MR. PRESIDENT,—I am sorry to ask the attention of the Senate at this late hour; but the importance of the question must be my apology.

In what I say I shall confine myself exclusively to a single feature of the present bill. Others may regret that the exigencies of the country were not promptly met by taxation,—or that at the beginning a different system was not organized by the Treasury, through which the national securities might have found a readier market,—or that the national credit was not sustained, at the period of bank suspension, by the resolute redemption of the Government securities in coin at any present sacrifice. But it is useless to discuss these questions. The time for such discussion has passed. The Tax Bill is not yet matured. The system adopted by the Treasury cannot be changed at once, if it were desirable. It is too late to organize the redemption of the national securities in coin on the daily application of holders. Meanwhile the exigencies of Government have become imperative. Money must be had.

And we are told that the credit of Government can be saved only by an act that seems like a forfeiture of credit. Paper promises are to be made a legal tender, like gold and silver; and this provision is to be ingrafted on the present bill authorizing the issue of Treasury notes to the amount of $150,000,000.

All confess that they vote for this proposition with reluctance, while to many it seems positively unconstitutional. Of course, if unconstitutional, there is an end of it, and all discussion of its character is superfluous. I am compelled by candor to declare that the doubts which perplex me do not proceed from the Constitution. If the question of constitutionality were in all respects novel, or, as lawyers phrase it, of first impression, then I might join with friends in their doubts. But it seems to me that the constitutional power of Congress to make Treasury notes a legal tender was settled as long ago as when it was settled that Congress might authorize the issue of Treasury notes; for from time immemorial the two have gone together, one as incident of the other, and, unless expressly severed, they naturally go together.

It is true that in the Constitution there are no words expressly conferring upon Congress the power to make Treasury notes a legal tender; but there are no words expressly conferring upon Congress the power to issue Treasury notes. If we consult the text, we find it as silent with regard to one as with regard to the other. There is no silence with regard to the States, which are expressly prohibited to “emit bills of credit,” or “make anything but gold and silver coin a tender in payment of debts.” Treasury notes are “bills of credit”; and this prohibition is imperative on the States. The inference is just, that this prohibition, expressly addressed to the States, was not intended to embrace Congress indirectly, as it obviously does not embrace it directly. The presence of the prohibition, however, shows that the subject was in the minds of the framers of the Constitution. If they failed to extend it still further, it is reasonable to conclude that they left the whole subject in all its bearings to the sound discretion of Congress, under the ample powers intrusted to it.

The stress so constantly put upon the prohibitions addressed to the States will justify me in introducing the opinion of Mr. Justice Story, in his Commentaries.

Plainly, no inference adverse to the powers of the National Government can be drawn from these prohibitory clauses; for, whatever may be these powers, there will be a fixed and uniform value throughout the United States.

As we proceed, the case becomes more clear. The States are prohibited to issue “bills of credit”; but there is no such prohibition on the National Government, which may do in the premises what the States cannot do. The failure to prohibit is equivalent to a recognition of the power. In other words, the National Government may issue “bills of credit,” which have been characterized by no less a person than Chief-Justice Marshall, in pronouncing the opinion of the Supreme Court, when he said: “To ‘emit bills of credit’ conveys to the mind the idea of issuing paper intended to circulate through the community for its ordinary purposes as money, which paper is redeemable at a future day.” And then again the learned Chief Justice said: “The term has acquired an appropriate meaning; and ‘bills of credit’ signify a paper medium, intended to circulate between individuals, and between Government and individuals, for the ordinary purposes of society.”[170] This “money” and “paper medium” the States are prohibited from emitting; but there is no such prohibition on the National Government,—as there is not a single word to prohibit the National Government from determining what shall be a legal tender.

