After the declarations made to-day, I am, at least for the present, satisfied, and shall not proceed further with my motion. I was particularly grateful to the Senator from Maryland for his very explicit statement of the law. I do not doubt he is entirely right. It has always been my opinion. I am glad to have it confirmed by that distinguished Senator and lawyer. I am also grateful to the Senator from West Virginia, who made the report, and who has so explicitly stated his own convictions, and, as I understand him, also the unanimous opinion of the Committee, to the effect that these people have legal rights precisely as white persons to the full enjoyment of all the privileges of the railroad in this District. If they have such legal rights, they are at this moment unquestionably exposed to what I must call outrage. If a white person were ejected from the cars on account of his skin, we should all feel that it was an outrage. Is it any less an outrage because the person ejected is simply guilty of a different skin? I confess, that, to my mind, it is a greater outrage, because obligations are greater in proportion to the humility and weakness of those with whom we deal.

But, Sir, I have no desire to proceed further in this question. I am for the present satisfied. My hope, however, is, that the railroad corporation will at once take notice, and act according to law.

Mr. President,—The question before the Senate is very simple. It is plain as one of the Ten Commandments. But the Senator from Maryland, with that nimbleness of speech which belongs to him, while undertaking to discuss it, has ranged over a very extensive field. He has treated the Senate to a discourse on almost everything, and something else also,—the elective franchise, social privileges of the Presidential mansion, the equality of races, the intermarriage of races, the state of Slavery in Maryland, also in some other States, and then the state of Slavery generally. Now, Sir, I shall not follow him on any of those topics. My desire is to present the precise point in issue. The Senate will then be prepared to vote.

But the Senator from Maryland will allow me to remind him that he seems to exhibit a rare inconsistency,—first, in declaring the absolute right of colored people to a seat in the cars, and then arguing, that, on every consideration of social life and of principle, they ought not to be admitted to any such privilege. The two parts do not go together. If colored people have the legal right to enter these cars, why does the Senator argue that they ought not to have that right? I agree with the Senator in the first point. They have the legal right to enter these cars, and the proprietors are trespassers, when they exclude them. Here I agreed with the Senator the other day. To my mind it is clear, because any other conclusion authorizes a corporation to establish a caste offensive to religion and humanity, injurious to a whole race now dwelling among us, and bringing shame upon our country.

The Senator asks, why, as I accept this conclusion, do I bring forward the present proposition? To this there are two answers, either of which is sufficient. The first is, that in the last railroad statute passed by Congress this provision was introduced, and I have heard of no complaint or trouble from it. In that now before us let us introduce the same provision, and make the two uniform. That is one reason. But the better reason is, that, while, beyond all question, colored persons have the legal right, even without this amendment, yet that legal right has been drawn in question. In point of fact, they are excluded from the cars. The Senator from Maryland refers to one case, because it has become well known. I am familiar with many other cases. They are brought to my attention almost daily. There is, then, at this moment, an existing abuse. Colored persons are kept out of their rights. But we cannot afford, at this crisis of our history, to sanction injustice. Every such act rises in judgment against us, and hangs on the movements of our armies, checking even the currents of victory.

The Senator admits their rights, but he says, Let them go to the courts. Sir, what is that for a poor, humble person, without means and without consideration? The Senator knows something of the law’s delay and the law’s expense; and I ask him whether it is just to subject an oppressed people to this additional oppression, when, by a few words, Congress, now in session, can overturn the wrong.

Mr. Sumner. I know very well that they may, in the last resort, be obliged to go to the courts; but I know that it will be more difficult for the Company to exclude them in the face of a positive statute than when their rights are simply founded on inference. The positive words which I propose leave no loophole for doubt. They must be obeyed.

There is nothing more common in legislation than, in case of doubt as to the meaning of a statute, or of the Common Law, to remove it by what is well known as a “declaratory” statute. I have in my hands a work of authority, which the Senator knows well, Dwarris on Statutes, from which I read:—

Are not these words completely applicable to the case before us? What should be the custom is, according to these words, “almost fallen into disuse, or become disputable.” I say, therefore, again, following these words, “for avoiding all doubts and difficulties,” it is the duty of Congress “to declare” what the law of the land is.

