I desire, Mr. President, to make one single remark. It is said that the proposition before the Senate is without precedent. New occasions teach new duties; precedents are made when the occasion requires. Never before has any person appeared to take a seat in this body whose previous conduct and declarations, as disclosed to the Senate, gave reasonable ground to distrust his loyalty. That case, Sir, is without precedent. It behooves the Senate to make a precedent in such an unprecedented case. At this very moment we are engaged in considering if certain Senators shall not be expelled for disloyalty; and it seems to me we shall do our duty poorly, if we receive a new comer with regard to whose loyalty there is reasonable suspicion.

MR. PRESIDENT,—Over each House of Congress, while in session, floats the flag of the Union. So long as that flag ripples above our end of the Capitol, the passing stranger knows that the Senate is engaged in loyal service to the Republic. In no other country is the national flag thus employed; and I remember to have heard a distinguished artist[199]—who, unhappily, no longer lives except in his works, some of which are near us—remark that this custom was to him the most original and picturesque feature of Washington. The national flag, symbolizing the labors of Congress, seemed to have a double beauty, reminding him not only of country, but also of the patriotic service in which those the people trusted were then engaged.

The Senate is now in session, performing its allotted duties, and the national flag is over it. I need not enlarge on these duties, legislative, diplomatic, and executive. They are present to your minds. Suffice it to say, that not a law can be passed, not a treaty can be ratified, not a nomination to office can be confirmed, without the action of the Senate. And now you are to determine the plain question, if this body, with these exalted, various, and most confidential trusts, and actually sitting beneath the flag of the Union, is so utterly powerless and abject, that, before admitting a person to participation in these trusts, it can make no inquiry with regard to his loyalty, and cannot even consider evidence tending to show that he is false to the flag now waving over us. Sir, if this be so, if the Senate is really in this condition of imbecility, if its doors must necessarily swing open to any traitor, even, presenting himself with a certificate in his pocket, let the flag drop, and no longer symbolize the loyal service in which we are engaged. The Report of the Committee, expressed in simple English, without circumlocution or equivocation, is, “Free admission to traitors here, and no questions asked.” In other words, the claimant of a seat in the Senate can enter and take it without question with regard to loyalty. He can freely participate in these most important trusts, with the flag of the Union waving over him, and nobody shall ask in advance whether he is true to that flag.

But it is argued by the Senator of New York [Mr. Harris], that the Constitution having provided for the expulsion of a Senator by a vote of two thirds, there can be no inquiry on the threshold, except with regard to the qualifications of age, citizenship, and inhabitancy of the State whose certificate he bears. If this be true, then open, flaunting treason is not a disqualification, and the traitor, if allowed to go at large, may present his certificate and proceed to occupy a seat among us. A proposition is sometimes answered simply by stating it; and it seems to me that this is done in the present case. The Constitution was the work of wise and practical men, and they were not guilty of the absurdity which such an interpretation attributes to them. They did not announce that a disloyal man, or, it may be, a traitor, may enter this Chamber without opposition, and then intrench himself securely behind the provision requiring a vote of two thirds for his expulsion; they did not declare that the mere certificate of a Senator is an all-sufficient passport to shield a hateful crime itself from every inquiry; nor did they insist that disloyalty in this high place is to be treated so tenderly as not even to be touched, until, perhaps, it is too late. This whole argument, that the claimant must be admitted to the Senate and then judged afterwards, is more generous to the claimant than just to the Senate; it is more considerate of personal pretensions than of public interests. To admit a claimant charged with disloyalty, in the hope of expelling him afterwards, is a voluntary abandonment of the right of self-defence, which belongs to the Senate as much as to any individual. The irrational character of such abandonment is aptly pictured in a Parliamentary speech reproduced in curious verses, more expressive than poetical, and once quoted by Mr. Webster:—

But the Senate is asked to do this very thing. Instead of shutting the door and keeping disloyalty out, we are asked to let it in and see if we can get it out again.

