This is certainly strong testimony, although, when we consider his political relations, testimony from an unwilling witness. There is other testimony of a similar character. In the text of the elaborate report by the Department of State, from which the above is taken, is found the following weighty opinion.

As late as June 25, 1850, a law was in force which subjected the vessels of all countries not acknowledging the independence of Hayti to an additional duty of ten per cent. American vessels, being within its operation, could not compete with the vessels of other nations, even in exporting to Hayti our own staples. Then, again, there was a tariff, that took effect in January, 1850, under which there was a most injurious discrimination against our trade. A despatch at that period from Aux Cayes to the Department of State says: “While the citizens of France are scarcely affected in their importations to Hayti, the Americans here import, and our merchants at home export, scarcely any article that is free.” And yet, in the face of these annoyances, and notwithstanding the embarrassments which they occasioned, our merchants have secured at least a moiety of the foreign trade of Hayti. With the encouragements bestowed on our relations with other countries, we shall enjoy a much larger proportion.[284]

If any additional motive were needed, it might be found in the political condition of the West India Islands, and the present movements in Mexico. Spain, quickened by ancient pride, has begun to recover her former foothold,[285] and it is sometimes supposed that France is willing to profit by imagined change of sentiment in her favor. Thus far the Republic of Hayti has been left without sympathy or support from our country. That it is able to sustain itself so well gives assurance of still greater strength, when surrounded by more auspicious circumstances. Nor is the influence of Hayti to be neglected in adjusting that balance of power which is daily becoming of increased importance in the West Indies. It may be of value to us that this republic should be among our friends, while it cannot be doubted that our friendship will contribute to Haytien security against danger from any quarter whatsoever. It will be remembered that Mr. Canning boasted, somewhat grandly, that he called a new world into existence to redress the balance of the old,—alluding in this way to the acknowledgment of the Spanish colonies. In the same spirit, and without any exaggeration, may it be said that by the acknowledgment of Hayti we shall provide a check to distant schemes of ambition, which have latterly menaced an undue predominance in the West Indies. In this view, the present proposition has a political importance which it is difficult to measure. It becomes a pledge of permanent peace, as well as of commerce; but it can have this character only if made effective, sincerely and honestly, according to the usage of nations.

Of the many colonies following our example and independence Hayti was the first, and yet, by strange perversity, is not even now recognized by our Government. We are told that the last shall be first and the first shall be last. This, surely, is a case where the first is last. It remains to be seen, if, under the genial influence of such recognition, Hayti may not become, among all independent colonies, first in importance to us, as it was first in accepting our example.

In acknowledging the independence of Hayti, we follow too tardily the lead of other nations. France for a long time hesitated, as Spain hesitated, to acknowledge the independence of her colonies. This concession was made in 1825, under Charles the Tenth, while Hayti stipulated by treaty to pay one hundred and fifty million francs, as well for the recognition as for indemnification to colonial proprietors. It was natural that the mother country should hesitate; but when France abandoned all claim, every objection to recognition by other nations ceased. Accordingly, this republic has been recognized, if not cordially welcomed, by Great Britain, France, Spain, Prussia, Denmark, Holland, Belgium, Portugal, Sweden, Hanover, Italy, and even by Austria, all of whom have representatives there, duly chronicled in the Almanach de Gotha.

Thus far I have confined myself to the case of Hayti. But Liberia has claims of its own. If our commercial relations with this interesting country are less important, they are nevertheless of such consequence as to require protection, while this republic may properly look to us for parental care.

The commercial tables by which I have illustrated so completely the relative importance of Hayti are less precise with regard to Liberia, inasmuch as this republic, owing to unhappy prejudices in recent Administrations, was not allowed a separate place in the tables, but was concealed under the head of “Other Ports in Africa.” From authentic sources I learn that the exports from the single port of Monrovia for the year 1860 amounted to near $200,000, while those from the whole republic amounted to as much as $400,000.