Again, in another place, this same authority, speaking still further of declaratory statutes, says:—

I ask the attention of the Senator to the expression, “they are acts of authentic interpretation.” Now, Sir, what I desire is, that the Senate shall give an authentic interpretation to the law. To do this it is not needful to range over the whole field of history, of morals, or of politics, in imitation of the Senator, or to discuss the equality of races, or their fortunes in the future; but it is enough for us to become acquainted with the existing abuse, every day under our own eyes, in the streets of this capital, and then to apply the remedy. Beyond all question, there is an abuse. The remedy is simple, and I cannot doubt that it will be effective.

Listening to the objections which this measure has encountered, I am reminded of those so often brought against the Wilmot Proviso. Sometimes it was said that Slavery could not go into the Territories without positive statute, and that therefore the prohibition was unnecessary. But it generally happened that those who opposed the positive prohibition were indifferent to the great question. No, Sir; there can be but one true rule. It is this: the rights of colored persons must be placed under the protection of positive statute, warning their oppressors against continued outrage.

Mr. President,—The Senator from Illinois [Mr. Trumbull], in former days, was a sincere, intelligent, devoted supporter of the Wilmot Proviso. As I understand that Proviso, it was simply a prohibition of Slavery in the Territories. Now I know not whether the Senator held, as I did, that, even without that prohibition, yet, by a strict interpretation of the Constitution, Slavery could not go into the Territories. I presume he did; most of us did. For myself, I held it resolutely and sincerely. I always regarded the Wilmot Proviso, if the Constitution were properly interpreted, as mere surplusage, sheer supererogation; and yet I never hesitated, in season or out of season, to vindicate it; and I believe the Senator never hesitated, in season or out of season, to do the same. I remember that my earliest admiration of that Senator was founded on his brave and able support of that very prohibition. Not then was he deterred from a humane provision because without it, according to his interpretation of the Constitution, Slavery could not enter the Territories. Nor was he deterred because the provision might be offensive to persons of weak nerves. No, Sir; openly and courageously he maintained the principle that Slavery must be prohibited. And on the same principle—if I may pass from great things to smaller, I admit, but not small—I insist that this proviso should also be adopted.

Our experience shows that the law as the Senator expounds it is not so accepted by this railroad corporation. He knows as well as I that colored persons are daily insulted. Some of these victims will compare in respectability of conduct with any whom I now have the honor to address. My colleague alluded to a colored clergyman whom he saw thrust out only the other day. We know of an officer of the United States, wearing the national uniform, thrust out; and the Senator from Illinois will allow all these things to be done, and not interfere. He tells us that it is contrary to law, and yet he allows it to proceed under the very eyes of the Senate. Sir, I insist that the Senate, when such outrage occurs, shall show that it has power, and is willing to exercise it on the side of justice.

But the Senator reminds us that in other days the Fugitive Act was passed here, and made especially offensive; and he pleads with us not to imitate that bad example, by introducing anything that may be offensive. I do not like the comparison of the Senator. Does he not know well that everything introduced into the Fugitive Slave Bill was in the interest of Slavery, and contrary to every sentiment of humanity, and that it was intended to give offence? The proposition now moved is opposite in character. It is to sustain the principles of humanity, to uphold human rights, to vindicate human equality, and with no purpose of offence,—none, not the least. The illustration of the Senator is entirely out of place. True it is that in those other days we were offended, and it was part of the hardships to which we were exposed. As, in the days which preceded our Revolution, the British officers said they would cram the stamps down the throats of the American people, so, in the same malignant spirit, the Slave-Masters insisted upon cramming Slavery down the throats of the Senate and the country. There was nothing but brutality then. Slavery in all its features is bad, but one of its most odious manifestations was the revolting insensibility to every sentiment of delicacy and humanity which it created in its supporters.

