On the 16th September the frigate Venganza arrived at Puerto Cabello from Spain, accompanied by an armed schooner and six transports, with the Granada regiment, 1,200 strong, under command of Colonel Salomón. Bolívar raised the siege and retired to Valencia.

Monteverde, encouraged by the retreat of the Patriots and by the reinforcement he had received, took the field on the 26th September with 1,600 men. But he had no fixed plan and committed the grave mistake of dividing his force. He himself took up a position on the road to Valencia at a place called Las Trincheras, and detached 500 men by another road to the heights of Barbula. Bolívar remained quiet for four days, unable to divine his intentions, and then sent Girardot and D’Eluyar with the Granadian troops against the enemy at Barbula, while a column under Urdaneta went in support. On the 30th September the Royalists were driven from this strong position, but Girardot fell, shot through the head in the moment of victory. His troops, in revenge, asked permission to attack the main body at Las Trincheras by themselves. Bolívar acceded to their request but supported them with 1,000 of his own troops. Monteverde was driven out of the entrenchments he had thrown up, with heavy loss, on the 3rd October. He himself being wounded returned to Puerto Cabello, leaving Salomón in command till he should recover, and the Patriots under D’Eluyar again laid siege to this fortress.

Bolívar, eager for fresh ovations, decreed sumptuous funeral honours to the memory of Girardot, to whose valour both New Granada and Venezuela owed their greatest victories. The citizens wore mourning for a month; his heart was taken out and carried to Caracas to be deposited in the Cathedral, his body was sent to Antioquia, his native province, and his pay was secured to his posterity. Bolívar himself accompanied the funeral procession to Caracas.

On the 14th October, the day of the obsequies, twenty of the civic functionaries of the capital assembled and decreed that Bolívar should be appointed Captain-General of the armies of Venezuela with the title of “Liberator,” which he had already bestowed upon himself, and that the inscription “Bolívar, Liberator of Venezuela” should be inscribed over the gateways of all the public offices. Posterity has confirmed this title to him, but its acceptance at that time, when the reaction was gaining ground every day, was a symptom of inordinate personal vanity.

In return for this compliment Bolívar instituted the military order of “The Liberators”; a star with seven rays, symbolical of the seven provinces of the Republic, given as a decoration to those who should merit it by deeds of arms, and which carried with it certain privileges. This order was more democratic than those instituted by O’Higgins and San Martin in Chile and Peru, as it was for lifetime only, and was less aristocratic than the order of Cincinnatus created by Washington.

The time which Bolívar wasted in theatrical displays the Royalists made good use of for their own purposes. Boves was a Spaniard by birth, whose real name was Rodriguez. In his youth he was condemned to eight years penal servitude at Puerto Cabello for piracy, but was released chiefly through the intervention of a man whose name he then adopted in gratitude. He joined the revolution when it first broke out, but being looked upon as disaffected he was thrown into prison at Calabozo till that town was retaken by Antoñanzas, when he joined the Royalists and took part in the butchery at San Juan de los Morros. Morales, his companion and second in command, had served as a volunteer with the Royalists at Barcelona, and was made a sub-lieutenant of artillery by Monteverde. These two men were both endowed with the warlike instinct, were both distinguished by indefatigable activity and by an iron will; they were just the sort of men to act as leaders of semi-barbarous troops. But Boves, with all his ignorance and brutality, had something of moral elevation about him: he fought for a cause, not for rapine. Morales took an actual pleasure in cruel deeds, and was of insatiable rapacity. These two men were the first to discover the latent strength of the people, which the revolution later on assimilated to itself. Up to this time the revolutionary movement had been confined to the cities and towns; Bolívar with all his perspicacity never suspected that the main strength of the country lay on the plains around them.

When these two men were left on the north bank of the Orinoco by Cajigal they adopted Bolívar’s plan of rousing the country by proclamations. They called the Llaneros to arms, offering them bloodshed and booty in the cause of the King, with pain of death to all who disregarded the summons. Each man presented himself on horseback with a lance; in each district a squadron was formed which took its name. Boves taught them the secret of victory, which was to have no fear of death, to go straight on and never look behind. In a very short time they had 2,500 men embodied, an army of horsemen such as had never yet been seen in America.

Colonel José Yañez, a Canarian, was a man of the same stamp as Boves and Morales, but of greater military skill. After the dispersion of the column by Tiscar, he had retreated to San Fernando on the Apure River, and with some help from Guayana, had there organized an infantry corps of 500 men, which he named the “Numancia” battalion. He also raised two regiments of Llanero cavalry, each 500 strong. With this force he invaded Barinas in September, before the waters had retired from the plains.

Boves opened his campaign by surprising a column of 1,000 men which had been sent against him, near Calabozo, on the 20th September. The cavalry passed over to him, the infantry he routed. He murdered all his prisoners, and then took and sacked the small town of Cura.

Now there appeared upon the scene another singular character, of the iron temperament of Boves, with all his ferocity and courage, who raised a barrier to his impetuous onslaught. Nothing was known of him except that he was a Spaniard who had come to America very young, and had married an American wife. When Bolívar opened his campaign of emancipation, this man had headed the rising at Mérida; then, leaving wife and children, he raised a battalion and devoted himself body and soul to the cause of independence. Throughout the campaign he distinguished himself by his indomitable valour and by his cruelty to prisoners, to whom he gave no quarter. The cause of his hatred to his fellow countrymen is unknown. He was accustomed to say:—

“When the Spaniards are all killed then I will cut my own throat, so that there shall not be one left.”

The name of this man was Vicente Campo Elias. At Las Trincheras he was raised to the rank of lieutenant-colonel for conspicuous bravery. This was the man to send against Boves.

He marched from Valencia with 1,000 infantry and 1,500 cavalry. Boves with 2,500 horse, and Morales with 500 infantry, waited for him at a place called Mosquitero, at the entrance to the plains. On the 14th October the armies met. Boves charged the left wing of the Patriots with his usual impetuosity, and carried all before him, but Campo Elias, caring nothing for this, rushed upon the main body of the Royalists, and routed them completely in fifteen minutes. Morales escaped badly wounded, but nearly the whole of his infantry were butchered, and the Llanero horse were cut to pieces. Boves and Morales fled with twenty men beyond the Apure, and the state of the plains rendered pursuit impossible.

Campo Elias contented himself by retaking the town of Calabozo, and killing every man in the place for having given assistance to Boves. Unarmed Venezuelans were butchered by Venezuelan troops at Calabozo in the name of Liberty on the same day on which Bolívar was greeted in Caracas as the Liberator. This cruel deed decided the Llaneros. Seeing that there was no mercy for them, they abandoned their homes and looked to Boves for their revenge. The decree of extermination began to bear fruit.

Ceballos, who commanded at Coro, on hearing that reinforcements had reached Puerto Cabello, drew up a plan for the concerted action of the scattered bands of Royalists. With such men as he could collect, he sallied forth, and after routing two detachments of Patriots took Barquisimeto, where he was attacked by Bolívar and Urdaneta. Bolívar captured the town with a handful of horse, but his main body was totally routed by the Spanish infantry led by Ceballos, who, after his victory, crossed the Cordillera, and at Araure, in the valley of Caracas, effected a junction with the column under Yañez. Salomón, instead of joining him, marched with 1,000 men to the heights of Vigirima, to the west of the city of Caracas, and there entrenched himself.

