ours. This bill is thus described:—

Thus, on three grounds,—first, by the reason of the thing,—secondly, by the familiar use in all the debates of the descriptive term, “money bills,”—and, thirdly, by the example of England,—the conclusion is inevitable, that “appropriation bills,” by which the Government is carried on, are within the spirit of the interdict upon the Senate, and that this body cannot originate such bills without violation of a well-established principle inherited from English jurisprudence, and also without unhinging, according to the language of Colonel Mason, that compromise by virtue of which the small States are admitted to equality of representation on this floor.

I am not unmindful of the fact, on which the Senator from Virginia has dwelt so emphatically, that the Senate is in the habit of originating pension bills, also bills for payment of private claims, and kindred measures. I was glad, to-day, to vote for the bill originating in this body for the relief of our late distinguished Minister at Constantinople.[46] But against this usage, which is exceptional in character, and has probably attracted little attention, from its considerable convenience and little importance, may be opposed the uniform practice by which the great bills providing for the necessities of the Government have always originated in the House of Representatives. And you will bear in mind, Sir, that the question is now on these bills.

Mr. President, it is a received maxim, that it is the part of a good judge to amplify his jurisdiction; but it will hardly be accepted, that it is the part of the American Senate to amplify its powers, particularly in derogation of the popular branch. And it surely cannot escape observation, that the present effort is launched at a moment when the popular branch promises to differ from the Senate on important questions of national policy. I am not insensible to the public convenience, which has been pressed in this debate; but permit me to say, Sir, that, should this convenience require the proposed departure from our standing policy, we shall be wise, if we hearken to the counsels of the Senator from New York, and refrain from any innovation, unless assured of the consent and coöperation of the other House.

RELIEF OF VESSELS IN DISTRESS ON THE COAST.

Though the memorial was addressed to the Secretary of the Treasury, I felt it my duty to apply to the Secretary of the Navy. He entered into the plan with much benevolence, and expressed a desire to do all that the means at his command would permit. The only vessel at Boston in readiness is the steam-frigate Merrimack, which is about to start on a “trial-trip” of one week, previous to a cruise of six months. This vessel has already been ordered to make the week’s voyage direct from Boston to Norfolk; but the Secretary will give directions that she shall proceed to the Great Banks as far as can be judiciously done, under the circumstances, in order to afford relief to vessels in distress. He would extend the cruise to a longer term at once, but the contractors who have furnished her engines have certain rights which he is bound to respect.

The Secretary authorizes me to say also that he will send further relief, if possible.

I beg you to assure the memorialists that it will give me pleasure to promote the objects of the memorial to the full extent of my power.

Believe me, dear Sir, faithfully yours,

Charles Sumner.

John T. Smith, Esq., Exchange News-Room.

THE EXAMPLE OF WASHINGTON AGAINST SLAVERY NOT TO BE FORGOTTEN NOW.

The play of Othello without the part of Othello would be a barren spectacle; and the example of Washington, without his testimony against the malevolent force which disturbs the Republic, would be hardly less barren. Let the young men of Boston be encouraged to dwell on those sentiments and acts which, while they elevate his name, apply with prevailing power to the existing state of things among us. Let them bear in mind that he declared it to be “among his first wishes to see some plan adopted by which Slavery in this country may be abolished by law,”—that, to promote this purpose, he expressed a desire, in a recorded interview with a distinguished foreigner, for the formation of an Antislavery Society,—that on many occasions he condemned Slavery,—that, in congratulations to Lafayette on his purchase of a plantation with a view of emancipating the slaves on it, he exclaimed, “Would to God a like spirit might diffuse itself generally into the minds of the people of this country!”—and that, finally, by his last will and testament, written within six months of his death, he bore his practical testimony to those ideas and aspirations, by the emancipation of his slaves. With these things taken to heart, the example of Washington will exert its just conservative influence over the country, holding it back from the extension of that evil against which he set himself, and arousing the general sentiment to repulse the aggressions which now threaten civil war. Then, indeed, will the Father of his Country have a new birth and influence.

Believe me, my dear Sir, very faithfully yours,

Charles Sumner.

Charles G. Chase, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

CONSTANT EXERTION AND UNION AMONG GOOD MEN.

THE ABROGATION OF TREATIES.

MR. PRESIDENT,—If I can have the attention of the Senate for a brief time, I will explain the object of this inquiry. The subject may be dry, but it is important, and, at this moment, of direct practical interest.

The President in his annual message named three different questions, arising out of our relations with foreign nations. Two of these, concerning England, have been discussed in the Senate; the other, which concerns the payment of the Sound dues to Denmark, has not yet been mentioned here. Introducing it now, I have no purpose to say anything on the character of these dues, or to arrest the efforts of the Government for the relief of our commerce from foreign exactions. That is a broad field of history and of public law, which for the present there is no occasion to enter. My desire is simply to open a question of domestic interest under our own Constitution, with which, of course, Denmark has no concern, but which is necessarily involved in the determination of our course on this matter.