If we look closely at the Constitution, we cannot hesitate. It is assumed by the Committee that there are but three qualifications for a Senator, and these words are quoted:—

According to these words, the three qualifications are (1) age, (2) citizenship, and (3) inhabitancy of the State he assumes to represent. These qualifications are not questioned, because they are grouped in a special clause of the Constitution; and every applicant, on presenting himself here, is subjected at once to these tests. But it is a mistake to suppose that these are the only qualifications imposed. There is another, mentioned in a later part of the Constitution, more important than either of the others; so that, though last in place, it is first in consequence. It is loyalty, which I affirm is made a qualification under the Constitution; and we have already seen, that, even if the organic law were silent, it is so essential to the fitness of a Senator for his trusts, that the Senate, in the exercise of its discretion, ought to require it. But the language of the Constitution leaves no room for doubt.

The words establishing loyalty as a qualification are as follows:—

These words are explicit in requiring the oath to support the Constitution. And the first statute of the First Congress, approved June 1, 1789, and standing at the head of our statute-book, provides for the administration of the oath as follows:—

Thus by the Constitution, explained by the earliest statutes, must the oath to support the Constitution be administered to a Senator previous to his taking his seat. But the oath is simply evidence and pledge of loyalty; and this evidence and pledge constitute a condition precedent to admission. As loyalty is more important than age or citizenship or inhabitancy, it has been put under the solemn safeguard of an oath. So far from agreeing with the Committee, or with the Senator from New York [Mr. Harris], that it is not named among “qualifications,” it seems to me that it stands first among them. Of course, it is vain to say that it is not expressly called a “qualification.” Let us ascend from words to things. It is made a qualification in fact, call it by what name you will. Men are familiarly said to “qualify” for an office, when they take the necessary oath of office; so that the language of common life becomes an interpreter of the Constitution. Sir, loyalty is among constitutional “qualifications” of a Senator.

Resting on this conclusion, and assuming that disloyalty is a constitutional disqualification, the single question remains as to the time when evidence with regard to it may be considered. Now, as the Senate, under the Constitution, is exclusive judge of the qualifications of its members, the time when it shall consider a case is obviously within its own discretion, according to the exigency. It may take up the case early or late, before or after the administration of the oath. Under ordinary circumstances, where the case turned upon a question of age or citizenship or inhabitancy, it would be reasonable, and according to usage, that the claimant should be admitted under his certificate, which is prima facie evidence of the requisite qualifications. In such a case the public interests would not suffer, for the disqualification is rather of form than of substance. But where the disqualification is founded on disloyalty, it is obvious that the public interests might be seriously compromised, if the claimant were allowed any such privilege,—for the disqualification is of substance, and not of form. Disloyalty must not find a seat in the Senate, even for a day; nor can any claimant charged with disloyalty complain that the Senate refuses welcome to its trusts.

The oath required to support the Constitution is on its face an oath of loyalty, and nothing else. The claimant may declare willingness to take it; but such declaration is not an answer to evidence showing disloyalty, unless you are ready to admit present professions to be a sufficient cloak for disloyalty, or, it may be, treason, in the past. On a question of such importance, with positive evidence against his loyalty, the claimant cannot expect permission to purge himself on his oath. The issue is distinctly presented, if he has not already committed himself, so that his oath to support the Constitution is entitled to no consideration. Sir Edward Coke pronounces generally, that “an infidel cannot be sworn,”—a doctrine which has been since mitigated in our courts. But whatever the rule on this subject in our courts, it is reasonable that an infidel to our Government, an infidel to our Constitution, should not be permitted by the Senate to go through the mockery of swearing to support the Constitution; nor should a person charged with such infidelity be permitted to take the oath, unless able to remove the grounds of the charge. The oath is administered by the President of the Senate at your desk, Sir, in the presence of the Senators; and the solemnity of the occasion is an additional argument against administering it to any person whose loyalty is not above suspicion. There is a German treatise entitled, “On the Lubricity and Slippery Uncertainty of the Suppletory Oath,”—being the oath of a litigant party in his own case. But an oath to support the Constitution by a claimant charged with disloyalty would be open to suspicion, at least, of lubricity and slippery uncertainty not creditable to the Senate.