Sir, the Senator from Illinois knows well that it is in a very different spirit that propositions like the present are brought forward. It is always in the interest of human rights, and I need not say to that Senator, so far as I am concerned, with no other purpose than that patent in the proposition itself, and with no idea of offending any human being,—on the contrary, with a desire to avoid offence, if I possibly can. In that spirit I wish to do my duty on this floor. I would never give offence to any one, here or elsewhere, if I knew how to avoid it, while in all things I faithfully discharge my public duty.

WRONG AND UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF FUGITIVE SLAVE ACTS.

Two Fugitive Slave Acts still exist unrepealed on our statute-book. The first, dated as long ago as 1793, was preceded by an official correspondence, supposed to show necessity for legislation.[313] The second, belonging to the compromises of 1850, was introduced by a report from Mr. Butler, of South Carolina, at that time Chairman of the Judiciary Committee of the Senate.[314] In proposing the repeal of all legislation on the subject, it seems not improper to imitate the latter precedent by a report assigning briefly the reasons governing the Committee.

RELATION BETWEEN SLAVERY AND THE FUGITIVE SLAVE ACTS.

These Acts may be viewed as part of the system of Slavery, and therefore obnoxious to the judgment which Civilization is accumulating against this Barbarism; or they may be viewed as independent agencies. But it is difficult to consider them in the latter character alone; for if Slavery be the offence which it doubtless is, then must it infect all the agencies it employs. Especially at this moment, when, by common consent, Slavery is recognized as the origin and life of the Rebellion, must all its agencies be regarded with more than ordinary repugnance.

If in time of peace all Fugitive Slave Acts were offensive, as requiring what humanity and religion both condemn, they must at this moment be still more offensive, when Slavery, in whose behalf they were made, has risen in arms against the National Government. It is bad enough, at any time, to thrust an escaped slave back into bondage: it is absurd to thrust him back at a moment when Slavery is rallying all its forces for the conflict it has madly challenged. The crime of such a transaction is not diminished by its absurdity. A slave with courage and address to escape from his master has the qualities needed for a soldier of Freedom; but existing statutes require his arrest and sentence to bondage.

In annulling these statutes, Congress simply withdraws an irrational support from Slavery. It does nothing against Slavery, but merely refuses to do anything for it. In this respect the present proposition differs from all preceding measures of Abolition, as refusal to help an offender on the highway differs from an attempt to take his life.

And yet it cannot be doubted that the withdrawal of Congressional support must contribute effectively to the abolition of Slavery: not that, at the present moment, Congressional support is of any considerable value, but because its withdrawal would be an encouragement to that universal public opinion which must soon sweep this Barbarism from our country. It is one of the felicities of our present position, that by repealing all acts for the restitution of slaves we may hasten the happy day of Freedom and of Peace.

Regarding this question in association with the broader question of Universal Emancipation, we find that every sentiment or reason or argument for the latter pleads for the repeal of these obnoxious statutes, but that the difficulties sometimes supposed to beset Emancipation do not touch the proposed repeal, so that we might well insist upon the latter, even if we hesitated with regard to the former. The Committee find new motive to the recommendation they now make, when they see how important its adoption must be in securing the extinction of Slavery.

It is not enough to consider the proposed measure in its relations to Emancipation. Even if Congress be not ready to make an end of Slavery, it cannot hesitate to make an end of all Fugitive Slave Acts. Against the latter there are cumulative arguments of Constitutional Law and of duty, beyond any to be arrayed against Slavery itself. A man may even support Slavery, and yet reject the Fugitive Slave Acts.

THE FUGITIVE CLAUSE IN THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE RULES FOR ITS INTERPRETATION.

These Acts profess to be founded upon certain words of the Constitution. On this account we must consider these words with a certain degree of care. They are as follows.

John Quincy Adams has already remarked that in this much debated clause the laws of grammar are violated in order to assert the claim of property in man; for the verb “shall be delivered up” has for nominative “no person,” and thus the grammatical interpretation actually forbids the rendition. It is on this jumble and muddle of words that a superstructure of wrong is built. Even bad grammar may be disregarded, especially in behalf of human rights; but it is worthy of remark, that, in this clause of the Constitution, an outrage on human rights was begun by an outrage on language.

