CHAPTER XLIV.

THE WAR IN QUITO.

1821—1822.

On the resumption of hostilities, General Torres, who had succeeded Valdez in command, was forced by Garcia to shut himself up in Popayán. He afterwards marched with 1800 men upon Pasto, but suffered such heavy losses by sickness and desertion, that he was compelled to retreat, and in August he abandoned Popayán.

The Royalists of Patia and Pasto, aided from Quito, might have prolonged the war indefinitely but that the operations of San Martin and Cochrane threw their base open to attack, and the revolution of Guayaquil cut off all communication between Quito and the Pacific. Bolívar saw this, and as Quito was not included in the armistice of Trujillo, determined to attack from the South as well as from the North, and at the same time open for himself a road to the Pacific. Looking about for an officer to whom he could entrust the undertaking, he chose General Sucre, who was at that time Minister of War of the Republic of Columbia.

Sucre was a native of Cumaná, had received a scientific education, and had served from his early youth in all the campaigns of the revolution of Venezuela, under Miranda, Piar, and Bolívar. Bolívar said of him:—

“Sucre has the best organized head in all Columbia.”

San Martin, who never met him, wrote of him in after years, that he was one of the most noteworthy men produced by the Republic of Columbia, and of greater military skill than even Bolívar himself.

The mission confided to Sucre was both political and military. He was to aid the new State of Guayaquil against the Royalists, and was to induce her to join the Republic of Columbia. At Popayán he collected a thousand of the dispersed troops, and reached Guayaquil by sea in May, 1821. He found that the majority of the people were in favour of union with Peru, and that they had already suffered defeat in their first brush with the Royalists.

At this juncture the flotilla and a battalion of native troops revolted in the name of the King. Sucre put down the movement, and thus became master of the situation, and commander-in-chief of all the forces.

At the head of a combined army, Sucre then marched against the Royalists, who under Aymerich were descending the mountain slopes from Quito, in two separate columns. One of these columns he totally defeated at Yahuachí on the 19th August, and compelled the other, which was led by Aymerich himself, to return to Quito with heavy loss. He then ascended the slopes of Chimborazo and occupied the plateau of Ambato, but was here attacked by Colonel Gonzalez with very superior forces, and was completely defeated, with a loss of 300 killed and 640 prisoners. He himself was wounded, and returned to his former position with a remnant of his force. Here he was fortunately reinforced by a battalion of 500 Columbian infantry, and as Aymerich did not follow up the victory, held his ground, till on the 20th November he arranged an armistice of ninety days.

At this time the Royalists, whose total force of regular troops amounted to 3,000 men, in the Provinces of Cuenca, Quito, and Pasto, received a reinforcement of 800 men, under General Murgeón, who had been appointed Viceroy of New Granada on the death of Sámano. Murgeón had arrived from Europe at Puerto Cabello with a smaller force, which being increased by La Torre, he led across the Isthmus to Panamá, whence he went by sea to Atacames, and from there marched for sixty miles through a dense forest and then over the Cordillera to Quito, where he arrived on the 24th December, 1821, and took the command.

When New Granada was secure, Bolívar wrote to O’Higgins that:—“The Army of Columbia was about to march on Quito with orders to co-operate with the Argentine-Chileno Army in their operations against Lima,” but after that, affairs in the North distracted his attention. After the fall of Cartagena, he wrote to San Martin, proposing to take 4,000 men across the isthmus, and by sea to Peru, to aid him in crushing the Royalists in the centre of their power, leaving them in their positions on the equatorial Andes till afterwards. But the defeat suffered by Sucre, and the arrival of Murgeón, determined him first of all to prosecute the war in the south of Columbia.

Under the name of the “Columbian Guard,” Bolívar had organized an army, with which he incorporated at Popayán the remnants of the division of General Torres, raising his total force to about 3,000 men. During his march through a hostile country, he was compelled to leave 1,000 sick in the hospitals, and with the rest reached the frontiers of Quito on the 24th March, 1822. Avoiding a conflict with the Pastusos, which had so often proved fatal to the Patriot arms, he turned to the right and tried to find a pass over the River Guáitara, a mountain torrent whose course lies at the bottom of an almost impassable abyss. Finding one suspension bridge cut, he marched to the left in search of another, and on the 7th April came upon the Royalist army under Garcia, strongly posted between the river and the volcano of Pasto. It was already past noon, but Bolívar seeing that to retreat was impossible, attacked the enemy at once. He drew up his army on the plain of Bomboná, and sent a column against the left wing of the enemy, where the ground presented fewer difficulties than on their right and centre. This column being repulsed, then attacked the centre of the position and was almost annihilated in the attempt to force its way through an abatis which covered this part of the Royalist line. Meantime another column, directed against the right wing of the Royalists, had detached a battalion of light infantry, which climbed the face of the mountain and secured a commanding position on the flank of the enemy, on which Bolívar made another attack upon the centre with a battalion drawn from the reserve. This attack was also repulsed, but when night came on the Royalists hurriedly retreated, abandoning their artillery. The Patriots were left masters of the field, but it was a Phyrric victory, they had lost 600 men in killed and wounded, while the loss of the Royalists was not over 250.

Bolívar remained for eight days encamped on the plateau of Bomboná, and then retreated, leaving 300 sick and wounded behind him. During the retreat his losses were very heavy, but at Patia he received reinforcements from Popayán. The climate and the people were both against him; two months he remained inactive, uncertain what to do, when news reached him that Sucre, aided by a contingent of Argentine-Peruvian troops, sent to his assistance by San Martin, had taken Quito. The moment had arrived in which the two revolutions of the North and of the South of the Continent joined hands on the Equator, in accordance with the plan of San Martin.

On the eve of setting out on his first expedition against Quito, Sucre had written to San Martin asking for his co-operation. After his defeat at Ambato, he wrote again, this time to the Peruvian Minister of War, showing the danger which threatened Guayaquil. From Columbia he received a reinforcement of 500 men, but this was quite insufficient to enable him to take the field. Again he wrote to the Protector of Peru, and San Martin now resolved to give him efficient help.

General Arenales, who was president of the department of Trujillo, had a division stationed on the Peruvian frontier of Quito. San Martin sent him orders to march with it to the assistance of Sucre. Arenales was ill, and declined the command, which was then bestowed upon Colonel Santa Cruz, and by a convention the Republic of Columbia undertook to pay the troops, and to supply the places of all who might fall in war. The auxiliary division consisted of about 1,200 men, among them being one squadron of the mounted grenadiers, under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Juan Lavalle.

