[92] MS. Records. Sir Gore Ouseley’s treaty is not given in the collection of treaties in the published “Papers relating to Persia and Afghanistan.” In another article of this, which does not appear in the subsequent treaty, the amount of the allowances to be granted by the Shah to the British officers serving in Persia is laid down.

[93] Of this article it has been said by an experienced writer: “The obligation which we contracted in the 9th article, to abstain from interference in the event of a possible contest between the Afghans and Persians, is hardly intelligible. Such a proposal could not have proceeded from Great Britain; and if proceeding from Persia, it indicated that desire of territorial extension which was more fully developed in the sequel, and which, when developed, compelled us on general grounds to repudiate the treaty altogether.”—[Calcutta Review, vol. xii.]

[94] The explanation of this failure, given by the same experienced writer, is worth quoting:-“If it be remembered that when the system is affected with chronic paralysis, the attempt is vain to restore any particular member to a healthy action, it will be understood that, to a nation devoid of organisation in every other department of government, a regular army was impossible. It thus happened that, notwithstanding the admirable material for soldiery which were offered by the hardy peasantry of Azerbijan, and the still hardier mountaineers of Kermanshah—notwithstanding the aptitude of the officers to receive instruction—notwithstanding that a due portion of physical courage appertained generally to the men—the disciplined forces of Persia, considered as an army, and for the purpose of national defence, were, from the epoch of their first creation, contemptible. Beyond drill and exercise, they never had anything in common with the regular armies of Europe and India. System was entirely wanting, whether in regard to pay, clothing, food, carriage, equipage, commissariat, promotion, or command; and under a lath-and-plaster government like that of Persia, such must have been inevitably the case. At the same time, however, a false confidence arose of a most exaggerated and dangerous character; the resources of the country were lavished on the army to an extent which grievously impoverished it at the time, and which has brought about at the present day a state of affairs that, in any other quarter of the world, would be termed a national bankruptcy; above all, the tribes—the chivalry of the empire, the forces with which Nadir overran the East from Bagdad to Delhi, and which, ever yielding but ever present, surrounded, under Aga Mahomed Khan, the Russian armies with a desert—were destroyed. Truly then it may be said that in presenting Persia with the boon of a so-called regular army, in order to reclaim her from her unlawful loves with France, we clothed her in the robe of Nessus.”—[Calcutta Review, vol. xii.] See also Correspondence of Sir John Malcolm.

[95] The characteristic words of the Russian manifesto, announcing these events, are worth quoting:-“Obliged to pursue the enemy through a country without roads, laid waste by the troops which were to have defended it; often opposed by nature itself; exposed to the burning sun of summer, and the rigour of winter; our brave army, after unparalleled efforts, succeeded in conquering Erivan, which was reputed impregnable. It passed the Araxes, planted its standards on the top of Ararat, and penetrating further and further into the interior of Persia, it occupied Tabreez itself, with the country depending on it. The Khanate of Erivan, on both sides of the Araxes, and the Khanate of Nakhichevan, a part of the ancient Armenia, fell into the hands of the conquerors.”

[96] This fortress, together with the surrounding country, to the extent of three wersts and a half, was ceded to Russia.

[97] Sir Harford Jones.

[98] The Duke of Wellington wrote to Mr. Canning, in Nov., 1826, “It will not answer to allow the Persian monarchy to be destroyed, particularly upon a case of which the injustice and aggression are undoubtedly on the side of the Russians.” Sir John Malcolm, to whom the Duke sent a copy of this letter, wrote, “You certainly are right. There is a positive claim in faith for mediation.” Mr. Canning, however, affected to doubt whether there had been any aggression against Persia. “Does not the article,” he asked, “which defines the casus fœderis to be aggression against Persia, limit the effect of the whole treaty, and the aim of the sixth article, which promises our mediation? Are we bound even to mediate in a case in which Persia was the aggressor.”—[Life and Correspondence of Sir John Malcolm, vol. ii. pp. 452-455.]

[99] A writer in the Foreign Quarterly Review, who, if not Sir John M’Neill himself, has unblushingly appropriated, without acknowledgment, a large portion of the pamphlet on the “Progress and present position of Russia in the East,” published some three or four years before, says: “Assuredly Prince Abbas Meerza relied strongly upon this (the 4th article of the treaty), and without it would never have engaged in the contest he provoked; we are bound in justice to say, and we say it on good authority, wantonly and in defiance of the feelings of the Persian Government and King. But though Persia had fairly executed all her share of the treaty in question, the English minister, when called upon to fulfil this condition, hesitated, hung back, negotiated, and delayed under every possible pretext, while he could not deny the faith or the claim of Persia. It was clear, however, to all the parties that Mr. Canning only sought a means of escaping the fulfilment of the stipulations. He was hard pressed by the reluctance to engaging in a war with Russia, represented as too probable by the minister of that power at the British Court, and by the dexterity of a first-rate female diplomatist, to whom, indeed, the management of the matter was fairly confided by the Russian Court, and whose influence was fatally effective in this and the Turkish questions. In affecting to adhere simply to the policy of his predecessors, Mr. Canning forgot the immense difference and disgrace of refusing the fulfilment only at the time when, and because, the need was urgent. He could not foresee that Persia must become, if further humbled, the tool of Russia against the East; if he had, no earthly power would have balanced against his duty. He did not even perceive that the crisis to Persia had arrived; and contented himself with a double sacrifice to vanity, in assuming to arbitrate against a sovereign prince, and hearing his praises resounded by the lips of successful beauty.”

