“The habits of a people are in a great degree the result of the laws under which they live; the high charges of our Post-Office have induced, amongst all but the richer classes, a habit of abstaining from epistolary communication, and it might take some time to correct that habit. But it appears to me very desirable that the impediment should be removed; and I have no doubt, that, in the course of a short time, as the poorer classes have the common affections of the human breast, they would form a taste for the pleasures to be derived from intercourse with absent friends and relations. It would be very desirable, for the moral interests of the community, that every facility should be afforded for that purpose.”[104]
On the “oppression of a tax,” where persons do not use the article taxed, the intelligent witness testified as follows:—
“They may not know the loss they sustain; but that does not alter the fact that they do sustain a very great loss; and it would be highly criminal and cruel voluntarily to inflict such a loss upon a person merely upon the ground that he does not know it. A child that is born blind does not know the advantages of sight; but still it would be a very extraordinary thing to inflict blindness upon a child, merely upon the ground, that, if you do it, in time he will not know the loss he has sustained.”[105]
All this is plain and unanswerable. The oppressiveness of a tax is not to be measured by the insensibility of the people on whose shoulders it is laid. It is a curiosity of despotism that the people are too often unconscious of their slavery, as they are unconscious also of bad laws. A wise and just Government measures its duties not by what the people bear without a murmur, but by what is most for their welfare; and it is to this criterion that I bring the question of cheap postage. Say not that the people are indifferent and do not ask for this reduction. Is it not for their good? Is not the advantage so eminent and unequivocal that the Government can no longer hesitate, especially at this transitional moment, when our country is passing from the Old to the New, and the people more than ever are assured in their rights?
After this exhibition of existing burdens, so prejudicial to the correspondence of the country, I return again to the main postulate of this argument, that a uniform rate of one cent for a letter of half an ounce is entirely reasonable, and in a short time, with proper relief in other directions, would render the Post-Office self-supporting. Here I introduce the testimony of a gentleman practically conversant with the operations of our Post-Office, who writes to me as follows:—
“Taking the weight of the letter mail-matter and the printed mail-matter, and charging the expense of transportation upon each proportioned to the weight, and one cent is all that would be relatively chargeable upon each half-ounce of letter mail. I speak from close daily observation in a large office, in a region that is a large revenue-paying one to the Department on all mail-matter.”
This testimony of an expert is only in harmony with my own conclusion.
This injustice becomes more apparent, when we consider the disproportion between the cost of other transportation and letter postage. Take, for instance, the fare of a passenger on a railway in comparison with that of a letter. The average weight of passengers with their baggage is supposed to be 230 pounds, which is the weight of 7,360 half-ounce letters, paying, at the present rate of three cents, $220.80, irrespective of distance. The following table, prepared some time ago, shows the cost of other transportation:—
| From Boston— | Passenger fare. | Mills per half oz. | Express freight. 230lbs. | Mills per half oz. |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| To New York | $4 | .5 | $1.50 | .2 |
| ” Philadelphia | 7 | .9 | 3.50 | .5 |
| ” Baltimore | 10 | 1.3 | 5.50 | .7 |
| ” Cincinnati | 25 | 3.4 | 10.50 | 1.4 |
| ” St. Louis | 35 | 4.7 | 12.00 | 1.6 |
| ” New Orleans | 45 | 6.1 | 14.00 | 1.9 |
| ” Liverpool per Cunard steamers | 120 | 16.3 | 7.20 | .9 |
In other transportation there is a slight increase in proportion to the distance; but it is difficult to see on what principle a mail-bag between Washington and New York should pay more than a passenger; and the same difficulty occurs when we consider ocean postage, where the disproportion between postage and other transportation is, perhaps, more conspicuous. Elihu Burritt, who has enforced the importance of cheap rates on the ocean with admirable comprehension of their importance, has reminded us that the freight of a barrel of flour, weighing two hundred pounds, is about fifty cents, while the charge for the same weight in half-ounce letters, being sixty-four hundred in number, at the rate of twenty-four cents a letter, would be no less than $1,536, and at the rate of one cent would be sixty-four dollars. These instances show that letters have been always overcharged, or charged out of proportion to their weight.
