MR. PRESIDENT,—There is a time for all things; but there are times when certain things are out of place; and this principle is especially applicable to the present debate. The question is on the adoption of a rule of the Senate to carry out an existing statute. It is not on the passage of the statute, or on its proposed repeal, but it is simply on its recognition as an existing statute, and the enforcement of its plain requirement. Considering the simplicity of the question, well may we be astonished at much that has been intruded into this debate.

The Senate is a branch of the legislative power, in conjunction with the House of Representatives and the President. Neither alone can make or unmake a law. The concurrence of all three is essential, whether in making or unmaking. So long as the law exists, there is no difference between the obligations of the Senate and the obligations of the humblest citizen, except, perhaps, that the Senate, which helped to make the law, is bound to set an example of obedience beyond any citizen.

Therefore I put aside, as entirely irrelevant, much that we have heard against the proposed rule. This is not the time to say that the oath is unconstitutional, or that it is ex post facto. These are considerations properly arising on the passage of the statute, or on a proposition for its repeal. The Senator from Delaware [Mr. Bayard] and the Senator from Maryland [Mr. Johnson], who have argued these topics so exhaustively, were either too late or too early. The statute is already the law of the land, and there is no bill pending for its repeal.

On a former occasion I vindicated the constitutionality of the statute, and I now willingly leave that topic to the judgment of Senators, enlightened by the wisdom of the Senator from Vermont [Mr. Collamer], whose argument has not been answered. But I repeat that this objection is utterly out of place at this moment.

A Senator over the way [Mr. Hendricks] has gone so far as to introduce my course on a former occasion as an apology for not taking the oath.[290] Because I denounced an infamous statute, which was a scandal to civilization, as unconstitutional and utterly unworthy the support of virtuous citizens, it is argued that the Slave-Drivers, then in power, were more lenient to me than we are now to them. In other words, the Slave-Drivers required of me an oath to support a statute which I abhorred, and therefore we are wrong in requiring the proposed oath. But this argument confounds two cases which are wide apart as the poles. While denouncing an outrageous statute, and refusing to play the part of slave-hunter, I never joined in rebellion against my country, or uttered one word except in loyalty. But here are persons with bloody hands, in battle array, striking at all we hold dear,—or others who have acted with them. Such persons will be justly brought to the test of an oath, and they can claim no immunity from the example of those patriot citizens who, recognizing the crime of Slavery, refused to become in any way its tools.

And another Senator [Mr. Johnson] has taken this occasion to arraign me for certain opinions on another question, and he complained that I place them under the protection of a judgment of the Supreme Court. This is not the time for the discussion of “Reconstruction.” It has nothing to do with the matter before the Senate. I may think that the Government of the United States has belligerent rights, as well as the right of sovereignty, over the Rebel States,—that it is especially the duty of Congress to take care that these rights are so exercised as to crush the Rebellion, and to prevent its breaking out again,—and that, to this end, Congress must take all possible bonds for the future. These opinions, which the Senator chose to characterize harshly, may be wrong, but they have nothing to do with the business in hand. At a proper time I shall be ready to defend them. At present I choose not to be diverted from the issue before us.

Putting aside irrelevant questions, and presenting the single point in issue, the case becomes too plain for argument. It is simply this: Will the Senate obey an existing statute? But here we must consider the meaning of the statute.

That the Senate will openly refuse obedience to an existing statute, recently enacted, in support of loyalty, is not to be supposed without impeachment of the loyalty of the Senate. Only because the question of obedience has been complicated with other questions has there been for a moment any doubt on this head. Clearly, the Senate will not disobey an existing statute. It is, then, on the statute alone, and nothing else, that any question can arise.

And here I ask leave to recall the Senate from the learned commentary and elaborate diversion of the Senator from Delaware. The actual question is one which may be treated without learning and without effort. It arises on the following words of the statute:—

It cannot fail to be observed here that the language is plain rather than technical. Every person “elected” or “appointed” to any “office” in the “civil, military, or naval departments of the public service” must take the oath. What words could be broader than “departments” and “public service”?

Obviously, and beyond all question, a Senator is “elected.” Therefore on this point there is no question.

The inquiry recurs, Is a Senator an “officer” in the “civil department of the public service”?

Is he an “officer”?

Is he in the “civil department”?

To raise these questions seems absurd. But I have not raised them. This is done by others. You might as well raise the question, if a man is a creature, and belongs to the human family.