Bolívar was then at Valencia with the Granadian contingent. He collected what other troops he could; Rivas brought up the garrison of Caracas, with a battalion of 500 students from the University. After two days’ fighting, Salomón was on the 25th October driven back to Puerto Cabello with the loss of four guns. Bolívar then turned his attention to Ceballos, and by drawing 1,500 men from the force under Campo Elias, he had by the 1st December collected a force of 3,000 men. Ceballos had 3,500 men and ten guns, posted in a strong position on the slopes of the mountains, at the town of Araure. Here Bolívar attacked him on the 4th December. One Patriot battalion advancing incautiously was cut to pieces, but Bolívar, nothing daunted, brought up the rest of his troops, and ordered a charge with the bayonet, which was his favourite manœuvre. He was no tactician; he hurled his men in masses upon the enemy, and trusted to their valour. Yañez attempted to take the attacking column on the flank with his cavalry, but was himself taken in flank by the Patriot cavalry, and utterly routed. Ceballos, after a stubborn resistance, was completely defeated, losing 500 killed, 400 prisoners, and all his guns. He fled to Guayana, 800 of his infantry escaped in the same direction, and Yañez fled to the Apure with 200 men. This was the first pitched battle won by Bolívar.

After the rout of Barquisimeto, Bolívar had formed the fugitives into a battalion, which, in punishment of their cowardice, he called the “Nameless Battalion,” telling them that they should have no flag till they did something to merit one. This corps greatly distinguished itself at the battle of Araure. Bolívar now presented it with the flag of the Numancia battalion, which had been captured in the fight, and renamed it “The Victor of Araure.”

Salomón had again taken the field with 1,300 men, but on hearing of the defeat of Araure, he again retired to Coro, harassed on his way by detached parties of the Patriots, and losing two guns and more than half his men.

Bolívar then marched to assist D’Eluyar in the siege of Puerto Cabello. The moment was propitious; the Spanish ships of war had left for the Havana, and Piar, with the flotilla from Cumaná, had established a blockade, cutting off the garrison from all supplies. Monteverde had been dismissed in disgrace from his command; Ceballos, who had been appointed to succeed him, was a fugitive in Guayana, where also was Cajigal, who had been appointed by the Home Government Captain-General of Venezuela, and had as yet done nothing. Still the garrison, which was only 600 strong, held out.

Meantime the dual dictatorship brought forth its natural fruit. The victories of the West were sterile without the concurrence of the army of the East. Mariño refused to combine operations with Bolívar until he was recognised as the supreme ruler of the territory he possessed. The Liberator modestly entreated him to march upon the plains, where Boves and Yañez were recruiting. Far from doing this, though such action was necessary to his own security, he even recalled his flotilla from Puerto Cabello, but Piar listened to the appeals of Bolívar, and continued the blockade. The result was that Bolívar, being unable to attend to the siege of Puerto Cabello and to the war upon the plains at the same time, Boves and Yañez were speedily in a position to assume the offensive. Boves, more especially, with that wonderful energy which hesitated at no means, however terrible they might be, to the end before him, again took the field, two months after his defeat by Campo Elias.

On the 1st November he summoned all able-bodied men to join him, proclaimed war to the knife against the Patriots, decreed that their goods should be distributed among his troops, and, finally, liberated all slaves who would enlist under the banners of the King. The Llaneros, irritated by the massacre of Calabozo, and eager for plunder, flocked in masses to his standard. From Guayana came 100 infantry and one gun. By the middle of December he had 3,000 cavalry, the blades of whose lances were forged from the spikes torn from the railings of windows.

With this horde he descended to the lower plains. On the 14th December he routed a division of 1,000 men at San Marcos, and occupied Calabozo, slaughtering without mercy, and enriching his troops with booty. He then overran the whole plain lying between the windward coast range and the Gulf of Paria. For further operations he needed infantry, and set to work to make some. At the same time Yañez, with some help from Guayana, organized a force of 2,000 men on the Apure, and captured the city of Barinas, while Cajigal and Ceballos raised another army on the leeward coast.

Bolívar was reduced to Caracas and the neighbouring valleys, with a feeble reserve in Valencia, and was constantly harassed by Royalist guerillas. Urdaneta, who had marched on Coro, was forced to return to his assistance.

Mariño, with 3,500 men distributed along the coasts of Barcelona and Cumaná, and in the adjacent valleys, did nothing. All the rest of Venezuela was occupied by Royalists; the country people were everywhere in favour of the reaction, and the Patriots were forced to seek refuge in the cities. The Patriot armies were entirely without guides, no one would give them any information. Despatches to the various commanders could only be forwarded from head-quarters under strong escort. At times only four men out of an escort reached their destination. Public opinion had returned to the state in which it was left by the earthquake of 1812.

Columbian historians attribute this revulsion of feeling to Bolívar’s decree of extermination, and to the excesses authorized by him. Bolívar was to fall as Miranda had fallen before him, but from different causes. Ever the logic of Destiny!

CHAPTER XXXIX.

THE SECOND FALL OF VENEZUELA.

1814.

To the Assembly he now convened at Caracas, to which by a convenient fiction he attributed representative authority, he gave an account of his administration, and into its hands he abdicated the power he had bestowed upon himself, only to receive it back again intact. He made three speeches; in the first he abdicated the Dictatorship, and pronounced a warm eulogium upon his own deeds; in the second, he gave a biographical sketch of his own life, and showed from it that it was impossible for him to continue in the exercise of unlimited power; in the third, he again accepted the Dictatorship, which was bestowed upon him without conditions by the acclamations of the Assembly.

His next step was to endeavour to secure the co-operation of Mariño, by recognising his authority in the eastern provinces, and in January, 1814, a treaty was signed between them. But it was too late now, their union merely prolonged the struggle.

Yañez was advancing with 1,000 men by the eastern slopes of the Cordillera. Urdaneta crossed the range, and on the 2nd February met him with 700 men at Ospino. Yañez led a charge of the Llanero horse upon the Patriot infantry, but was killed, and his troops dispersed. His body was cut into fragments, which were sent as trophies to the scenes of his atrocities. Calzada, who took the command, in revenge burned the town of Ospino and then retreated.

Campo Elias was detached with 1,500 men against Boves and his hordes of Llanero horse. He marched to the town of Cura, where it was arranged that he should be joined by Mariño, but Mariño never came. Boves detached Rosete with 1,200 men to Ocumare, a town lying to the west of Caracas, which was feebly defended, and the inhabitants, men, women, and children, were all butchered; even those who had taken refuge in the church found there no safety.

On the 3rd February Campo Elias and Boves met at La Puerta. The Patriots were crushed by overwhelming numbers, and all the infantry perished, but Boves was badly wounded. Campo Elias, with the remains of his force, retreated to the narrow pass of Cabrera in front of Valencia, where he threw up entrenchments.

Morales, who now took command of the Royalists, advanced with 1,000 horse and 300 infantry by the valley of Aragua to Victoria, which city he attacked on the 10th February. Here Rivas was in command of the Patriots, but had hard work to hold the position against the superior numbers of the Royalists, till Campo Elias suddenly appeared at the head of 220 horse, and Morales was beaten off with the loss of all his artillery, and retired to Cura.