I forbear details with regard to the commerce of Liberia. It is enough that it is already considerable, and is increasing in value, although Great Britain, by a treaty, and the cultivation of friendly relations, has done something to divert this commerce from the United States. But it is not too late for us to enter into a treaty, and to establish similar friendly relations. If, beyond the impulse of self-interest, we need anything to quicken us, we shall find it in the judgment of Henry Clay, who, in a letter dated Ashland, October 18, 1851, uses these positive words:—

In taking this step, and entering into a treaty with Liberia, we only follow the example of commercial nations. Nor can I doubt that we must in this way essentially promote our own commercial interests. Liberia is so situated, that, with the favor of the National Government, it may become the metropolitan power on the whole African coast, so that the growing commerce of that continent will be to a great degree in its hands.

I do not dwell at length on the general advantages from the recognition of these two powers, nor do I enlarge on the motives of justice. I mean to state the case simply, without introducing any topic which can justly cause debate in this body. It is enough that the acknowledgment is required for our own good. Happily, in benefiting ourselves we shall promote the interests of others.

There is one consequence which I cannot forbear to specify. Emigrants to these Republics will be multiplied by such recognition, while every emigrant, when happily established, will create an additional demand for the productions of our commerce, and contribute to the number of American keels which plough the ocean.

And there is yet one other consequence, which ought to be presented expressly. Our commerce will be put at once under the solemn safeguard of treaty, so that it will enjoy that security which is essential to its perfect prosperity, and can no longer suffer from discriminating duties or hostile legislation, aroused by a just sensibility at our persevering illiberality. If you would have such treaties, you must begin by an acknowledgment of independence.

Sir, there is one business only which can suffer by this measure: I mean that of counterfeit money. You know, Sir, that, by a familiar rule of International Law, declared by the Supreme Court of the United States,[286] it belongs exclusively to the political department of the Government to determine our relations with a foreign country. And since our Government refuses to acknowledge Hayti, our courts of justice are obliged to do so likewise; so that, when criminals are arraigned for counterfeiting the money of Hayti, they decline all jurisdiction of the offence. As Hayti is not a nation, it cannot have money. Such is the reasoning, and the counterfeiters go free. It is said that during the past thirty years millions of false dollars have in this way been put in circulation. A case has occurred only recently, where the counterfeiter was promptly discharged, while the witness alone seemed to be in danger. It is time that such an outrage should be stopped.

It may be said that the same objects can be obtained by consuls, instead of commissioners. It is clear that it is not the habit of the United States to enter upon negotiations and open friendly relations with foreign states through consuls. And it is also clear, that, according to the usage of nations, consuls are not entitled to the same consideration with diplomatic representatives. Their influence is less, whether in dealing with the Government to which they are accredited, or with the representatives of other powers at the same place. On this point I content myself with reading the words of Mr. Wheaton.

It may be true that negotiations are sometimes conducted by consuls, but very rarely; and the exceptions testify to the prevailing policy. Ministers are the received agents of diplomacy. Any other agent must be inferior in weight and character. If this be true,—and it is undeniable,—then obviously the objects now proposed can be most fitly and effectively accomplished only by diplomatic representatives. And since what is worth doing is worth well doing, I hope there will be no hesitation. Here again the example of the great European powers may properly influence us. England, France, and Spain have diplomatic representatives at Hayti, who are reputed to discharge their responsible duties with activity and ability. All these have the advantage of subsisting treaties. Our treaty remains to be negotiated. To do this in such a way as to secure for our various interests all proper advantages must be our special aim. Any further neglect on our part can be nothing less than open abandonment of these various interests. Too long already has this sacrifice been made.

Mr. President, a full generation has passed since the acknowledgment of Hayti was urged upon Congress. As an act of justice too long deferred, it aroused even then the active sympathy of multitudes, while as an act for the benefit of our commerce it was ably commended by eminent merchants of Boston and New York without distinction of party. It received the authoritative support of John Quincy Adams, whose vindication of Hayti was associated with his best labors in the other House. The right of petition, which he steadfastly maintained, was long ago established. Slavery in the national capital is now abolished. It remains that this other triumph shall be achieved. Petitioners, who years ago united in this prayer, and statesmen who presented the petitions, are dead. But they will all live again in the good work they generously began.