Sucre left Guayaquil with such troops as he had, and joined the auxiliaries in the Province of Cuenca in February, 1822, forming an army of 2,000 men, and in March went in search of the enemy. While on the march Colonel Santa Cruz received a despatch from the Government of Peru directing him to withdraw from the army at once with his contingent, which strange order arose from the misunderstanding concerning Guayaquil. Santa Cruz showed the despatch to Sucre, who forbade him to act upon it, telling him that he was no longer under the orders of the Protector. Fortunately the officers of the contingent upheld the authority of Sucre, whose firmness on this occasion prevented a great disaster, and a few days later a despatch was received from San Martin himself cancelling the order.

The situation of the Royalists was now very difficult. The Army of Quito, though numbering 2,000 good soldiers, was isolated, and might defend the mountain passes, but was powerless to take the offensive. The affair at Bomboná had greatly depressed the spirits of the Pastusos. Murgeón had died of despair on seeing the untoward course of events, and Aymerich was again in command.

Aymerich detached Colonel Lopez with 1,500 men to protect the western passes. Lopez stationed himself at Rio Bamba, but was out-manœuvred by Sucre, who entered the valley at the foot of Chimborazo. In accordance with his instructions, Lopez avoided an action, and slowly retreated from one impregnable position to another, till on the 21st April, 1822, Sucre managed to gain his rear by an undefended pass. The Royalists retreated to another position behind the town of Rio Bamba. As they were marching, Lavalle took advantage of a faulty manœuvre, and with ninety-six grenadiers charged the whole of their cavalry, 420 in number, and drove them in confusion upon the positions held by their infantry. Then retreating at full trot, he was joined by thirty Columbian dragoons. The Royalist horse having rallied, came down upon him at full gallop, upon which he wheeled round, charged them again, and completely routed them, with a loss of 52 killed and 40 wounded. One Argentine and one Columbian were killed and twenty were wounded, and the Royalist horse were of no further use in that campaign.

The infantry continued their retreat to the inaccessible position of Jalupano. Then Sucre, by a flank march of four days over the snow-covered heights of Cotopaxi, gained the valley of Chilló, 14 miles from Quito, but found the enemy again in an inaccessible position between him and the city. On the night of the 23rd May, during heavy rain, the Patriot army defiled by a narrow road, covered with loose stones, over the slopes of the volcano of Pichincha, and at eight o’clock the next morning reached the heights overlooking the city of Quito, where the steep mountain side below them was covered by a forest of trees and brushwood.

Before the whole army had reached this position the Royalists had ascended the mountain side, and rushed out of the forest upon the 2nd battalion of Peru, which led the van. Colonel Olazabal, who was in command, stubbornly held his ground till his ammunition was exhausted. The position was held by one battalion after another, as it came up, so long as any cartridges were left, but the reserve ammunition was far in the rear, and the Royalists gained ground. A Columbian regiment charged with the bayonet and recovered the position. Then the Royalists advancing under shelter of the trees, endeavoured to turn the left flank of the Patriots, but were in their turn taken in flank by three companies of the Albion battalion and driven back in confusion. Colonel Cordova then brought up his regiment of Columbian infantry, and, with the aid of the Albion, drove the Royalists down the steep mountain side in utter rout. On such ground the cavalry on neither side could come into action, but the Royalist horse, drawn up as a reserve in the suburbs of the city, was attacked later on by the Patriot cavalry and dispersed.

Sucre then summoned the city to surrender. Next day, the 25th May, 1822, Aymerich capitulated. The Royalists lost 160 officers and 1,100 men taken prisoners, 400 killed and 190 wounded, 14 guns, and all their flags. The Patriots had 200 killed, of whom half belonged to the auxiliaries from Peru, and 140 wounded.

The victory of Pichincha was the seal of the continental alliance, and concluded the war in the North. Garcia, with his isolated force, capitulated to Bolívar, but the indomitable Pastusos refused to lay down their arms till Garcia appealed to Padilla, Bishop of Popayán, who had hitherto, both by his preaching and by his example, encouraged them in their fanatic loyalty to the King of Spain. Thanks to Bishop Padilla, a capitulation was agreed upon, by which these brave mountaineers were secured in possession of all their local laws and customs.

The Liberator entered Pasto in triumph, and thence, on the 8th June, addressed a bulletin to the Columbian people:—

“From the banks of the Orinoco to the Andes of Peru the liberating army, marching from one triumph to another, has covered with its protecting arms the whole of Columbia. Share with me the ocean of joy which bathes my heart, and raise in your own hearts altars to this army which has conquered for you glory, peace, and liberty.”

The deification of the armies of Columbia inaugurated prætorianism in South America, which was soon to press heavily upon the independent States, and was to bring the career of Bolívar to an end. The soldiery began to look upon the people they had freed as upon men whom they had conquered. The victors of Pichincha declared that Quito was annexed to Columbia. The municipality protested, and were banished from the city. Nevertheless, Bolívar on his arrival was received with enthusiasm. On the 16th June he made a triumphal entry, and was presented with a laurel wreath of gold, the third he had received in commemoration of his victories.

The two Liberators of the North and of the South were now about to meet on the dividing line of their several campaigns. Their triumphant armies converged upon Peru. History presents no other example of so vast a military combination, carried out with steady perseverance for twelve long years, ending in the concentration of the forces of an entire continent upon one strategical point, which concentration gave the final victory.

CHAPTER XLV.

GUAYAQUIL.

1822.

When the Province of Guayaquil declared herself independent, she placed herself under the protection of the troops of San Martin and Bolívar, and became an apple of discord between the two leaders. Both accepted the Protectorate, San Martin with the idea of annexing the Province to Peru, Bolívar with the intention of annexing it to Columbia. In November, 1820, San Martin sent Guido and Luzuriaga to negotiate a treaty of alliance, which should place the province under his control; when they arrived the situation had changed. Guayaquil had sent 1,500 men against Quito, under the command of Luis Urdaneta, an officer from Venezuela. Urdaneta easily overran the Province of Cuenca, but on advancing towards the capital was met on the plateau of Ambato by Colonel Gonzalez, with 600 regular troops, and was completely defeated, on the 20th November. An Argentine officer named Garcia rallied the dispersed troops and led them back against the enemy, but was also routed on the 3rd January, 1821. Garcia was taken prisoner, and being put to death, his head was exposed in an iron cage at one of the entrances of the capital.