Rivas then marched with 800 men upon the town of Charavaye, then occupied by the column under Rosete, and cut the Royalists to pieces, giving no quarter. He then re-took Ocumare, and finding the streets strewn with dead bodies, swore an oath of vengeance, in which oath he was joined by Arismendi, who held the command at Caracas in his absence. This vow was most fearfully fulfilled.

Arismendi finding the prisons of La Guayra full of Spaniards, wrote to Bolívar who was at Valencia, asking instructions, and stating that their presence was a danger to the capital. The answer was an order for the immediate execution of all of them, except such as had taken out letters of naturalization.

“The Secretary of the Liberator is a fool,” said Arismendi, “he has put with the exception instead of including.”

Then with a refinement of cruelty, he set the prisoners to work to erect a great funeral pile on which their bodies should be burned. When the pile was ready the massacre commenced, the prisoners were brought in groups from the dungeons; to the sound of the trumpet the soldiers fell upon them with bayonet, axe, and poniard, and cast their quivering bodies into the flames. Very little powder was burned on the eight days during which the slaughter lasted. Eight hundred and sixty-six victims perished, among them being many who had saved the lives of Patriots at the risk of their own.

These horrible massacres were the natural fruit of Bolívar’s decree of extermination. They utterly failed to accomplish their purpose, that of stamping out the spirit of reaction, and only served as a pretext for the perpetration of equally brutal atrocities by the Royalists.

Bolívar, who had only 1,500 infantry and 600 cavalry, could not advance into the open country against Boves, who had at least four times that number of resolute horsemen, but the capital was safe against an assault by such troops. He fortified Valencia and armed a flotilla on the lake, strengthened the pass at Cabrera, occupied Victoria, and threw up field-works at San Mateo, where he established his head-quarters, while he waited for Mariño. The position was well chosen; on the heights which surrounded it stood a country-house which was his own property, to the east of which lay one of the most valuable of his patrimonial estates. But in place of Mariño, Boves, whose wound was by this time healed, appeared in his front on the 25th February, at the head of 2,000 light infantry and 5,000 horse.

Morales was completely routed in an attack on his right flank, and Boves himself was repulsed in an attack on the centre, but captured some outworks on the right. Bolívar sent a reinforcement under Villapol and Campo Elias. Both these leaders were killed, but the son of the former, Captain Villapol, restored the day, drove the Royalists from the positions they had captured, and though badly wounded, held his ground till nightfall. Boves, who was again severely wounded, was carried off the field by his men, and Morales resumed the command.

In this desperate fighting the Royalists had exhausted their ammunition, and were for fifteen days compelled to remain inactive, till on the 11th March Morales again attacked the entrenchments, but was again repulsed. On the 17th Boves again took command, and was on the 20th beaten off in a third attack.

The Patriot magazine was established in the country-house to the rear of the position. On the 25th March Boves detached a column of infantry to make its way by the heights beyond the Patriot lines, to capture this magazine, while he himself led a general attack in front. The magazine was in charge of a young officer, a native of New Granada, named Ricaurte, who had only fifteen men with him. When this young officer saw the infantry column rushing down upon him from the heights, he knew that it was hopeless to attempt to defend the house. He sent off his men, and remaining alone he waited till the enemy burst in upon him with shouts of triumph, when he fired the magazine, and he himself and the greater part of the Royalist column were blown into the air together.

When Bolívar saw the flight of the small garrison, he thought that all was lost. He dismounted from his horse and ran into the ranks, calling to his soldiers that he would die with them, but the Royalists were so terrified by the sudden destruction of their column of infantry, that they desisted from the attack and withdrew, leaving 800 dead and wounded behind them.

While attacking the lines of San Mateo, Boves had detached a strong column under Rosete to make an attempt upon the capital. Rivas was ill in bed, and 800 of the youth of the city sallied out under Arismendi to meet the enemy on the open plain, but were cut to pieces on the 11th March. Bolívar sent 300 picked troops under Colonel Montilla to the assistance of the garrison. With this reinforcement Rivas managed to organize a column of 900 men, and leading them out in person, lying on a stretcher, he totally defeated Rosete on the 20th March at Ocumare, and the capital was saved.

Cajigal, the new Captain-General, had established his head-quarters at Coro, and had formed a column of 1,000 men from the remnants of various shattered battalions. These troops he placed under command of Ceballos, who drove Urdaneta before him out of Barquisimeto. Urdaneta then endeavoured to hold San Carlos, but was driven thence by Calzada, and took refuge in Valencia, where the war material of the Patriots was stored. Here he received orders from Bolívar to resist to the last extremity, and to send 200 men to aid D’Eluyar in the siege of Puerto Cabello. Urdaneta obeyed orders, but was left with only 280 muskets to make head as he could against the united forces of Ceballos and Calzada, who now attacked Valencia with 3,000 men. The Royalists had no artillery, but by dint of numbers they drove the Patriots from the outworks, and cut off the supply of water from the garrison. Urdaneta called a council of his officers, when it was agreed that if the inner line of defence was forced, the garrison should retire to the artillery barracks and blow the place up. The example of Ricaurte had enflamed their hearts.

Boves for some time made no further attempt on the lines of San Mateo, and the dispirited Llaneros began to desert, but the situation of Bolívar was desperate. His only chance lay in the speedy arrival of Mariño, who was at last advancing by forced marches from the East, and was sweeping the plains in the rear of the Royalists. Then Boves after one more desperate assault upon the lines, which was repulsed, retreated to La Puerta, to stop the advance of Mariño from the plains. But Mariño succeeded in turning this position and established himself at the Boca Chica. Here he was attacked by Boves on the 31st March, but forced him to retreat with a loss of 500 killed, and occupied the city of Victoria.

Ceballos then, fearing an attack on his rear by the united forces of Bolívar and Mariño, raised the siege of Valencia and retired to San Carlos, to await reinforcements which Boves was collecting on the plains. Here he was attacked by Mariño on the 17th April. Mariño was so destitute of military capacity that the troops under his immediate command dispersed at the first volley, but Urdaneta rallied the infantry and retired to Valencia.

Cajigal then brought up a strong reinforcement and took command of the Royalists. Bolívar, after being joined by Rivas with 800 men from Caracas, advanced against him. After some manœuvring the armies met on the plain of Carabobo, and Bolívar won a complete victory. The Royalists lost 300 killed and all their guns and flags, while the Patriots had only 12 killed and 40 wounded.

Bolívar was victorious over the Spanish generals, but the strength of the people was against him. The indefatigable Boves had received large supplies of arms and ammunition from Guayana, and again rushed upon him from the plains with about 7,000 men, of whom more than 2,000 were infantry. Bolívar, instead of massing his troops to make head against this new danger, detached Mariño against Boves with only 2,300 men, while he sent Urdaneta with 700 men off westward, and another division of 1,100 in pursuit of Cajigal and Ceballos. But this latter corps joined Mariño, who then in complete ignorance of the superior strength of the Royalist leader, determined to wait for Boves at La Puerta, in a most unfavourable position. Bolívar joined him too late to remedy the evil. The Patriots were overwhelmed by a desperate charge of the Llanero horse on the 14th June, and were slaughtered without mercy; at least 1,200 were left dead upon the field; Boves himself reported that 2,800 were killed.