The President, in his annual message, announces:—

The treaty, it will be noted, reserves to either party—that is, to either of the Governments between whom it is made—the privilege of terminating it by notice; and the President, without the sanction of an Act of Congress, but simply in pursuance of a resolution of the Senate, passed in Executive Session, has constituted himself the Government, so far as to give such notice, and by such notice to abrogate the treaty. Acting under his instructions, our Minister at Copenhagen, on the 14th of April, 1855, notified the Danish Government, that,—

Thus undertaking, merely with the consent of the Senate, and without the concurrence of the House of Representatives, to abrogate a treaty, the President has assumed a power inconsistent with the Constitution, and disowned by the practice of the Government, adopted, after debate, on leading occasions. Such a usurpation cannot be justified by the good that is sought; for that good might have been sought, and may still be sought, by another course, in entire harmony with the Constitution and the practice of the Government. Nor will any temporary purpose justify the removal of constitutional safeguards.

The Constitution declares that the President “shall have power, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur”; but it does not declare that the President, by and with the consent of the Senate, shall have power to abrogate treaties. The absence of all language conferring this extraordinary power is itself an unanswerable argument against the existence of the power. But we are not left to found our conclusion even on irresistible inference. There are explicit words of the Constitution, which determine it beyond doubt. It is declared, that—

Thus declaring treaties to be “the supreme law of the land,” the Constitution not only gives to them the highest authority, but places them under the highest safeguard known to our institutions. When once made, they are obligatory on our side as laws, and can be abrogated by no power less than that which may abrogate existing laws. Not the President alone, not the President and Senate, can set them aside; but for this purpose the whole power of the Government must be invoked, in its most solemn form, by Act of Congress. In conformity with this requirement, the power to declare war, involving, of course, the abrogation of treaties, is expressly lodged with Congress. The President, with the consent of the Senate, cannot declare war; and it is difficult to see what greater power he possesses in the abrogation of a treaty, involving possibly the rupture of friendly intercourse with a foreign nation, and involving certainly the overthrow of what the Constitution declares to be the supreme law.

Thus placing treaties under all the sanctions of law, I follow the best authorities. The eminent commentator, Mr. Justice Story, in speaking of them, gives them this character. Expounding this very clause, he says:—

And the Supreme Court of the United States affirm the same principle.

This is a decision comparatively recent. But early in our history the authority of treaties was much considered by the Supreme Court, in the famous case of Ware v. Hylton et al., 3 Dallas, 199-285, and we find judges from opposite sections of the country arriving at the same conclusion. Mr. Justice Gushing, of Massachusetts, said:—

Mr. Justice Iredell, of North Carolina, passed directly upon the power of Congress, asserting that to this body alone was given the power to abrogate a treaty under our Constitution. These are his words:—

In practical illustration of the legal character attributed to treaties, it will be observed that they are published with the Laws of the United States, and constitute part of this collection, being bound between the same covers; and I submit that the President and Senate might undertake to tear out a leaf from the Statutes at Large with as much propriety as to tear out an existing treaty.

Such is the rule of the Constitution, in conformity with which is the practice of the country. Never before has the President assumed to act without the House of Representatives in the performance of this duty.

This question arose early after the adoption of the Constitution, in our relations with France; and you will find, Sir, on our statute-book the evidence of the way in which it was regarded. In 1798, the existing treaties with France were abrogated by Act of Congress, which, after a preamble, proceeded as follows:—

This very Act of Congress originated in the Senate, which at that day undertook to exercise no such power as is now claimed. It was not passed hastily, or without debate. The subject of our relations with France was referred to a committee of that body on the 29th of November, 1797. After the lapse of months, on the 21st of June, 1798, Mr. Goodhue, from that committee, reported a bill to abrogate existing treaties with that nation, which passed the Senate on the 23d of June, by a vote of thirteen yeas to five nays. On the 25th it was carried to the House of Representatives, where it was referred to the Committee of the Whole on the State of the Union, fully debated, and finally passed on the 6th of July. In the course of the debate, treaties were recognized as laws, to be abrogated only by Act of Congress. A Representative from Massachusetts, afterwards an eminent judicial character, Mr. Sewall, put this point in these words:—

This view was in no respect controverted or questioned. On the contrary, it was recognized by the whole debate. Mr. Dana, of Connecticut, said:—

Mr. Gallatin, whose position in our public affairs was afterwards so justly distinguished, employed the very language applicable to laws, when he spoke of the proposed abrogation of the treaty as a repeal.

Such is the first and leading precedent in our history. The next is more recent, and of hardly less importance. It was the notice to Great Britain of the termination of the convention of 1827, relating to the joint occupancy of certain parts of Oregon. This was not done by the President, with the advice of the Senate in secret session, but by Act of Congress. President Polk, in his annual message of 2d December, 1845, called upon Congress to act. These are his words:—