THE NATIONAL BANKS AND THE CURRENCY.

MR. PRESIDENT,—This question seems to me very simple. The country is now engaged in mortal struggle to establish itself as a nation. It has gone forth to meet Rebellion organized in the name of State Rights. In preparing ourselves for this unparalleled contest, we are compelled to look about in every direction to increase our army, to enlarge our navy, and to multiply our financial resources; but at every stage we are encountered by objections in the name of State Rights. No single proposition is brought forward, having for object the salvation of the Republic by infusing new energy and new vitality, which is not encountered in the name of State Rights. And now, Sir, while considering how to secure financial stability, we are doomed again to encounter the oft-repeated objection. The Rebellion began in State Rights, and all opposition to the measures conceived to crush it is in the name of State Rights. It is hard that we should be obliged to meet State Rights not only on the battle-field, but also in this Chamber.

The Senator from Vermont [Mr. Collamer] complained that it was proposed to sequester so large an amount of property from State taxation. The sum-total of property thus sequestered is $300,000,000[330]; but has the Senator considered how much is sequestered by other agencies to save this Republic? There is the army with all the material of war, there is the navy with all the material of the navy,—all sequestered. Who complains that this vast material, now counted far beyond $300,000,000, is sequestered from State taxation? Does any Senator, in the name of State Rights, claim that the enlarged navy of the Republic, as it floats into a Northern port, shall be brought within the sphere of local taxation, whether State or municipal? Does any Senator say that all the vast material of war, ammunition, cannon, and the like, deposited, for the time being, in any particular locality, shall fall within the sphere of State or municipal taxation? Or does any Senator insist that the public securities shall be left exposed to State taxation? No Senator makes any such complaint. But the complaint is reserved for the present occasion, when it is proposed to create a new agency for the currency of the country.

I know not how the exemption can be sanctioned in one case and not in the other. The reason applicable to one is applicable to the other. It is said that the army and navy are for war, and naturally share exemptions incident to war and its preparations. But it would be difficult to say, that, in this crisis, what you do for the finances is not essentially a war measure, entitled to all the consideration accorded to such measures in a moment of war. What are your army and navy without a Treasury? Milton, in one of his sublimest sonnets, has aptly pictured that statesmanship which was able

In these few words the very likeness is given. All who hear them will confess their truth.

Now, Sir, no Senator complains because we protect the nerve of iron; but the Senator from Vermont registers complaints because it is proposed to protect the much more delicate nerve of gold. What is worth doing is worth well doing; and if it be worth while to organize the finances of this Republic by the proposed banking system, it is worth while to do it well; and can you do it well, if, at the very moment of its organization, you leave its most sensitive part exposed to hostile influence?

The precedent for this exemption is complete. Already you exempt the public stocks and securities from local taxation. Pray, Sir, tell me what policy justifies such exemption which is not equally strong for the exemption of shares in the national banks. Clearly, it was to commend your national stocks that you established the exemption; and for the same reason I ask you now to establish this other exemption. It is strange that the vast sequestration of the national stocks from State taxation should have been made with so little doubt, when Senators question so pertinaciously this smaller sequestration. If it was proper in one case, it is in the other. If it was necessary in one case, it is in the other.

If you allow the State to interfere with the proposed system by taxation in any way, may they not embarrass it? Where shall they stop? Where will you run a line? Undoubtedly, according to the Supreme Court, they cannot tax the bank directly. This would be unconstitutional. But it is said that they may tax the shares. Now I raise no constitutional question. It may be that a tax on shares is constitutional. But I shall not consider it on this ground. I am now arguing against the policy of such tax. It is a question of expediency which I raise, for the sake of the system we are about to establish. But here the rule seems clear. Every consideration urged against taxing the bank directly may be urged against taxing the shares. If it be bad policy in one case, it must be in the other.

I suppose there is no judgment of our Supreme Court which has been more admired than that in the case of M’Culloch v. The State of Maryland.[332] It was pronounced by Chief Justice Marshall, and is as good a specimen of that “pure reason” which belonged to this magistrate as any that can be named. In the course of this elaborate judgment all the topics were considered which enter so peculiarly into this debate. It was there insisted that the tax was unconstitutional. But the words of the Chief Justice seem intended for the present occasion. His object, from beginning to end, was to keep the bank safe from the hostile acts of the States. It was a great effort to uphold a national institution against State Rights. It was, permit me to say, an answer in advance to the Senator from Vermont. I do not like to trouble the Senate, but there are passages so pertinent that I will read them. Here, for instance, the Chief Justice considers the ground of exemption.