Bolívar fled to Caracas, but instead of making some attempt to reunite his shattered forces, maintained the siege of Puerto Cabello and instructed the garrison of Valencia to hold out to the last extremity. A small detachment of 250 men defending the pass of Cabrera was overwhelmed, every man was killed, and Valencia was forced to capitulate to Boves, who, in spite of his oath to spare the lives of the garrison, butchered them all, and many of the inhabitants of the town also. D’Eluyar being isolated, spiked his guns and embarked his troops on the flotilla. Urdaneta was left alone in the West; Bolívar evacuated Caracas and withdrew to the East, carrying with him all the jewels and specie he could find in the churches, and embarrassed by the multitude of fugitives who fled with him. He reached Aragua with 2,000 men and at once commenced to throw up entrenchments. Mariño sent him 1,000 men under Bermudez from Cumaná, and some supplies of war material.

On the 18th August, the position at Aragua was attacked by Morales with a horde of 8,000 negroes, mulattos, and Indians. The Patriots defended themselves with the resolution of despair, but after two hours fighting, in which entire battalions had perished, Bolívar retreated with a part of his force on Barcelona. Bermudez still held the position for two hours longer, and then fled to Maturin with the remnant of his cavalry. The butchery which followed was frightful, more than 3,000 were killed in cold blood, even the townsfolk who sought refuge in the church had their throats cut in the sacred edifice. The loss of the Royalists was nearly 2,000 in killed and wounded.

Bolívar, Mariño, Rivas, Piar and D’Eluyar met at Cumaná, and resolved to concentrate the resistance at Güiria, a position easily defended, while the flotilla kept open their communications by sea. Bolívar had shipped the treasure brought by him from Caracas on board of these vessels. Bianchi, who was still in command, determined to seize it. Bolívar and Mariño hearing of his intention, embarked with him as he sailed for the island of Margarita. He gave two vessels up to them with all the jewels and two-thirds of the specie, retaining the rest as payment for the prizes he had made, upon which the two Dictators returned to the mainland.

On the 3rd September they landed at Carúpano, where they found that they had been proscribed as traitors who had deserted their comrades, while Rivas and Piar had taken the command. Piar had the intention of treating Bolívar as he had treated Miranda, but Rivas set him at liberty and arrested Mariño. At this juncture Bianchi returned, and by threats saved them both. Bolívar gave up the treasure to Rivas and retired to Curaçoa, leaving behind him an address to the people in which he disdainfully left his justification to the future:—

“I swear to you that this title (Liberator), which your gratitude bestowed upon me when I broke your chains, shall not be in vain. I swear to you that Liberator or dead, I shall ever merit the honour you have done me; no human power can turn me from my course.”

When he had gone, Rivas took the supreme command, but the genius of Bolívar was wanting. On the 26th August Cumaná pronounced for the Royalists. Bermudez, entrenched at Maturin, was attacked by Morales with a greatly superior force, but sallying out, utterly routed him, killing 2,000 of his men. He was then joined by Rivas; between them they assembled nearly 5,000 men. Piar, disregarding the orders of Rivas to join him, marched on Cumaná, which he retook and collected 2,000 men, but was then attacked by Boves and totally defeated.

Boves then retook Cumaná, and put every man to death who fell into his hands. It is said that more than a thousand victims perished in this massacre. Cumaná was left a desert. Boves was then joined by Morales, who had reorganized his army, and together they marched on Maturin at the head of 7,000 men. The Patriots sallied out to meet them under the command of Rivas and Bermudez.

With very inferior numbers they met the Royalist army at Urica to the west of Maturin, on the 5th December. Boves drew up his men in two lines and awaited their onslaught. An impetuous charge of the Patriot cavalry broke the right wing of the Royalists, and Boves, ever foremost in a melée, was killed by a lance thrust. Morales, with the left and the reserve, restored the combat and gained a complete victory. No quarter was given and the last army of the Republic was destroyed.

Morales was by acclamation named General-in-Chief of the “Windward Army,” which was the name which had been given to this Royalist force by its late commander, and lost no time in marching upon Maturin, which city was well fortified and had a good supply of artillery, but the garrison, only 600 in number, was but poorly armed. After an obstinate defence which caused severe losses to the Royalist army, this last bulwark of the Patriots was captured on the 11th December. Bermudez escaped with 200 men, but Rivas flying alone, was overtaken and killed, and his head, covered with the Phrygian cap of Liberty, was exposed in an iron cage on the road from Caracas to La Guayra. According to contemporary writers more than 3,000 victims were slaughtered by Morales after his victory. The peace of the tomb reigned in Venezuela.

Three popular leaders still kept up the flames of insurrection at the head waters of the Orinoco and its tributaries: Zaraza, Monagas, and Cedeño, who afterwards became celebrated as Guerilleros. In the West all was quiet after the rout of La Puerta. The column under Urdaneta, so imprudently detached by Bolívar after Carabobo, was cut off when Boves occupied Valencia. Urdaneta retreated with 1,000 men, and being hotly pressed by Calzada, crossed the frontier into New Granada. He then detached 200 infantry and some cavalry officers to defend the Province of Casanare. This small detachment became the nucleus of the famous Army of the Apure, which changed the destinies of Venezuela, by leading the people to embrace the cause of the revolution. Among these cavalry officers was one named Jose Antonio Paez, a man till then unknown, who was soon to become the Achilles of Venezuela, and was to eclipse by his deeds the fabulous prowess of the heroes of Homer.

There now only remained one spot of Venezuelan territory over which still floated the flag of the Republic, the island of Margarita, where Arismendi and Bermudez with some few followers had found asylum.

CHAPTER XL.

THE DISSOLUTION OF NEW GRANADA.

1815—1817.

In the year 1813 these two colonies had been united by the Spanish authorities under one nominal government, Marshal Montalvo being appointed Viceroy. The Peninsular troops had made but a poor show in the war in Venezuela; the two restorations had been achieved by native troops under the command of Monteverde, Boves, and Morales, who looked with contempt upon the Spanish generals as they condemned their excesses, and who refused all obedience to the colonial authorities. Thus Montalvo looked upon the preponderance of the native element as a source of danger, and as a dishonour to the cause of royalty, and had applied to the Home Government for reinforcements. New Granada was now to be the theatre of war, and thither went Bolívar, either to take part in it or to seek help for another reconquest of Venezuela.

He presented himself to the Congress assembled at Tunja. Camilo Torres, the President, thanked him for his distinguished services, saying that Venezuela was not lost so long as Bolívar lived. He was at once put in command of a corps of 1,800 men, of which Urdaneta’s column formed a part, and was sent to reduce Cundinamarca, which still held aloof from the Federal Government. In view of the danger which now threatened the Republic, Congress had appointed a Supreme Junta, whose authority was recognised by all the provinces except Cartagena and Cundinamarca. Santa Fé de Bogotá was the arsenal of the Republic, the subjugation of Cundinamarca was therefore necessary.

Bolívar prosecuted his campaign with his usual activity. At his approach all the towns of Cundinamarca declared in favour of Congress; Bogotá, the capital, where Alvarez, who had been left in command by his nephew, Nariño, when he marched for the South, had entrenched himself, alone offered any resistance. Bolívar laid siege to the city, and by a series of vigorous assaults shut up the garrison in the principal square, and cut off their supply of water. Alvarez was forced to capitulate.