[100] “A letter has been received in town from Persia, which has excited a good deal of talk in the bazaar, and the substance of which we give merely as a rumour of the day. It states that Prince Abbas Meerza has ordered 30,000 men to march upon Herat, and that this movement is only preparatory to an advance upon India in conjunction with Russia. This is probably a mere rumour or the echo of a lie—but ‘coming events cast their shadows before,’ and many of these rumours, combined with the tone which now and then breaks out in the Russian journals, show but too well the turn of men’s thoughts and wishes, and should warn us to be prepared.”—[Bombay Gazette, August 25, 1832.] About the same time, Dr. Wolff, who was then travelling in Central Asia, wrote: “It is remarkable that there is a current belief, not only throughout Khorassan, but, as I found it afterwards, throughout Toorkistan even to Caubul, that Abbas Meerza had married a Russian Princess, and adopted the Russian religion; and that 50,000 Russians would come to Khorassan by way of Khiva, and assist Abbas Meerza in conquering Khorassan. So much is true that Russia has written to Futteh Ali Shah, offering him 5000 men for taking Khorassan, and putting down the chupow—i.e., plundering system of the Toorkomans; and I hope to prove it to a certainty that Russia will be very soon the mistress of Khiva, under the pretext that the King of Khiva has 8000 Russian slaves, whilst I know by the most authentic reports that there are not above 200 Russian slaves and 60 Russian deserters at Khiva.”—[Calcutta Christian Observer, September, 1832.] It was stated at one time that Russia had consented to yield her claim to the balance of the indemnity money remaining then due by Persia, on condition of the latter joining in an expedition against Khiva.

[101] Abbas Meerza gratefully acknowledged the assistance he received from Captain Shee, Mr. Beek, and M. Berowski, the Pole, of whom subsequent mention will be made. At the siege of Koochan a sergeant of the Bombay Horse Artillery, named Washbrook, directed the mortar batteries, which mainly conduced to the reduction of the place.

[102] Nor did he scruple outwardly to evince the relative degrees of respect which he entertained for the two nations in the persons of their representatives. On one occasion, for example, when the Russian envoy, Count Simonich, was returning from an excursion, the foreign minister went out to meet him, but demurred to paying the same compliment to the British ambassador.—[MS. Records.] This incident, however, which created some sensation in the Calcutta Council-Chamber, may have had its source in the private feelings of Meerza Massoud, the foreign minister, who, having long resided at St. Petersburgh, was a mere creature of the Russian State.

[103] Mr. Ellis to Lord Palmerston: Teheran, November 13, 1835.—[Published Papers relating to Persia and Afghanistan.]

[104] The officer whom he proposed to send was Lieutenant Todd, of the Bengal Artillery, who held the local rank of Major in Persia, and who had long been employed in instructing the artillery of the Persian army.

[105] The Russian minister had urged the King to undertake a winter campaign against Herat. But Count Nesselrode always resolutely maintained that Simonich had endeavoured to persuade the Shah not to proceed against Herat at all; and Simonich told the same story in his letters to his own government.

[106] Though we need not seek the causes of this expedition in anything either nearer or more remote than the ambition of the young Shah and the intrigues of the Russian Government, a pretext was put forth by, or for Persia, of a more plausible kind. It was urged that the Heratees had carried off and sold into slavery the subjects of the Persian Shah. There is no doubt of the fact. But it was never put prominently forward by the Shah, who always urged that Herat had no right to be independent. Another pretext, but a weak one, for undertaking the war was also alleged. Hulakoo, son of the Prince of Kerman, after his father was taken and blinded, and Kerman occupied by the Shah’s troops, fled to Herat, and from thence endeavoured to excite disturbances in Kain, Khaf, and Eastern Kerman.

[107] Kamran had threatened Candahar on more than one occasion; and at the end of 1835, Mr. Masson reported to the Supreme Government that the Sirdars of that place, despairing of obtaining any assistance from Dost Mahomed, had sent an emissary to the Bombay Government, offering to cede their country to the British!—[MS. Records.] I merely give this as a report sent down by the English news-writer.

[108] “I share with you,” he wrote to Sir Charles Metcalfe, in September, 1836, “the apprehension of our being at no distant date involved in political, and possibly military operations upon our western frontier; and even since I have been here, more than one event has occurred, which has led me to think that the period of disturbance is nearer than I had either wished or expected. The constitutional restlessness of the old man of Lahore seems to increase with his age. His growing appetite for the treasures and jungles of Sindh—the obvious impolicy of allowing him to extend his dominions in that direction—the importance which is attached to the free navigation of the Indus, most justly I think, and yet perhaps with some exaggeration from its value not having been tried—the advance of the Persians towards Herat, and the link which may in consequence be formed between Indian and European politics,—all lead me to fear that the wish which I have had to confine my administration to objects of commerce, and finance, and improved institutions, and domestic policy, will be far indeed from being accomplished. But as you say, we must fulfil our destiny; and in the mean while I have entreated Runjeet Singh to be quiet, and in regard to his two last requests have refused to give him 50,000 musquets, and am ready to send him a doctor and a dentist.”—[MS. Correspondence.]

[109] Moorcroft seems to have been upheld only by the kindly encouragement of Sir Charles (then Mr.) Metcalfe, who, as Resident at Delhi, took the greatest interest in his enterprise, and afforded him all possible assistance. He attributed the unwillingness of our Government to explore the countries beyond our frontier, to some vague apprehension of alarming the Sikhs. “It is somewhat humiliating,” he wrote to Metcalfe, “that we should know so little of countries which touch upon our frontier; and this in a great measure out of respect for a nation that is as despicable as insolent, whose origin was founded upon rapine, and which exists by acquiring conquests it only retains by depopulating the territory.”—[MS. Correspondence.]

[110] “The greatest apathy,” says Mr. Sterling, “prevailed, and the members of the government could not be roused to take an interest in the subject. The knowledge that I had been in these interesting countries produced no desire for intelligence regarding them, and my reception gave no encouragement for the production of it. Neglect had been preceded by the deprivation of my appointment. I was no longer collector of Agra; that situation had been disposed of nearly two months prior to my reaching the Presidency: my return was deemed hopeless, and my death anticipated.”

[111] Sir William Napier says, that “an enlightened desire to ascertain the commercial capabilities of the Indus induced Lord Ellenborough, then President of the India Board of Control, to employ the late Sir Alexander Burnes to explore the river in 1831, under pretence of conveying presents to Runjeet Singh.” But the enlightenment of this measure was questioned at the time by some of the ablest and most experienced of our Indian administrators. At the head of these Sir Charles Metcalfe emphatically protested against it. In October, 1810, he recorded a minute in Council, declaring “the scheme of surveying the Indus, under the pretence of conveying a present to Runjeet Singh,” to be “a trick unworthy of our government, which cannot fail when detected, as most probably it will be, to excite the jealousy and indignation of the powers on whom we play it.” “It is not impossible,” he added, “that it may lead to war.”—[MS. Records.] These opinions were repeated privately in letters to Lord William Bentinck, and, at a later date, to Lord Auckland. Metcalfe, indeed, as long as he remained in India, never ceased to point out the inexpediency of interfering with the states beyond the Indus.