Now, Sir, every consideration, every argument, which goes to sustain this great judgment, may be employed against the proposed concession to the States of the power to tax this national institution in any particular, whether directly or indirectly. The reason of the judgment is as strong against an indirect tax as against a direct tax.

The very measure under consideration seeks to create a new currency by a system of national banks which shall supersede the existing State banks as agents of currency. Of course the new system must begin in rivalry with the State banks, which in many cases will be hostile. This is no inconsiderable impediment. But this impediment will be increased, if the national banks be exposed to local taxation. It is an untried experiment upon which you are entering. On every account it should be made under the most favorable circumstances,—precisely as when we put stock in the market. The national banks should be commended in every possible way. But, instead, it is proposed to fasten upon them a liability, which, if it do not cause people to avoid them, will at least keep them in rivalry with the State banks, so that the new system cannot become truly effective. It seems to me that there is but one practical course. Naturally, all who are against the proposed system will favor any limitation or burden to impair its efficiency. But all who are for the system, and wish to see it doing all the good it can, will take care that it is not compelled to carry weight. The whole case may be briefly summed up. Would you place the national credit on a sure foundation? Are you for the national banks as a proper agency to this end? If these two objects interest you, then, I say, do not allow them to be sacrificed in subserviency to State Rights.

Mr. President,—At last, in this discussion, it is clear that we have come to the place where the road branches in two opposite directions: one toward the support of the whole country, and of that improved currency essential not only to the general welfare, but also to the common defence; and the other toward State rights, State taxation, and State banks. Which road will you take, Sir?

Or, stating the case in a different way, it is a question between the national credit, involving the interests of all, on the one side, and certain local pretensions on the other side. It is a question between the whole and a part,—between the life of the Republic and a small percentage of taxation which Senators claim for their States. The enemy is at our gates,—gold is at 180,—and yet Senators hesitate.

All are watching, at this moment, the movement of our forces under General Grant, and are longing for victory. Nothing that the country can do to make him strong is left undone. Men, money, supplies, everything is lavished; and only the day before yesterday the Senate voted another $25,000,000.

There is another field, where the battle is bloodless, but scarcely less important: I mean the field of finance. If our pecuniary resources fail, it is doubtful if the army and navy must not fail also. But victory on this field would give triumphant strength and vigor to all the operations of Government. There is no argument for the army and navy—ay, Sir, for the present support of the Lieutenant-General of the United States, in the field at the head of our military forces—which at this moment is not equally applicable to the support of the Secretary of the Treasury at the head of our financial forces.

How different the treatment of these two officers! Everything is given to the one, almost without debate; but little is given to the other without higgling at every stage.

There are movements pending in the field of national finance hardly less important than those in the field of war. A defeat in finance would be little less disastrous than a defeat in war.

Under these circumstances, and at this critical moment, a measure is brought forward whose real character is discerned in its title: “To provide a national currency secured by a pledge of United States bonds, and to provide for the circulation and redemption thereof.” The primary object of this bill is not, therefore, to establish national banks, but to secure the national currency. For the sake of the currency a system of national banks is to be established; they are the means to the end. But the end sought is an improved currency. Sir, this must not be forgotten. If it were a mere question of a national bank, if it were a question between two rival systems, Senators might take sides. But who will hesitate to give all that is needed, even all that is asked by the proper authorities, for an improved currency? You may seem to give much, when you abandon sources of State taxation; but you can give nothing that will not be returned tenfold, a hundred-fold, when the currency at last becomes fixed and uniform.

Glance only for a moment at the incalculable advantages of a sound currency. Gold will assume its normal place, business will be sure, values will be fixed, fluctuations will cease, inflated prices will pass away. There is not a mart of commerce, there is not a village in the whole country, that will not feel the change. But this great boon cannot be assured without corresponding effort. Like victory in the field of battle, it must be fought for and paid for.

And now, when victory seems within reach, when an improved currency is already begun, Senators hesitate in conceding those facilities without which victory is doubtful. They set up claims for their States, and insist upon certain rights of taxation. If this were a season of peace, I could appreciate the pretension; but when I consider the peril of the country, filling us all with such anxiety,—when I consider that its very being is assailed, and that it is to be defended on the field of finance just as much as on the field of battle,—I feel that every endeavor to hamper the pending measure differs little in character from an effort to hamper our soldiers in the field. We spare nothing essential to our armies; we should spare nothing essential to our currency. Men and money both are necessary; both must be cherished and protected with equal patriotic care.