Congress then changed the seat of government to Bogotá; the Republic had at last possession of its own capital, and the Government was greatly strengthened. Bolívar was named Captain-General of the Confederation, his title of Liberator was recognised, and another was bestowed upon him, that of “Illustrious Pacificator.” Of course Bolívar made a speech on this occasion, and prophesied that the Army of New Granada would break the chains of all the oppressed peoples of South America.

The new plan of Bolívar was to advance by the coast to Coro. Government gave him three battalions of infantry and a squadron of cavalry, in all 2,000 men, with orders to seek supplies of arms and ammunition at Cartagena. Colonel Castillo, who was Governor of this Province, prompted by his old jealousy of Bolívar, and listening to the counsels of Mariño and Montillo, who had taken refuge at Cartagena, refused these supplies. Bolívar established his head-quarters at the beautiful city of Mompox and remained inactive, passing his time in feasts and parades, and in intrigues against the local government, till his money was spent and he had lost half his troops by sickness and desertion.

Then, with only one gun, he laid siege to Cartagena, the strongest fortress in South America, till a powerful Spanish expedition landed on the coast and brought him to his senses. On the 8th May, 1815, he handed over the relics of his army to Castillo, and took leave of his men in a sentimental address, in which he expressed his sorrow at not being able to share in the triumphs which awaited them. He then withdrew to Jamaica, but ere he went fired a parting shot, declaring:—

“Cartagena prefers her own destruction to the duty of obedience to the Federal Government.”

A shot which recoiled upon himself, for he also had preferred his own destruction to obedience, and had inoculated the Granadian Republic with a new germ of dissolution.

In Jamaica he published a memorial in his own defence, which rather strengthens the case against him. Soon after that, under the signature of “A South American,” he published another memorial upon the Revolution in South America, and upon the future organization of the new republics, which is a refutation of the chimerical plan of a Continental monocracy which he attempted to establish later on. In this memorial he advocated the absolute independence of each separate colony, “but New Granada shall unite with Venezuela, and this nation shall be called Columbia.” A prophetic vision!

The reinforcements applied for by Montalvo reached Cumaná early in April. One ship-of-the-line, three frigates, and twenty-one smaller ships of war came in convoy of a fleet of sixty transports, carrying 10,600 men and a siege train. This was the greatest effort which had as yet been made by the mother country to crush the insurrection in South America, and it was the last. The troops were selected from regiments which had fought against the armies of Napoleon, and had been educated in the school of Wellington. They were under the command of Marshal Morillo, the best of all the Spanish generals of that time. Originally a sergeant of marines, he had won his way by distinguished valour to his present high position. He had seen hard service among the Spanish guerillas, and had learned the art of war in the Anglo-Spanish armies. He was no great military genius, but he had respectable talents and was a good fighter. He was popular among the soldiery, but was a strict disciplinarian, and tenacious in his enterprises. He was cruel by system, not from inclination, but was also of a suspicious and passionate temperament. He knew nothing of the country he was sent to pacify, and his instructions gave him no information of any value, being drawn up in complete ignorance of the actual state of South America, and were instinct with contempt for the Creole inhabitants, a contempt in which he also shared.

This expedition was originally intended for the River Plate, but on the fall of Monte Video its destination was changed. At the same time, as Panamá was considered to be the key to the continent, another expedition of 2,500 men was sent, under command of General Miyares, to Vera Cruz for the purpose of securing the Isthmus.

Morillo was instructed to overrun the mainland from Guayana to Darien, first of all reducing the island of Margarita. He was then to take Cartagena, subdue New Granada, and to re-establish order in Venezuela. All this was thought so easy that he was further instructed to send his spare troops to Peru and Mexico. Vast as was this plan, Morillo accomplished it in the time given him for the purpose. In the course of the year 1815 all the insurgent colonies of Spain were reduced to submission, with the exception of the Provinces of the River Plate.

The rest of the instructions were drawn up in terms of benevolence towards the Americans. The atrocities committed under the Royal flag were severely censured, and the troops who had taken part in them were directed to be withdrawn from the theatre of action, but ample power was given to Morillo to deviate from these instructions when he thought it necessary, and he had also permission to suppress the tribunals of justice. Thus everything was left to his discretion.

The first man with whom Morillo spoke in the New World was Morales, who was now master of the east of Venezuela, and had fitted out a flotilla for an attack upon the island of Margarita. Early in April the expedition was sighted from the coast of Cumaná; Morales sailed out to meet it with three brigs, manned by a division of infantry, to place himself at the orders of the general. Camba, the historian, who was present, says that his European soldiers gazed in astonishment upon the decks of these three small vessels as they sailed through the Spanish fleet. They were crowded with dark-skinned men wearing round straw hats, a waistcloth, with a cartridge-box buckled over it, and, in general, no other raiment. If these were the victors what must the vanquished be like! An unfortunate first impression to receive, which gave them a false idea of the work before them. “Venezuela and Caracas were lost after the arrival of first-class troops, who were well commanded.”

In accordance with his instructions, Morillo went on to the island of Margarita with all his army, reinforced by three thousand of Morales’ troops, shipped on the flotilla. The Patriot cruisers had captured one of the vessels of the convoy, so that the strength of the expedition was known. Bermudez proposed to resist to the last extremity, but finding no support fled to Cartagena. Arismendi gave himself up, and was kindly received by Morillo, who seated him at his own table, apparently forgetting his massacre of eight hundred Spaniards. On the 9th April, 1815, the island was occupied without resistance. Morillo issued a proclamation offering an amnesty to all insurgents who would give themselves up, and kept his word; but fifteen men who gave themselves up to Morales were slaughtered.

The first success and the first disaster of the expedition came together. The ship-of-the-line San Pedro, the most powerful vessel of the squadron, caught fire and was a total loss, the military chest and a great quantity of warlike stores being burned with her.

The generous behaviour of Morillo at Margarita procured him a favourable reception at Caracas, where he arrived on the 11th May, but his first act was to levy a forced loan to replace the treasure lost on the San Pedro. He then proceeded to confiscate the properties of all who had taken part in the Revolution, and of those who were absent or who were suspected, the amount so taken being estimated at fifteen millions of dollars. General Moxó, a man of cruel and rapacious character, was made Governor of Venezuela; the Audiencia and all the civil tribunals were suppressed, and were replaced by councils of war. A military despotism was established.

Morillo had now 16,000 men under his command, including the native troops. He sent a battalion of light infantry to Puerto Rico, a division of 1,700 men to Peru, 3,000 men were told off as the garrison of Venezuela, and Calzada’s division, in Barinas, was reinforced by European troops. Then with 5,000 Europeans and 3,500 native troops under Morales, embarked in fifty-six ships, he sailed on the 12th July for the leeward coast to commence operations against New Granada.

The employment of native troops was in accordance with his instructions, but the measure produced discontent in his ranks. These troops were despised by the Spaniards, and had no wish to leave their native country. More than a thousand of the Llaneros deserted rather than embark. The way in which they were treated aroused in them the native instinct for independence, of which they soon became the most doughty champions.