Mr. President, this is the statement I have to make on this important question. As I know that the Senator from Kentucky [Mr. Davis] desires to move an amendment, I shall not ask a vote to-day; but I propose that the further consideration of the bill be postponed until to-morrow at half past twelve o’clock, when I hope we may have a vote upon it.

Mr. Sumner. Mr. President, the Senate will bear me witness, that, in presenting this important question yesterday, I made no allusion to the character of the population in the two Republics. I made no appeal on account of color. I did not allude to the unhappy circumstance in their history, that they had once been slaves. It is the Senator from Kentucky who introduces this topic. And not only this, Sir, he follows it by alluding to some possible difficulties—I hardly know how to characterize them—which may occur in social life, should the Congress of the United States undertake at this late day, simply in harmony with the Law of Nations, and following the policy of civilized communities, to pass this bill. I shall not follow the Senator on those sensitive topics. I content myself with a single remark. More than once I have had the opportunity of meeting citizens of these Republics, and I say nothing beyond the truth when I add that I have found them so refined and so full of self-respect as to satisfy me that no one of them charged with a mission from his Government can seek any society where he will be not entirely welcome. Sir, the Senator from Kentucky may banish all personal anxiety. No representative from Hayti or Liberia will trouble him.

But the proposition of the Senator makes a precise objection to the bill, which I am ready to meet. He insists that we shall be represented by consuls only, and not by diplomatic agents. Yesterday, in the remarks I had the honor of addressing to the Senate, I anticipated this very objection. I quoted then the authoritative words of Mr. Wheaton in his work on the Law of Nations, where he sets forth the distinction between ministers and consuls, and shows the greater advantage from a representation by one than by the other. I follow up that quotation now by reading from another work. It is a treatise on International Law and the Laws of War by General Halleck; and as I quote this authority, which is not yet much known, I venture to remark that I doubt if there is any recent contribution to the literature of the Law of Nations of more practical value. In a few words he states the character of consuls. I quote from him as follows.

The Committee who had the subject in charge, taking it into careful consideration,—as I believe the Senator from Kentucky, who is a member of the Committee, will confess,—deliberately reached the conclusion that it was advisable for the United States at present to be represented at each of those Republics by a person of diplomatic character. The Committee put aside the proposition that we should be represented merely by a consul. It was felt that such an officer would not adequately do all that our country might justly expect to have done. Nor is this all. We were guided also by the precedents of our Government. There are eighteen different states lower down in the scale of commerce and navigation with the United States, where we are now represented by diplomatic representatives. One of these, as I explained yesterday, is the Sandwich Islands, with a population of only seventy thousand, and with a commerce and navigation vastly inferior to that between the United States and Hayti.

Mr. Sumner. Possibly. I go into no inquiry on that point. Suffice it to say we already have these eighteen diplomatic representatives, and one of these is at the Sandwich Islands, with a population, a commerce, and navigation inferior to those of Hayti. Besides, at the Sandwich Islands we have three consuls highly paid. If we have too many, let us reduce the list, but do not commence our economies on Hayti and Liberia.

The Committee in their conclusion followed the usage of nations, and also the example of the great powers at Hayti. In presenting this measure, I make no appeal on account of an oppressed race. I urge it simply as an act for our own good. We go about the world hunting up the smaller powers, where to make treaties and to place diplomatic representatives, under the temptation of petty commercial advantage. Thus far we have stood aloof from two important opportunities of extending and strengthening our influence. It is time to change.

FINAL SUPPRESSION OF THE SLAVE-TRADE.