We are told in the Epistle to the Hebrews that an oath is “the end of the whole dispute”;[203] but this of course assumes that the oath is above question. If not above question, it is wrong to allow the oath,—at least in the Senate of the United States, which is the exclusive judge of its own proceedings.

I say nothing of the facts in the present case; nor do I venture to suggest any judgment on the final weight to which they may be entitled. I confine myself to the simple question as to the duty of inquiry at the present stage of proceedings.

It is my earnest hope that the claimant will be able to purge himself, and show that he is a loyal citizen. Meanwhile I do not wish to prejudge him; I have not prejudged him; I have come to no conclusion on the facts; but I have come to a perfect, fixed, and irreversible conclusion on the duty of the Senate at this time to enter into this inquiry, and to ascertain from the evidence whether he is loyal or not.

MR. PRESIDENT,—I am unwilling to speak again in this debate. Nothing but a sense of duty makes me break silence. But I am determined that this Chamber of high trust, so carefully guarded by the Constitution, shall not be opened to disloyalty, if any argument, any persuasion, or any effort of mine can prevent it.

Of course, in this debate something is assumed. It is simply this: that the evidence touching the loyalty of the claimant is not valueless; that it merits attention; that it affords probable cause, if I may adopt the phrase of the Roman Law, for distrust; that it is enough to put a party on the defensive. If this be the case, if all these affidavits, verified by the certificate so numerously signed, are not put aside as baseless, then the Senate must inquire into the charge. The result of the inquiry may be one way or another; but the inquiry must be made. Not to make it is abandonment of present duty; and not to assert the power is abandonment of an essential right of self-defence.

I have listened to the various arguments pressing the Senate to disarm itself, as they have been presented by able Senators, especially by the Senator from Maine [Mr. Fessenden] and the Senator from Wisconsin [Mr. Howe]; and I have felt, as I listened, new confidence in the constitutional power of the Senate to protect itself at all times against disloyalty, and in the duty to exercise this constitutional power at any time, early or late, in its completest discretion.

But it is said,—and I believe the Senator from Maine first presented this argument, which has been urged so strongly by the Senator from Wisconsin,—that, if we reject the present claimant, Oregon will be without a representative. And if we expel him, will not Oregon be without a representative? Surely this is no reason for hesitation in either case. I, too, desire a representative for Oregon; but I know full well that a disloyal representative is no representative,—or rather, Sir, is worse than no representative. In sustaining such a representative, you sacrifice substance to form,—you abandon the living principle, content with the dead letter,—you “keep the word of promise to the ear, and break it to the hope,”—you offer to the people of Oregon a stone, when they demand bread. In the name of the people of Oregon, whose wishes are manifest in the papers before us, I protest against the pretension that they can be represented by a disloyal person. Misrepresentation is not and never can be representation.

But it is said,—and I believe the Senator from Maine made the argument,—that the evidence against the claimant, if sustained, might justify expulsion, but will not justify refusal of admission to take the oath.

Mr. Sumner. The Senator says, that, if the same language had been used while he was a Senator, it might justify expulsion. That is enough, Sir; and yet the Senator argues that it will not justify the Senate in refusing to open its doors, when he presents himself for admission. In plain terms, the Senate may pronounce the stigma of expulsion, but not the judgment of exclusion. A similar absurdity would be to say, that in private life an offence would justify kicking an intruder down stairs, but would not justify refusing him admission to our house. It is enough to state this case. Nothing can be clearer in the light of reason—and I say also of the Constitution—than that it is the duty of the Senate to meet disloyalty on the threshold,—to say to it, wherever it first shows itself, that this Chamber is no place for it. The English orator pictured his desolation, when he said that he was alone, and had none to meet his enemies in the gate.[204] Desolate will be the Senate, when it cannot meet disloyalty in the gate.