To my mind it is unjust that the letter everywhere should contribute so largely to the transportation and delivery of other mail matter, while in some parts of the country it contributes besides to postal facilities elsewhere. I think I do not err, when I aver, that, even with the latter burden, the Post-Office, if it carried nothing but letters, and every letter paid one cent, would be self-supporting. I put the case in this way so as to exhibit the essential equity of the proposed reduction, and, I would add, its entire practicability. Although the Post-Office cannot be relieved of the other mail-matter, yet the letters can be relieved of the burdensome contribution to which they are now subjected. One cent postage would give new operation to the law according to which reduction of price tends to produce consumption, and there would be a new impulsion to correspondence, by which in a short time it would be doubled, tripled, quadrupled, quintupled, and sextupled,—nay, in our growing country it would be multiplied beyond calculation.
As to this increase, I have already shown something of its progress in Great Britain, beginning with one hundred and twenty-two per cent. the first year of penny postage.[106] Why may not the same take place with us? According to the official table now on our desks, the smaller population of the United Kingdom sends more letters than ours. It would be difficult to credit this result, if the figures did not tell the tale beyond correction. Here is the table:[107]—
| Proportion of Letters and Revenue to Population | United States, year ending June 30, 1868. | United Kingdom, year ending Dec. 31, 1867. |
|---|---|---|
| Population (estimated) | 40,092,356 | 30,305,284 |
| Number of letters delivered (estimated) | 488,000,000 | 774,831,000 |
| Number of letters to each person | 12 | 26 |
| Gross revenue | $16,232,148.16 | $23,341,070 |
| Amount of revenue to each person of aggregate population | 40 cents | 77 cents |
Testimony could not be stronger. The smaller population sends a larger sum-total of letters, making of course a larger number for each person, and yielding a larger gross revenue. It is humiliating to think that the people of this Monarchy send at the rate of twenty-six letters for each person, while the citizens of our Republic send only at the rate of twelve for each person. The inverse disproportion of letters becomes the more remarkable, when it is understood that the proportion of people who can read and write is greater among us than in the United Kingdom, so that, all other things being equal, the number of letters by each person should be greater among us; but we are obliged to confront the unquestionable fact that the number is less. How is this? Why is this? I know no way of accounting for it except in the discouraging cost of correspondence. Here I find unquestionable reason to conclude that we have not a proper rate of postage. Clearly something is wanting. It is not education; for the people among us excel the British people in this respect. It is not business, or family, or friendship; for are not all these active with us? I submit that we want nothing but cheap postage, so that the people, finding their means in harmony with the rates, shall be tempted to write letters. So it was in England; and so it may be among us.
Against the entire reasonableness of the proposed rate, it will not do to say that in the wages of English labor a penny is the equivalent of three cents among us. Even if it be so, there is a twofold answer to the allegation: first, that convenience and reason concur in favor of the lowest unit of coin, which with us is the cent, as in England it is the penny; and, secondly, that with us the general scale of salary and expenditure is less than in England, beginning with the President as compared with the Queen, and embracing the functionaries of Government in the two countries. The penny, which is a larger unit than the cent, typifies the larger scale of price; so that our postage will be brought to practical equality with that of England only by the adoption of the corresponding unit of our country. If this seems refined or technical, let me add that I adduce it only in answer to an objection, which forgets not only the beauty of that simplicity found in the lowest unit of coin, but also that fundamental difference between England and the United States found in their respective institutions.