[112] And doubtless, very absurd and uncalled for the jealousy was considered in those days. As Burnes ascended the Indus, a Syud on the water’s edge lifted up his hands, and exclaimed, “Sindh is now gone, since the English have seen the river, which is the road to its conquest.” Nearly twenty years before, Sir James Mackintosh had written in his journal: “A Hindoo merchant, named Derryana, under the mask of friendship, had been continually alarming the Sindh Government against the English mission. On being reproved, he said that although some of his reports respecting their immediate designs might not be quite correct, yet this tribe never began as friends without ending as enemies, by seizing the country which they entered with the most amicable professions.” “A shrewd dog,” said Mackintosh; but he did not live to see the depths of the man’s shrewdness.

[113] He was promised, too, the reversion of the office of minister.

[114] Burnes, when in England, had endeavoured to impress the Court of Directors with an idea of the expediency of sending him out as commercial agent to Caubul; but Mr. Tucker, who was then in the chair, could see only the evils of such a measure. “The late Sir Alexander Burnes,” he wrote some years afterwards, “was introduced to me in 1834 as a talented and enterprising young officer, and it was suggested that he might be usefully employed as a commercial agent at Caubul, to encourage our commerce with that country and to aid in opening the river Indus to British industry and enterprise.... I declined then to propose or to concur in the appointment of Lieutenant Burnes to a commercial agency in Caubul, feeling perfectly assured that it must soon degenerate into a political agency, and that we should as a necessary consequence be involved in all the entanglement of Afghan politics.”—[Memoirs of H. St. George Tucker.] Mr. Grant, who was then at the Board of Control, concurred in opinion with Mr. Tucker; Sir Charles Metcalfe also wrote a minute in council, emphatically pointing out the evils of this commercial agency.

[115] Mr. Percival Lord of the Bombay Medical Establishment, joined the Mission in transitu. Mohun Lal also accompanied it.

[116] Avitabile, an Italian by birth, was a General in the service of Runjeet Singh, and at that time Governor of Peshawur.

[117] Unpublished Correspondence of Sir Alexander Burnes.

[118] Unpublished Correspondence of Sir A. Burnes.

[119] And, on the 30th December, Burnes, with reference to this promised sympathy, wrote, in the following words, to Mr. Macnaghten. The passage was not published in the official correspondence. It was thought better to suppress it:-“The present position of the British Government at this capital appears to me a most gratifying proof of the estimation in which it is held by the Afghan nation. Russia has come forward with offers which are certainly substantial. Persia has been lavish in her promises, and Bokhara and other States have not been backward. Yet, in all that has passed or is daily transpiring, the chief of Caubul declares that he prefers the sympathy and friendly offices of the British to all these offers, however alluring they may seem, from Persia or from the Emperor—which certainly places his good sense in a light more than prominent, and, in my humble judgment, proves that, by an earlier attention to these countries, we might have escaped the whole of these intrigues, and held long since a stable influence in Caubul.”—[Ungarbled Correspondence of Sir A. Burnes.]

[120] “As I approached Caubul,” he wrote to a private friend, on the 5th of July, “war broke out with the Afghans and Sikhs, and my position became embarrassing. I was even ordered by express to pause, and while hanging on my oars another express still cries pause, but places a vast latitude in my hands, and ‘forward’ is my motto—forward to the scene of carnage, where, instead of embarrassing my government, I feel myself in a situation to do good. It is this latitude throughout life that has made me what I am, if I am anything, and I can hardly say how grateful I feel to Lord Auckland.... I have not as yet got the replies to my recommendation on our line of policy in Caubul, consequent on a discovered intrigue of Russia, and on the Caubul chief throwing himself in despair on Perso-Russian arms. I have at last something to do, and I hope to do it well.”—[Private Correspondence of Sir A. Burnes.]

[121] Ante, page 186. In a letter to another correspondent, written about the same time, Burnes says: “With war came intrigues, and I have had the good fortune to find out all the doings of the Czar and his emissaries here, where they have sent letters and presents. After proving this, I plainly asked the Governor-General if such things were to be allowed, and I got a reply a week ago, altering all my instructions, giving me power to go on to Herat, and anywhere, indeed, I could do good. The first exercise of the authority has been to despatch a messenger to Candahar, to tell them to discontinue their intercourse with Persia and Russia, on pain of displeasure—and not before it was time, for a son of the chief of that city, with presents for the Russian ambassador, is ready to set out for Teheran.”—[Sir A. Burnes to Captain Jacob—Caubul, 29th of October, 1837: MS. Correspondence.]

[122] “The chiefs of Candahar,” he wrote a few days afterwards, to a private friend, “had gone over to Persia. I have detached them and offered them British protection and cash if they would recede, and if Persia attacked them. I have no authority to do so; but am I to stand by and see us ruined at Candahar, when the Government tell me an attack on Herat would be most unpalatable. Herat has been besieged fifty days, and if the Persians move on Candahar, I am off there with the Ameer and his forces, and mean to pay the piper myself. We have good stuff—forty-six guns and stout Afghans, as brave as regular troops need be. I am on stirring ground, and I am glad to say I am up to it in health and all that, and was never more braced in my life.”—[Correspondence of Sir A. Burnes—privately printed.]

[123] Mr. W. H. Macnaghten to Captain A. Burnes—Camp Bareilly, 20th January, 1838. The letter from which this passage is taken consists of twenty-four paragraphs, of which three only appear in the published correspondence. There seems, indeed, to have been a studious suppression of the entire history of the offers made to the Candahar chiefs, and of the censure which they called down upon Captain Burnes. Lord Auckland subsequently, with praiseworthy candour, admitted that the best authorities at home were of opinion that the measure which had evoked these expressions of the severe displeasure of his Lordship, was the very best that could have been adopted.

[124] I have given the vulgar orthography of the name. His real name was Viktevitck, or Wiktewitch.