But the Senator from Maine complains, and the Senator from Vermont [Mr. Collamer] joins in the complaint, that the claimant is not allowed to purge himself by his oath,—thus using a technical phrase of the law, applicable chiefly to suspected persons. Not allowed to purge himself! Rather say, Sir, not allowed to perjure himself. For, in view of the testimony on your table, the inference is, unhappily, too strong, that in any oath to support the Constitution he must perjure himself. I say this with pain, and anxious not to prejudge the case, but simply because the facts, as they stand without contradiction, leave no opportunity for any other conclusion.

Since complaint is made by learned lawyers that the claimant is not allowed to purge himself, I desire to adduce a legal analogy on this question. It is well known that by the Common Law a person is not permitted to take an oath who does not believe in God. This is the general principle; but when we look at the application, we see how completely it illustrates the present case. If a person is known to have openly and recently declared disbelief, he will not be permitted to purge himself by his oath, for the reason that his own declarations are decisive.

Here again is additional illustration from the annotations to the great work of Phillipps on the Law of Evidence.

I would not press this illustration too far. But it seems to me clear, that, if you accept the declarations of a person as decisive against his religious belief, they must be accepted as equally decisive with regard to his political belief. An oath to support the Constitution presupposes political belief, as much as the oath itself presupposes religious belief.

Pardon me, Sir, but I cannot refrain from astonishment that Senators, learned lawyers, should be willing to treat the oath to support the Constitution as an oath of purgation, an oath of defecation, an oath of purification,—by which a suspected person may cleanse himself, by which an evil spirit may be cast out. Sir, it is no such thing. Such is not the oath of the Constitution. By that oath the accepted Senator dedicates himself solemnly to the Constitution. It is not an oath of purgation, as Senators insist, but an oath of consecration. To such an oath may be fitly applied the words of the ancients, when they spoke of the oath as “the greatest pledge of faith among men.”

I would not be carried into technicalities; but, since Senators insist that this oath is merely of purgation, I venture to add, that, according to early writers, there were two forms of oaths,—one technically styled “the oath of expurgation,” sometimes the ex officio oath, by which persons were bound to answer all questions, even to the extent of accusing themselves or intimate friends. This oath was much used and abused in the days of Queen Elizabeth. At an earlier day it was administered to an Archbishop of York charged with murder, and no less than one hundred compurgators were sworn with him. The other is what is called “the promissory oath,” which is the oath of the sovereign, the magistrate, the judge, the senator. Obviously this is widely different from the oath by which a person clears himself from suspicion, or cleanses his name.

There is another oath, with a peculiar title: I mean the custom-house oath. You all know something of this oath, which is taken hastily, without solemnity or question, and is now an acknowledged nuisance and mockery, against which people petition Congress. By such oaths, “sworn is the tongue, but unsworn is the mind.” With such oaths for seed, perjury is the natural harvest. If Senators who have spoken in this debate can have their own way, you will degrade the solemn oath of the Constitution to the same class, and make it the seed of similar harvest.

For myself, I am determined, so far as my vote or voice can go, that the oath shall mean something, and that it shall be kept solemn and above suspicion. It shall not be degraded to be an oath of purgation or a custom-house oath, but shall be in all simplicity what is regarded by the Constitution an oath of office, in itself the pure and truthful expression of assured loyalty,—not of loyalty still in question, still doubtful, so that people openly testify against it. And where there is evidence seriously impeaching the loyalty of a claimant, he shall not take that oath, with my consent, until the impeachment is removed. Sir, I am not insensible to the attractions of comedy, when well performed on the stage; but there is a place for everything, and I am unwilling to sit in my seat here and witness the comedy proposed. The Senate is to resolve itself into a theatre, under the management of grave Senators,—the Senator from New York, the Senator from Maine, and other Senators,—and we are to see the play proceed. The claimant from Oregon crosses the floor, and, under honorable escort, approaches the desk, takes the oath, and kisses the book. The title of the play is borrowed from a forgotten old English drama: “Treason made Easy; or, An Oath no Great Thing.”