Here I am reminded of the possible loss of revenue, and this is set up as an insuperable barrier; but I confess, that, when I regard the infinite good from this reform, I am little concerned by any such prospect. Better any possible loss of revenue than the postponement of such a good. Nobody can say positively what the loss will be. It is only an estimate, or, if you please, a guess. Some may make it high, others low. According to the last Reports of the Postmaster-General, the actual deficiency, with the rate of three cents, was $5,353,620, and the estimated deficiency for 1870 is $7,440,413; but in both cases the expenditures are swollen by illegitimate and extrinsic charges on the Post-Office properly belonging to the Treasury. For 1871, with the rate at three cents, the estimated expenditures, swollen by the illegitimate and extrinsic charges, are $25,581,093, with receipts, $20,178,961, leaving a deficiency of $5,402,132.[108]
Making the estimate for 1871 with the rate of one cent, and assuming an increase in correspondence at only one hundred per cent., there would be a deficiency of $12,128,452, from which should be deducted the illegitimate and extrinsic charges properly belonging to the Treasury. Considering these for one moment, you will see how small the deficiency will be; and here I follow the last Report of the Postmaster-General, who does not hesitate to estimate the proportion of free matter in the mails at twenty-five per cent. of the whole, so that, according to him, “it will appear that the Government is bound in honor and justice to appropriate $5,000,000, instead of $700,000 [the present appropriation], for this service.”[109] But with the abolition of the franking system all this postal matter will pay the ordinary rate, and thus contribute to the postal service. Deduct also another sum for the expenditures of outlying routes, justly chargeable upon the Treasury, like the existing franking system.
Such is the whole case as to any possible loss of revenue, which I state with entire frankness; but I cannot doubt that a short period would witness a change, while the people entered into the enjoyment of their great possession. Letters would daily multiply, and the revenue would bear witness to the increase.
Only in obedience to traditional usage have I dwelt thus long on the financial aspect of this question, which to my mind is the least important of all. Not to make money, but to promote the welfare of the people, and to increase the happiness of all,—such is the precious object I would propose; and here I ask no such question as, “Will it pay?” It may not pay in revenue at once, but it will pay in what is above price. Unhappily, the Post-Office, whether at home or abroad, has been from the beginning little more than a taxing machine, a contrivance to raise money, or a “milch cow” with fruitful dugs. In England it was at times farmed out to a speculator, and then again it was charged with the support of a royal mistress or favorite. For its profits only was it regarded, and not for its agency in the concerns of life. In this respect it was not unlike the Government, which was simply a usurpation for the benefit of the few. All this is now changed, at least among us, and Government is the creation of the people for their good. The Post-Office should share this transformation. Instead of a mere taxing machine, or contrivance to raise money, or “milch cow” with fruitful dugs, it should be an omnipresent beneficent minister, reaching its multitudinous hands with help and comfort into all the homes of our wide-spread land. Such it is already in England, to the infinite joy of all. But the omnipresent beneficent minister belongs to a republic more than to a monarchy. Cheap postage is a republican institution. If England has anticipated us, we may at least profit by her example.
It is because Senators see the Post-Office only in its least elevated, not to say its most vulgar character, that there is any hesitation. Contemplate for one moment, if you please, its great and beautiful office. It is the universal messenger of a people, bearing tidings of all kinds, whether of business, hope, affection, charity, joy, or sorrow, and articulating them throughout the land. There is nothing that man can do, desire, or feel, which is not contained in the various and abounding errand. The letters of a single day are the epitome of life, and this service is unceasing. Every day this messenger flies over the land, from city to city, from town to town, from village to village, from house to house, leaving everywhere the welcome token. Such a messenger is more than a winged Mercury, with sandalled feet and purse in hand, whose special care was commerce; it is an angel in reality, as in name. In the ancient Greek, from which the word is derived, an angel was a messenger; and is not the office of our messenger angelic? But by what rule or reason can you tax such a messenger in his great and beautiful office?