The city of Guayaquil was thrown into consternation at this disaster, but the commissioners were well received, and Luzuriaga being placed in command of the remaining troops, checked the advance of the enemy, until the rainy season covered the low grounds with water and put an end to military operations; after which the commissioners returned to Peru, without having made any definite arrangement.

The division of Sucre, sent by Bolívar, arrived in May, 1821, and for a time the influence of Columbia prevailed, but the defeat of Sucre and the retreat of Bolívar from Pasto, turned the eyes of the people again to San Martin, who had by this time taken the city of Lima. It was then that San Martin decided to take a part in the war in Quito, and sent the contingent which did such good service at Pichincha.

On the 16th December, 1821, the district of Puerto Viejo declared itself a part of Columbia, and was supported by the Columbian officers. The Junta of Guayaquil pronounced this an act of rebellion, and resolved on measures of repression. Civil war appeared imminent, when Sucre interposed, and by calming the zeal of his subordinates, restored tranquillity.

On the 30th November, 1821, Salazar had arrived as Peruvian Minister, with instructions from the Protector to adopt a waiting policy, which, in the face of a resolute opposition, was to ensure defeat. The Junta, which, as also the majority of the people, was in favour of annexation to Peru, complained to Salazar of the overbearing conduct of the Columbian troops, on which La Mar was sent from Peru to take command of the provincial forces.

Bolívar, who was resolved to include in the new Republic of Columbia the whole of the late Viceroyalty of New Granada, now sent Don Joaquin Mosquera to Peru as Minister of Columbia, to arrange the question of limits, and on the eve of marching against Quito, sent a note to the Junta, saying that “the Government of Guayaquil knows that it cannot remain an independent State; that Columbia cannot give up any of her legitimate rights; and that there was no human power which could deprive her of a hand’s breadth of her territory.”

The Province of Guayaquil had been at various times a dependency of the Viceroyalty of Peru, but on the formation of the Viceroyalty of New Granada it became definitely an integral part of Quito, which was a dependency of the new Viceroyalty. During the disturbances of 1809 and 1810, Abascal, Viceroy of Peru, had for military purposes taken charge of the province, as he had done of the outlying districts of Upper Peru, which belonged to the Viceroyalty of the River Plate. But this arrangement came to an end in 1819, by a decree from the Court of Madrid. Without Guayaquil Quito was cut off from all communication with the Pacific.

The Junta of Guayaquil appealed to San Martin, who replied that if they boldly declared Guayaquil an independent State he would assist them by force if necessary, but that he would make no complaint if they chose to join the Republic of Columbia. At the same time he wrote to Bolívar, asking him to let the people decide for themselves.

The attitude adopted by Bolívar was one of defiance; that adopted by San Martin, if more correct, was not based either on good policy or on good military tactics. Bolívar could not recede without consenting to the mutilation of Columbia, a republic of his own creation. The direct intervention of San Martin endangered an open rupture between them, which would upset the plans of both.

Under these sinister auspices took place the interview previously arranged between San Martin and Bolívar, at Guayaquil, which had been postponed in consequence of the exigencies of the war.

CHAPTER XLVI.

THE INTERVIEW AT GUAYAQUIL.

1822.

Events are the logical sequence of causes which have preceded them, nevertheless they are moulded by the influence of individuals. If Columbus had never lived, America would at some later date have been discovered by some one else. If Cromwell had never lived the Revolution would have occurred in England all the same, but without him it would not have triumphed. The emancipation of the British colonies of North America must in any case have produced a great Republic, but it was Washington who impressed upon the democracy the seal of his moral greatness. The French Revolution was the natural outcome of what had preceded it, but had it been directed by others than those who did direct it the result might have been better. The insurrection in South America was a spontaneous movement, resulting from historical antecedents and from the circumstances of the time, but the triumph would have been delayed, and the losses in the struggle would have been greater, but for the genius of San Martin and Bolívar, who directed the discordant elements to one definite end.

San Martin acted more from calculation than from inspiration, Bolívar more from instinct than from method, yet both were necessary, each in his own place. While they went with the current they were mere agents, but they laid hold of the forces that were in action, condensed them, and impelled them to act on one general plan by them devised, which was unseen by the masses. And they worked in concert, the idea of San Martin being carried to a successful ending by Bolívar. Neither could alone have achieved the emancipation of the Continent.

Now these two men were to meet for the first time, under the fiery arch of the Equator, with the ocean on one hand, on the other the giant range of the Andes. The world listens intently and hears nothing of what they say. One quietly disappears, saying words which have no meaning in them; the other as quietly takes his place. For twenty years all is mystery; then the veil is partially drawn aside, and it is seen that there is no mystery, that nothing had happened save what everyone knew was certain to befall. Only now that the masks have fallen we can read in the character of each one of them the motives which made the one relentless in his purpose and forced abdication on the other.

San Martin sent an auxiliary force to aid in the war in Quito without making conditions of any kind, and expected to receive help in Peru on the same terms, but after Pichincha, Bolívar was master of the situation, and could dictate his own terms. San Martin indulged the illusion that he was still one of the arbiters of South America, that Bolívar would share with him his political and his military power, and that in conference they would arrange together the destinies of the nations by them emancipated. Without other plan, he sought that interview with the Liberator which was to decide his own destiny and was to paralyze his career.

Guayaquil was the only province of the late Viceroyalty of New Granada which was not yet absorbed in the new Republic of Columbia. With this acquisition her territory would stretch from the Atlantic to the Pacific, and Bolívar would lay his powerful hand upon Peru, “the last battlefield of America” as San Martin expressed it. Bolívar was now arbiter of the destinies of South America, and could not tolerate opposition from San Martin. His policy, a union of personal ambition with grand designs of emancipation, now began to show itself.

At Quito he saw for the first time the troops of San Martin, and could compare them with his own. He marked their soldierly bearing and strict discipline, more especially he noted the Argentine mounted grenadiers, and saw that, compared with them, his own Llaneros, brave as had been their deeds, were but an undisciplined mob of horsemen. From that time there arose in his heart that jealousy of Argentine influence which was presently to mould his policy.