Look now at these questions in their order.

1. Is a Senator an “officer”? Here please to consult the dictionary. I turn to Webster.

Thus, plainly, offices are legislative. But why summon the dictionary? And yet the zeal of the other side leaves no alternative.

Not content with the dictionary, I call attention to the use of the word in other authoritative places,—and pardon me, if I begin with the Constitution of Massachusetts, written originally by John Adams.

In the Bill of Rights of this Constitution it is declared:—

Members of the Legislature are classed among officers, and thus this word received its interpretation.

In another part of the same Constitution it is provided:—

Here the place or trust of a Senator or Representative is called an office. And this same use of these terms, as synonymous, and applicable to the post of Senator or Representative, is continued:—

The authority of New Hampshire is like that of Massachusetts. Her Constitution declares:—

Here the word “officers” obviously means the substitutes and agents of the people. But who are substitutes and agents of the people more than Senators?

Then again, in the same Constitution, it is declared:—

Here the word “office” is made synonymous with “place.”

The Constitution of Vermont testifies:—

Thus, in Vermont, members of the Legislature are “officers.”

The old Constitution of New Jersey testifies also, in the clause prescribing the qualifications entitling a person to vote:—

Here again members of the Legislature are treated as “public officers.”

The Constitution of Pennsylvania testifies:—

Here members of the General Assembly are classed with those holding “offices.”

The original Constitution of New York is more positive:—

Here the post of Delegate to the General Congress, and also of “Senator,” is treated as an “office.”

Surely this is enough. The post of Senator is an office of honor or profit, and a “Senator” is an “officer.”

2. But, assuming that the post of Senator is an “office,” and that a Senator is an “officer,” the question occurs, To what “department of the public service” does he belong?

Clearly he is not of the “military” or “naval” department. But if not “military” or “naval,” he must be “civil.” Here again consult the dictionary. I cite Webster.

To say that a Senator is not included under this comprehensive, but distinctive term, is simply an absurdity.

It is evident that Congress adopted the words of the statute because they were comprehensive and distinctive. They obviously comprehended all “officers” in the “public service,” whether “elected,” like a Senator, or “appointed,” like a judge. But, beyond their plainness, these words had this added advantage, that already for more than a generation they had received a practical interpretation from Congress.

Here is the familiar Blue Book. Its title-page begins:—

Turning to the contents, we find in this list Members of Congress, including Senators and Representatives, with the “officers and agents” of the two Houses.

If we go back to the Blue Book for 1820, which is now in my hands, we find the same title, and the same enumeration of Senators and Representatives.

This Blue Book is still published, in pursuance of a joint resolution by Congress, originally adopted as long ago as 27th April, 1816, with the following title:—

If Senators are properly included in such a register, it is only as belonging to the “civil department of the public service,” which is precisely where they have been placed by the recent Act of Congress.

The only apology for the objection urged from the beginning of this debate with so much pertinacity is founded on the case of Mr. Blount, the Senator expelled and afterwards impeached, at the close of the last century. I shall not take time to consider this case. It has been amply done by others. On former occasions I have done it at length. And yet I will not leave it without protesting again that it is absolutely inapplicable to the present occasion. If that case were out of the way, nobody would have suggested that a “Senator” was not an “officer in the civil department of the public service.” Now what did this case decide? Let another give the summary. I quote the words of Mr. Wharton, in the notes to his edition of the State Trials.

The case of Mr. Blount has no application to the present question. It is not an interpretation of the statute, and so far as it illustrates the Constitution it simply concerns the liability to impeachment. But even this case has often been drawn into doubt. And if we look into the proceedings of the time, we find that the decision, such as it was, encountered an able and earnest opposition.

Among those who took a distinguished part on that occasion was James A. Bayard,[302] of Delaware, the eminent Representative who conducted the impeachment as Manager on the part of the House of Representatives. In his effective argument he has set forth the true signification of the Constitution. From the argument of the Senator from Delaware [Mr. Bayard] in the present debate I confidently appeal to that of the earlier Mr. Bayard. Here is a passage.

In view of these emphatic words, it is difficult to see how any person can insist that a “Senator” is not a “civil officer,” even according to the text of the Constitution. Conceding to the judgment on the trial of impeachment all the authority which can belong to it, you cannot properly deduce from it any conclusion, except that a Senator already expelled is not a “civil officer” liable to impeachment: nothing beyond this.