A letter is simply conversation in writing, and therefore, by strictness of logic, the tax you impose is a tax on conversation. Reflect a moment on the part performed by conversation in the education of men and in the economies of life; and here I give you testimony. Once at Mr. Webster’s table I heard the question discussed, “From what do men derive most of what they know?” The scholars about him answered,—one naming “Our Mothers,” another “Schools,” another “Books,” another “Newspapers,” when the host, who had listened to each, remarked, very gravely, “You forget Conversation, from which, in my judgment, we derive the larger part of what we know.” Who shall say that Mr. Webster was not right? It is clear that conversation is a wonderful educator and a constant servant. But conversation in writing, no matter on what subject, whether of business or of the heart, is now subject to an unrelenting tax, so that persons conversing by letter must not only pay the cost of the intermediary in their own case, but must contribute to the expense of other conversations elsewhere.
Custom makes us insensible to folly, and even to injustice. Thus the tax on letters has gained an undeserved immunity, which is augmented by a prevailing notion, sometimes supposed to find authority even in the Constitution, that the Post-Office must support itself. Whether regarded as rule or maxim or provision of the Constitution, it is without foundation, and sooner or later will be classed with those “vulgar errors” which are as disturbing in government as in science. There is nothing in the Constitution or in reason to distinguish the Post-Office in this respect from the Army, the Navy, or the Judiciary. The Constitution confers upon Congress the power “to establish post-offices and post-roads,” precisely as it confers upon Congress the power “to raise and support armies,” the power “to provide and maintain a navy,” and the power “to constitute tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court”; and in each of these cases it is empowered “to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers.” Nobody suggests that now in peace our armies shall amplify their commissariat by enforced contributions, that our navy shall redouble its economies by supplementary piracy, or that our tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court shall eke out a salary by requisitions on the suitors, to the end that each of these departments may be in some measure “self-supporting.” Why, then, should the Post-Office be subjected to a different rule? Not, surely, because it is less beneficent; not because it is the youngest child of Government, a very Benjamin, coming into being long after the others. But such is the case. The rule for the others is discarded when we come to the Post-Office, and here for the first time we hear that a Department of Government must be “self-supporting.”
As there is no ground in the Constitution for this pretension, so is there none in reason. Of all existing departments, the Post-Office is most entitled to consideration, for it is most universal in its beneficence. That public welfare which is the declared object of all the departments appears here in its most attractive form. There is nothing which is not helped by the Post-Office. Is business in question? The Post-Office is at hand with invaluable aid, quickening and multiplying all its activities. Is it charity? The Post-Office is the good Samaritan, omnipresent on all the highways of the land. Is it the precious intercourse of family or friends? The Post-Office is carrier, interpreter, and handmaid. Is it education? The Post-Office is schoolmaster, with school for all and with scholars counted by the million. Is it the service of Government? The Post-Office lends itself so completely to this essential work, that the national will is conveyed without noise or effort to the most remote corners, and the Republic becomes one and indivisible. Without the Post-Office where would be that national unity, with irresistible guaranty of Equal Rights to All, which is now the glory of the Republic? Impossible! absolutely impossible! Therefore, in the name of all these, do I insist that now, in these days of equality, the Post-Office shall be admitted to equality with all other departments of Government, so that it may discharge its own peculiar and many-sided duties, without being compelled to find in itself the means of support. It has enough to do without taking thought of the morrow. On every side and in every direction it is the beneficent helper. To the Army it is a staff; to the Navy it is a tender; to the Treasury it is a support; to the Judiciary it is a police; to President and Congress it is an adjunct; and to all else, public or private, whatever the interest, aspiration, or sentiment, it is an incomparable ally. Better than two blades of grass are two letters where was only one before; and when the precious product is measured by millions, you see the vastness of the beneficence.