From the proceedings of the National Convention it appears that a clause in the first draught of the Constitution empowering Congress to “emit bills on the credit of the United States” was after discussion struck out. In the debate on this clause, Mr. Madison asked: “Will it not be sufficient to prohibit the making them a tender? This will remove the temptation to emit them with unjust views.” Mr. Mason said, “Though he had a mortal hatred to paper money, yet, as he could not foresee all emergencies, he was unwilling to tie the hands of the [National] Legislature. He observed, that the late war could not have been carried on, had such a prohibition existed.” Mr. Mercer was “opposed to a prohibition of it altogether. It will stamp suspicion on the Government to deny it a discretion on this point.” Mr. Butler remarked, that “paper was a legal tender in no country in Europe. He was urgent for disarming the Government of such a power.” Mr. Mason was “still averse to tying the hands of the Legislature altogether. If there was no example in Europe, as just remarked, it might be observed, on the other side, that there was none in which the Government was restrained on this head.” Mr. Gorham was “for striking out, without inserting any prohibition.” And this view finally prevailed.[171] Thus it appears that the suggestion was made to prohibit the making of bills a tender; but this suggestion was not acted on, and no such prohibition was ever moved. It is evident that the Convention was not prepared for a measure so positive. Less still was it prepared for a prohibition to emit bills. Such is the record. While all words expressly authorizing bills were struck out, nothing was introduced in restriction of the powers of Congress on this subject.

Thus was the whole question practically settled; and the usage of the Government has been in harmony with this settlement. Treasury notes were issued during the war of 1812, and in the monetary crisis of 1837, also during the war with Mexico, and constantly since, so that the power to issue them cannot be drawn into doubt. If there was any doubt originally, unquestioned practice, sanctioned by successive Congresses, has completely removed it. I do not stop to consider whether the power is derived primarily from the power “to borrow money,” or the power “to regulate commerce,” or from the unenumerated powers. It is sufficient that the power exists.

But I see not how to escape the conclusion, that, if Congress is empowered to issue Treasury notes, it may affix to these notes such character as shall seem safe and proper, declaring the conditions of their circulation and the dues for which they shall be received. Grant the first power, and the rest must follow. Careful you will be in the exercise of this power, but, if you choose to take the responsibility, I see no check in the Constitution.

The history of our country furnishes testimony, which has been gathered with extraordinary minuteness in an elaborate opinion by Mr. Justice Story.[172] I follow mainly his authority, when I set it forth.

It appears that the phrase “bills of credit” was familiarly used for bank-notes as early as 1683 in England, and also as early as 1714 in New England. But the first issue in America was in 1690, by the Colony of Massachusetts, and the occasion—identical with the present—was to pay soldiers, returning unexpectedly from an unsuccessful expedition against Canada. These notes were from two shillings to ten pounds, and were receivable for dues at the Treasury. Their form was as follows: “This indented bill of ten shillings, due from the Massachusetts Colony to the possessor, shall be in value equal to money, and shall be accordingly accepted by the Treasurer, and Receivers subordinate to him, in all public payments, and for any stock at any time in the Treasury.” Here followed the date, and the signatures of the Committee authorized to issue these notes.[173] Such was their depreciation, that these notes could not command money or commodities at money price, although the historian, Hutchinson, who has recorded these interesting facts, does not hesitate to say that they had better credit than King James’s leather money in Ireland only a short time before.[174] Being of small amount, they were soon absorbed in the payment of taxes. But this example did not stand alone.

The facility with which paper money is created renders it difficult to withstand the temptation, unless a Government is under the restraint of correct principles of finance, which at that early day were utterly unknown. An excuse for Massachusetts may be found in the general poverty at that time, the lack of precious metals, and the distance from marts of trade. In 1702 there was another issue of bills of credit, for £15,000, which, by a subsequent Act, in 1712, were made a tender for private debts. Under the continued cry of scarcity of money, bills of credit were again issued in 1716, to the amount of £150,000, to be lent, for a limited period, to inhabitants, whose lands were mortgaged as security. These were not made a tender; but they were receivable at the Treasury in discharge of taxes, and also of mortgage debts. Other bills were afterwards issued, so that paper money was common. The historian who has exposed this condition of things does not hesitate to liken this currency to pretended values stamped on leather or paper, and declared to be receivable in payment of taxes and in discharge of private debts. The natural consequence was a fatal depreciation, so that an ounce of silver, worth in 1702 six shillings and eight pence, in 1749 was equivalent to fifty shillings of this paper currency.[175] At the present moment I do not seek to exhibit the character of this currency, but simply the original association between bills of credit and the idea of a tender.