Assuming that the clause is not invalidated by bad grammar, it is often insisted, and here the Committee concur, that, according to authoritative rules of interpretation, it cannot be considered applicable to fugitive slaves; since, whatever the intention of its authors, no words were employed positively describing fugitive slaves and nobody else. Obviously, this clause, on its face, is applicable to apprentices, and it is known historically that under it apprentices have been delivered up on the claim of the party to whom “such service or labor” was due. It is therefore only by discarding its primary signification, and adopting a secondary signification, that it can be made to embrace fugitive slaves. On any common occasion, not involving a question of human rights, such secondary signification might be supplied by intendment; but it cannot be supplied to limit or deny human rights, especially to defeat Liberty, without a violation of fundamental rules which constitute the glory of the law.

This principle is common to every system of civilized jurisprudence; but it has been nowhere expressed with more force than in the maxims of the Common Law and the decisions of its courts. It entered into the remarkable argument of Granville Sharp, which preceded the judgment extorted from Lord Mansfield, and led him to exclaim, in words strictly applicable to the Constitution of the United States, “The word slaves, or anything that can justify the enslaving of others, is not to be found, God be thanked,” in the British Constitution.[316] It entered into the judgment pronounced at last by Lord Mansfield, under the benevolent pressure of Granville Sharp, in the renowned Somerset case, where this great magistrate grandly declared that Slavery could not exist in England. His words cannot be too often quoted as an illustration of the true rule of interpretation. “The state of Slavery,” he said, “is of such a nature, that it is incapable of being introduced on any reasons moral or political, but only by positive law.… It is so odious, that nothing can be suffered to support it but positive law.”[317] Therefore the authority for Slavery cannot be derived from any words of doubtful import. Such words are not “positive.” And clearly, by the same rule, if the words are susceptible of two different significations, that must be adopted which is hostile to Slavery. This same cardinal principle, thus announced by the Chief Justice of England, has been echoed by the Chief Justice of the United States, being none other than Marshall, speaking for our own Supreme Court, when he said, “Where rights are infringed, … the legislative intention must be expressed with irresistible clearness to induce a court of justice to suppose a design to effect such objects.”[318] In a clause capable of two meanings there can be no such “irresistible clearness” as would justify an infringement of human rights.

But Lord Mansfield and Chief Justice Marshall were simply giving practical application to those venerable maxims cherished in America as in England. It is not necessary to repeat them at length. They are substantially embodied in the words, Angliæ jura in omni casu Libertati dant favorem,—“The Laws of England, in every case, show favor to Liberty”; and also in those other vigorous words of Fortescue, Impius et crudelis judicandus est qui Libertati non favet,—“He is to be adjudged impious and cruel who does not favor Liberty.”[319] By such lessons have all who administer justice been warned for centuries against the sacrifice of human rights. Even Blackstone, whose personal sympathies were with power, was led to declare, in most suggestive words, worthy of a commentator on English Law, that “the law is always ready to catch at anything in favor of Liberty.”[320] And Hallam, whose instincts were always for Freedom, has adopted and vindicated this rule of interpretation as a pole-star of Constitutional Liberty. “It was,” says this great author, “by dwelling on all authorities in favor of Liberty, and by setting aside those which made against it, that our ancestors overthrew the claims of unbounded prerogative.”[321] Nor can it be doubted that this conduct helped to build those great English safeguards of Freedom which have been an example to mankind.