At a banquet given in his honour at Quito he exclaimed in his enthusiasm:—

“The day is not far distant when I will carry the flag of Columbia triumphant to Argentina.”

Five Argentine officers were present, and Juan Lavalle, rising to his feet, proposed a toast:—

“To the independence of America, and of the Argentine Republic.”

There were no more toasts.

On the 11th July Bolívar entered Guayaquil, under triumphal arches inscribed with his name. The gunboats on the river hauled down the white and blue flag of Guayaquil and hoisted the tri-colour of Columbia.

“What, so soon!” he exclaimed, thinking this was a signal for the incorporation of the Province. But when the boats had fired a salute up again went the white and blue flag, and was hailed by a unanimous shout of, “Viva Guayaquil independiente!”

He replaced his cocked hat, which he had till then carried in his hand, and the procession went on, but the incident excited much comment in the city, and especially in the Peruvian legation.

The intentions of Bolívar were no secret; he had brought 1,500 men with him, who occupied the city. Within twenty-four hours of his triumphal entry a deputation of his partisans waited upon the municipality and asked them to proclaim the Province a part of the Republic of Columbia. They refused, alleging that the decision of the question lay with the representatives of the people, who were then in Assembly. The application was repeated, and was again refused.

On the 13th July an appeal was made to Bolívar himself. Bolívar sent his secretary to the Junta and an aide-de-camp to the Assembly, to announce to them that in consequence of the anarchy which prevailed he had assumed the supreme power, and had annexed the Province to Columbia. The Junta resigned and fled on board the Peruvian squadron, then lying at anchor in the harbour. San Martin had sent this squadron in support of his own partisans, thinking that Bolívar was yet in Quito, but the Liberator had been too quick for him.

On the 25th July San Martin himself arrived in the schooner Macedonia. Bolívar sent off two of his aides-de-camp to salute him, and to offer him hospitality “on Columbian soil.” The next day he disembarked amid files of silent soldiery and crowds of enthusiastic people. Bolívar, dressed in full uniform and surrounded by his staff, awaited him at a house which had been prepared for him. The two heroes met, and embraced for the first and last time, at the foot of the staircase, and turning, entered the house arm-in-arm. In the salon the Liberator presented his generals; then the authorities of the city came to bid him welcome. A deputation of ladies presented an address to him; then a beautiful girl of eighteen years of age placed a laurel wreath of gold upon his head. San Martin, little accustomed to such theatrical ceremonies, flushed and took the crown from his head, but said that he would keep it for the sake of the patriotic sentiment that inspired the gift, and for the sake of those who bestowed it, in memory of these happy days.

The two representatives of the Revolution being left alone, walked up and down the salon together, but what they said to each other could not be heard by those in the ante-room. Bolívar appeared to be agitated, San Martin was calm and self-possessed. They shut the door and talked together for more than an hour and a half. Bolívar then retired, impenetrable, and grave as a sphinx. San Martin accompanied him to the foot of the staircase, and they took a friendly leave of each other. Later on the Protector paid a visit to the Liberator, one of mere ceremony, which lasted only half an hour.

The next day, the 27th, San Martin sent his baggage on board the schooner, saying that he should sail after attending the great ball given in his honour, and at one P.M. went again to call on the Liberator, remaining closeted with him for four hours.

At five P.M. they sat down together to a splendid banquet. When the time for toasts arrived, Bolívar stood up and proposed one:—

“To the two greatest men of South America—General San Martin and myself.”

San Martin then proposed another:—

“To the speedy conclusion of the war; to the organization of the different Republics of the Continent; and to the health of the Liberator of Columbia;” words that indicated the thoughts which occupied his mind.

They then passed to the ball-room, where Bolívar gave himself up with juvenile ardour to the delights of the waltz, of which he was passionately fond. The rude behaviour of the Columbian officers, who were roughly reproved by Bolívar, gave a grotesque aspect to the scene. San Martin looked coldly on, evidently pre-occupied with thoughts of a much more serious nature. At one A.M. he called his aide-de-camp, Guido, to him, and said:—

“Let us go; I cannot stand this riot.”

Bolívar had already taken leave of him; a chamberlain showed them out by a private door, and accompanied them to the landing place. An hour afterwards the Macedonia was under way.

The next day San Martin rose early and was silent and pre-occupied. After breakfast, as he was walking the deck, he exclaimed:—

“The Liberator has been too quick for us.”

On reaching Callao he commissioned General Cruz to write to O’Higgins:—

“The Liberator is not the man we took him to be;” words which are a compendium of the results of the interview. Of what passed between them no account was published, but at that time there were only two questions which could be discussed between them: the conclusion of the war, and the political organization of the new States.

What occurred at the famous conference at Tilsit is as well known as though all the world had been there to listen; the interview at Guayaquil is still more easy to reproduce, illuminated as the subject is by later disclosures from the pen of San Martin himself.

The unsteady glance and ill-concealed vanity of Bolívar produced repulsion in San Martin, who read his character at once, but Bolívar, full of himself, failed to penetrate the calm exterior of San Martin; he learned nothing of his ideas, and looked upon him as one who owed his victories to fortune more than to genius.

Bolívar had in his head a confused plan for the consolidation of America, in which everything was to hinge upon his own personality. San Martin, who had no personal ambition, said of him:—

“His feats of arms entitle him to be considered the most extraordinary character that South America has produced; of a constancy to which difficulties only add strength.” But he had none of the frankness of a soldier, and disclosed nothing of these plans to San Martin; there was, therefore, nothing to discuss between them—on that point they could treat only of facts already accomplished.

San Martin expatiated upon the importance of bringing the war to an end. Three or four thousand Columbian troops, placed at his orders, would enable him to finish it in three months. Bolívar offered him only three battalions, and the war lasted for yet another three years. San Martin then offered to serve under him, if he would only take a sufficient force with him. Bolívar declined the offer, alleging that he could not leave Columbian territory without special authority from Congress. San Martin then saw that the Liberator would not make common cause with him, that one or the other must give way, and it is probable that he then formed the resolution of retiring from the scene.