But Massachusetts was not alone. The neighboring colony of Rhode Island, as early as 1710, followed her example, and in 1720 made her bills a tender in payment of all debts, except certain debts specified. Connecticut issued bills at different periods, beginning with 1709, some of which were made a tender, and some not. New York began in the same year, substantially following Massachusetts; and her bills were generally made a tender. In 1722 Pennsylvania issued bills, secured on mortgage, and made a tender. In 1739 Delaware did likewise, making her bills a tender. So also did Maryland, in 1733, to the amount of £90,000; but other bills were issued by Maryland, in 1769, which were not made a tender.

The example of Virginia is more conspicuous, although not so early in time. The very term, “Treasury notes,” now used as the equivalent of “bills of credit,” first appears in her colonial legislation, when, in 1755, they were made a tender in payment of debts.[176] There were successive emissions in 1769, 1771, and 1773, which were not made a tender,—and then in 1778, and at other times afterwards, which were made a tender. That these “Treasury notes” were deemed “bills of credit” is demonstrated by the legislation of the State, especially by the Act of May, 1780, which, after reciting that the exigencies of the war require the further emission of paper money, authorizes new “Treasury notes,” and proceeds to punish with death any person who shall forge “any bill of credit or Treasury note to be issued by virtue of this Act.”[177]

I find that North Carolina, as early as 1748, sent forth bills of credit which were made a tender, and many subsequent emissions were authorized. South Carolina began in 1703; but these bills, bearing interest at twelve per cent, do not seem to have been made a tender. Others issued by this colony, at different times afterwards, were made a tender. In 1760 Georgia authorized bills of credit on interest, and secured by mortgage of the property of the receivers, which were made a tender.

The extensive employment of paper money in New England aroused the jealousy of the Imperial Parliament, which, by the Act of 25th June, 1751,[178] expressly forbade the issue of any “paper bills, or bills of credit,” except for certain specific purposes, or upon certain specified emergencies. The Act constantly speaks of these two as equivalent expressions, thus seeming to show that “bills of credit,” in their true meaning, were what is familiarly called “paper money,” with the incidents of such money. But the Act proceeds to limit these incidents by declaring expressly that “no paper currency, or bills of credit,” issued under it, shall be a tender in payment of any private debts or contracts whatsoever, with a proviso that nothing therein contained should make any bills then subsisting a tender. That Parliament should deem it necessary, by special enactment, to take from bills of credit the character of a tender, attests the customary association between these two ideas.

During the Revolutionary War, under the exigencies of that time, with a country without resources and a treasury without money, bills of credit, known as Continental money, were issued by Congress. But, while receivable in discharge of taxes and other public dues, they were not made a tender by Congress, although the States were recommended to make them such.

Mr. Sumner. At the adoption of the National Constitution, the people, to their wide-spread cost, had become familiar with bills of credit and their incidents, while all conversant with Colonial history must have known the part which bills of credit played for nearly a century, not only as a help to currency, but as a tender, constituting paper money. And yet, with all this ample knowledge,—present certainly to the framers of the Constitution, if not to the people,—no express words on this subject were introduced into the text of the Constitution, except with regard to the States. The conclusion from this silence, under all the circumstances, is strong, if not irresistible.