This rule has never received plainer illustration than in the writings of Dr. Webster, the eminent lexicographer. In a tract bearing date 1795, long before the heats engendered by the Fugitive Slave Act, he used language which, if applied to our Constitution, must defeat every interpretation favorable to Slavery. “Where there are two constructions,” he says, “the one favorable, the other odious, that which is odious is always to be rejected.”[322] This principle, thus sententiously expressed by the American lexicographer, may be found also in the judgments of courts and the writings of civilians without number. It is one of the commonplaces of interpretation. Lord Coke, our master in English law, tells us, that, where words “may have a double intendment, and the one standeth with law and right, and the other is wrongful and against law, the intendment that standeth with law shall be taken.”[323] And Vattel, a master in International Law, says that “we should particularly regard the famous distinction of things favorable and things odious,” and then he assumes that we must “consider as odious everything that in its own nature is rather hurtful than of use to the human race.”[324] But the clause of the Constitution which has been made the apology of the Fugitive Slave Act is clearly open to “two constructions,” according to the language of Dr. Webster, or “a double intendment,” according to the language of Lord Coke, or one “favorable” and the other “odious,” according to Vattel. Thus far in our history, under the malignant influence of Slavery, the odious construction or intendment has prevailed.

There is also another voice to be heard in determining the meaning of a doubtful clause. It is the Preamble, which, on the threshold, proclaims the spirit in which the Constitution was framed, and furnishes a rule of interpretation. To “establish justice, insure domestic tranquillity, provide for the common defence, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our posterity”: such are the declared objects of the Constitution, which must be kept present to the mind as we read its various provisions. And every word must be so interpreted as best to uphold these objects. The Preamble would be powerless against any “positive” sanction of Slavery by unequivocal words; but, on the other hand, any attempted sanction of Slavery by words not “positive” and not unequivocal, must be powerless against the Preamble, which, in this respect, is in harmony with the ancient maxims of the law.

ANALYSIS OF THE WORDS OF THE FUGITIVE CLAUSE.

Looking more minutely at the precise words of this clause, we see how completely it is stamped with equivocation from beginning to end. Every descriptive word it contains is double in signification. The clause may be seen, first, in what it does not contain; and, secondly, in what it does contain. It does not contain the word “slave” or “slavery,” which singly and exclusively denotes the idea of property in man. Had either of these fatal words been employed, there would have been no uncertainty or duplicity. But in abandoning these words, all idea of property in man was abandoned also. Other words were adopted, simply because they might mean something else, and therefore would not render the Constitution on its face “odious.” But the unquestionable fact that these words might mean something else makes it impossible for them to mean “slave” or “slavery,” unless in this behalf we set aside the most commanding rules of interpretation. It is clear that the authors of this clause attempted an impossibility. They wished to secure Slavery without plainly saying so; but such is Slavery that it cannot be secured without plainly saying so. Naturally and inevitably they failed, as if they had attempted to describe black by words which might mean white, or to authorize crime by words which naturally mean something that is not crime. The thing could not be done. The attempt to square the circle is not more absurd.

The clause begins with the descriptive words, “No person held to service or labor in one State under the laws thereof.” Now a slave is not a “person,” with the rights of persons, but a chattel or thing. Such is the received definition of the Slave States, handed down from Aristotle. He is not “held to service or labor,” but he is held as property. The terms employed describe an apprentice, but not a slave. And he must be held “under the laws” of a State. Here again is the case of an apprentice, who is clearly held “under the laws” of a State. But we have the authority of Mr. Mason, recently of the Senate from Virginia, for saying that no proof can be produced that Slavery in any State “is established by existing laws.”[325] The person thus described shall not “be discharged from such service or labor.” Clearly an apprentice is discharged, but a slave is manumitted or emancipated. This undischarged person “shall be delivered up on claim of the party to whom such service or labor may be due.” But all these words imply contract, or at least debt, as in the case of an apprentice. The slave can owe no “service or labor” to his master. There is nothing in their relations out of which any such obligation can spring. The whole condition stands on force and nothing else. It is robbery tempered by the lash,—not merely robbery of all the fruits of industry, but robbery of wife and child. To such terrible assumption the language of contract or debt is totally inapplicable. Nothing can be “due” from slave to master, unless it be that “resistance to tyrants” which is “obedience to God.” It is absurd to say that “labor or service,” in any sense, whether of justice or of law, can be “due” from the slave. The same power which takes wife and child may exact this further sacrifice, but not because it is “due.”