Such is the Post-Office; and nothing is clearer than that here in the United States it should be of the highest type. Ours should be the best in the world,—not second to any. So long as Slave-Masters bore sway, this could not be; for they set their faces against this minister of Civilization. One of the first legislative acts of the Rebel Government at Montgomery was to raise the rates.[110] But this hostile obstruction is now overcome, and we are at last free to act for the good of all. It is for the welfare of the people that our Republic is founded, and therefore it should omit nothing by which their condition is improved and elevated. Other Governments may seek to augment the revenue. Our aim should be to augment the sum of human happiness, making it the crown of our whole people; and just in proportion as we fail in this duty is the Republic a failure. But the best Post-Office is where letters at the smallest charge are faithfully carried to every door, thus combining cheapness and efficiency. That ours may fulfil this condition there must be a change.
Our duty is simple. It is to relieve the Post-Office of present burdens, including especially the franking system and the expense of unproductive routes, while at the same time we establish a uniform rate of one cent. To these cardinal objects may be added others named in the bill introduced by me, especially the requirement of payment always by stamps, so as to simplify the accounts and to make peculation impossible; but the fundamental change is in the rate of postage.
Could my desires prevail, the Post-Office should be like the Common School, open to all, with this only condition, that the rate should be sufficient to guard against abuse. But this is accomplished by that now proposed.
Let the uniform rate be one cent and you will witness a transformation. The power to frank, which is now confined to a few, will practically belong to all, and letters will be multiplied in proportion,—opening to the people an inexhaustible source of all good influences, whether of education, wealth, virtue, or happiness, while the Republic rises in the scale of civilization. Such a rate will be better than a mine of gold in every State,—better than a band of iron for the Union,—better than a fortress scowling on uncounted hilltops; for it will be an angelic power.
And could this rate be extended to international postage, its least service would be to our commercial relations. Beyond this would be an inconceivable influence on that immigration to our country which is a constant fountain of life, while it carried into the homes of the Old World the most seductive invitations to take part with us in our great destinies. Republican ideas would be diffused, and the Rights of Man gain new authority. Every letter from glowing firesides among us, when read at colder firesides abroad, would be a perpetual proclamation of the Republic.
More than ever this change is needed now. It is essential in the work of Reconstruction, which can be maintained only through the national unity. The very extent of our country, which is superficially urged as the apology for a high rate, is to my mind an all-sufficient reason for the proposed reform. Because our country is broad and spacious, therefore must distant parts be brought into communication and woven together by daily recurring ties. Because our people are various in origin and language, therefore must they be enabled to commingle and become homogeneous. And, lastly, because fellow-citizens have suffered and been separated by terrible war, therefore must the Post-Office become a good angel to quicken industry, to remove ignorance, to soothe prejudice, and to promote harmony. Blessed are the peace-makers; and in this company the Post-Office, properly reformed, will take an illustrious place.
Report in the Senate, of the Committee on Foreign Relations, June 24, 1870.
The Committee on Foreign Relations, to whom was referred the message of the President of March 10, 1870, covering a report of the Secretary of State and correspondence concerning the Chinese Indemnity Fund, also certain petitions on the same subject, have had the same under consideration, and beg leave to report.
The origin and history of the Chinese Indemnity Fund are found in authentic documents, so that little need be done except to state the case from these authorities.
The British and French expeditions of 1858, which, after capturing Canton, turned their combined forces toward Peking, and ascended the Pei-ho as far as Tien-tsin, opened the way to the presentation of claims of our citizens, which were promptly recognized by the Chinese Government. Though taking no part in the war, our people profited by the result. The convention that ensued was born of the war.