[125] The first information relative to the fact of Vickovich’s mission to Caubul was accidentally obtained by Major Rawlinson, when on his way to the camp of Mahomed Shah, who was then marching upon Herat. The circumstances, as set forth in a private letter, from that officer himself, are not unworthy of narration:-“Teheran, November 1, 1837. I have just returned from a journey of much interest. M’Neill had some business in the Persian camp which he thought I might help to arrange, and I was bid accordingly to make my way to the ‘Royal Stirrup,’ with all convenient despatch. I was obliged to ride day and night, as the post-horses on the road, owing to the constant passage of couriers, were almost unserviceable, and yet I was only able, after all, to accomplish the distance of something more than 700 miles in a week. The last morning of my ride I had an adventure. Our whole party were pretty well knocked up, and in the dark, between sleeping and waking, we had managed to lose the road. As morning dawned, we found ourselves wandering about on the broken plain which stretches up from Subzewar to the range containing the Turquoise mines, and shortly afterwards we perceived that we were close to another party of horsemen, who were also, apparently, trying to regain the high road. I was not anxious to accost these strangers, but on cantering past them, I saw, to my astonishment, men in Cossack dresses, and one of my attendants recognised among the party a servant of the Russian Mission. My curiosity was, of course, excited, and on reaching the stage I told one of my men to watch for the arrival of the travellers, and find out who they were. Shortly afterwards the Russian party rode up, inquired who I was, and finding I was a British officer, declined to enter the Khan, but held on their road. In such a state of affairs as preceded the siege of Herat, the mere fact of a Russian gentleman travelling in Khorassan was suspicious. In the present case, however, there was evidently a desire for concealment. Nothing had been heard of this traveller by our Mission at Teheran. I had been told, indeed, absurd stories on the road, of a Muscovite Prince having been sent from Petersburgh to announce that 10,000 Russians would be landed at Asterabad, to co-operate with the Shah in reducing Herat; and this was evidently the man alluded to, but I knew not what to believe, and I thought it my duty, therefore, to try and unravel the mystery. Following the party, I tracked them for some distance along the high road, and then found that they had turned off to a gorge in the hills. There at length I came upon the group seated at breakfast by the side of a clear sparkling rivulet. The officer, for such he evidently was, was a young man of light make, very fair complexion, with bright eyes and a look of great animation. He rose and bowed to me as I rode up, but said nothing. I addressed him in French—the general language of communication between Europeans in the East, but he shook his head. I then spoke English, and he answered in Russian. When I tried Persian, he seemed not to understand a word; at last he expressed himself hesitatingly in Turcoman, or Uzbeg Turkish. I knew just sufficient of this language to carry on a simple conversation, but not enough to be inquisitive. This was evidently what my friend wanted, for when he found I was not strong enough in Jaghatai to proceed very rapidly, he rattled on with his rough Turkish as glibly as possible. All I could find out was, that he was a bonâ fide Russian officer, carrying presents from the Emperor to Mahomed Shah. More he would not admit; so, after smoking another pipe with him, I remounted, and reached the Royal Camp beyond Nishapoor before dark. I had an immediate audience of the Shah, and in the course of conversation, mentioning to his Majesty my adventure of the morning, he replied, ‘Bringing presents to me! why, I have nothing to do with him; he is sent direct from the Emperor to Dost Mahomed, of Caubul, and I am merely asked to help him on his journey.’ This is the first information we have ever had of a direct communication between Petersburgh and Caubul, and it may be of great importance. The gentleman made his appearance in camp two days after my arrival, and I was then introduced to him by Mons. Goutte, as Captain Vitkavitch. He addressed me at once in good French, and in allusion to our former meeting, merely observed, with a smile, that ‘It would not do to be too familiar with strangers in the desert.’ I was so anxious to bring back to M’Neill intelligence of this Russian Mission to Caubul, that I remained but a very few days in camp; and here I am again in Teheran, after a second gallop of 750 miles, accomplished this time in about 150 consecutive hours.”—[MS. Correspondence.]

[126] A few days afterwards, in one of those undress communications from which we often gather more significant truth than from the more formal official documents, Burnes wrote to a private friend: “We are in a mess here. Herat is besieged, and may fall; and the Emperor of Russia has sent an envoy to Caubul, to offer Dost Mahomed Khan money to fight Runjeet Singh!!!!! I could not believe my eyes or ears; but Captain Vickovich—for that is the agent’s name—arrived here with a blazing letter, three feet long, and sent immediately to pay his respects to myself. I, of course, received him, and asked him to dinner. This is not the best of it. The Ameer came over to me sharp, and offered to do as I liked, kick him out, or anything: but I stood too much in fear of Vattel to do any such thing: and since he was so friendly to us, said I, give me the letters the agent has brought; all of which he surrendered sharp; and I sent an express at once to my Lord A., with a confidential letter to the Governor-General himself, bidding him look what his predecessors had brought upon him, and telling him that after this I knew not what might happen, and it was now a neck-and-neck race between Russia and us; and if his Lordship would hear reason, he would forthwith send agents to Bokhara, Herat, Candahar, and Koondooz, not forgetting Sindh. How all this pill will go down I know not, but I know my duty too well to be silent.”—[Private Correspondence of Sir A. Burnes.]

[127] Mohun Lal says that he translated the Persian copy of the letter from the Emperor, but that he lost the translation during the insurrection of 1841-42. “It plainly acknowledged,” he states, “the receipt of the Ameers letter, and assured him that all the Afghan merchants shall be well received in the empire of Russia, justice and protection shall be extended towards them, and their intercourse will cause to flourish the respective states.”—[Life of Dost Mahomed, vol. i. p. 300.] Masson declares that it was a forgery, seal and all, alleging in proof, that it bore no signature. To this Mohun Lal replies, that the absence of the royal signature is a proof rather of the genuine than the counterfeit character of the document. The reasons given are not very conclusive, as regards the general usage of the Czar; but, under the circumstances of the case, he would have been more inclined to omit than to attach the signature. The following is the translated letter; it was excluded from the published papers:

“A.C. In a happy moment, the messenger of your Highness, Meerza Hosan, reached my Court, with your friendly letter. I was very much delighted to receive it, and highly gratified by its perusal. The contents of the letter prove that you are my well-wisher, and have friendly opinions towards me. It flattered me very much, and I was satisfied of your friendship to my everlasting government. In consequence of this, and preserving the terms of friendship (which are now commenced between you and myself) in my heart, I will feel always happy to assist the people of Caubul who may come to trade into my kingdom. On the arrival of your messenger I have ordered him to make preparations for his long journey back to you, and also appointed a man of dignity to accompany him on the part of my government. If it pleases God, and he reaches safe, he will present to you the rarities of my country, which I have sent through him. By the grace of God, may your days be prolonged.—Sent from St. Petersburgh, the capital of Russia, on the 27th of April, 1837 A.D., and in the 12th year of my reign.”