But whatever the signification of this word in the Constitution, even conceding all that is claimed for it there, the instance is entirely inapplicable to the interpretation of the statute in question. If there be doubt on the Constitution, there is none on the statute. The latter is plain, and there are no associate words to interfere with its natural and unequivocal signification.

I conclude this branch of the subject as I began, by putting aside all irrelevant matter, all superfluous questions, all surplusage, all topics not properly germane to the debate. There is no question of the Constitution, no question of ex post facto, but a simple question on the meaning of a statute.

The oath is prescribed by Congress. It is too late to debate its constitutionality thus incidentally. It only remains for us to take it, promptly, patriotically. The procrastination of this debate is of evil example. How can we expect the alacrity of loyalty among the people, if the Senate hesitates?

Another objection to the proposed rule has been brought forward by the Senator from Vermont [Mr. Foot]. According to him, the statute is obligatory, and the oath must be taken by Senators, but a rule requiring the oath is superfluous and without precedent. The argument of the Senator is plausible, but it is answered by a simple statement of facts, in which, as presiding officer of the Senate, he bore a conspicuous part.

From this statement it will appear that the rule, or some equivalent action of the Senate, is not superfluous.

The language of the Chair, when inviting Senators to take the oath, left a loophole through which they might avoid the oath. It was, “Such Senators present as choose to do so will come forward,” and then “they will have an opportunity to subscribe the oath.” In such terms Senators were invited to do as they pleased, thus making a discrimination between the earlier oath, which they were obliged to take in order to be qualified, and the additional oath, which they were free to neglect.

Such is a plain statement of facts, which I make in no spirit of personal criticism, but simply that you may see the occasion for the proposed rule.

Had the Chair at the beginning proceeded to administer the additional oath, as the earlier oath, there would have been no occasion for a rule. Or had the Chair afterwards, when attention was called to the omission, administered the additional oath according to the requirement of the statute, there would have been no occasion for a rule.

The Chair did no such thing, but left the taking of the oath to the conscience or will of each Senator. And though the statute solemnly declares that “every person elected or appointed to any office of honor or profit under the Government of the United States … shall, before entering upon the duties of such office, and before being entitled to any of the salary or other emoluments thereof, take and subscribe” the oath in question, yet the Senator from Delaware [Mr. Bayard] has not only “entered upon the duties” of his office as Senator, but he has continued to discharge these duties, and to draw his salary, although he has never taken and subscribed the oath.

Evidently something must be done to correct this incongruity, and to rehabilitate, if I may so say, the Act of Congress. I know no better way than by the proposed rule. But I have no partiality for this mode. I am ready for any other proposition which will lift the statute from the desuetude and neglect into which it was allowed to fall, and will secure its enforcement. In the events at hand this statute will be a safeguard of the Republic, and its enforcement here will secure its enforcement everywhere. To the traitor seeking office it will be a touchstone, while, with guardian force, it thrusts away from these Chambers all those brutal enemies, who, for the sake of Slavery, have helped to fill our land with mourning.

THE LATE HON. JOHN W. NOELL, REPRESENTATIVE OF MISSOURI.

There have been many in Congress from the Slave States, but he was the first in our history inspired to bring in a bill for the abolition of Slavery in a State. Rejecting the palpable sophistries by which it was sought to postpone an act of unquestionable justice, and discarding the idea that wrong was to be dealt with tardily, gradually, or prospectively, he proposed Immediate Emancipation. Let it be spoken in his praise. Let it be carved on his tombstone. His bill passed the House. It was lost in the Senate.[304] But it was not lost to his fame. He died without beholding the fulfilment of his desires, but the cause with which his name is associated cannot die.

Among the human benefactors of Missouri, so rich in natural resources, he must always be numbered; and his memory will be appreciated there just in proportion as men discern what contributes most to the wealth, the character, and the true nobility of a State. Hereafter, when the present conflict is ended and peace once more blesses our wide-spread land, he will be mentioned gratefully with those who saw truly how this blessing was to be secured, and bravely strove for it. Better in that day to have been a doorkeeper in the house of Freedom than a dweller in the tents of the ungodly: and what ungodliness can compare with the ungodliness of Slavery, whether in the lash of the taskmaster or in the speech of its apologist?