…

Sir, I am unwilling to be misunderstood. I have no feeling except of kindness for the State banks, especially when they keep within the proper sphere of banks, and do not undertake to supply a currency for the country. But at this moment, when we are seeking to create a new currency, which shall be the foundation of national credit, and of national character too, I confess that I have little sympathy with anything that puts itself in the way. The State banks have performed their task as agents of currency, and the time has come for them to abdicate,—or, if they do not abdicate, at least to conform to the new system.

I do not stop to inquire if any paper issued by State banks as currency can be constitutional,—to consider if the States, which cannot coin money, can yet put paper in circulation as money. I content myself with insisting, that, whatever the constitutional merits of this question, it is no longer expedient that States should be invested with the power. We must have another system. The best interests of the whole country require it, especially at this time of national peril.

It is clear that the State banks are not competent to meet the crisis. They cannot do the business required. Besides, they are in the way. Putting their notes in circulation almost at will, the currency is inflated beyond control. Depreciation naturally ensues. Bankruptcy may follow.

When I say that the State banks are in the way, I do not use too strong language. Authentic tables show the extent to which during the last year the currency has been affected by their interference. I hold in my hand a statement from the Bank Reports for 1862, page 208, and for 1863, page 210. At the risk of wearying the Senate, I will read it.

Statement of the Circulation of the Banks in certain States, on or about 1st January, 1862 and 1863.

Being over sixty-six and two thirds per cent.

Similarly in New York, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey, we find the circulation, on or about 1st January:—

Being over forty-seven per cent.

Aggregate Increase in the Principal Eastern States.

Being over fifty-five and three fourths per cent.

These tables speak. They show the range within which the State banks undertake to operate, and their consequent interference with the national system. If it be said that in certain parts of the country, as in New England and New York, the State banks have performed good service, I reply, that, even admitting all that is claimed, the service is local and incomplete. It does not embrace the West.

The present endeavor is to provide a remedy for this trouble by a comprehensive national system, discharging the function performed by the State banks, and embracing the whole country. It is called national because it belongs to the nation, and not to any particular State, and because its origin, aim, and inspiration are all national. It is conceived in no hostility or unkindness to the State banks, but in a patriotic purpose to do what can be done to secure what all desire,—a national currency. The State banks will be welcome to a place in the system, like State troops coming forward for the defence of the Republic; but they cannot be tolerated, if they stand aloof, or refuse to take the post assigned them. At a moment of peril, when the Government is bending all its energies to save the national currency, a mutiny among State banks will be hardly less disastrous than a mutiny among State troops. Every murmur or mutter of such mutiny ought to be repressed at once. All should be summoned to perfect and harmonious coöperation in that cause which embraces the whole country, in every walk of life, whether military or civil.

I know not how others are impressed, but to my mind it is difficult to imagine anything, short of those everlasting principles of human freedom involved in this war, which should at this moment be more carefully watched than the currency of the country. Let this be safe, and everything will be safe,—army, navy, and the whole national cause. Such a currency will constitute an epoch in the history of the country,—ay, Sir, in the history of the world. There have been ministers in other countries and other times whose names are immortal from association with commercial reforms. Colbert was the founder of the commercial system of France; Peel was the founder of free trade in England. But the present Secretary of the Treasury, when the new system is at last triumphant over all obstacles, including the mutiny of State banks and the lukewarmness of Senators, may boast that he has given a currency to his country. Next after the great gift of human freedom there is nothing greater he could give,—nothing that comes home so completely to the business and bosoms of the people, rich and poor, throughout our wide-spread empire. An improved currency is like sunshine, penetrating every corner of the land, under which commerce, business, comfort, civilization, life itself, will put forth blossom and fruit. Nobody in the community too high, nobody too low, not to feel the new-found boon filling every household and travelling on every highway. But it is seen now in another aspect. An improved currency is like a new levy of national troops, a new navy afloat, a new contribution of supplies. It is the herald and assurance of untold success. In itself it is a present daily victory,—fruitful parent of victory everywhere.