[128] An attempt, in the published Blue Book, was made to conceal the fact of the receipt of these letters, and to make it appear that Burnes acted entirely upon his own responsibility. The genuine letter commenced with the following words:-“I have now the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your (the Political Secretary’s) letters of the 25th of November and 2nd of December last, which reached me about the same time, and conveyed the views of the Right Honourable the Governor-General regarding the overtures made by Dost Mahomed, &c., &c.” In the published version the letter commences with the word “regarding.”

[129] Burnes, commenting on the Newab’s proposal, observes: “The observations coming from the Newab Jubbar Khan are the more remarkable, since he is devoted to his brother, Sultan Mahomed Khan, and would rejoice to see him restored to Peshawur. They consequently carried with me a conviction that the Ameer’s fears are not groundless, and that they will deserve all due consideration before government entered upon any measures for attaching this chief to its interests.” This passage was, of course, suppressed. Whether any attempt was made to bring about a settlement of the Peshawur question on the basis of this proposal, I have not been able to ascertain. But Captain Wade, considering it by no means unreasonable, declared his willingness, with the consent of the Supreme Government, to urge it upon the acceptance of Runjeet. It is doubtful, however, whether, even if Runjeet had consented to it, Sultan Mahomed would have fallen into the arrangement, although Jubbar Khan declared his ability to reconcile the brothers.

[130] Lord Auckland’s offers to restrain Runjeet from attacking the country of the Sirdars were laughed at by them. Jubbar Khan said that they indicated very little knowledge of the state of Afghanistan; for that, “so far from the proffered protection from Runjeet being of the value stated, the Maharajah never sought to attack Caubul, and that hitherto all the aggression had been on the part of the Ameer, and not the ruler of Lahore.” He added with undeniable truth, that “it appeared we valued our offers at a very high rate, since we expected, in return, that the Afghans would desist from all intercourse with Persia, Russia, Toorkistan,” &c. “Were the Afghans,” he asked, “to make all these powers hostile, and receive no protection against the enmity raised for their adhering to the British?” “As for Peshawur,” he added, “being withheld from the Ameer, it might be got over; and he believed he did not overrate his influence with Sultan Mahomed Khan, when he stated that he might bring about a reconciliation between him and the Ameer; but he must say that the value of the Afghans had indeed been depressed, and he did not wonder at the Ameer’s disappointment.”—[Ungarbled Correspondence of Sir A. Burnes.]

[131] “The Meerza made nearly the same observation as the Newab about the expectations which the Ameer had cherished of doing service for the British, and devoting himself to it; that it was not the adjustment of Peshawur affairs that dissipated his hopes, but the indifference to his sufferings and station, which it was now clear we felt.” The Meerza truly said that Dost Mahomed had often written to the British Government about his affairs, and that in reply they answered him about their own.—[Ungarbled Correspondence of Sir A. Burnes.]

[132] It is probably of this meeting, or one shortly preceding it, of which General Harlan, who has not much regard for dates, speaks in the following passage. Harlan had by this time quitted Runjeet Singh’s camp, and taken service with Dost Mahomed:-“The document (Lord Auckland’s ultimatum) was handed to me amongst others. I satisfied myself, by the Governor-General’s signature, of its authenticity, surveying the contents with extreme surprise and disappointment. Dost Mahomed was mortified, but not terrified.... The Governor-General’s ultimatum was handed round, and an embarrassing silence ensued. A few minutes elapsed, when Abdul Sami Khan recalled the party from abstraction.... He proclaimed that the Governor-General’s ultimatum left no other alternative than the dismission of the English agent, for the spirit of the Kuzzilbash party was supercilious and unyielding, though full of duplicity.... Nieb Mahomed Ameer Khan, Akhondzadeh, openly opposed the Kuzzilbash party, and urged many weighty arguments in favour of a pacific settlement of the Ameer’s relations with the British Government, which had now assumed a position so inauspicious. He concluded his oration with these words, addressing the Ameer: ‘There is no other recourse for you but to introduce Mr. Harlan in the negotiations with Mr. Burnes, and he, through his own facilities and wisdom, will arrange a treaty according to their European usage, for the pacific and advantageous settlement of your affairs;’ and to this proposition the council unanimously assented.” The proposition, it appears, was made to Burnes; but Burnes declined the honour of negotiating with the doctor-general. Harland says that he then wrote to the British envoy, offering to “negotiate upon his own terms;” but Burnes sent “a reply personally friendly,” but “evincing a deficiency of knowledge of first principles concerning the rights of independent powers in political negotiations.” Burnes says nothing about this in his official or private letters.

[133] Mr. Masson says, that before its departure the Mission had fallen into contempt, and that the assassination of Burnes was talked of in Caubul. He explains too, what, according to his account, were the real causes of Burnes’s departure without his companions; but it does not come within our province to investigate Masson’s charges against the envoy.

[134] Overtures had been made to Runjeet by Vickovich, who offered to visit the Maharajah’s Court. But British influence at this time was too strong at Lahore for the Russian to make way against it. Runjeet, however, who was not ignorant of the Russo-phobia then rampant amongst us, turned the Cossack’s overtures to some account, and probably pretended more uncertainty on the score of the answer to be returned to him than he in reality felt. Mackeson, to whom the business of counteracting the designs of Vickovich was entrusted, managed it with great address, and won from the Maharajah a promise to have nothing to do with the Muscovite agent. But the knowledge that the Russian agent was, as it were, knocking at the gates of Lahore, made our authorities especially anxious to conciliate the Maharajah, by refraining from entering into any negotiations with Caubul which might possibly give umbrage to Runjeet.