The organization of the new States was the only other subject on which they could exchange opinions. Doubtless San Martin set forth his reasons for believing that in the establishment of independent monarchies lay the solution of the question, the people not being yet so educated in the principles of self-government as to be capable of sustaining the common responsibility of democratic rule, and Bolívar would scout the idea, showing that monarchy was a European, not an American institution; his own power, as the head of a republic, was greater than that of any constitutional king. Deep in his mind lay the teachings of his old master, Simon Rodriguez, who had taught him that the bestowal of all offices for life was the means whereby stability could be given to democracy. The result of this talk was seen in the toast which San Martin proposed at the subsequent banquet:—

“To the Republics of South America.”

Was there more than this? Likely enough. The reserve which both maintained on the subject for so many years is an indication that such was the case. San Martin foresaw the failure of his scheme, and silence became a patriotic duty, lest he should place arms in the hands of the enemy. Bolívar, recognising the moral superiority of his rival, felt abashed in the presence of such abnegation, and cared not to speak of that which could only throw a slur upon his own fame.

On the return of San Martin to Peru, he announced publicly his satisfaction with the result of the interview, the conclusion of a South American alliance, and the speedy arrival of a reinforcement of three battalions of Columbian troops. But immediately afterwards he wrote to Bolívar, setting forth the great numerical superiority of the Royalist forces, and showing that much more efficient help was needed to put an end to the war. He concluded with these remarkable words:—

“My decision is irrevocable. I have convened the first Congress of Peru; the day after its installation I shall leave for Chile, convinced that my presence is the only obstacle which keeps you from coming to Peru with your army.

“For me it would have been the height of happiness to have concluded the War of Independence under the orders of a General to whom America owes her liberty. Destiny has decreed otherwise, and I must resign myself to it.”

This letter explains one of the principal causes of his retirement from public life, and may be considered as his political testament. He yields his self-imposed task into the hands of a more fortunate rival, congratulating him upon the glory of finishing the great work.

By the bearer of this letter he also sent Bolívar a fowling-piece, a brace of pistols, and a war-horse to carry him on his next campaign, with this special note:—

“Receive, General, this remembrance from the first of your admirers, with the expression of my sincere desire that you may have the glory of finishing the war for the independence of South America.”

History records not in her pages an act of self-abnegation executed with more conscientiousness and with greater modesty.

CHAPTER XLVII.

THE ABDICATION OF SAN MARTIN.

1822.

Riva-Agüero, who was president of the municipality, acceded to their request, and demanded the immediate imprisonment of the obnoxious minister. Government replied that they would take the matter into consideration next day.

At half past ten at night the people assembled in crowds at the gates of the municipal building and round the government house, calling loudly for the deposition of the minister. Monteagudo resigned. The municipality demanded his imprisonment, which was decreed, and Monteagudo remained under arrest in his own house.

Meantime the army remained quietly in barracks, Alvarado not choosing to interfere, although he wrote to the municipality that if the disorders continued he might be compelled to take steps to restore tranquillity. But the popular excitement day by day increased. As one of their own leaders said, “The peace-loving Peruvians appeared to have changed into raging lions.” National sentiment was aroused against the foreigners who ruled them, republican sentiment against the monarchical proposals of the Government. Fly-sheets of the most seditious tendency circulated from hand to hand.

On the 29th the municipality again met and demanded the banishment of Monteagudo. He was banished.

On the 20th August San Martin returned, and was received with enthusiasm by the people. Riva-Agüero and the principal leaders presented themselves and assured him of their adhesion, but he was not deceived. He saw that they were tired of his rule, that the army was no longer devoted to him, that he had erred in the choice of his deputy, and of his ministers, and that he himself was no longer necessary, and might even become an obstacle to the complete independence of the country. He could only re-establish his authority by means of repression, which were repugnant to him; he preferred to leave the Peruvians to work out their destiny for themselves. Then it was that he wrote the memorable letter to Bolívar, of which mention was made in the last chapter.

Also he wrote to O’Higgins, alleging bad health as the cause of his retirement:—

“I am tired of hearing them call me tyrant, that I wish to make myself King, Emperor, the Devil. On the other hand, my health is broken, this climate is killing me. My youth was sacrificed to the service of Spain, my manhood to my own country. I think I have now the right to dispose of my old age.”

Twenty-five years later the publication of his letter to Bolívar disclosed the true motive of his retirement. He sacrificed himself from duty, and from necessity, and kept silence.

But he did not purpose to leave Peru defenceless. He set to work with the greatest activity to place the army on the best possible footing. At the end of August he had more than 11,000 men under arms, and expected 1,000 men from Chile to join in an expedition against the intermediate ports, and drew up a plan for the next campaign, which would probably have been decisive if he had led the troops himself.

On the 20th September, 1822, the first Constituent Congress of Peru was installed with great pomp. San Martin, in its presence, took off the bi-coloured sash he wore as the emblem of his authority, made a short speech, laid six folded sheets of paper upon the table, and retired amid the plaudits of the Assembly. The first sheet being opened was found to be a renunciation of all future command.

Congress passed a vote of thanks “to the first soldier of Liberty,” and named him generalissimo of the land and naval forces of the Republic, with a pension of 12,000 dollars a-year.

San Martin accepted the title and the pension, but refused to serve, giving good reasons therefor:—

“My presence in Peru after the powers I have wielded would be inconsistent with the dignity of Congress, and with my own. I have kept the promise I made to Peru, but if some day her liberty be in danger I shall glory in joining as a citizen in her defence.”

Congress then voted him the title of “Founder of the Liberty of Peru,” with the right to wear the sash he had laid down, and with the rank of Captain-General; decreed to him the same pension as Washington had enjoyed; that a statue should be erected to him with inscriptions commemorative of his services; that a bust of him should be placed in the National Library he had established; and that he should receive all the honours due to one of the actual executive.

Up to this time San Martin had said no word to anyone of his intention to leave the country, but that same evening at his country-house he told Guido, who had gone there with him. Guido expostulated with him, and tried all means to dissuade him from his intention, till at last he told him in confidence his real reasons for going:—-

“There is not room in Peru for both Bolívar and myself. He will shrink from nothing to come to Peru; it may not be in my power to avoid a conflict if I am here. Let him come, so that America may triumph. It shall not be San Martin who will give a day of delight to the enemy.”

It was ten o’clock; his orderly announced that all was ready; the General embraced his faithful friend, mounted on horseback, and rode away through the darkness. Next morning Guido found a letter of farewell from him lying at the head of his bed, and Alvarado received another, but San Martin had embarked that same night on the brig Belgrano, and had left Peru for ever.