Such is the object proposed,—important at any time, inconceivably important at this moment. And the question recurs, Are you for a national, life-giving currency, or are you for the State banks? You cannot be for both; one must yield to the other. If you are for the former, you must abandon the State banks, or compel them to enlist in the national cause.

Massachusetts—which has a larger bank capital in proportion to her population than any other State, and, moreover, looks to taxation of this capital as a chief source of income—has already, by her patriotic Governor, volunteered support to the national banks.

Such is the testimony of Massachusetts, by the lips of her brave Chief Magistrate. Seeing the object before us, he raises no question of State rights, presents no claim of State taxation, makes no plea for State banks.

Sir, it is vain to think that you can keep both systems at the same time. One must yield to the other. But if you sincerely desire the national system to prevail, then must you so endow and protect it that it will be commended to the public, and that investments will naturally seek it. Therefore every privilege you confer, every immunity you give, every exemption you establish in its favor, must naturally contribute to its strength, and make it more effective for its transcendent purposes.

This is the day of sacrifice. Families are offering sons and brothers. States are giving their citizens, and every citizen is contributing according to his means to the safety of the Republic. But there is one other sacrifice now required: it is the sacrifice of the State banks as agents of currency; and this sacrifice requires that the local taxation should be suspended with regard to the national currency, and that all the proceeds of such local taxation should be passed to the credit of the whole country. You must do for the national currency precisely what you do for the national securities. Here are the words of the statute:—

The reason which sustains the exemption in this case is equally applicable in the other.

But we have other exemptions from local taxation.

There are the imports of the country, which no State or municipality can tax.

There are the army and navy, and all the material of war,—ships, arms, munitions, commissariat supplies,—all exempt from local taxation.

There are the public lands of the United States, which no local authority can touch.

There is the Mint, which is untaxed.

There are the public buildings in Washington, the National Capitol, the Executive Mansion, the offices of the heads of Departments, covering large spaces of ground, all secured from local taxation.

But no reason can be assigned for exemption in these cases that does not prevail with regard to the currency. Nay, at this juncture, when our object is, above all things, to secure a national currency, the reason for exemption is of special and unanswerable force.

We have more than once been warned not to slay the goose that lays the golden egg,—meaning by this goose the State banks. But all who use this illustration forget that there is another bird, which lays such eggs as no State banks can hatch,—eggs not merely of gold, but of victory. It is the national credit, which Senators seem willing to abandon, if not to slay; and it is the national credit which I now insist shall be preserved at all hazards.

Mr. President, I was not a sharer in the counsels that originated this measure. Had I been consulted, I know not that I should have originally advised the experiment in its actual form. Clearly, something was necessary for the sake of the currency, and for the sake of the country; and after proper consideration the present system was adopted. Operations under it have already commenced; $60,000,000 of capital have been organized according to its requirements. It is too late to retreat. It only remains that you should go forward, not sluggishly, heavily, reluctantly, but bravely, confidently. The financial enterprise already begun must be finished and protected. Here I cannot hesitate. If the system is to be maintained, if it is not to be utterly abandoned, it must be placed under the most favorable auspices, so at least that it may not fail from any want of care on our part. It should be made strong in itself, and then it should be surrounded with an atmosphere congenial and friendly. For this reason I shall vote to keep it free from all State hostility and even State rivalry, that it may become in reality, as in name, wholly national.

Sir, I am told that it will be unpopular to make this sacrifice, and ancient ghosts are paraded through this Chamber to frighten us from duty. Naturally, all who are against the proposed system will be against the seeming sacrifice. But the people are too intelligent not to see what is demanded by the best interests of the national currency; and unless I greatly err, they will insist that what we do shall be so done as to make our work most effective and most triumphant, to the end that victory may be certain. It is on no narrow ground that I make my appeal. I speak for a national currency which shall be to the whole country like the horn of abundance; and I plead for it now, as essential not only to the general welfare, but also to the common defence.

BRANCH MINTS AND COINAGE.