Claims were brought forward amounting to more than one and a quarter million of dollars; but Mr. Reed, our Minister in China, concluded, after examination, that 600,000 taels, or about $840,000, was a proper estimate for all rightfully due. Accordingly he entered into an arrangement with the Chinese plenipotentiaries for their prospective liquidation. At first there was nothing but an agreement in correspondence, being a sort of executory contract, which was unsatisfactory in form, incomplete in stipulations, and embarrassed by the condition that in the adjudication of the claims a Chinese officer should take part. All this involved delay, at least, if not more. At last this agreement was embodied in the terms of a convention between the two governments, dispensing with Chinese coöperation, and the amount of damages was reduced to 500,000 taels, to be paid from the maritime revenues of Shanghai, Foo-chow, and Canton, in complete discharge of all demands.[111]
The original agreement was at Tien-tsin, where the Chinese met the British, French, and Russian negotiators; but the convention was finally executed at Shanghai, November 8, 1858. The statement already made appears in the terms of the convention. After setting forth that certain maritime revenues were pledged for the payment of American claims, “to an amount not exceeding 600,000 taels,” the convention proceeds to declare, “And the plenipotentiary of the United States, actuated by a friendly feeling towards China, is willing, on behalf of the United States, to reduce the amount needed for such claims to an aggregate of 500,000 taels”; and then it is agreed “that this amount shall be in full liquidation of all claims of American citizens at the various ports to this date.”[112]
Mr. Reed, in communicating this treaty to the Department of State, says, under date of November 10, 1858:—
“Nor has there been any great difficulty in effecting it, the Chinese plenipotentiaries showing no disposition to evade the agreement they had entered into at Tien-tsin, and being quite willing to arrange the details on reasonable grounds.”[113]
The Minister then proceeds to say, that his first duty—“not the less binding because to the Chinese”—was to revise the claims themselves, and ascertain whether, after giving credit for such as had in the mean time been settled and paid, and applying some clear principle of law, the aggregate could not be reduced; and he adds, that “the amount assumed at Tien-tsin was an arbitrary one.” In order to arrive at a more precise result, he called upon the claimants for a revised statement of their demands. In many instances the requisition was complied with; in others it was made the occasion for “all sorts of speculative and contingent claims,—such, for example, as a vice-consul asking to be remunerated for fees that he might have made, and the captain of a steamer claiming the profits of a year to come.” Notwithstanding these instances the claims were revised in a proper spirit, and were sensibly reduced by the claimants themselves. Still there were many of a contingent character. On a careful review of all the evidence before him, the Minister was satisfied that he could materially reduce the amount to be demanded, which was accordingly done. In the draught of the convention first submitted to the Commissioners at Shanghai, the amount stated was 525,000 taels, with a provision, that, in case of excess beyond the claims and interest, it should be refunded to the Chinese Government; on which the Minister remarks: “They preferred, however, the small sum without such provision, evidently thinking it was their best policy to get rid of the matter forever.”[114] The language of the Commissioners was:—
“We acknowledge the consideration and kindness of your Excellency in this matter, in that you have, of your own accord, reduced the first amount of claims, and now place the total at 525,000 taels. We have taken the matter into full consultation, and propose, that, if a further reduction of 25,000 taels be made, fixing the total amount at 500,000 taels, then custom-house certificates can be issued at Canton, Shanghai, and Foo-chow, dating from the first day of our next year, (February 3, 1859,) which can be successively applied to the gradual payment of the entire sum.”[115]
These terms were embodied in the final convention between the parties.
After this exposition, the Minister declares that the convention, if ratified by our Government, and carried into execution by the Chinese, as he did not doubt it would be, would liquidate every claim on China by citizens of the United States, principal and Chinese interest at twelve per cent. per annum, on most of the claims for three years, and for a longer period on others, among which was one as ancient as 1847, which had occupied the attention and excited the sympathies of many of his predecessors.
The Minister appends a tabular statement of claims, with a list of what he calls “Claims Suspended,” among which is one known as “The Caldera,” to which reference will be made hereafter. He then says:—
“A sufficient sum can be reserved to cover these claims, all of which are more or less doubtful.”
And adds:—
“If they be recognized, and the principle of paying interest be adopted throughout, the fund will be exhausted. If they be disallowed, though interest be paid to all the other claimants, there will be a surplus at the disposition of the Government.”[116]
Thus early was there anticipation of a surplus.