RECONSTRUCTION AGAIN: GUARANTIES AND SAFEGUARDS AGAINST SLAVERY AND FOR PROTECTION OF FREEDMEN.

RESOLVED, That, in determining the duties of the National Government, it is of first importance that we should see and understand the real character of the contest forced upon the United States, for failure to appreciate this contest must end in failure of those proper efforts essential to the reëstablishment of unity and concord; that, recognizing the contest in its real character, as it must be recorded by history, it is apparent that it is not an ordinary rebellion or an ordinary war, but that it is absolutely without precedent, differing from every other rebellion and every other war, inasmuch as it is an audacious attempt, for the first time in history, to found a wicked power on the corner-stone of Slavery; and that such an attempt, having this single object,—whether regarded as rebellion or war,—is so completely penetrated and absorbed, so entirely filled and possessed by Slavery, that it can be regarded as nothing else than the huge impersonation of this crime, at once rebel and belligerent, or, in other words, as Slavery in arms.

2. That, recognizing the identity of the Rebellion and Slavery, so that each is to the other as another self, it becomes plain that the Rebellion cannot be crushed without crushing Slavery, as Slavery cannot be crushed without crushing the Rebellion; that every forbearance to the one is forbearance to the other, and every blow at the one is a blow at the other; that all who tolerate Slavery tolerate the Rebellion, and all who strike at Slavery strike at the Rebellion; and that, therefore, it is our supreme duty, in which all other present duties are contained, to take care that the barbarism of Slavery, in which alone the Rebellion has its origin and life, is so utterly trampled out that it can never spring up again anywhere in the Rebel and belligerent region; for, leaving this duty undone, nothing is done, and all our blood and treasure are lavished in vain.

3. That, in dealing with the Rebel War, the National Government is invested with two classes of rights,—one the Rights of Sovereignty, inherent and indefeasible everywhere within the national limits, and the other the Rights of War, or belligerent rights, superinduced by the nature and extent of the contest; that, by virtue of the Rights of Sovereignty, the Rebel and belligerent region is now subject to the nation as its only rightful government, bound under the Constitution to all the duties of sovereignty, and by special mandate bound also to guaranty to every State a republican form of government, and to protect it against invasion; that, by virtue of the Rights of War, this same region is subject to all the conditions and incidents of war, according to the established usages of Christian nations, out of which is derived the familiar maxim of public duty, “Indemnity for the past and security for the future.”

4. That, in seeking restoration of the States to their proper places as members of the Republic, so that every State shall enjoy again its constitutional functions, and every star on the national flag shall represent a State in reality as well as in name, care must be taken that the Rebellion is not allowed, through any negligence or mistaken concession, to retain the least foothold for future activity, or the least germ of future life; that, whether proceeding by the exercise of sovereign rights or of belligerent rights, the same precautions must be exacted against future peril; that, therefore, any system of “Reconstruction” must be rejected which does not provide by irreversible guaranties against the continued existence or possible revival of Slavery, and that such guaranties can be primarily obtained only through the agency of the National Government, which to this end must assert a temporary supremacy, military or civil, throughout the Rebel and belligerent region, of sufficient duration to stamp upon this region the character of Freedom.

5. That, in the exercise of this essential supremacy of the nation, a solemn duty is cast upon Congress to see that no Rebel State is prematurely restored to its constitutional functions until within its borders all proper safeguards are established, so that loyal citizens, including the new-made freedmen, cannot at any time be molested by evil-disposed persons, and especially that no man there may be made a slave; that this solemn duty belongs to Congress under the Constitution, whether in the exercise of Rights of Sovereignty or Rights of War, and that in its performance that system of “Reconstruction” will be best, howsoever named, which promises most surely to accomplish the desired end, so that Slavery, which is the synonym of the Rebellion, shall absolutely cease throughout the whole Rebel and belligerent region, and the land it has maddened, impoverished, and degraded shall become safe, fertile, and glorious from assured Emancipation.