Much dependence has been placed upon the report of the Director of the mint at Philadelphia. Now, Sir, if he had contented himself with giving an opinion against establishing a mint in Oregon, without assigning reasons, I might have respected his opinion; but when he puts forward as his first great objection that the multiplication of mints will tend to “national disintegration,” I confess that I join with the Senator from Oregon [Mr. Nesmith] in distrusting his conclusion. What confidence can anybody have in anything founded on such premises, which experience, if not reason, shows to be false? Why, Sir, the author of this opinion forgets that in the country most centralized in the world, where all the agencies of Government converge in a single capital,—I mean France,—there have been for a long time, even within its comparatively contracted borders, more than half a dozen different mints. Besides a magnificent central mint at Paris, there are, or were very recently, auxiliary mints at Lyons, Marseilles, Bordeaux, Lille, Rouen, and Strasbourg. I never heard that this multiplicity tended toward “national disintegration.” France still continues one and indivisible; and I doubt if there would be any difference in this respect, even if there were a mint in every one of her eighty-six Departments. Really, the Director of the Philadelphia mint ought to have borne in mind the famous instructions of Lord Mansfield to the colonial magistrate, and contented himself with an opinion without assigning reasons.

There is a different consideration, to which I confess that I am not insensible. It is the importance of a correct and finished coinage, which it seems natural to suppose best promoted by a single mint. On this point I am disposed to agree with the Director. But our Government has not acted on this principle.

If circumstances favored the consolidation of the national coinage at a single mint, I can conceive that there would be advantages of an unquestionable character. Indeed, if we repair to France, where the mints have been in times past so numerous, we find that these advantages have not been denied. I suppose that the most authoritative testimony on this subject, whether we look at it in the light of theory or of practice, is found in that country; and if we seek special authorities, there is nothing so instructive or ample as the report of Dumas and De Colmont, made in 1839, under a commission from the French Minister of Finance. This document, with its minute disclosures on the operations of mints, was for some time kept secret in France. I have understood that only twelve copies were printed for the use of the Commission, who were placed under a solemn obligation not to divulge it. But I believe it found its way to publicity at the time of the Parliamentary inquiry into the Mint in 1849, which resulted in a valuable blue-book.

The testimony of Dumas is for a single mint. He dwells especially on two considerations,—economy, and the perfection of the coinage; and these he places above local interests demanding multiplicity of mints. The figures by which he illustrates the superior economy are very striking. These assume that the metal is already delivered at the mint,—a point not to be forgotten on the present occasion. Beyond his own opinion on the question of perfection, Dumas quotes the testimony of Basterrèche, Regent of the Bank of France, who, after an examination of the subject as long ago as 1800, very positively declared that “the perfection of labor which ought to distinguish a great nation imperiously required a single mint, placed under the immediate superintendence of the Government.” And he also quotes the testimony of Humann, Minister of Finance, who, in presenting his budget in 1835, declared that the Paris mint was adequate to do all the coinage required in France,—that the concentration of labor there would promote improvement in the processes of production,—that in this way the Government would be relieved from the expense of different establishments,—that all the money from the same mint would be identical in character, and in proportion as it acquired perfection would be less exposed to counterfeiting,—and, in fine, that the superintendence of the Government would be a guaranty of security, which does not exist where the work is distributed in a large number of establishments. Such was the testimony of the minister, adopted by the illustrious authority in science, Dumas. Perhaps the case could not be stated stronger. Yet it did not prevail in 1800, when it was first given,—nor in 1835, nor in 1839,—even in France, where the tendency to concentration is so active, where the facilities for it are so great, and the disposition to take counsel of science is so confirmed. And surely there must be a reason why it did not prevail.

Dumas says, in rather contemptuous phrase, that “on one side is a petty local interest, in a great degree imaginary.”[335] But if this “petty local interest” were of sufficient importance to prevail for so long a time in France, against such influences, it must be because there was something of intrinsic strength in its character. I allude thus minutely to this testimony, because I would not keep anything out of the discussion calculated to shed light, and because it seems to me that the long-continued practice of France, in spite of such testimony, must not be disregarded in our endeavors to arrive at a true policy.

Thus far our Government has followed the teachings from the practice of France, rather than from its science on this subject. It renounced, some time ago, the policy of a single mint, acting, it may be supposed, under other considerations of a controlling character. The statute of March 3, 1835, entitled “An Act to establish branches of the Mint of the United States,”[336] provides for mints at New Orleans, Charlotte, in North Carolina, and Dahlonega, in Georgia,—the two latter for coinage of gold only. Since then there has been provision for mints at San Francisco, Denver, and Carson City.

I have not before me the most recent statement of the production at these different mints; but this is not necessary for illustration. If we take the year 1851, we find that the number of pieces, gold, silver, and copper, produced that year, was as follows:—

So that mints were kept up at the two latter places merely to manufacture a very small amount of coin, and the reason assigned was, that gold was produced in the neighborhood.