MR. PRESIDENT,—Already a slave-trader has been executed at New York, being the first in our history to suffer for this immeasurable crime.[290] English lawyers dwell much upon treason to the king, which they denounce in a term borrowed from ancient Rome as lese-majesty; but the slave-trade is treason to man, being nothing less than lese-humanity. Much as I incline against capital punishment, little as I am disposed to continue this barbarous penalty, unworthy of a civilized age, I see so much of good in this example at the present moment, that I reconcile myself to it without a pang. Clearly it will be a warning to slave-traders, and also notice to the civilized world that at last we are in earnest, while it helps make the slave-trade detestable. Crime is seen in the punishment, and the gallows sheds upon it that infamy which nothing short of martyrdom in a good cause can overcome.

The important treaty now before the Senate is to enforce on a large scale final judgment against the slave-trade. It is to do with many what has just been done with an individual. Our flag is desecrated by this hateful commerce; ships equipped in New York are tempted by its cruel gains. To stop this has been impossible, while Slavery prevailed in the National Government. How could our courts judge the slave-trader, how could the National Government set itself against the hateful commerce, while Slavery occupied all the places of power? But this is changed. If Emancipation is yet longer delayed, Slavery is at least dislodged from its predominant influence. Therefore is the way free for action against the slave-trade.

The treaty proceeds on the idea of earnest work, and it recognizes two especial agencies, each of which has been discussed between the two Governments in former years, but has always failed of adoption. The first is a mutual and restricted right of search, and the second is the well-known system of mixed courts, for the enforcement of the treaty.

The treaty has just been read, so that I need not recite in detail the terms of these two provisions. I pass at once to the consideration of their origin and necessity.

There was a time when our country was open and earnest against the slave-trade. A well-known provision of the Constitution, classed among original compromises, restrained Congress from prohibiting it prior to the year 1808; but, just so soon as it had the power, Congress acted. Its promptitude justified the enthusiasm with which Judge Story in his Commentaries remarks: “It is to the honor of America that she should have set the first example of interdicting and abolishing the slave-trade in modern times.”[291] By Act of Congress, bearing date as early as March 2, 1807, and to take effect January 1, 1808, the importation of slaves into the United States was prohibited, under penalties of imprisonment, fine, and forfeiture. These were increased by Act of Congress of April 20, 1818. But mild and moderate enactments were not enough; and at length, by Act of May 15, 1820, Congress was constrained to declare the slave-trade piracy, and to punish it with death. Since then this offence has stood in the catalogue of capital crimes.

Already this immense subject had occupied the attention of the great European powers. In the Treaty of Paris in 1814, Great Britain and France united against what was denounced as “a species of commerce equally repugnant to the principles of natural justice and the lights of the times.”[292] This was followed by the Treaty of Ghent, at the close of the same year, in which the United States and Great Britain denounced the traffic in slaves as “irreconcilable with the principles of humanity and justice,” and promised their best endeavors for its suppression.[293] Then came the Treaty of Vienna, where the great powers joined in declaring it “repugnant to the principles of humanity and of universal morality.”[294] These were declarations only. The next attempt was to find a system of action, which should be effective against the Protean monster in the many metamorphoses it was able to assume, and here England nobly took the lead.

Lord Castlereagh instructed the Duke of Wellington, the British ambassador at Paris, to obtain from France the concession of a mutual right of search for the enforcement of the denunciation in which they were agreed; but this was found unwelcome to the French Government, and therefore not pressed at the time. Such was the beginning of the proposition, which, after various fortunes, is at last recognized in the treaty now before us.

Meanwhile negotiations were opened on our side particularly with Great Britain. These seem for a time to have had the sanction not only of the Executive, but of Congress, or at least of the House of Representatives. Messages from the President, calling attention to the slave-trade, were answered by reports from special committees of the House of Representatives. One of these, made February 9, 1821, concluded with a resolution, “That the President of the United States be requested to enter into such arrangements as he may deem suitable and proper with one or more of the maritime powers of Europe for the effectual abolition of the African slave-trade.” The report, while declaring that “to efface this reproachful stain from the character of civilized mankind would be the proudest triumph that could be achieved in the cause of humanity,” proceeds to announce, in words applicable to the present moment, that “this happy result, experience has demonstrated, cannot be realized by any system, except a concession by the maritime powers to each other’s ships of war of a qualified right of search.”[295] Another report, by a select committee of the House, April 12, 1822, adopted the resolution of the previous committee, and also the recommendation of a mutual right of search, adding, that it could not be doubted “that the people of America have the intelligence to distinguish between the right of searching a neutral on the high seas in time of war, claimed by some belligerents, and that mutual, restricted, and peaceful concession by treaty, suggested by your Committee, and which is demanded in the name of suffering humanity.”[296]