But the omission of the Constitution with regard to bills of credit was practically supplied by Congress, which has not hesitated to assume the existence of the power. If the Constitution failed to speak, Congress has not failed; and the exercise of this power cannot now be questioned, without unsettling our whole financial system. But we have seen that throughout our Colonial history the tender was a constant, though not inseparable, incident of the bill of credit,—that, indeed, it was so much part of the bill of credit that the Imperial Parliament positively interfered to separate the two, and, while sanctioning the bill of credit, forbade the tender. And now, if this historical review is properly apprehended, if it is not entirely out of place, it must conduct to the conclusion, that, whatever may be the present question of policy, the power to make Treasury notes a tender has precisely the same origin in the Constitution with the power to create Treasury notes. It is true that you may exercise one power and decline the other; but if you assume the power to issue bills of credit, I am at a loss to understand how you can deny the power to make them a tender. The two spring from the same fountain. You may refuse to exercise one or both; but you cannot insist upon one, under the Constitution, and reject the other.

Assuming the constitutionality of this proposition, or rather declining to admit the satisfactory force of the constitutional arguments against it, I am brought to a question which has, for me, more of difficulty and doubt: I mean the policy of exercising the power at this moment. It is not too much to say that this question concerns the national character, as well as the national welfare, while intelligent and patriotic men differ earnestly with regard to it. Decide it as we may, we cannot escape anxiety on the subject. Take which way we will, we cannot escape the just sense of responsibility. Seeking the truth only, and jealous of that good name which is to a Government one of its best possessions, I shall consider the question frankly; nor shall I disguise any of the difficulties which it presents, whether from principle or from experience. This is not the time for concealment, and I insist, that, if the power is exercised, its true character shall be understood. I invoke, also, the examples of history, to make us pause; but it will be my duty to show that there are other examples calculated to sustain the Government in the policy it now so urgently recommends.

If the Treasury notes of the United States were at this moment convertible into coin, there would be no occasion to declare them a tender; for they would be everywhere, at least in our own country, as good as coin. But the suspension of the banks was followed by suspension of the Treasury, and its notes are now inconvertible paper, which it is proposed to sustain artificially by declaring them a tender. If this proposition be adopted, the Treasury will be enabled to substitute bits of engraved paper for money. Of course, such a proposition, on its face, is obnoxious to objections that make upon me an impression not to be disguised.

Looking at the history of paper money, especially in our own country, we find no encouragement. Its evils were vividly portrayed by the “Federalist,”[179] and have been powerfully presented in this debate by the Senator from Vermont [Mr. Collamer]. Congress, during the Revolution, began, as early as 1775, with bills to the amount of $3,000,000, on their face declaring the bearer entitled to receive the sum specified in “Spanish milled dollars, or the value thereof in gold or silver,” according to a certain resolution of Congress. The bills were receivable for taxes, and the thirteen colonies were pledged for their redemption. Other emissions followed, and, as their credit began to fail, Congress went so far as to declare that whoever refused to receive this paper in payment should “be deemed, published, and treated as an enemy of his country.”[180] As the paper continued to depreciate, Congress became more violent in its support, and even ventured to recommend it as of peculiar value. “Let it be remembered,” said Congress, “that paper money is the only kind of money which cannot ‘make unto itself wings and fly away.’”[181] The sum-total of these bills at last reached upwards of three hundred millions, which in 1780 became so utterly worthless in the hands of their possessors that they ceased to circulate, and have ever since been treated only as curiosities, without positive value. No serious proposition for their redemption has ever been made.

The French assignats, amounting to the enormous sum-total of nine thousand million dollars,[182] issued during the fiery excitements of the Great Revolution, shared the fortunes of American Continental money, passing into the limbo of “things transitory and vain.” Perhaps there is not a country on the European continent, which, during the fearful wars that followed, did not encounter the same experience. I have heard it said that old soldiers in Denmark lighted their pipes with paper money, which had become to them only the record of a broken promise.