It ill becomes the Senate at this moment to do or to forbear anything by which the standard of loyalty can be lowered. If it justly expects loyalty from others, if it requires loyalty in its soldiers and officers, surely it ought to set an example in its own members. Toward itself, at least, it cannot be too austere in requirement. Wherever about us disloyalty shows itself, whether in the Senate or in its lobby, whether already intrenched in this Chamber or struggling to enter in, whether planted at these desks or still standing in the gate, we have one and the same duty to perform. We must inquire into its character, and if it be found unworthy of trust, we must chastise it or exclude it. This is the least we can do.

Mr. President,—The Senate will observe that the resolution declares that the Senator from Oregon has been found by a Committee of the Senate to be disloyal. Now, Sir, I have no desire to discuss the facts of this case. But, in order to exhibit the urgency of this question, it is my duty to exhibit the conclusions of the Committee, set forth in their Report, as follows.

Of these propositions the first two had the sanction of the Senator from Virginia [Mr. Willey], while all three had the sanction of the rest of the Committee, being the Senator from New Hampshire [Mr. Clark], the Senator from Indiana [Mr. Wright], the Senator from Michigan [Mr. Howard], and the Senator from Ohio [Mr. Sherman]. Thus, in a Special Committee of five, raised expressly to consider this case, raised, too, after protracted discussion in the Senate, four of the Committee united in all the conclusions of the Report, and the dissenting member united in the first two conclusions. And this Report is, if possible, entitled to additional consideration, when it is known that the Senator from Oregon himself appeared before the Committee. On these accounts I accept the Report, and do not wish to go into it or behind it. It is with me the solemn verdict of a jury duly impanelled for the trial of a cause.

But if the Committee is the jury, the Senate is the court; and it remains that judgment should be entered.

I hear a voice saying that we must not take time for this question. Pray, Sir, what time is needed? The time has been already taken. The hearing has been had, the verdict is rendered.

Pray, why not take time? We are engaged in war to put down disloyalty. For this we set armies in the field, and contend in battle with our own fellow-citizens. For this we incur untold debts. For this we are preparing to incur untold taxation. Sir, all this is simply to put down disloyalty. And yet, when a committee of this body, after careful inquiry, solemnly declares a Senator disloyal to the National Government, we are told that there is no time to consider the question. Sir, I am against disloyalty, wherever it shows itself, whether in belligerent States, sheltered and strengthened by numbers, or sitting here, with all the privileges of this Chamber. Others will do as they please; but I cannot remain silent, while disloyalty, already exposed by our own Committee, is allowed a seat in our councils, open and secret. In not acting, you will discredit the Report of the Committee, or show that the Senate is indifferent to the character of its members. I will have no part in any such thing.

HELP FOR MEXICO AGAINST FOREIGN INTERVENTION.

On the 2d of September, 1861, Mr. Seward, in a despatch to Mr. Corwin, at Mexico, announced that the President greatly desired the political status of Mexico as an independent nation to be permanently maintained; that the events communicated by Mr. Corwin alarmed him, and he conceived that the people of the United States would scarcely justify him, were he to make no effort for preventing so great a calamity on this continent as would be the extinction of that neighbor republic; that he had therefore empowered Mr. Corwin to negotiate a treaty with Mexico for the assumption by the United States of the interest, at three per cent, upon the funded debt of that country, the principal of which was understood to be about sixty-two millions of dollars, for the term of five years from the date of the decree recently issued by Mexico suspending such payment, provided that Mexico could pledge to the United States its faith for the reimbursement of the money, with six per cent interest, to be secured by special lien upon all the public lands and mineral rights in the several Mexican States of Lower California, Chihuahua, Sonora, and Cinaloa, the property so pledged to become absolute in the United States at the expiration of the term of six years from the time when the treaty went into effect, if such reimbursement were not made before that time. The President felt that this course was rendered necessary by circumstances as new as they are eventful, and seeming to admit of no delay.