Then came the devoted efforts of Charles Fenton Mercer, an admirable representative of Virginia, who exposed this terrible traffic with a pathos not to be forgotten. On his motion, another resolution was adopted, February 28, 1823, by a vote of one hundred and thirty-one yeas to only nine nays, calling upon the President to enter into negotiations “for the effectual abolition of the African slave-trade, and its ultimate denunciation as piracy, under the Law of Nations, by the consent of the civilized world.”[297] The character of this resolution was impaired by the rejection of an amendment, “and that we agree to a qualified right of search,”[298] which was a falling off from the recommendations of the two committees.

The Executive responded to Congress, and, under instructions from John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State, a treaty was negotiated with Great Britain, bearing date March 13, 1824, in which it was stipulated that the ships of the two powers might “cruise on the coasts of Africa, of America, and of the West Indies, for the suppression of the slave-trade,” and empowering them under certain restrictions to detain and capture vessels engaged in this traffic.[299] Important in substance, this treaty became important historically. Although the clause quoted appeared in the original draught sent out from Washington, yet the treaty was ratified by the Senate only on the condition that the words “of America” were struck out, thus excluding operations of British cruisers along the whole extent of American coast.[300] This was fatal to the treaty, as the British Government would not accept the condition. The case is memorable, not only as a check to negotiations for the suppression of the slave-trade, but as a conspicuous instance, where the Senate, in dealing with a power like Great Britain, did not shrink from asserting its prerogative under the Constitution, not less decisive than the tribunitial veto.

Thus it stood. Our own Government had proposed a modified search on the coast of America, but this was point-blank refused by the Senate. It appears that the proposition was made contrary to the judgment of Mr. Adams. His sense of wrong from the long-continued search exercised by British cruisers was so keen that he would not willingly furnish any excuse for its revival; and such, it was feared, might be the concession. Afterwards, in the revelations which he sometimes made to the House of Representatives, he declared his repugnance to this negotiation, and the way it was overcome. The same repugnance, doubtless, influenced Senators in the vote on the treaty, increased by a growing sentiment for Slavery, which the debates on the Missouri Compromise had quickened.

Mr. Adams’s statement made in debate at a later day lets us behind the scenes at an important period. After describing the proposition for a mutual right of search, the veteran said:—

This statement from an eminent quarter shows how at another time the opposition to a mutual right of search became manifest. It is for the Senate to determine if the time has not come for this opposition to cease.

Not disheartened by failure with the United States, Great Britain pursued her honorable policy, enlisting Government after Government, until nearly all the maritime powers of Europe, moved by a common sentiment of humanity, had conceded a mutual and restricted right of search, with the single object of suppressing the slave-trade. The famous Quintuple Treaty of 1841 between the great powers consecrated the same principle on a wider theatre; but, owing to the extraordinary efforts of General Cass, our Minister at Paris, France was induced to withhold her assent, yielding, I fear, to an irritated Anglophobia and to the growing pretensions of Slavery. The treaty was duly ratified by Great Britain, Russia, Prussia, and Austria. As a substitute, stipulations for naval coöperation were adopted between Great Britain and France,—also between Great Britain and the United States. And still Great Britain persevered in this glorious championship, until, in 1850, it was her boast that she stood party to no less than twenty-four treaties denouncing the slave-trade, of which ten conceded a mutual right of search and mixed courts, twelve conceded search with trial only before home tribunals, and two provided for naval coöperation.[302]

This summary brings us to the present treaty, where we find a mutual and restricted right of search and mixed courts for certain purposes, but with the trial of criminals only before home tribunals.