Such is the simple truth touching this much debated clause. At the touchstone of unquestioned rules of interpretation its odious character disappears, and astonishment prevails that the public mind for so long a period could have been perverted with regard to its true meaning. Nobody can doubt that this clause may be interpreted in favor of Freedom, so as to exclude all idea of property in man. But if it may, then such is the voice of Freedom that it must.

APPLICABLE TO INDENTED SERVANTS.

Here it is important to consider, that, besides apprentices, there was a class of “indented servants” embraced by this clause. From Bancroft we learn that this species of servitude, under indentures or covenants, had from the first existed in Virginia. According to the historian, “the servant stood to his master in the relation of a debtor,” which, be it observed, is not the condition of a slave. From the same authority we learn that “the supply of white servants became a regular business,”—that, “like negroes, they were to be purchased on shipboard, as men buy horses at a fair,”—that “in 1672 the average price in the Colonies, where five years of service were due, was about ten pounds, while a negro was worth twenty or twenty-five pounds.”[326] The Scots captured on the field of Dunbar, royalist prisoners of the Battle of Worcester, and companions of Monmouth in his ill-starred insurrection were sent to the Colonies as a merchantable commodity, and there held in slavery for life or for years.

The other historian of our country, Hildreth, contributes to our knowledge of this class of servants. According to him, the importation of indented white persons, called “servants,” or sometimes “redemptioners,” in contradistinction to negroes, known as slaves, was extensively carried on as late as 1750, especially in the Middle States; and he mentions, that the Colonial enactments for keeping them in order, and especially for preventing their escape, were often very harsh and severe. They were put, for the most part, on a level with slaves, but their case in other respects was different. Except in very young persons, the term of service seldom or never exceeded seven years, and in all cases it was limited by law.[327] Even during the Revolution these indented servants appear on the stage. Many were enlisted in the army, and, yielding to the earnest request of Washington, Congress relinquished a plan already adopted of stopping a portion of their pay for the benefit of their masters.[328]

An English Colonial official, Eddis, in a letter from America, dated September 20, 1770, describes four different denominations of persons “in a state of servitude”: first, the “negroes,” who are the entire property of their respective owners; secondly, “convicts,” transported from the mother country for a limited term; “indented servants,” engaged for five years previous to leaving England; and “free-willers,” supposed from their situation to possess superior advantages. These he proceeds to describe. Of the last class he says, they are received under express condition, that, on arrival in America, they are to be allowed a number of days to dispose of themselves most to their advantage, but, in fact, they are rarely permitted to set foot on shore until they have bound themselves.[329]

If, happily, at the formation of the Constitution, these servants had diminished in number, or had ceased to exist as a class, the condition was not unknown. They were persons “held to service or labor,” and the provision of the Constitution was strictly applicable to them.

Rejecting the odious application involving the support of Slavery, we follow received rules and the undoubted genius of the Common Law. How anxiously judges seek to evade an obnoxious penal statute is illustrated by a curious case mentioned by Lord Campbell. It was proved that the defendant, being in a stubble-field with a pointer, fired his gun at a covey of partridges, and shot two, when the judge, disliking to enforce the Game Laws, objected that there was no evidence that the gun was loaded with shot, and advised the jury to conclude that the birds fell dead from fright.[330] But a clause for the rendition of fugitive slaves is entitled to as little respect as the Game Laws, and, when the words employed are applicable to others than slaves, they should not be applied to slaves.

NO LAPSE OF TIME CAN DEFEAT AN INTERPRETATION IN FAVOR OF LIBERTY.

Against this interpretation, so overpowering in reason and authority, it is no objection that thus far Slavery has prevailed. There is no statute of limitation and no prescription against the undying claims of Liberty. Rejected or neglected in one generation, they revive in another; nor can they be impaired by any desuetude. This objection was impotent to prevent Lord Mansfield from declaring that Slavery could not exist in England, although practically, under a false interpretation of the British Constitution, sustained by the professional opinions of Talbot and Yorke, and by the judgment of the latter on the bench, under the name of Lord Hardwicke, African slaves were sold in the streets of London, and advertised for sale in English papers, for a period full as long as that which has witnessed the false interpretation of our Constitution. As length of time did not prevail against a true interpretation of the British Constitution in the case of Somerset, it ought not to prevail against a true interpretation of our Constitution now.