All that he took with him were 120 doubloons, the standard of Pizarro, and the golden bell of the Inquisition of Lima. In Chile he had the farm which had been given him, and a small sum of money left with a friend, most of which was lost. The Government of Peru, hearing of his poverty, sent him 2,000 dollars, with which, after an illness of two months in Chile, he crossed to Mendoza early in 1823, and while living there as a farmer, heard of the banishment of O’Higgins, and of the death of his own wife.

The reasons for his sudden departure were for long a mystery to all, except to Bolívar and to Guido. Some looked upon it as an act of self-abnegation, some as one of desertion. Time has solved the problem. The step was taken after mature reflection, and was the result of deep insight into his own character, into those of the men about him, and into surrounding circumstances. Bolívar was master of the situation, he recognised this fact, and left the field open for him to put the seal to their joint labours in his own way.

On the night of his departure he issued a farewell address to the Peruvian people, in which no mention was made of these facts. He gave no sufficient reason for so leaving them, and this caused much obloquy to be thrown upon his name. But he did so wittingly, for the disclosure of the true character of Bolívar would have predisposed the Peruvians against him, and his aid was necessary to their complete deliverance.

The public life of San Martin ends here, but the remains of the army which he had organized for the liberation of Chile, continued its glorious career in Peru until the emancipation of South America was accomplished.

CHAPTER XLVIII.

THE FIRST NATIONAL GOVERNMENT OF PERU.

1822—1823.

Bolívar no sooner saw the coast clear than he wrote to the new Government offering them a reinforcement of 4,000 men, and promising, if these were not sufficient, six or eight thousand more. Bolívar had not seen that San Martin was eager to open the way for him; San Martin had failed to see that by rousing the national spirit of the Peruvians he had shut them off from help. Government suspected the intentions of Bolívar, and coldly declined his proffered assistance. The answer was long in coming, and Bolívar in alarm wrote to General Castillo, the commander of the Columbian contingent, not to incur any risk of defeat, but rather to retire on Columbia, and afterwards notified these instructions to the Government of Peru.

Jealousy of foreign influence then induced Congress to decree that all vacancies in the civil, military, and naval services should be filled by Peruvians alone, and then set to work to debate what constitution they should give to the country.

The nation was named “The Peruvian Republic;” the constitution was drawn up on the basis of popular sovereignty, and a special clause was inserted providing that executive offices should be neither for life nor hereditary, which was directed against Bolívar.

The plan drawn up by San Martin for the ensuing campaign depended upon the efficient co-operation of two armies; one acting in the South under Alvarado, the other in the Centre under Arenales.

The whole line of the main Cordillera was held by the Royalists, but the Patriots commanding the sea had the choice of the point of attack. The bulk of the Royalists, under Canterac, occupied the Centre of their line from Jauja to Huancayo. Arequipa was weakly garrisoned. La Serna had his head-quarters at Cuzco with a reserve at Puno. Olañeto was at Potosí, and Valdés was fully occupied in Upper Peru by Lanza the guerilla chieftain. Consequently, a simultaneous attack from the South and Centre would place the main army between two fires. This plan was adopted by Government.

The Army of the South, consisting of 1,700 Argentines, 1,200 Chilians, and about 1,600 Peruvians, with ten light field pieces, embarked on transports at Callao in September. Alvarado wished to take the Columbian contingent also, but Castillo refused to go. The expedition did not sail till October, and was fifty-seven days on the voyage; a most unfavourable commencement which presaged a catastrophe.

On the 3rd December the convoy reached Arica, but Alvarado sent one battalion to Iquiqui, which landed there on the 7th. Miller, with a very small force, had performed wonders in the previous campaign in this district, but Alvarado remained three weeks at Arica without doing anything. He consulted Miller, who told him anything was right if it was only done quickly. He then detached Miller with 120 men further north to make a diversion, and occupied Tacna with a strong vanguard under General Martinez. These long delays had given the Royalists time to concentrate their forces, and the indefatigable Valdés, with a flying column of 800 men, descended the hills, crossed the sandy plain, and on the 1st January, 1823, encamped in a fertile valley about twelve miles from the city. The Patriots were so superior in number that his position was one of great peril; nevertheless he put on a bold front, and while Martinez was wasting time in an attempt to surround him, he succeeded in effecting his retreat during the night and the following day to the foot of the hills at Moquegua.

On the 13th January Alvarado occupied the valley of Locumba, but again by dilatory movements lost his chance of overwhelming a small force of Royalists which had been detached by Valdés to watch him. Valdés, who was expecting Canterac with a strong force, allowed Alvarado to occupy the city of Moquegua on the 18th without resistance, but then prepared to dispute his further progress.

Beyond Moquegua the ground rises in abrupt steps which give great facilities for defence. The Royalist skirmishers covered the heights, and detached parties lay in ambush in the hollows. One by one they were driven from these positions, but at Torata Valdés drew up his force in line of battle. On the afternoon of the 19th the two armies faced each other, and the Patriots advanced to the attack. A Spanish battalion in skirmishing order covered the centre, and at the same moment the heights beyond were occupied by an advanced party of Canterac’s division, whose shouts of “Viva el Rey!” re-echoed from the mountain sides. Canterac strengthened his right flank and beat back a vigorous attack of the left wing of the Patriots, upon which the whole Royalist line advanced and drove the Patriot infantry, who had exhausted their ammunition, before them in utter rout with great slaughter. The Patriots lost about 500 men killed and wounded, the Royalists about half that number. The Peruvian legion, which was now for the first time under fire, distinguished itself by its steady behaviour.

The routed battalions rallied under the fire of their artillery, but during the following night the whole army retreated, and encamped next day at Moquegua, seventeen miles from the field of battle. The ammunition was nearly exhausted. Alvarado summoned a council of war, but the advice of his officers was so discordant, that before he had formed any resolution the enemy was again in his front on the 21st.

Alvarado then took up a strong position, with his left resting upon the suburbs of the city, and his line extending along the ridge of a steep declivity, broken in the centre by a road which was swept by the fire of his artillery. His right rested upon a bare hill. Valdés, with two battalions and two squadrons of horse, seized this hill and turned the right flank of the Patriots, while the rest of the Royalist cavalry menaced the left, and Canterac led the main body against the ridge. Alvarado wheeled back his right wing, and for a short time the Patriots held their ground with great determination, but were at length driven from the position and totally routed with a loss of 700 in killed and wounded, and 1,000 prisoners. The mounted grenadiers, led by Lavalle, made two desperate charges to cover the retreat, but were in their turn overwhelmed by the Royalist horse.