At the same time the Minister suggested that Congress should provide for the adjudication of the claims and a dividend among claimants. This was done by the Act of March 3, 1859, entitled “An Act to carry into effect the Convention between the United States and China, concluded on the 8th of November, 1858, at Shanghai,”[117] authorizing the appointment of commissioners “to receive and examine all claims which may be presented to them under the said convention, according to the provisions of the same, the principles of justice and International Law,”—and further providing “that the said commissioners shall report to the chief diplomatic officer in China the several awards made by them, to be approved by him,” which are to be paid out of the revenues set apart for this purpose, in ratable proportion, “according to the direction of the said diplomatic officer.”
The examination of the claims was completed in January, 1860, and the payments directed by the Commissioners were duly made. Then occurred a condition of things almost without precedent in the relations of nations. After all the payments directed by the Commissioners, a large surplus was found in the custody of the legation at Peking, which was subsequently transferred to the United States. This surplus, with accumulations of interest and gain by exchange, less an amount paid under authority of an Act of Congress approved February 22, 1869,[118] has been invested in Ten-Forty bonds, which are now held by the State Department, amounting at par to $386,000. Another amount of $206.87 in cash is also in the possession of the Department; and about $2,000 remain in the custody of the Minister to China, who has been directed to make remittance of the same.[119]
The Secretary of State, in his Report on this subject, as late as March 10, 1870, says that he “is not aware of any claims against this fund which have not been considered by the Commissioners and determined by them.”[120]
This surplus has been the subject of discussion for more than a decade of years. During all this time it has been before Congress without any definitive action. As long ago as December, 1860, it was thus noticed by President Buchanan in his Annual Message:—
“After the awards shall have been satisfied, there will remain a surplus of more than $200,000 at the disposition of Congress. As this will in equity belong to the Chinese Government, would not justice require its appropriation to some benevolent object in which the Chinese may be specially interested?”[121]
Nothing was done by Congress, and President Lincoln, in his Annual Message of December, 1861, thus followed in the footsteps of his predecessor:—
“I repeat the recommendation of my predecessor, in his Annual Message to Congress in December last, in regard to the disposition of the surplus which will probably remain after satisfying the claims of American citizens against China, pursuant to the awards of the Commissioners under the Act of the 3d of March, 1859. If, however, it should not be deemed advisable to carry that recommendation into effect, I would suggest that authority be given for investing the principal, over the proceeds of the surplus referred to, in good securities, with a view to the satisfaction of such other just claims of our citizens against China as are not unlikely to arise hereafter in the course of our extensive trade with that empire.”[122]
The subject was at this time considered by the Committee on Foreign Relations, aided by the Secretary of State, who laid before the Committee all the original papers relating to the proceedings of the Commissioners. In a communication to the Committee,[123] Mr. Seward stated the case as he understood it, recognizing “the refunding of the whole amount to the Chinese” as one of the methods which “suggest themselves.” This was in the summer of 1862, at the most critical period of the war for the suppression of the Rebellion, and the Committee did not feel disposed at that time to make any recommendation with regard to the fund.
Meanwhile the disposition of this fund was discussed elsewhere. Our distinguished representative in China, Mr. Burlingame, entered upon it with characteristic ardor. Regarding the fund as essentially Chinese in character, if not belonging in equity to China, he urged that it should be devoted to the foundation of an institution of learning at Peking, which he proposed to call The American College, or Ta-Mei Kwoh Hioh-kung: first, to teach Americans the language and literature of China, so as to fit them to be interpreters and consuls; and, secondly, to educate Chinese in English studies and in their own literature, with a view to employment by their own rulers or by the United States. The usefulness and practicability of such a college were developed in two elaborate dispatches,—one bearing date Shanghai, May 19, 1862,[124] and the other, Peking, November 18, 1863,[125] in the course of which Mr. Burlingame said that he was “disposed to urge the adoption of this proposal more with a reference to the benefit such a college would be to the Chinese than to ourselves.”[126] Not content with thus declaring his desire to make this fund of benefit to them, he says, “In equity the balance appears to belong to the Chinese, but they have no voice in its disposal.”[127] His eloquent appeal has thus far been without effect. Nothing has been done to carry out his recommendation, and the question still remains, What to do with the fund?