Morillo landed at Santa Marta, intent upon the capture of Cartagena. The garrison was weak, was short of arms and of provisions, and was cut off from help either by sea or by land, but was nevertheless resolute to resist to the last extremity. The ground was cleared for three leagues round, outlying posts were called in, a flotilla was armed for the defence of the bay, sixty guns were added to the eighty-four already mounted on the batteries, martial law was proclaimed, and all men capable of bearing arms were compelled to serve. The garrison was thus increased to 3,600 men, of whom 1,300 were regular troops. The command was at first given to Castillo, but he was soon after replaced by Bermudez, and Montilla was named Major-General.

Cartagena was then the strongest fortress in America. It was captured by the French in 1697, but when the English, under Admiral Vernon, attacked it in the year 1741 they were beaten off, although they had 9,000 soldiers in addition to a powerful fleet. It was built upon a promontory running into the sea, and is so separated from the mainland by marshes that it may be considered an island—a sort of military Venice. The city proper is situate to the north-west of this promontory, and to the west of it lies a suburb called Getzemani, which communicates with the city by a fortified bridge thrown across a deep canal, and is closed at each end by a stockade. Getzemani is also joined to the mainland by another bridge of similar construction. The fortress, the city, and the suburb, were all enclosed on the land side by high walls and bastions. To the east, beyond the swamps, and about half a mile from the walls, stood a castle on a hill, called San Lázaro, whose fire swept all the city, but was itself under the fire of a fortified hill, called La Popa, which commanded all the approaches. The most accessible part of the city was the bay, which runs from north to south, and is nearly a mile in length. This bay is shut in from the Gulf of Mexico by two islands, which leave only two practicable entrances—the Boca Grande, by which Admiral Vernon penetrated, and which was afterwards closed by orders from Spain, and the Boca Chica, which was defended by two castles on the island and by batteries on the coast. The flotilla consisted of a corvette, seven schooners, and some gunboats, aided in shallow water by a sort of armed rafts called “bongos.”

Morillo detached Morales, with his division, across the Magdalena, to blockade the city by land while he blockaded it by sea, his idea being to starve out the garrison.

The heavy rains of the season and frequent tempests made the work of the siege very arduous to the Royalists, filling their hospitals with sick. On the 25th October the city was bombarded, with no other effect than to kill a few women and children. Several assaults were made upon various outworks, which were repulsed, but in November the larger island was captured by Morales. Two batteries were placed upon it and upon the adjacent shore, the fire from which swept the bay and prevented fishing, thus destroying one great resource of the city, where hunger soon proved more formidable than shot and shell. Fevers broke out, rats and hides were eaten by the starving garrison, sentinels were found dead at their posts when parties were sent to relieve them, but no one talked of surrender. At last it was determined to drive from the city two thousand useless mouths, old men, women, and children. It was a procession of spectres; only one-third of them reached the advanced posts of the besiegers, the rest sank down and perished on the way. The survivors were kindly received by the Spaniards, but Morillo wrote to the Patriot leaders that if they did not surrender in three days he would drive the fugitives back into the city. On that day, the 4th December, three hundred persons died of hunger in the streets; it was impossible to hold out longer, but still they would not surrender.

On the night of the 5th the guns on the hill of La Popa, and on the castle of San Lazaro, were spiked. At dawn on the day following, a remnant of two thousand men embarked on the flotilla, crossed the bay under the fire of the Royalist batteries, took on board the garrisons of the batteries at the Boca Chica, and on the 7th put to sea in a storm which dispersed the blockading squadron.

Morillo entered the city on the 6th December, and found it a hospital of dying men, and a cemetery of dead bodies, which lay all about the streets; the very air was poison. The siege had lasted one hundred and eight days. It was calculated that six thousand had died in the city of hunger and disease, besides those who were killed in the various attacks. The loss of the besiegers was nearly three thousand five hundred men.

The victory was stained by an act of barbarism. Morales, who had occupied the batteries at the Boca Chica, on their evacuation by the Patriots, offered an amnesty to all fugitives who would present themselves. Four hundred old men, women, and children, and some fishermen who had hidden in the brushwood covering the island, presented themselves. The throats of every one of them were cut on the seashore by his orders. Morillo was more humane, but Castillo, who had hidden himself, was put to death by his command, and his body was exposed on a gibbet. The same fate was meted out to six of the principal citizens, among them being Garcia Toledo, who had headed the revolution in 1810. At the same time the Inquisition was re-established.

Calzada, advancing from Barinas to aid in the subjugation of New Granada, attempted first to clear the plains of Casanare of the Patriot light horse, but being beaten by them on the 1st October, he crossed the Cordillera with 1,800 infantry and 500 cavalry, routed various detached parties of Patriots who came in his way, and totally defeated their main body at Balaga on the 25th November. He then occupied Pamplona, where he found the streets strewn with the corpses of Spaniards, who had been barbarously murdered by the Patriots when they evacuated that city.

Congress now again made Torres President, with dictatorial powers, and appointed Torices Vice-President. Torres raised an army of 2,500 recruits, with which he forced Calzada, who was advancing on the capital, to retreat to Ocaña. But Calzada, after receiving some reinforcements, turned upon him and completely routed him on the 22nd February. The three Provinces of Pamplona, Socorro, and Antioquia were then occupied by the Royalists, and the capital lay defenceless. Torres resigned, and a physician named Madrid was appointed in his place. He called for volunteers; only six men offered themselves.

Cundinamarca, which had been forced into the Union, had remained disaffected, and now became openly Royalist. The rest of the country was worn out, and was only eager for peace. Congress authorised Madrid to negotiate with Morillo, and dissolved itself. The new President retired to the South with the remnant of the army, and joined the division of Popayán under Mejia, who then marched against a Royalist force under Sámano, which was advancing from Quito, and was totally defeated.

Morillo left a strong garrison at Cartagena and divided the rest of his diminished force into four light columns for the complete subjugation of the country. Bogotá fell without a shot being fired, but while he was at Ocaña with the reserve, news reached him that Venezuela was again in commotion, that a fresh insurrection had broken out in the island of Margarita, and that the emigrants, headed by Bolívar, were preparing an expedition to rekindle the flames of revolution on the mainland. Seriously alarmed, he sent Morales with a division back to Venezuela to secure his base of operations.

Morillo now, for the first time, appreciated the magnitude of the enterprise he had undertaken, and, with rare perspicuity, foresaw its fatal termination. He wrote to the Home Government that, in spite of his success, he could not without reinforcements bring the Llaneros into subjection, and that it was necessary to establish a military government, and so crush rebellion by the use of the same means which had been employed at the time of the conquest. He then published an amnesty to all officers of the revolutionary armies, from captain downwards, who would lay down their arms, but he put to death all superior officers who fell into his hands, quartering their bodies and exposing their heads in cages.

General La Torre, who commanded at Bogotá, published a similar amnesty to civil officials, for which step he was severely censured by Morillo, and in May, 1816, the prisons of the capital were full.

Morillo then went there himself, avoiding a public reception and entering the city by night. La Torre and Calzada were again censured for receiving presents from rebels; the first was, as a punishment, sent off to the plains, and the second to Cúcuta. The amnesty was then annulled, and severe decrees were published against all who should either write or speak on forbidden subjects.

On the 30th May, which was the birthday of the King, the women of the city presented themselves, imploring mercy for their fathers, sons, and husbands. Morillo received them roughly and sent them off with insults. The prisons being insufficient to accommodate the multitude of prisoners, some were confined in the convents. He searched the city archives for pretexts to increase their number, and a military tribunal was established to try them.

