The Boer strategy was of archaic simplicity, but great effectiveness; it aimed at enveloping the British forces, in small detachments, entrenching Boer commandoes round the British camps, bringing up artillery of the heaviest possible calibre, and then inviting attack. The Boers themselves rarely assaulted. They had infinite patience, and, when once the British were shut in, waited for time and hunger to accomplish the required object.
The town of Ladysmith was badly situated for defensive purposes. It was dominated by two high hills which rose the one to the north-east and the other to the east, known as Lombard's Kop and Bulwana Mountain, four or five miles distant. To the rear of the town was the Klip River, which was fordable except during heavy rains. Here centred the roads and railways from the Transvaal, from the Free State, and from eastern and southern Natal. Here also great quantities of stores and ammunition had been accumulated, in readiness for a forward move. The distance by railway from Pietermaritzburg, the capital of Natal, was 119 miles; from Durban, the real British base, 189 miles.
General White had now to arrive at a most critical decision. He had to determine whether he should hold on to Ladysmith or abandon the place and fall slowly back. It was already clear that the Boers were far stronger than anyone in the British army had supposed. They had heavy artillery, with which the British force was utterly unprovided, and even their field-guns had on occasion outranged ours. They had fought splendidly; after each battle and each British victory it was said that the "moral effect" would be enormous, yet, nevertheless, the Boers always advanced, and appeared to come up smiling. Moreover, certain circumstances had taken the edge off our victories. After Dundee the Boers had captured a great part of our cavalry; and Yule's retreat left them all our wounded of that battle. After Elandslaagte had come Rietfontein, in which they had fully held their own. They had overrun the northern wedge of Natal, and were confident of driving the British into the sea.
This little town, near the Transvaal border, was abandoned by the British when concentrating at Dundee and Ladysmith. The late Mr. Escombe, formerly Premier of Natal, was staying here, and was one of the last to leave.
No substantial help could be expected for three weeks; the only reinforcements immediately available were the Border Regiment and the Rifle Brigade, at the most 1,600 men, which were landing at Durban on their way from Europe. But if General White fell back the moral effect would be very bad, and the difficulty of preventing the enemy from overrunning the centre of Natal and plundering the loyalists very great; moreover, the vast accumulation of British stores and ammunition at Ladysmith would have to be either destroyed or abandoned if our army retreated.
These Hollanders must not be confused with the Boers; they are natives of Holland in the pay of the Transvaal Government. The photograph shows a party of them in occupation of Fort Amiel, after the abandonment of Newcastle by the British.
General White, therefore, decided to hold the town. He had now under his orders about 12,000 men and 48 guns—36 15-pounders of the field artillery and 12 7-and 9-pounders of little value. Of the total force about 2,400 were mounted men. Against these the Boers had from 25,000 to 30,000 men and a large number of guns. They were, to a man, mounted, and good horsemen; many of them knew the country; all were accustomed to the peculiar warfare which the terrain in South Africa renders necessary.