Looking at the cost of production at these different places, we find that at Philadelphia it was only forty-two hundredths per cent,—at New Orleans, one and eight hundredths per cent,—at Charlotte, three and fifty-five hundredths per cent,—at Dahlonega, three and thirteen hundredths per cent. But, great as was the economy at Philadelphia, compared with that at the other mints, we find that at the Paris mint the same production costs one half less.

If we look further at the mints of Charlotte and Dahlonega, it is easy to see how every consideration of economy was against them. With a single Munich press in the mint at Charlotte, the whole annual coinage there would have been accomplished in thirty-five hours; and with a similar press at Dahlonega, the whole annual coinage there would have been accomplished in less than twenty-eight hours! Experience shows that one Munich press will coin in a day of ten hours, allowing one sixth of the time for stoppages and accidents, thirty thousand pieces. Of course the coinage at these two places must have been at an expense much beyond that of Philadelphia. It would be more economical for the Treasury to pay the cost of transporting the gold from these places to Philadelphia. And doubtless this would be done, if the question of economy were alone involved.

I refer to these instances as illustrations of the policy already adopted. I need not say that they do not commend themselves to my judgment, especially when it is considered that in all probability the coinage at these mints, besides being expensive, was also of an inferior quality.

But the vast products of gold in distant California presented the question in a new form. Unexpectedly, the early prodigies of Mexico and Peru were renewed. Private persons were suddenly enriched. Gold was turned up like clods of earth, or washed from sands deposited by mountain torrents. Where gold so abounded, the currency of the country was naturally in this metal, which thus performed its double function of merchandise and money. Should all this treasure be sent far away to Philadelphia for coinage? The answer of reason, convenience, and commerce was clearly against such enforced transportation. A mint became a necessity. Even assuming that the coinage could be executed with more economy and perfection at Philadelphia, it is evident that the local interests of California were too important to be neglected. The mint was established, and during the last year gold has been coined there to the amount of $17,510,960, while the smaller amount of $3,340,931 was the sum-total of gold coinage during the same time at Philadelphia.

It is now proposed to create another mint in Oregon, and the reasons for it are similar to those which prevailed in the case of California. The region is fruitful in gold, if not to the same extent as California, yet so much so as to require similar facilities for coinage. It seems that the amount received at three private assay-offices in the city of Portland, from January 15th to October 20th of the last year, reached $2,486,496. Compare this sum with the paltry yield at Charlotte or Dahlonega, where mints were established and maintained down to the Rebellion. The mines of Peru have been proverbial for richness; but the sum-total of their product in 1858 was only $6,000,000. That of Chile was $5,000,000; and that of Bolivia was only $2,000,000,—being less than the product of Oregon for nine months.

Here, again, the considerations of science, so strong in favor of a single mint, seem to lose their applicability, or rather they fail in presence of other considerations not to be neglected. Sir, we cannot forget in legislation that it is no narrow territory that comes within our jurisdiction, but that it is a vast region, washed by two great oceans and separated by intervening mountains. A rule which may be proper in a country like France becomes inapplicable to a country so vast in space. If all our States were huddled together on a single seaboard, perhaps a single mint might suffice. In such a case economy and perfection of coinage might be exclusively consulted. But the interests of business on the Pacific coast must not be sacrificed even to these considerations. Spain still has mints at Madrid and Seville, although at the latter place the coinage is chiefly confined to copper; but in former days, while Mexico was a Spanish province, there was a Spanish mint there,—for the same reason, I suppose, that a mint is now proposed in Oregon.

The consideration from distance alone cannot be disregarded. Oregon is more than five thousand miles from Philadelphia, and seven hundred miles from San Francisco. It is impossible to legislate for such immense spaces as you would legislate for a European kingdom, where every part is within easy distance of the metropolis.

In England a single mint transacts the business of that commercial country. But I need not remind you that all its immense commerce is conducted within a small territory. In Holland, also, there is only a single mint,—although during the days of the Republic there was a mint in each province. Afterwards these were abandoned, and one mint for the whole kingdom was established at Utrecht. But here again I remind you of the narrow space of territory served by this mint.