Villavicencio, Montufar, Lozano, Camilo Torres, and Torices were executed, being shot in the back as traitors, and their bodies were hung on gibbets. Baraya and Mejia shared the same fate. Caldas, the philosopher, whose scientific labours had won him world-wide fame, was sentenced to death, and when Morillo was entreated to spare the life of so illustrious a man, he answered savagely:—

“Spain has no need of sages.”

One hundred and twenty-five victims perished on the scaffold, of whom a fifth part were graduates of the University. The properties of all victims were confiscated; their families were reduced to misery; the entire male population was classified as convicts, and gangs of them were forced to work on the public roads. Truly the system adopted by the Spaniards at the conquest was now re-established in America in the cause of Spanish absolutism, and for a King who was spoken of by his own mother as “tiger heart and mule head.”

Bloodshed and absolute power clouded the mental faculties of Morillo; he dreamed of destroying the Argentine Republic, and of then returning in triumph to Mexico to repeat there the cruelties of Cortes, but the course of events in Venezuela soon opened his eyes. He left a garrison of 3,800 men at Bogotá, Venezuelans and Pastusos, and with 4,000 Spanish troops crossed the Cordillera in November, 1816, taking some prisoners with him to shoot on the frontier line. This march convinced him, for the second time, of his impotence to prosecute his enterprise; by his own confession, he could neither pass the rivers nor procure supplies without the help of the Llaneros who went with him.

General Sámano remained in command at Bogotá. His first act was to erect a gallows in the great square, in front of the windows of his palace, and to set up four execution-posts (banquillos) on the public promenade. One of his first victims was a beautiful young woman, convicted of sending information to the Patriot guerillas on the plains of Casanare. She was shot in the back, with seven men implicated in the same affair. She died encouraging her companions to meet their fate like men, and prophesying that her death would soon be revenged. Under the name of La Pola her memory is still preserved in the songs of her native land.

Morillo, finding Sámano so apt a pupil in his school of terrorism, made him Viceroy in place of Montalvo, whose more humane nature shrank from the perpetration of such cruelties.

CHAPTER XLI.

THE THIRD WAR IN VENEZUELA.

1815—1817.

After the rout of Urica, and the catastrophe of Maturin, the remnants of the Republican army of the East were dispersed as guerillas along the banks and about the head-waters of the Orinoco, and on the plains of Barcelona, while the insurrection was still unquelled on the plains of Casanare. A fresh signal for a general revolt was given by the island of Margarita immediately after the departure of Morillo on his expedition against New Granada. The Royalist governor, Colonel Urreistieta, to assert his authority, ordered the arrest of Arismendi. Fifteen hundred of the islanders rose in arms. The governor ordered the troops to give no quarter to the insurgents, gave them permission to pillage as they chose, and burned two towns in accordance with instructions received from General Moxó. The insurgents accepted the challenge of war to the knife. Arismendi put himself at their head, and took possession of the northern half of the island, captured by assault the fort at the Villa del Norte, and put to death the whole of the garrison, who numbered 200 men. Then on the 15th November, 1815, he laid siege to the capital and shut up the governor in the castle of Santa Rosa. His army numbered 4,300 infantry and 200 cavalry, badly armed, but all resolute men.

On the plains of Casanare the scattered groups of guerillas were organized by Paez into an army. José Antonio Paez was a native of Barinas, and was at this time twenty-six years old. He had served bravely throughout the campaign of the reconquest, but had never attracted special notice; now he was to show his great talents as a leader. He was a genuine Creole, of Caucasian race, with some mixture of native blood; a man of herculean strength, a breaker-in of wild horses, and an untiring swimmer. Skilful in the use of lance and sword, in moments of danger he was ever in the front rank, and had great influence over his men, both by his personal and by his moral qualities. They were accustomed to call him “Uncle” when addressing him. If any soldier committed a crime or showed unwillingness to obey orders it was his custom to challenge him to single combat. Whether the challenge were accepted or not he was always the victor, either physically or morally. After the excitement of a battle his nervous system would frequently give way, and he would fall to the ground, apparently lifeless. His plans were always carefully thought out and rapidly executed. He at this time knew neither how to read nor write, and was in no sense a politician, but was of a kindly, generous nature, and of very superior intelligence. In times of peace he was easily led, but in times of danger he led every one. His usual dress was a blouse of blue cloth, with a cloak thrown over his shoulders; a slouched hat, the front rim turned up and decorated with the cockade of Venezuela; and the gaiters of a Llanero. He wore a Toledo sword, and invariably carried a long lance.

Paez was serving as a simple captain with a small corps of Patriots which held the town of Guadalito, when news was brought of the approach of the Spanish governor of Barinas, with 1,100 horse and 300 infantry. The officer in command proposed to retreat. Paez requested permission to remain with one squadron to defend the town. Most of the other officers present approved of the proposition, on which the commander said angrily,

“Then let Paez command you, and those who choose may follow me to Casanare.”

Paez, left with 500 men, marched out to meet the enemy, whom he found on the 16th February, 1816, near to the sources of the Apure. Paez, advancing alone to reconnoitre the position, had his horse killed under him by a musket-ball. It was near nightfall; some advised him to wait for daylight.

“It is as dark for them as it is for us,” said Paez, and shouted to his men, “Comrades, they have killed my horse. If you will not revenge his death I will revenge him alone, and will die in the enemy’s ranks.”

The men shouted back that they would go wherever he would lead them. He formed them in two lines and led them on under a heavy fire. Such was the fury of the charge that two-thirds of the Royalist cavalry were driven in confusion from the field. As he led an attack upon their second line his horse was wounded, and burst the girths of the saddle with his plunges. The attack was beaten off. Springing on to the first horse he could catch, Paez rallied his men and again charged at full speed upon the rest of the Royalist cavalry, and bore them down in the rush. While the Patriots pursued the broken cavalry the Spanish infantry retreated through the woods. Four hundred killed and two hundred prisoners were the trophies of the day. Paez treated his prisoners so well that they all voluntarily took service with him.

This brilliant affair attracted the attention of the Llaneros, who were weary of the brutal rule of Boves and Morales, and won them over to the cause of independence.

Paez became at once the first general of cavalry in America. He was the bond of union between the Llaneros and the Patriots. He was proclaimed the chieftain of the plains, and from the recruits who poured in to join his standard he organized the famous Army of the Apure. On taking command he told his men that he would do his best to merit the confidence they had placed in him, but exhorted them above all to put faith in Divine Providence. In September, 1816, he invaded the Province of Barinas.

While the Army of the Apure was thus gathering itself together, the parties of guerillas, scattered along the banks of the Upper Orinoco, and on the eastern plains, also collected, forming divisions of as many as 1,500 men, under Monagas, Saraza and Cedeño. The Governor of Guayana sent a strong column against Cedeño, which was completely routed by him on the 8th March, 1816. A second expedition of 1,500 men, sent in boats up the Orinoco, had no better fortune, and was forced to retire to Angostura, the capital of Guayana.

While Bolívar, in exile at Kingston, Jamaica, was turning over in his mind many plans for renewing the War of Independence, he had a narrow escape from assassination. A slave of his who had followed his fortunes went one night into his room when all was dark, and seeing a man asleep in his hammock, gave him two stabs with a poniard, killing him on the spot. The dead man was found to be a poor emigrant named Amestoy, who, knowing that Bolívar would not sleep at home that night, occupied his room. The slave was caught, and confessed that it was his intention to kill Bolívar, but said not a word about accomplices. He was hung, but it was generally believed that an emissary of General Moxó had paid him to do the deed.