There is no chemistry in time to transmute wrong into right. Therefore the whole question on the Constitution is still open, as on the day of its adoption. The cases of misinterpretation are of no value,—at least they cannot settle the question against Liberty. Such was the noble declaration of Charles James Fox in the British Parliament, when, in words strictly pertinent now, he said: “Wherever any usage appeared subversive of the Constitution, if it had lasted for one or for two hundred years, it was not a precedent, but an usurpation.”[331] And such is the character of every instance in which our Constitution has been perverted to sanction Slavery.

PERVERSIONS WITH REGARD TO ORIGIN OF THE FUGITIVE CLAUSE.

A slight examination will show prevailing perversions with regard to the origin and history of this clause. Not content with imparting to it a meaning which it cannot bear, the partisans of Slavery have given to this clause an origin and history having no foundation in truth.

It is common to assert that the clause was intended to remove or counteract some difficulty which had occurred anterior to the Convention. But there is no evidence of any such difficulty. There was no complaint. Not a single voice was raised in advance to ask any such security.

It is also asserted, with peculiar confidence, that this clause, interpreted to require the rendition of fugitive slaves, constituted one of the original compromises of the Constitution, without which the Union could not have been formed. This pretension makes an asserted stipulation for the rendition of fugitive slaves one of the corner-stones of the Union. To this discreditable imputation upon the fathers of the Republic the Supreme Court seems to have lent sanction, when it declared, in the famous Prigg case, not only that “the object of this clause was to secure to the citizens of the slaveholding States the complete right and title of ownership in their slaves as property in every State in the Union into which they might escape,” but that “the full recognition of this right and title … was so vital to the preservation of their domestic interests and institutions, that it cannot be doubted that it constituted a fundamental article, without the adoption of which the Union could not have been formed.”[332] Mark the way in which this extraordinary statement is ushered in,—“It cannot be doubted”! But it is doubted, and more too. Chief Justice Taney, at a later day, put forth the statement, that, during the Revolution, it was an accepted truth that colored men “had no rights which the white man was bound to respect,”[333]—and this statement was said to stand on authentic history; but it is now exploded, and the other statement must share the same fate. A careful inquiry shows that it is utterly without support in the records of the Convention, where the real compromises are revealed; nor is there a single contemporary pamphlet, speech, article, or published letter, out of which any such thing can be inferred. Surely, had this provision been of such controlling importance, it could not have escaped notice, at least, in the “Federalist,” when its writers undertook to describe and group the powers of Congress “which provide for the harmony and proper intercourse among the States”;[334] but the “Federalist” is entirely silent with regard to it. And yet we are gravely told “it cannot be doubted” that this provision “constituted a fundamental article, without the adoption of which the Union could not have been formed.” Frequent repetition has caused the common belief that this was history, instead of fable.

The actual compromises of the Constitution are well known. They were three in number. One established the equality of all the States in the Union, by securing equal representation in the Senate for the small States and large States. Another allowed representatives to the Slave States according to the whole number of free persons and “three fifths of all other persons,” in consideration that direct taxes should be apportioned in the same way. Another was the toleration of the slave-trade for twenty years, in consideration of commercial concessions to the “Eastern members.” Such are the actual compromises of the Constitution, with regard to which there is evidence. But imagination or falsehood is the only authority for adding the rendition of fugitive slaves to this list.

TRUE ORIGIN OF THE FUGITIVE CLAUSE.

The debates of the Convention attest the little contemporary interest in this clause. In all the general propositions or plans successively brought forward, from the meeting on the 25th of May, 1787, there was no allusion to fugitive slaves; nor was there any allusion to them, even in debate, till as late as the 28th of August, when, as the Convention was drawing to a close, they were incidentally mentioned in a discussion on another subject. The question was on the article providing for the privileges of citizens in different States. Here is the authentic report by Mr. Madison of what was said.