The whole question is obscured by considering gold, when coined, as exclusively currency, whereas it is also merchandise. In this latter character it comes under the laws governing commerce in other articles. If we go back to Aristotle, we find a definition difficult to improve in our day. “It is agreed,” says this master of thought, “to give and receive in exchange a substance which, useful in itself, is easily managed in the usage of life: as, for example, iron, silver, or such other substance as shall have a determined dimension and weight, and which, in order to avoid the embarrassment of continual weighing, shall be marked by a particular stamp as the sign of its value.”[337] In quoting these words, Michel Chevalier, the political economist and new-made Senator of France, who has given much attention to this subject, rightly says that the whole question is admirably put and at the same time determined.[338] But the same idea has been presented by Adam Smith in his remarkable work on the Wealth of Nations. “The qualities,” he says, “of utility, beauty, and scarcity are the original foundation of the high price of those metals, or of the great quantity of other goods for which they can everywhere be exchanged. This value was antecedent to and independent of their being employed as coin, and was the quality which fitted them for that employment.”[339] Therefore it must not be forgotten that coin is something more than money; it is merchandise also. In this character it plays a conspicuous part in the commerce of the world. It differs in bulk from the lumber of Maine, but it is just as much an article of merchandise.

Regarding gold as merchandise, we see how clearly in certain places and under certain circumstances it escapes from the scientific laws applicable especially to coinage. Gold is unique among articles of commerce. Every other article allows discussion as to its quality. Cloth or wool may be more or less fine; flour more or less bolted, or it may be made from hard or soft wheat. But gold is chemically a simple body, and, when once refined, perfectly homogeneous, whether from California or Siberia, from the sands of Transylvania or the poorer sands of the Upper Rhine. Let it be once brought to any arbitrary standard, as, say, nine tenths, and there is no difference in its character. But this degree of fineness must be established in authentic manner,—otherwise transactions in this article may be arrested at every moment. The delicate agencies necessary for determining its value are not easily accessible. The Government, therefore, as representative of the community, after refining and weighing gold, puts upon it a stamp which guaranties its weight and fineness. Thus, the eagle, with the stamp of ten dollars, is a piece which, according to the Act of Congress of 18th January, 1837,[340] weighs two hundred and fifty-eight grains, with nine tenths of gold and one tenth of alloy. The English sovereign is a stamped piece of gold twenty-two carats fine, and of such weight in proportion to the troy ounce that £3 17s. 10½d. make an ounce. The French franc is a stamped piece of silver weighing exactly five grammes, and nine tenths fine.

But in our country, and now especially in California and on the Pacific coast, gold has become a principal article of production and exportation, like wheat or cotton. Such is its character that it instinctively seeks inspection, in order to secure a guaranty and recommendation. Now every State has its inspectors, for instance, of flour, pot and pearl ashes, fish, beef, and pork. In Massachusetts there are inspectors of sole-leather, although a hide of leather is open on all sides. But, if gold be regarded as merchandise, there is more reason for its inspection. As it is more portable than these other articles, so it is also more valuable, more easily lost, more easily stolen, and more provocative to plunder. Therefore it is entitled to peculiar safeguards.

Here, then, is the case in a nutshell. California is already a large exporter of gold as merchandise. Oregon is now commencing a similar career. But the gold there ought to have every advantage as merchandise which it can derive from the inspection of the Government. Call it protection, if you will; but I beg to submit that an interest so important, so peculiar, and so delicate, deserves this protection.

If it be said that all this may be accomplished by an assay office, I reply, that this does only partially what is accomplished by the mint. The gold is delivered back in ingots stamped, so that for certain purposes it is merchandise; but the work is only half done. If the quantity were trivial, as at Charlotte and Dahlonega, then an assay office would suffice; but where the supply is so great as in California or Oregon, it would seem as if no pains ought to be spared by the Government to facilitate the commerce in this article, or to meet the desires of its producers. Now it is obvious that nothing in this respect can equal the stamp upon the national coin. A courtier said to Philip the Second of Spain, “Your golden ducats carry your name and your features over all the countries of Europe, exciting envy and dread.” The time for envy and dread has passed; but our eagles are not idle. There is their inscription, E pluribus unum, an unquestionable stamp of nationality and value, which they carry wherever they go.

Therefore, Sir, while admitting, that, for the sake of the coin, there should be the highest accuracy possible in the operations of the mint, I cannot hesitate to insist, that, regarding gold as merchandise, the mint must be established in such localities as may be required by the interests of commerce.

I do not think there would be any hesitation in this conclusion, if the whole subject of coinage had not been shrouded with a certain mystery, almost like the “black art.” This appears constantly.