[135] What befel the unhappy agent after this, it is painful to relate. When he returned to Persia, in 1839, after giving a full report of his mission to M. Duhamel, the new minister at Teheran, he was instructed to proceed direct to St. Petersburgh. On his arrival there, full of hope, for he had discharged the duty entrusted to him with admirable address, he reported himself, after the customary formality, to Count Nesselrode; but the minister refused to see him. Instead of a flattering welcome, the unhappy envoy was received with a crushing message, to the effect that Count Nesselrode “knew no Captain Vickovich, except an adventurer of that name, who, it was reported, had been lately engaged in some unauthorised intrigues at Caubul and Candahar.” Vickovich understood at once the dire portent of this message. He knew the character of his government. He was aware of the recent expostulations of Great Britain. And he saw clearly that he was to be sacrificed. He went back to his hotel, wrote a few bitter reproachful lines, burnt all his other papers, and blew out his brains.

[136] Arthur Conolly. The correctness of this description is confirmed by Eldred Pottinger, in his unpublished journal. I have been obliged to write it in the past tense. “The late war,” says Pottinger, “and its consequences have so changed the entire neighbourhood of the city, that, under its present appearance, it would not be recognised by its former visitants. Moreover, the city and its surrounding places have been so well described by Lieut. A. Conolly, that I need not repeat the description.”—[Eldred Pottinger’s MS. Journal.]

[137] Of these bazaars Pottinger writes: “The interior of the city is divided into four nearly equal divisions, by two streets which, at right angles, cross each other in the centre of the city. The principal one joins the gate of Candahar to the Pay-i-Hissar, and was formerly covered by a succession of small domes, springing from arches which cross the streets. About two-thirds of this magnificent bazaar still remain; but so choked up with rubbish, and so ruinous, that it has lost much of its attraction to the eye. This bazaar was about 1300 yards long and 6 in width. The solidity of the masonry of this work should have insured its stability; but unfortunately the arches are all defective—not one has a keystone. They are built, as all others in this country are, with a vacancy at the apex, filled merely with bits of broken bricks, ... The whole of the lower floors on each side are used as shops.”—[Eldred Pottinger’s MS. Journal.]

[138] Conolly says: “The town itself is, I should imagine, one of the dirtiest in the world.... No drains having been contrived to carry off the rain which falls within the walls, it collects and stagnates in ponds which are dug in different parts of the city. The residents cast out the refuse of their houses into the streets, and dead cats and dogs are commonly seen lying upon heaps of the vilest filth.”—[Conolly’s Journey to the North of India.]

[139] Report of Major Eldred Pottinger to the Supreme Government of India on the defences of Herat. Calcutta: July, 1840.—[MS. Records.]

[140] Eldred Pottinger’s MS. Journal.

[141] Eldred Pottinger, from whose manuscript journal the materials of this chapter are mainly drawn, gives a remarkable illustration of the manner in which justice was then administered. “During this period,” he says, “a Heratee detected a noted robber in his outhouse, and with the aid of his neighbours arrested him. In the morning, when taken before the Sirdar by the cutwal, to request the order for punishment might be given as the case was proved, the robber declared, that on hearing the citizen call for aid, he had run to his help, and, being immediately laid hold of, made prisoner and accused. He also accused the cutwal of being a partner in the plan. The young Sirdar, with an acumen to be wondered at but not described, decided that his was the truth of the story—sold the accuser, and so severely fined the witnesses, that they were reduced to poverty and debt to the soldiers—the sure precursor of slavery. He then gave the thief, who was his own servant, a khelat (or dress of honour) and released him. Under such a governor the misery of the people would require a more eloquent pen than mine to narrate.”

[142] It need scarcely be said that the Persians are generally of the Sheeah, and the Afghans of the Soonee sect. At Herat the rulers and the soldiery were Soonees, whilst the shopkeepers and other peaceful citizens were Sheeahs. The oppression of the Sheeahs by their Afghan masters was one of the circumstances by a reference to which Mahomed Shah sought to justify his invasion of Herat.

[143] Pottinger says that “he was much devoted to field-sports, and spent the greater part of his time in their pursuit. He was an unerring shot with a matchlock; he could divide a sheep in two by a single cut of his sabre, and with a Lahore bow send an arrow through a cow.”—[MS. Journal.]

[144] Yar Mahomed was the nephew of Atta Mahomed, an influential Sirdar of the Alekozye tribe, who was Minister to Shah Mahmoud and Hadjee Feroz, and afterwards of Shah Kamran. This man left two sons, Deen Mahomed and Sultan Mahomed; but neither possessed the same capacious mind and energetic character which distinguished their cousin Yar Mahomed, who was always, more or less, at enmity with them, and at last drove them out of Herat, in 1841.

[145] Pottinger says, with reference to this ill-judged movement, that “the Wuzeer played away the last stake of his master by which he could have hoped to recover his former dominions or to defend his present. Indeed, after-events have shown that the body of cavalry which he thus frittered away and destroyed was strong enough to have prevented the Persian army leaving its own frontier.” There was, however, some compensation which, whether the result of the siege or not, is worth mentioning, in the fact that when Herat was attacked by the Persians, many of the old garrison of Jowayn came to the assistance of their former enemies.

[146] It is doubted by some, whose opinions are entitled to the highest respect, whether either Kamran or Yar Mahomed ever really contemplated an expedition for the recovery of Candahar and Caubul; but it is certain that they talked about it. In the letter which Kamran sent to Mahomed Shah, by Futteh Mahomed Khan, he expressed a “hope of obtaining the favour of his Majesty, so that with the aid of the well-wishers of Persia he might subdue his hereditary dominions, and overwhelm his rebellious enemies;” and in a message which Pottinger was commissioned to deliver to the Persian monarch, it was distinctly declared that Futteh Mahomed Khan had been sent to Teheran to beg for aid towards the recovery of Kamran’s paternal kingdom.

[147] Among these was M. Euler, the Shah’s European physician.

[148] “I have heard him,” writes one who knew Pottinger well, “describe how on two occasions, when challenged about not praying or turning towards Mecca, he silenced all questioning by appealing to the usage of India.”—[Private Correspondence.]