It is sometimes proposed that this fund should be reserved for the satisfaction of possible claims hereafter. But this would be contrary to the terms of the convention, which expressly provides for the “claims of American citizens at the various ports to this date,”—thus positively limiting the disposition of the fund. Mr. Burlingame, without referring to the terms of the convention, objected to any such reservation as calculated to produce embarrassment in our relations with China. According to him, “it would be preferable to return the whole to them, or distribute the money, as it accrues, to the disappointed claimants, and those Chinese in the employ of our citizens who suffered severe losses in consequence of their connection with them, than to lay it aside for future contingencies to settle with a government like the Chinese.”[128] His authority on this proposition may be considered decisive.
But there is another consideration which leads to the same conclusion. Any retention of the fund to meet possible future claims is a plain recognition of the interest, if not the proprietorship of China; and since there is no authority under the convention for its application to possible future claims, it will be at least questionable whether the Chinese Government should not have a voice in the adjudication of such claims. At all events, we shall assume a peculiar responsibility, if we undertake to apply this fund to claims not contemplated by the convention. Nor is there any reason of expediency which can justify such an assumption on our part. China has evinced no disposition to be otherwise than just to American citizens. Although twelve years have elapsed since the date of the convention, there are no outstanding claims against China which have received the sympathy of our Government. Should any such claims arise, it were far better that they should be presented directly, and be satisfied by an award in their favor. Meanwhile the old account should be closed.
A remark of Mr. Burlingame, already quoted, requires one word of comment. He mentions, as a possible course, the distribution of the fund among “disappointed claimants, and those Chinese in the employ of our citizens who suffered severe losses in consequence of their connection with them.” Of the Chinese mentioned the Committee know nothing. No claims in their behalf have been presented. But since the award of the Commissioners three different cases have occurred, coming under the head of “Disappointed Claimants.” The disposition of these is mentioned at the end of this Report.[129] It does not seem advisable that the fund should be kept to meet such applications. The awards of the Commissioners have been approved by our Minister in China, and the proceedings closed. If they were opened in the case of the Neva, it was because the claimants there had not been heard in China. It is not supposed that any other occasion can arise to open these proceedings. The fund in question cannot be regarded as a charity or largess for the gratification of “disappointed claimants,” nor would it be proper for the United States to play such a generous part at the expense of China.
Our country has no house for its legation at Peking or for its consulates in other places, nor does it possess any buildings in China which it might use as courthouse or jail; and latterly there has been a strong disposition to apply this fund in this direction. Mr. Seward seems to have inclined this way, as appears from his Report to Congress,[130] and Mr. Fish also, as appears from his Report to Congress.[131] But this disposition proceeds on the admission that the fund differs materially from other moneys of the United States,—that, if it does not belong to China, it bears the Chinese earmark so strongly that it cannot be treated as belonging to our national assets. In point of fact, all attempts to cover it into the Treasury have proved unsuccessful.
Petitions from opposite quarters with regard to the disposition of the fund attest a prevailing interest.
At a meeting of citizens in New York, March 11, 1870, a distinguished committee was appointed, with Isaac Ferris, Chancellor of the University, as chairman, with whom as associates were William E. Dodge, President of the Chamber of Commerce, Frederick S. Winston, E. D. Morgan, E. C. Benedict, A. A. Low, John C. Green, James H. Taft, Stewart Brown, and William P. Jones, many of them having large interests in China, who adopted resolutions on this subject to be forwarded to Congress. The first resolution declares,—