If at an earlier day there was reason to be sensitive about any concession of the right of search, especially to Great Britain, always so exacting on the ocean, that day has happily passed. The reason ceasing, so also should the opposition cease. Even if the acknowledged power of the United States and the enlightened opinion of the civilized world did not remove the liability to abuse, making it so absolutely impossible as not to be an element in the case, we cannot forget a recent signal event, when Great Britain openly renounced that tyrannous pretension which so stirred the soul of the whole American people, never again to assert it. This was done in solemn demand for the rendition of Mason and Slidell, who had been taken by a national cruiser, acting in precise conformity with early and constant British practice. Therefore on this account there need be no solicitude. Conceding search for the suppression of the slave-trade, we furnish no excuse and open no door for that other search, always so justly offensive, which finally brought war in its train. Such a concession now is only an addition to international policy demanded by the civilization of the age.

Nor need there be any jealousy on account of Slavery; for this power is disappearing. If, unhappily, it is not yet extinct, if it still lingers in prolonged malignant existence, it has ceased to sway the National Government. Therefore I see no reason why the sensibilities of its partisans should be consulted.

Another possible objection to the treaty is more technical. This also was presented by John Quincy Adams, when he spoke of mixed courts “as inconsistent with our Constitution,”[303] because the judges are not appointed, nor do they hold office, according to its well-known requirements. But this objection, if entitled to any consideration, is mitigated in the present treaty, which hands over the slave-trader for trial in the home courts of the captor, leaving to the mixed courts only the condemnation and destruction of the slave-ship. But whatever doubts might have prevailed at an earlier period, when the question was less understood, it is plain now that this objection is wholly superficial and untenable. Besides courts known to the Constitution and subject to its requirements, there are others extra-constitutional, like courts in the Territories, where the judges hold for four years instead of during good behavior, and yet are recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States.[304] Like Territorial courts, mixed courts are plainly extra-constitutional, standing on the treaty power and the practice of nations,—as courts martial are also extra-constitutional, standing on the war power and the practice of nations.

Among frequent means for the determination of international questions are mixed courts or mixed commissions in various forms, where different nations are represented. Such tribunals are the natural incident of treaties, and were recognized as such at the beginning of our history. Nor is it easy to see how treaties can be consummated without their ancillary help. A mixed commission, where our country was represented, sat at London under Jay’s Treaty, deciding numerous cases; and similar commissions have been sitting ever since. The Jay Commission was originally criticized on the ground that judicial power cannot be vested except according to the Constitution,[305]—being the very objection to mixed courts in anti-slave-trade treaties, that occupied so much attention at a later day, and to which I am now replying. But nobody now doubts that this commission was proper. The proposed tribunal, though differing in purpose, proceeds from the same fountain of power. It is kindred in character and origin. Now, without considering if the objection to mixed courts is not equally strong against a crowned head as arbitrator, as when the French Emperor sat in judgment on the long-pending litigation between the United States and Portugal in the General Armstrong case, it is obvious that all the international tribunals constituted by treaty, whether an emperor or a commissioner, are sustained by unbroken usage as well as by reason. To insist that the restrictions of the Constitution, evidently intended for the national judicature, are applicable to these outlying tribunals, is to limit the treaty power and to curtail the means of justice beyond the national jurisdiction. Mixed courts are familiar to International Law, and our country cannot afford to reject them, least of all on a discarded technicality which would leave us isolated among nations.

It remains only that we make haste to ratify the treaty, nor miss the great opportunity. A moment lost is a concession to crime. Therefore must we be prompt.

Foreign nations will not fail to recognize this open pledge to Human Rights, and the Rebels will discern a new sign of the national purpose. Abroad and at home we shall be strengthened. The Rebellion itself will feel the blow, and ambitious Slavery foresee its doom.