From Jamaica Bolívar crossed to the island of Santo Domingo, hearing on his way of the fall of Cartagena, where, too late, he had been offered the command. The famous mulatto, Alexander Petión, was at that time President of Haiti. He was an ardent partisan of the emancipation of Spanish America, and not only supplied Bolívar with arms for another expedition, but opened a credit for him for the necessary expenses with the house of a wealthy English merchant named Robert Sutherland. Bolívar also met here a Dutch shipbuilder named Luis Brion, who, becoming deeply interested both in him and in his designs, placed seven armed schooners at his orders, with 3,500 muskets, and offered his life and fortune in the same cause.

Bolívar commenced his preparations early in 1816, at the port of Cayos de San Luis, which has given its name to this famous expedition. There the refugees from Cartagena, and many officers from New Granada and Venezuela had collected. Among them were Piar, Mariño, Bermudez, Montilla, Soublette, the English Colonel MacGregor, who had served with Miranda, Doucoudray-Holstein, and Francisco Zea. There was anarchy among them; many of them refused to recognise the authority of Bolívar. Petión interposed his influence, and Brion declared that he would entrust his ships and armament to no one but to the Liberator. He was at length accepted as leader of the expedition, from which Montilla, who had challenged Bolívar, and Bermudez, who had led the opposition, were excluded.

Brion, with the title of Admiral of Venezuela, took command of the squadron, which sailed from Cayos on the 16th March, 1816. The expedition consisted of 300 men, whom Bolívar afterwards compared to the 300 Spartans of Leonidas, as he compared his reconquest of Venezuela to the redemption of Jerusalem by the Crusaders. They reached the island of Margarita early in May, finding there the Spanish brig Intrepido and the schooner Rita, which Brion boarded and captured, after a desperate resistance in which three-fourths of their crews were killed. The expedition then disembarked at the port of Juan Griego, the Royalists concentrating their forces at Pampatar and Porlamar.

Bolívar and Arismendi then conjointly convened a meeting of the officers of the Patriot army, and of the principal inhabitants, in the church at La Villa del Norte, in order to name the supreme ruler of the Republic they were about to restore. In accordance with his custom, Bolívar immediately renounced all pretensions to so important a post, which, as he had already arranged the matter with Arismendi, was merely one way of securing his own appointment. On the 7th May he was named “Supreme Chief,” with power to do whatever he might find necessary for the salvation of the country. Mariño was named second in command.

On the 8th May Bolívar published a proclamation to the people of Venezuela, announcing that the National Congress would be reinstalled, and authorising the free towns to elect deputies, who should have the same sovereign powers as in the former epoch.

The expedition, reinforced by four ships from the island, then went on to Carupano, on the coast of Paria, capturing two armed vessels of the enemy and the fort, which was abandoned by the garrison. Here Bolívar established his head-quarters on the 1st June.

Rumour had greatly exaggerated the strength of the force he brought with him, but Bolívar made small use of the stupor into which the Royalists were thrown. He detached Piar to Maturin and Mariño to Güiria, but remained himself at Carupano, issuing pompous bulletins, in which he renounced his former system of a war of extermination, as a mistake. Also, in fulfilment of a promise to Petión, he published a decree giving liberty to all slaves, and called the people to arms, but no one joined him. He then convened an assembly of the townsfolk, who at his suggestion decreed the centralization of the powers of government. The federal system was abolished in Venezuela.

But a month of precious time was thus lost. Twenty days after the disembarkation, his advanced posts were driven in, and he was besieged by a division of 1,300 men, while a Spanish squadron threatened his communications by sea. Mariño sent him a strong reinforcement, but Brion refused to risk his ships in an unequal fight with the Spanish squadron. Meantime the guerilla leaders of the East proclaimed him general-in-chief, and desired his presence.

Rejecting the advice of Piar to occupy Guayana as a base of operations, he re-embarked his small force, and again landed on the 5th July at Ocumare, between Caracas and Puerto Cabello. This step can only be explained by his anxiety to rescue his native city from the Royalists, a preoccupation which was to cost him the loss of three campaigns. Again rejecting the advice of his officers, who wished to effect a junction with the guerillas and so form an army, he detached Soublette with the bulk of his men to occupy the pass of Cabrera, and a smaller force along the coast in search of recruits, while he landed a printing press and issued more bulletins, and Brion went off on a cruise leaving him one armed brig and two small schooners.

On the same day on which Bolívar landed at Ocumare, Morales reached Valencia, with the division detached by Morillo after the surrender of Cartagena. In the face of such a superior force, Soublette was compelled to retire to a strong position on the heights of Ocumare. Bolívar went to his assistance with 150 recruits, but the combined force was completely routed by Morales on the 13th July.

MacGregor was then sent off with a detachment southwards to Choroni, while Soublette protected the retreat of Bolívar with the artillery to Ocumare, where he intended to re-embark. While engaged at night in this operation, he received word that the enemy were entering the town. It was a false alarm, Soublette still held his ground, but his men were panic-struck, and Bolívar, without inquiring into the truth of the report, abandoned his sick and wounded, and fled on board the brig where his stores of war material were already in safety. He sailed at once and reached the island of Bonaire on the 16th July. Here he was joined by Brion, and sailed with him for Choroni, where he learned that Soublette and MacGregor had marched inland and had taken refuge in the valleys of Aragua. Returning to Bonaire he there met Bermudez, and with him sailed off to join Mariño at Güiria.

Soublette and MacGregor had joined forces at Choroni, the latter taking the command. Two days he waited for news of Bolívar and then marched off for the plains with 600 infantry and 30 horse. Dispersing a Royalist detachment which attempted to bar the passage of the hills, he occupied Victoria and routed another detachment under Rosete. On the 1st August he was met by a squadron of Saraza’s guerillas, who were in search of him, and on the 2nd August routed another division of 1,200 Royalists at Quebrada-Honda. The next day he was joined by Saraza and Monagas with their divisions of guerillas, and was master of the plains of Barcelona, while Cedeño held his ground on the Upper Orinoco. So was formed the army which was afterwards known as “the Army of the Centre,” which, in conjunction with that of the Apure, decided the destinies of Venezuela. Of this army MacGregor was recognised as general-in-chief.

At Güiria Bolívar met with but a sorry reception, the troops of Mariño refused to obey him, and the island of Margarita declined to recognise his authority. Bermudez charged him with cowardice for deserting his soldiers when in danger. Amid threats and jeers he was forced to re-embark and returned to Haití, where he was coldly received by Petión. The people were incensed against him and had lost all faith in him. Nevertheless, Bolívar was the man not only for the revolution in Columbia, but for the emancipation of South America. None so well as he could rise superior to adverse fortune, none had such power as he over the petty chieftains, none but he could organize the discordant elements of the revolution into the strength of a warlike nation. Spite of his ignorance of military tactics and of his puerile vanity, he was the genius of the revolution in the North of the Continent. The sacred fire of liberty and of patriotism burned within him and inspired him. As he himself said, he would yet merit the title of Liberator. History owes to him this justice as she turns this disgraceful page.