6. That, in the process of “Reconstruction,” it is not enough to secure the death of Slavery throughout the Rebel and belligerent region only; that experience testifies against Slavery wherever it exists, not only as crime against humanity, but as disturber of the public peace and spoiler of the public liberties, including liberty of the press, liberty of speech, and liberty of travel and transit; that, in the progress of civilization, it has become incompatible with good government, and especially with that “republican form of government” which the United States are bound to guaranty to every State; that from the outbreak of this Rebel war, even in States professing loyalty, it has been an open check upon patriotic duty and an open accessory to the Rebellion, so as to be a source of unquestionable weakness to the national cause; that the defiant pretensions of the master claiming control of his slave are in direct conflict with paramount rights of the nation; and that, therefore, it is the further duty of Congress, in the exercise of its double powers under the Constitution, as guardian of the national safety, to take all needful steps for the extinction of Slavery, even in States professing loyalty, so that this crime against humanity, this disturber of the public peace, and this spoiler of the public liberties shall no longer exist anywhere to menace the general harmony, that civilization may be no longer shocked, that the constitutional guaranty of a republican form of government to every State may be fulfilled, that the Rebellion may be deprived of the traitorous aid and comfort Slavery has instinctively volunteered, and that the master claiming an unnatural property in human flesh may no longer defy the nation.

7. That, in addition to the guaranties stipulated by Congress, and as the cap-stone to its work of restoration and reconciliation, the Constitution itself must be so amended as to prohibit Slavery everywhere within the limits of the Republic; that such prohibition, leaving all personal claims, whether of slave or master, to the legislation of Congress and of the States, will be a sacred and inviolable guaranty, representing the collective will of the people of the United States, and placing Universal Emancipation under sanction of the Constitution, so that Freedom shall be engraved on every foot of the national soil and be woven into every star of the national flag, while it elevates and inspires our whole national existence, and the Constitution, so often invoked for Slavery, but at last in harmony with the Declaration of Independence, will become, according to the aspirations of its founders, sublime guardian of the inalienable right of every human being to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness: all of which must be done in the name of the Union, in duty to humanity, and for the sake of permanent peace.

PRAYER OF ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND.

It will be perceived that the petition is in rolls. Each roll represents a State. For instance, here is New York with a list of seventeen thousand seven hundred and six names, Illinois with fifteen thousand three hundred and eighty, and Massachusetts with eleven thousand six hundred and forty-one. But I will read the abstract with which I have been furnished.

These several petitions are consolidated into one, being another illustration of the motto on our coin,—E pluribus unum.

This unprecedented petition is signed by one hundred thousand men and women, who unite in this unparalleled number to support its prayer. They are from all parts of the country, and from every condition of life: from the seaboard, fanned by the free airs of the ocean, and from the Mississippi and the prairies of the West, fanned by the free airs which vitalize that extensive region; from the families of the educated and uneducated, rich and poor, of every profession, business, and calling in life, representing every sentiment, thought, hope, passion, activity, intelligence, that inspires, strengthens, and adorns our social system. Here they are, a mighty army, one hundred thousand strong, without arms or banners, the advance-guard of a yet larger army.

Though memorable for numbers, these petitioners are more memorable for the prayer in which they unite. They ask nothing less than Universal Emancipation; and this they ask directly at the hands of Congress. No reason is assigned. The prayer speaks. It is simple, positive. So far as it proceeds from the women of the country, it is naturally a petition and not an argument. But I need not remind the Senate that there is no reason so strong as the reason of the heart. Do not all great thoughts come from the heart?

It is not for me at this moment to offer reasons which the one hundred thousand petitioners have forborne. But I may properly add, that, naturally and obviously, they all feel in their hearts, what reason and knowledge confirm, not only that Slavery as a Unit, one and indivisible, is the guilty origin of the Rebellion, but that its influence everywhere, even outside the Rebel States, is hostile to the Union, always impairing loyalty, and sometimes openly menacing the national cause. It requires no difficult logic to conclude that such a monster, wherever it shows its head, is a National Enemy, to be pursued and destroyed as such, or at least a nuisance to the national cause, to be abated as such.

The petitioners know well that Congress is the depository of those supreme powers by which rebellion, alike in its root and distant offshoots, may be surely crushed, while unity and peace are permanently assured. They know well that the action of Congress may be with the coöperation of the Slave-Masters, or even without their coöperation, under the overruling law of military necessity, or the commanding precept of the Constitution to guaranty a republican form of government. Above all, they know well that to save the country from peril, especially to save the national life, there is no power in the ample arsenal of self-defence which Congress may not grasp; for to Congress, under the Constitution, belongs the prerogative of the Roman Dictator, to see that the Republic receives no detriment. Therefore to Congress these petitioners appeal.

I ask the reference of the petition to the Select Committee on Slavery and Freedmen.