About 1,000 men reached Ilo with General Martinez, and embarking there, returned to Lima. Alvarado went to Iquiqui in search of the detachment he had left there, and on the 14th February landed a small party on shore, which was all either captured or destroyed by Olañeta, who had occupied the city. Alvarado then invited Olañeta to a conference concerning the prisoners, and found this general to be so disaffected to the Viceroy and his adherents, whom he styled “traitorous Liberals,” that he declared his intention of separating from them and confining himself to the defence of Upper Peru for the King.

Miller, with his 120 men, accomplished more than all the rest of the army; he alarmed all the South, and kept the whole reserve under Caratala in check.

Meantime Arenales lost much time in endeavouring to persuade General Castillo to incorporate his auxiliaries with the army he was organizing for the attack on the centre of the Royalists. Castillo refused to join at first, on the plea that success was doubtful, and then demanded that a Peruvian should be appointed to command the allied army. His demand being refused, he then asked permission to retire altogether from the country. Government, anxious to free itself from so arrogant an ally, furnished transports, and the Columbian contingent left Peru for Guayaquil, taking with it the Numancia battalion, 600 strong, which Bolívar had claimed, as being a Columbian corps. This Columbian contingent had cost Peru 190,000 dollars and had been of no service whatever.

Nevertheless Arenales, who hoped to make up by speed for paucity of numbers, had organized a column of 2,000 men, when Martinez arrived with a remnant of the Army of the South. The news brought by him produced great irritation, but by no means disheartened the people, who were confident of ultimate success. Their anger was turned against Government; the army encamped at Miraflores was almost in open revolt. Arenales was asked to put himself at the head of the movement, but this stout soldier would have none of it, and giving up the command to Santa Cruz left Peru for ever.

The leaders of the army headed by General Martinez, on the 26th February, 1823, presented an address to Congress, asking that Riva-Agüero might be placed at the head of the Executive. The city militia supported them. Congress yielded, and on the 27th Riva-Agüero was named President of the Republic, and afterwards Grand Marshal of the armies, although he was simply a colonel of militia and had never been under fire.

Riva-Agüero was a true representative of the people, and his popularity was enhanced by his activity and by the skill shown in the first measures he adopted. He reorganized the army, making Santa Cruz general-in-chief, and Martinez general of the division of the Andes and Chile. He reopened relations with Chile, and wrote to Bolívar accepting the help which Congress had refused. Bolívar made a treaty with him, in which he promised 6,000 men, who were to be equipped and paid by Peru. Chile promised a further contingent of from 2,000 to 2,500 men, and 1,500 muskets in addition. San Martin in Mendoza pushed on the organization of an Argentine division, which was to operate on the frontiers of Salta, under the orders of Urdininea. At the same time news was received that the Peruvian commissioners, in London, had abandoned their monarchical schemes, and had effected a loan of one million two hundred thousand pounds sterling, which was ratified by Congress.

Before two months had passed Peru had an army of 5,000 men ready for the field, in addition to the Argentine and Chilian auxiliaries, who were 2,500 more. Riva-Agüero determined upon another expedition to the intermediate ports, directed against Arequipa and Puno, while another army, composed of troops of the four Allied Nations, should advance by Jauja upon the centre, a repetition of the previous plan. Bolívar approved of the plan when his opinion was asked, and promised his 6,000 men. Chile again promised a fresh contingent, which should be sent to the south of Peru, and offered to supply horses for the expedition. The Royalists, ignorant of these preparations, made ready on their part for an attack upon Lima.

Five thousand Peruvian troops left Callao in May for the South under General Santa Cruz, with Colonel Gamarra as chief of the staff. For the first time Peru had an army of her own, commanded by Peruvian generals. Before leaving, Santa Cruz presented himself to Congress and swore to return triumphant or to die. He did neither the one thing nor the other.

Santa Cruz showed more activity than Alvarado had done. On the 17th June the convoy reached Arica. On that same day Canterac, with an army of 9,000 men, rushed down from the Highlands and captured Lima. The expedition was thus isolated, but the move was a false one on the part of the Royalists.

Bolívar did not share in the general confidence, he was more clear sighted than most others, as is seen in a notable letter which he wrote at this time to General Sucre. He had concentrated his forces at Guayaquil, and on hearing of the disasters of Torata and Moquegua, before signing the treaty of which we have already made mention, he at once sent off an expedition of 3,000 men under Sucre, with instructions to gain possession of the fortresses of Callao at any cost. Sucre, whom he called “his right arm,” was also named minister plenipotentiary to Peru, and was sent to prepare the way for the accomplishment of the secret designs of the Liberator, who saw that Peru would soon be in a condition to welcome him as her saviour.

The occupation of Lima by the Royalists was a mistake, it gave them no military advantage while Callao and the ocean were held by the Patriots. The Government fled to Callao, and the army collected under shelter of the guns of that fortress. Sucre was made general-in-chief. Congress dispersed; some of the members went over to the enemy; but a minority, who were hostile to Riva-Agüero, kept together, and sent for Bolívar on the 19th June, 1823, giving him the title of Generalissimo and ample powers for the salvation of the country. Riva-Agüero retained the title of President, but was sent out of the way to Trujillo.

Bolívar accepted the invitation, saying that “for a long time his heart had yearned towards Peru.” Pending his arrival Sucre exercised his powers as his representative; the secret wish of Bolívar was accomplished, he was master of Peru.

The Viceroy soon perceived the mistake he had made, and recalled his army from Lima. On the 16th July Canterac evacuated the city, and returned to the Highlands unmolested. On the 20th Sucre sailed southwards with 3,000 Columbians and Chilians and a squadron of Peruvian cavalry, leaving an army of Peruvians, Argentines, and Columbians at Lima with orders to occupy Jauja and secure the line of the Apurimac. His intention was to combine the movements of the three armies, with Arequipa as the base of his operations, and to advance on Cuzco with 8,000 or 12,000 men, but when he reached the south coast Santa Cruz was already far inland. He then landed at Quilca and marched on Arequipa; but the same day Santa Cruz had fought a battle of doubtful result on the borders of Lake Titicaca.