Power of all kinds is liable to abuse, and experience shows that the power to issue inconvertible paper is no exception to this prevailing law. The issue may be moderate at first, and sustained by plausible reasons, but it breaks soon into excess. Of course, actual value, or its equivalent, is the life of money, giving to it a circulating quality; and when money begins to be suspected, it loses its circulating quality. But inconvertible paper, even when made a tender, has no actual value, and circulates only because Government commands its circulation. It has no present worth beyond the engraving; therefore all ordinary checks to undue issue of money are wanting. Nothing exists to prevent excess and consequent depreciation; and this danger is verified by history. I refer to it now that I may not seem indifferent to any of the perplexities which surround us.

In some countries a legal tender is gold and silver; in others it is gold alone. In England, since 1816, gold, and not silver, has been the tender for sums of forty shillings and upwards; and since 1833 the notes of the Bank have been a tender for sums over five pounds, everywhere except at the Bank itself and its branches. But it is to be borne in mind that both these metals have positive value in the market equivalent to that of coin; so that coin is value itself. But convertible paper is not value itself; it is only the representative of value; while it is doubtful if inconvertible paper can be called the representative of anything in particular. These considerations are not decisive of the policy now proposed, but they justly incline us to a prudent hesitation.

If we are not deterred by the bad examples of history, or by the acknowledged danger of excess and consequent depreciation,—if we are willing to take the chance of seeing Treasury notes in the same list with Continental money and French assignats, and of having returned soldiers in old age light their pipes with the worthless paper,—if these suggestions are put aside as exaggerated or irrelevant, I ask you not to forget that a constant aim of good government is to secure the immediate convertibility of paper into coin. But, instead of securing such immediate convertibility, or taking any steps towards it, you will for the present renounce it.

Pardon my frankness, Sir, if I declare that the present proposition, when examined carefully, seems too much like bad faith. I say it seems: I would not speak too strongly. Is there not bad faith towards creditors, who are compelled to receive what is due in a depreciated currency? Is there not bad faith towards all abroad, who, putting trust in our integrity, national and personal, have sent their money to this country in gold or its equivalent? And just in proportion as this is so, you cannot doubt that we shall suffer alike in character and resources too; for what resource is greater to a nation or to an individual than a character for integrity? The present proposition must be followed soon by others,—even to the extent of $1,000,000,000. But where shall this vast amount be obtained, and at what cost, when it is seen that we have already undertaken to authorize inconvertible paper as a tender? Credit is volatile and sensitive, and will not yield to force. Do you propose the right way to win the delicate possession? It will not come to you from abroad, where money usually abounds. Will it salute you here at home? And is it good economy to obtain the amount you seek by a policy which will create a disturbing impediment to all your efforts for the larger amounts soon to be required? I put these questions without answering them. It is sufficient for me that I open the difficulties before us; and here I follow the Senator from Maine [Mr. Fessenden], Chairman of the Committee on Finance, who commenced this debate.

In courts of law, experts are summoned to testify on questions of science or art within their special knowledge. If, on this occasion, experts in finance or currency were summoned, I do not know that we should be much enlightened; for, according to my observation, there are such differences among them, and, as the Senator from Maine [Mr. Fessenden] has pleasantly told us, such differences even in the same person, one day and the day after, that it is difficult to place reliance in their counsels. Some tell us that making Treasury notes a tender will be most beneficent; others insist that it will be dishonorable and pernicious. On each side strong words are employed. Which shall we follow?

Crossing the sea, we find similar differences, not, of course, with regard to the present proposition, which is not yet known there, but with regard to the principles entering into this debate. In England the general subject has occupied much attention. As late as 1857 it was brought before a distinguished Parliamentary Committee, and their Report is remarkable for the testimony of numerous witnesses whose experience and knowledge give authority to their opinions. The Report is a financial monument. But among these witnesses are some who were little disturbed by an inconvertible currency, although the weight of testimony was the other way.