[149] Pottinger, who is provokingly chary, in his journal, of information about himself, does not say whether he appeared at these interviews in his true character of a British officer; but I conclude that he did not, on these occasions, attempt to conceal his nationality. Nor does it seem that, in his intercourse with the higher class of Heratees, he wore any disguise; for we soon find him taking part in a conversation about Arthur Conolly, and addressed as a countryman of that fine-hearted young Englishman. I cannot transcribe, without a glow of pleasure, the following passage in Pottinger’s journal:-“I fell in with a number of Captain Conolly’s acquaintances. Every person asked after him, and appeared disappointed when I told them I did not know him. In two places I crossed Mr. Conolly’s route, and on his account received the greatest hospitality and attention—indeed, more than was pleasant, for such liberality required corresponding upon my part; and my funds were not well adapted for any extraordinary demand upon them. In Herat, Mr. Conolly’s fame was great. In a large party, where the subject of the Europeans who had visited Herat was mooted, Conolly’s name being mentioned, I was asked if I knew him, and on replying, ‘Merely by report,’ Moollah Mahomed, a Sheeah Moollah of eminence, calling to me across the room, said, ‘You have a great pleasure awaiting you. When you see him, give him my salutation, and tell him that I say he has done as much to give the English nation fame in Herat, as your ambassador, Mr. Elphinstone, did at Peshawur;’ and in this he was seconded by the great mass present.”—[Eldred Pottinger’s MS. Journal.]

[150] Better known by his title of Asoof-ood-dowlah. He was the head of the Yukhaw-bash division of the Kajjar tribe, and, according to the heraldry of the clans, was thus of higher rank than the Shah, who was merely the chief of the Ashagha-bash, or younger branch. Futteh Ali Shah, to stanch an old tribe feud, had married his son and heir-apparent, Abbas Meerza, to the heiress of the rival branch, an Mahomed Shah being the issue of this marriage, the Asoof-ood-dowlah was his maternal uncle. The Asoof was Governor of Khorassan, with almost independent powers, from 1835 to 1847. He is now in exile at Baghdad.

[151] As the army approached Herat some important captures were made. Among others, the secretary of the Asoof-ood-dowlah was carried off, with all his papers.

[152] This was Yar Mahomed’s first angry view of the case; but it may be doubted whether Shere Mahomed Khan was fairly to be censured for the loss of Ghorian. Of small dimensions, and unfurnished with bomb-proofs, the place was ill calculated to sustain the heavy vertical fire of shot and shell which the Persian artillery poured into it. A magazine and storehouse took fire; and at the time of its surrender Colonel Stoddart pronounced it to be quite untenable.

[153] Shums-ood-deen Khan of Herat was a Populzye nobleman of very good family, and in great favour with Shah Kamran before the commencement of the siege of Herat. His sister was the Shah’s favourite wife, and he was entirely in his Majesty’s confidence. A position of so much power, however, made Yar Mahomed his enemy, and it was to escape the minister’s persecution that he deserted to the Persian camp on the approach of the invading army. Had he remained in the city, he would certainly have been imprisoned or assassinated, for the Shah was powerless to protect him. It was surmised, indeed, that his Majesty counselled, or at any rate connived at, his flight, as his only means of escape.

[154] Of this barbarous custom of bringing in the heads of the enemy, Pottinger speaks with becoming indignation. “I have not thought it necessary,” he writes in his journal, “to recount the number of heads that were brought in daily, nor indeed do I know. I never could speak of this barbarous, disgusting, and inhuman conduct with any temper. The number, however, in these sorties was always insignificant, and the collecting them invariably broke the vigour of the pursuit, and prevented the destruction of the trenches. There is no doubt great terror was inspired by the mutilation of the bodies amongst their comrades. But there must have been, at least, equal indignation—and that a corresponding exaltation was felt by the victors at the sight of these barbarous trophies, and the spoils brought in.”—[MS. Journal.] As rewards were always given for these bloody trophies, the garrison were naturally very active in their endeavours to obtain them. Sometimes their avarice outstripped both their honesty and their nationality. On one occasion, after an unsuccessful sortie, an Afghan brought in a pair of ears. A cloak and some ducats were given him as a reward for his butchery. Before any questions could be put to the fellow, he suddenly vanished. About half an hour afterwards, another man, covered with mud, made his appearance with a head in his hand. The Wuzeer, thinking it looked as though it had no ears, ordered one of his retainers to examine it. On this the bearer of the ghastly trophy threw it down, and ran away with all the speed he could command. The head was picked up by one of the Wuzeer’s retainers, and found to be that of a comrade, who had fallen during a sortie of the preceding night. The fellow was pursued, and soundly beaten and kicked—but the more successful bringer-in of the ears was not to be found, though several rough unscrupulous fellows were told by the Wuzeer that they might possess themselves of both cloak and ducats if they could.

[155] MS. Journal of Eldred Pottinger.

[156] “The enemy’s fire being directed to the parapet at all points, the rubbish began to shelter the foot of the escarp. Strong working parties commenced building up backs to the rampart at the point fired at, so that the body of the old rampart may become a parapet, and the summit of the new back a terre-pleine from which to defend the breaches when formed.”—[MS. Journal of Eldred Pottinger.]

[157] “A great number of these shells are carved out of slate-rock, and their chamber contains little more than a bursting charge. Hence they are unable to do much execution.”—[MS. Journal of Eldred Pottinger.]

[158] “They made,” says Pottinger, “but a beggarly appearance.”