Mr. Seward proceeds to say, that his instructions are conditional upon the consent of the British and French Governments to forbear action against Mexico, on account of failure or refusal to pay the interest in question, until after the treaty had been submitted to the Senate, and, if ratified, then so long thereafter as the interest is paid by the United States.

Mr. Seward adds, that his instructions are not to be considered as specific, but general, subject to modification as to sums, terms, securities, and other points.

Mr. Corwin, in an earlier despatch, dated at Mexico, 29th July, 1861, and addressed to Mr. Seward, had already suggested the policy he was now authorized to pursue, and proposed a lien on the public lands and mineral rights in the provinces mentioned by Mr. Seward. From such arrangement, in his opinion, two consequences would follow: first, all hope of extending the domain of a separate Southern republic in this quarter or in Central America would be extinguished; and, secondly, any further attempt to establish European power on this continent would cease to occupy either England or Continental Europe.

Afterwards, in a despatch, dated at Mexico, November 29, 1861, Mr. Corwin enclosed to Mr. Seward the project of a treaty between the United States and Mexico, by which the United States were to lend Mexico five millions of dollars, payable in monthly instalments of one half million a month,—also the further sum of four millions of dollars, payable in sums of one half million every six months; the whole to be secured by mortgage on the public lands, mineral rights, and Church property of Mexico, for the realization of which a board of five commissioners was to be organized, three to be appointed by Mexico and two by the United States, holding sessions in the city of Mexico until the debt and interest were fully discharged. No reference was made in the proposed treaty to the consent of the British and French Governments, mentioned by Mr. Seward as a condition, nor to the application of the money, when received by Mexico; nor does anything on this subject appear in the accompanying despatch.

The President, by his Message of December 17, 1861, submitted the draught of this treaty to the Senate for their advice. Afterwards, by another Message, of January 24, 1862, he called their attention to it again, in the following language.

Meanwhile, Great Britain, France, and Spain, by a Convention, dated at London, October 31, 1861, have entered into an alliance, the declared object of which is “to demand from the authorities of the Republic of Mexico more efficacious protection for the persons and properties of their subjects, as well as a fulfilment of the obligations contracted by the Republic of Mexico.” The high contracting parties engaged not to seek for themselves, in the employment of coercive measures, any acquisition of territory, nor any special advantage, and not to exercise in the internal affairs of Mexico any influence of a nature to prejudice the right of the Mexican nation to choose and to constitute freely the form of its government. Desiring that the measures they intend to adopt should not bear an exclusive character, and being aware that the Government of the United States, on its part, has, like them, claims upon the Mexican Republic, they further agree that our Government shall be invited to join in the Convention.

Mr. Seward, in a despatch, dated at Washington, December 4, 1861, declined to join in the Convention, saying, “that the United States prefer, as much as lies in their power, to maintain the traditional policy recommended by the Father of their country, confirmed by successful experience, and which forbids them to make an alliance with foreign powers.”

In pursuance of this Convention, the naval and military forces of the three great powers have assembled at San Juan de Ulua, and the flags of the three powers now float over the castle. The Government of Mexico has rallied the people to resistance, and there is at this moment the prospect of a prolonged and exhausting contest. The occasion seems to have arrived, when the aid proposed by Mr. Seward, in his despatch of September 2, 1861, may be of decisive value to Mexico. To the United States it may also be of great importance, if it could be the means of removing from Mexico the pressure of hostile armaments, and placing a neighbor republic in a more tranquil and independent condition. If the Allied Powers desire security for their claims, and nothing else, then a reasonable provision of this nature ought to be satisfactory, so far as any question arises from the claim.