Nobody was more positive than Nathaniel Alexander, Esq., head of the firm of Alexander & Co., India merchants. His attention being called to the proper means against the effects of panic on the Bank of England, he proposed, as an assistance to the Bank, another currency, inconvertible, and a tender for Government dues, under Act of Parliament. From its inconvertible character, such a currency, he said, would not be reached by panic, and would therefore contribute to the security of the Bank.[183] This testimony seems to maintain the principle of the present proposition; and I quote it, as showing that the proposition is not entirely without practical authority.

John Twells, Esq., a London banker for upwards of fifty years, also testified in favor of an inconvertible note under sanction of Government, and a legal tender. Here are his answers to two questions.

Two other questions and answers may be given.

Another witness was Mr. Edward Capps, who described himself as engaged in the surveying and building trade for thirty years, so that his attention had been directed to the influence of credit on the manner in which buildings are erected in London. He, too, testified in favor of inconvertible paper. Here are some of his answers.

Against these witnesses was the testimony of a person perhaps the highest living authority on this question. I refer to Lord Overstone, known before his elevation to the peerage as Mr. Jones Loyd, the eminent banker, whose life makes him practically acquainted with this subject, while his liberal studies and various experience add to the solidity of his judgment. His testimony on this occasion, extending over almost three days, occupies nearly one hundred folio pages. Writers on finance have quoted it ever since, and practical men have accepted it as a guide. In reply to questions by the Committee, he declared himself strongly opposed to the issue of Government notes not payable in specie on demand. In his opinion “they would generate a state of utter confusion which could not be tolerated for three months.”[189] Then again:—

Here are his answers to other questions.

But the testimony of Lord Overstone, strong as it was, against an inconvertible currency, still admitted a possible occasion for departure from it; and here his testimony bears directly on the pending proposition. Alluding to the well-known suspension of specie payments by the Bank of England in 1797, he says:—

If this authoritative testimony be accepted in favor of a constant specie currency, it is unquestionably important as recognizing grounds of exception,—as, according to the language of the witness, if the country were “suddenly exposed to the calamity of a very large foreign force occupying its soil, or to the calamity of a very formidable and serious civil insurrection.” In these exceptions there is matter for much reflection. Strong as we may be against any questionable currency, we must not be insensible to a possible limitation even of this just principle. In short, we must be content with the best we can command. And here history affords valuable illustrations in conformity with this testimony.

In 1745, the alarm occasioned by the advance of the Highlanders, under the Pretender, as far as Derby, led to a run upon the Bank of England; and in order to gain time, the directors, while continuing to pay in specie, adopted the device of paying in shillings and sixpences. But, next to the retreat of the enemy, their best relief was found in a resolution by the merchants and traders of the city, declaring their willingness to receive bank-notes in payment of any sum due, and pledging their utmost endeavors to make all payments in these bank-notes. This proceeding, it is perceived, was prompted by the pressure of civil disturbance. But the most authentic case is that of 1797, when the Bank, under pressure of political events, was prohibited, by Order in Council, issued on Sunday, the 26th of February, from paying their notes in cash, until the sense of Parliament should be taken on the subject. At the meeting of Parliament, after much discussion, it was agreed to continue the suspension till six months after the signature of a definitive treaty of peace, thus positively recognizing the existence of war as a reason for this departure from principle. A recent English writer vindicates this act as follows.

Unhappily, the definitive treaty of peace, on which the restoration of specie payments depended, was not consummated till 1815, so that throughout this long period there was an inconvertible currency, which even the sanction of Parliament did not save, in 1814, from a discount of twenty-five per cent. But peace did not bring specie at once. The routine of paper had become too strongly fixed, and it was only through the remarkable efforts of Sir Robert Peel, in 1819, that an Act of Parliament was passed requiring the payment of specie at the Bank in 1823. Such is the practical testimony of British experience.