[159] The Wuzeer was too crafty a man to do anything to exasperate the Shah of Persia whilst there was the least prospect of his success. Pottinger’s opinion on the subject is worth quoting:-“The minister throughout all the negotiations constantly addressed Mahomed Shah as his sovereign, and called both Hadjee Akasy (the Persian prime minister) and Alayar Khan (Asoof-ood-dowlah) his father. He also invariably threw the blame of the defence on some one else, and regretted being obliged to fight. He constantly talked of his being bound in honour to serve his master, Kamran, but in inclination to serve Mahomed Shah. He also invariably avoided mixing himself up individually in any act decidedly hostile to Persian feelings or prejudices; allowing some of his friends to act, and then, under (to the Persians) a show of inquiry, sharing the advantages; so that in reality very few tangible instances could be mentioned of his hostility, and none but what, as a good talker, he could easily assert were not so; and that he had taken the Persian side. He knew that the King was aware that all the chiefs of the Persian army supported themselves by the same means as he did; and in many instances without adding the lip-loyalty which he always gave vent to—that, moreover, he could say that he did not oppress the Persian people—that it was the other chiefs who did so—that without aid, he could not check it in his equals, who would otherwise join to overthrow him—that the aylayats (wandering tribes) always acted so—that he would not desert the cause of his patron and benefactor. In a despot, who only looks in his followers for personal attachment, and prefers the hardiest and most unscrupulous, less than this would have secured favour; nay, more, among chiefs who support themselves in the same way, such arguments would have secured popularity; and as parties also ran high in the Persian camp, and he had secured the favour of the two chiefs, both sides would have been anxious to secure so knowing and powerful an assistant by exertions in procuring his liberty. Yar Mahomed, with that shrewdness which characterises the Afghan nation, saw the favourable position he was in, and availed himself of it to the utmost. He had an overweening idea of the valour of his countrymen in arms, and a corresponding low one of that of the Persians. From having failed in a siege with his own people, he thought no other army could succeed against his nation; and in the event of being taken, his eyes, overlooking the danger to which the Persian wrath might expose him, were dazzled with visions of the wealth, the power, and glory he might acquire in the service of what he thought a rich and ill-managed government. I do not mean to say that any persons had recommended this plan to Yar Mahomed, or that it had been [obscure in MS.]; but that from the multitude of his counsellors, some recommending war, some submission, this must have been the mean opinion; and, added to the knowledge that, whether he defended himself or not, his life was in the same danger, and that the promise of a Kajar was only to be trusted as a last resource. He, therefore, addressed himself to the task of defence; but, at the same time, took steps to secure his interest in case of a reverse. I do not think that he could have succeeded in the latter point but he, doubtless, had hopes of succeeding.”—[MS. Journal.]

[160] On the 10th of January, “money being wanted, the houses of the Persian followers of Shere Mahomed were confiscated on a charge of treason, in giving up Ghorian.”—[Pottinger’s Journal: MS.]

[161] “The digging a gallery,” writes Pottinger, “under the wall, and entering in the midst of the town, appeared a most capital plan, and suited much better their cunning than any other. Consequently, they were seriously alarmed, and for a time serious consequences resulted to the Sheeah inhabitants; and many domiciliary visits were paid in search of the gallery, whilst the ruins and empty houses were particularly patrolled for many nights.”—[MS. Journal.]

[162] Eldred Pottinger’s MS. Journal. “No matter,” he adds, “how the cowardice and meanness of these men might be despised, no one could help pitying the wretchedness they were suffering. Even the better class of the Afghans used to say, ‘Afsoos ast, lekin chi koonym’—‘It is a pity, but what can we do?’ In the Pay Hissar (esplanade in front of the drawbridge) were lying half a dozen Persian heads lately brought in.”

[163] MS. Journal of Eldred Pottinger.

[164] Contending emotions of sympathy, now with their co-religionists, and now with their fellow-citizens, agitated the breasts of the Heratees. “I went,” writes Pottinger, on the 2nd of February, “to see a Sheeah: he was grieving over the fate which hung over him; one moment cursing Mahomed Shah’s pusillanimity—the next, the Afghan tyranny. But through the whole of his discontent, I observed he felt a sort of pride and satisfaction in being the countryman of those who set the Persians at defiance. But he appeared fully impressed with the idea that the city must fall, whilst the Afghans I had just left were talking of plundering Teheran with the aid of our artillery and infantry.”—[MS. Records.]

[165] Eldred Pottinger’s MS. Journal.

[166] Samson was a Russian in the Persian service, commanding a corps of Russian refugees.

[167] “I then proceeded to Colonel Stoddart’s tent, whom I found in the greatest astonishment possible, as his servants, taking up the general report of my rank, had announced me as the Mooshtehid of Herat. He had been undressed; and putting on his coat to do honour to the high dignitary, gave me time to enter his tent before he could get out, so we met at the door, where he overwhelmed me with a most affectionate Persian welcome, to which I, to his great surprise, replied in English. No one who has not experienced it, can understand the pleasure which countrymen enjoy when they thus meet—particularly when of the same profession, and pursuing the same object.”—[Eldred Pottinger’s MS. Journal.]

[168] They fired from this piece eight-inch shells full of lead, or twelve or eighteen-pound shot, with an outer case of copper. These were of so much value, that the garrison fought for them.

[169] The same man, a major in the army, whom Pottinger had first met in the Persian camp.

[170] “The man,” says Pottinger, “was also instructed to say that warning should be taken from our conduct in India, where we had pretended friendship and trade to cover our ambition, and finally, by such deceit, had mastered all India.”—[MS. Journal.]

[171] It would be tedious to narrate all the details of the siege, and difficult to render them intelligible, even to the scientific reader, without the aid of a series of elaborate plans.

[172] “The point,” says Mr. M’Neill, “on which the negotiation broke off was, I believe, the demand of the Shah, that Shah Kamran and Yar Mahomed should wait upon him in his camp, and there make their submission to him. I learn that the Persians did not, as on a former occasion, require that a garrison of their troops should be admitted into the town.”—[Mr. M’Neill to Lord Auckland, April 11, 1838. Published Correspondence.]

[173] Mr. M’Neill to Lord Auckland, April 11, 1838. Papers relating to Persia and Afghanistan.

[174] Eldred Pottinger’s MS. Journal.

[175] “Several men,” says Pottinger, “received bullets through the hands and arms. One fellow, more fool-hardy than the rest, kept brandishing his huge Afghan knife, after the others had complied with the repeated orders to sheath their weapons, and had the knife destroyed by a bullet, which struck it just above his hand. I had gone down to the spot to see the mine sprung, and was sitting on the banquette with the Wuzeer and a party of chiefs, who, whilst tea was preparing, were bantering the man whose knife was broken, and who came to beg a sword instead, when a bullet came in through a loophole over my head, and, smashing a brick used for stopping it, lodged in Aga Ruhem’s lungs, who was standing opposite—one of the splinters of the brick at the same time wounding him in the face. The poor fellow was an eunuch of Yar Mahomed’s, and was always to be seen wherever any danger was. He died in two or three days. I had been but the moment before looking through the top of the parapet, with my breast resting against the loophole, watching the Persians, who were trying to establish themselves in the crater of the mine, and the Afghans on the counterscarp, who were trying to grapple the gabions and overset them, so that the scene was very interesting; and I had not sat down with the chiefs until Deen Mahomed Khan actually pulled me down by my cloak to listen to the jokes passed on the man who had his knife destroyed; and I thus escaped Aga Ruhem’s bullet.”—[MS. Journal.]