The debt of Mexico to the Allied Powers may be stated, in round numbers, as follows.

Of course, payment or guaranty of this large mass on our part is out of the question; nor was it contemplated by the United States in the original instructions to Mr. Corwin. It was proposed to make such payment as would afford present relief to Mexico, and secure the forbearance of the Allied Powers. To this end, Mr. Seward offered to assume the interest of the Mexican debt for the term of five years. But the unfunded claims in the foregoing list, entitled “immediate,” it is understood, are pressed with equal energy by the Allied Powers. If these were satisfied, and provision made for the interest, the United States would have the following liabilities.

Other outstanding claims of the Allied Powers are not included in either of these lists. It is proposed that these should be provided for by a sinking fund, at the rate of 10 per cent a year for ten years, as follows.

The assumption of all these liabilities for a long period would throw upon the United States a burden too great for the present moment, although, perhaps, not out of proportion to the anticipated advantages. If anything be done on our part, it must be more moderate. The offer of Mr. Seward for five years, if accepted, would devolve upon the United States a responsibility sufficiently large; and this responsibility ought to be kept within a limitation, of which $15,000,000 should be a maximum.

But there are two conditions to be required by the United States, before the assumption of any such responsibility. The first is the assent of the Allied Powers, and the acceptance on their part of the friendly offers proposed. Unless the Allied Powers are parties to the transaction, it would be productive only of embarrassment and loss, without accomplishing any permanent good to the United States or to Mexico.

The other essential condition is, that security should be given by Mexico for the liabilities assumed. It is not too much to expect such security; nor is Mexico, as is well known, disinclined to give it. Her creditors are now foreclosing their demands, at the cost, perhaps, of her national existence, and she turns to the United States for help. Not merely friendship, but a continental policy, affecting our own cherished interests, prompts us to afford such help, so far as in our power. In asking for security, we simply follow the rules of prudence, whether between individuals or nations.

The security proposed by Mr. Corwin on the public lands, minerals, and Church property of Mexico, would require the appointment of a board or mixed commission for the management and disposition of this property. This necessity adds to the complications of such security.

The security proposed by Mr. Seward, on the public lands and mineral rights in the several provinces of Lower California, Chihuahua, Sonora, and Cinaloa, is simple, and it is understood that in some of this territory there is vast mineral wealth. The province of Lower California is unquestionably the territory of Mexico most interesting to the United States in a military and naval point of view.

Another security, perhaps less manageable, but more interesting still, would be the right of way across the Isthmus of Tehuantepec, with a mortgage on the adjoining public lands of the Isthmus. Estimated by its pecuniary value, this security would not be large; but there can be no doubt of its political and commercial value.

Still another security would be a pledge by Mexico of 25 per cent, or perhaps a larger percentage, of the customs or other revenues.

It is not easy to say positively, at this distance from the scene of operations, and with the information before the Committee, what is the most practicable form of security. Perhaps it is advisable to leave the matter to the careful discretion of our minister at Mexico, under instructions from the President, with the explicit understanding that the United States decline any territorial acquisition, and seek the consolidation of Mexico, without dismemberment of any kind.

Such are the main features of the question on which the President has asked the advice of the Senate. With more precise information on the matters involved, it might be proper for the Senate to enter upon details in its answer. But such information, especially with regard to actual relations, now daily changing, between Mexico and the Allied Powers, can be obtained only on the spot. It is evident, therefore, that the Senate can do little more than indicate an opinion on what has already been done, and declare the proper principles on which a negotiation with Mexico should be conducted, without presuming to fix in advance all its terms. Much must be left to the discretion of our minister there, and to the instructions he will receive from the President.

The Committee recommend the passage of the following resolution.