The experience of France is similar. I do not now refer to the old assignats, but to a modern instance. Beyond question, the Bank of France is conducted with caution and skill; but no caution and skill are adequate to counteract the influence of a sudden revolution, especially like that of 1848, when the Republic was declared. The Bank made large advances to the Provisional Government. This obligation, combined with distrust universally prevalent, occasioned so severe a drain of gold, that, to prevent the total exhaustion of its vaults, the Bank was authorized by Government decree of 16th March, 1848,—just three weeks after the Revolution,—to suspend specie payments, while its notes were at the same time made a legal tender. To prevent abuse, possible in such a condition of things, a maximum of issues was fixed at three hundred and fifty million francs. Such precautions were proper; but the fact of the authorized suspension remains an example of history. The prompt return to the true system is not without encouragement.

If these instances are entitled to consideration, they seem to show, that, according to the experience of other countries, Government may be compelled at times to relax the rigor of its requirements with regard to convertible paper. But they do not fix the limitation to the exercise of this extraordinary discretion. That the discretion exists is important in the present debate.

It is a discretion kindred to that under which the Habeas Corpus is suspended, so that citizens are arrested without the forms of law,—kindred to that under which an extensive territory is declared to be in a condition of insurrection, so that all business with its inhabitants is suspended,—kindred to that which unquestionably exists, to obtain soldiers, if necessary, by draft or conscription instead of the free offering of volunteers,—kindred to that under which private property is taken for public uses,—and kindred, also, to that undoubted discretion which sanctions the completest exercise of the transcendent right of self-defence.

But, while recognizing the existence of the discretion in the last resort, under the law of necessity, the question still remains if this necessity actually exists. And now, as I close, I shall not cease to be frank. Is it necessary to incur all the unquestionable evils of inconvertible paper, forced into circulation by Act of Congress,—to suffer the stain upon our national faith, to bear the stigma of a seeming repudiation, to lose for the present that credit which in itself is a treasury, and to teach debtors everywhere that contracts may be varied at the will of the stronger? Surely there is much in these inquiries to make us pause. If our country were poor or feeble, without population and without resources, if it were already drained by a long war, if the enemy had succeeded in depriving us of the means of livelihood, then we should not even pause. But our country is rich and powerful, with a numerous population, busy, honest, and determined, abounding in unparalleled resources of all kinds, agricultural, mineral, industrial, and commercial; it is yet undrained by the war in which we are engaged, nor has the enemy succeeded in depriving us of any means of livelihood. It is hard, very hard, to think that such a country, so powerful, so rich, and so beloved, should be compelled to adopt a policy of even questionable propriety.

If I mention these things, if I make these inquiries, it is because of the unfeigned solicitude which I feel with regard to this measure, and not with the view of arguing against the exercise of a constitutional power, when, in the opinion of the Government to which I give my confidence, the necessity for its exercise has arrived. Surely we must all be against paper money, we must all insist upon maintaining the integrity of the Government, and we must all set our faces against any proposition like the present, except as a temporary expedient, rendered imperative by the exigency of the hour. If it has my vote, it will be only because I am unwilling to refuse the Government especially charged with this responsibility that confidence which is hardly less important to the public interests than the money itself. Others may doubt if the exigency is sufficiently imperative; but the Secretary of the Treasury, whose duty it is to understand the occasion, does not doubt. In his opinion the war requires this sacrifice. Uncontrollable passions are let loose to overturn the tranquil conditions of peace. Meanwhile your soldiers in the field must be paid and fed. There can be no failure or postponement. A remedy is proposed which at another moment you would reject. Whatever the national resources, they are not now within reach, except by summary process. Reluctantly, painfully, I consent that the process shall issue.

And yet I cannot give such a vote without warning the Government against the dangers from such an experiment. The medicine of the Constitution must not become its daily bread. Nor can I disguise the conviction that better than any device of legal tender will be vigorous, earnest efforts for the suppression of the Rebellion, and the establishment of the Constitution in its true principles over the territory which the Rebellion has usurped.

LOYALTY A QUALIFICATION REQUIRED IN A SENATOR.