Santa Cruz had changed the plan. Instead of keeping his army together he had divided it into two columns, directed against Upper Peru. With the first he landed near Ilo, and advanced to Moquegua, while the second, under command of Gamarra, landed at Arica, and occupied Tacna. Here he remained till the middle of July, awaiting the Chilian contingent; but as it did not come he, on the 13th July, ascended the Cordillera, crossed the Desaguadero by the bridge of the Inca without opposition, and on the 8th August occupied the city of La Paz. Gamarra at the same time marched by the Tacora road, crossed the Desaguadero lower down, and occupied the city of Oruro, which is about 170 miles from La Paz.

Olañeta, who was retreating towards Potosí with 1,500 men, was almost surprised by Gamarra, of whose movements he knew nothing, and withdrew to the South. Gamarra was then joined by Lanza, the Guerilla chieftain, with 600 men, and learned that Urdininea, with the Argentine division, was advancing from Salta; but he lost the opportunity of destroying Olañeta, which was part of the plan of Santa Cruz, by remaining inactive at Oruro.

Santa Cruz, hearing that La Serna was concentrating his scattered divisions at Puno, then turned back to cover the line of the Desaguadero, and stationed himself on the left bank at the bridge of the Inca. Valdés advanced against him with 2,000 men, but finding the bridge was defended by artillery, he withdrew to the town of Zepita. Santa Cruz crossed the bridge and went after him, and overtook him in a strong position between the mountains and the lake of Titicaca. By a feigned retreat he drew Valdés into the plain, where two Peruvian squadrons cut the Royalist horse to pieces, but the attack upon the infantry was less successful, and night put a stop to the action. Both sides claimed the victory, but Valdés retreated, and soon after Santa Cruz returned to his position on the Desaguadero. This was the first and last battle of the expedition.

La Serna joined Valdés at Zepita, and crossed the Desaguadero with 4,500 men. Santa Cruz retreated before him, and on the 8th September joined Gamarra to the south of Oruro. He then manœuvred to prevent a junction between La Serna and Olañeta, who was returning from Potosí with 2,500 men, but La Serna by a flank march over the heights succeeded in effecting the junction on the 14th September. Santa Cruz thought himself lost, and without attempting to bring on an action in which the chances would have been in his favour, retreated precipitately. The retreat soon became a flight, arms and baggage were thrown away, and he recrossed the Desaguadero utterly routed, without fighting and without even seeing an enemy. He left a company of infantry with two guns to defend the bridge, who capitulated to the Royalist vanguard at the first summons. Barely 1,000 men reached the coast, and the Chilian contingent, which just then arrived, returned at once to their own country.

Sucre, seeking to affect a junction with Santa Cruz, had shown in the prosecution of his arduous task both the prudence and the ability of a master in the art of war. At Arequipa he heard of the fight at Zepita, and marched on Puno supposing that Santa Cruz was still holding his ground at the bridge of the Inca, but was met by the intelligence of the total dispersion of the Patriot army, and of the concentration of the Royalists. Placing himself so as to cover the flight of the fugitives, he steadily retreated and re-embarked at Quilca.

Before the result of the first expedition to the intermediate ports was known, two of the admirers of San Martin had written to him in his retirement at Mendoza, telling him that “the hand of San Martin alone can crown his work and give liberty to Peru.” Even Riva-Agüero wrote to him, beseeching him to return to public life. After the disasters of Torata and Moquegua, the eyes of all Peruvians were turned to their late Protector, and a multitude of letters to the same effect reached him in his solitude. The new Government of Chile wrote to him that posterity would forget his immense services unless he completed his work. After the failure of the second expedition a council of Peruvian officers, headed by General Porto Carrero and Admiral Guise, with the authorization of Riva-Agüero, passed a resolution that all Peruvians of every class called upon their Protector to fly to their assistance, now that their country was in danger. Guido wrote to him that all Patriots looked to him for help. Riva-Agüero, who had quarrelled with Congress, and was opposed to the alliance with Columbia, offered him the supreme power, by a special messenger. But San Martin had no faith in Riva-Agüero, and wrote to him to re-establish the authority of Congress, and on his refusal, rejected his offers with disdain.

Riva-Agüero, in his semi-exile at Trujillo, had dissolved Congress, and on the 19th July had convened a Senate of his own selection, but he had no support in public opinion. On the 6th July thirteen members of the late Congress met at Lima, called up some substitutes, formed themselves into a sovereign Congress, appointed Torre-Tagle chief of the Executive, and on the 8th August declared Riva-Agüero an outlaw. He replied by declaring them traitors and their decrees null and void. He then collected an army of some sort, proposed an armistice to the Spaniards and offered to dismiss the auxiliaries. But the auxiliaries refused to recognise his authority, and the Columbian troops called upon him to lay down the command.

Then came Bolívar. The castles of Callao thundered him a welcome; Lima decked herself in flags in his honour. He landed in Peru on the 1st September; no American ever received so enthusiastic a reception. Congress made an appearance of consulting him, but in reality only awaited his orders. As at Caracas, at Angostura, in New Granada, and at Cúcuta, he renounced all claim to civil power, placing only his sword at their disposal. Congress paid no attention to these empty phrases, invested him as Liberator with supreme authority, both military and civil, and voted him an annual salary of 50,000 dollars, which, with his usual disinterestedness, he declined to touch.

At a banquet which followed, the name of San Martin was not mentioned among the many toasts proposed. Whereupon Bolívar rising to his feet proposed one himself:—

“To the good genius of America, which brought General San Martin with his liberating army from the banks of La Plata to the shores of Peru; and to General O’Higgins who had sent him on from Chile.”

Then as the banquet drew to an end, he proposed another:—

“That the peoples of America may never raise a throne upon their soil.”

At night as he entered the theatre, the whole audience rose to their feet. He occupied the official box with the President, under a drapery of the festooned flags of Peru and Columbia.

Procter, an English traveller who was present on this occasion, thus describes him:—

“He is very thin, but his whole person shows great activity. His features are well formed, but are worn by fatigue and anxiety. The fire of his black eyes draws attention at once. Never did the exterior give a more exact idea of the man himself. Egoism, determination, activity, intrigue, and a persevering spirit, are clearly expressed in his bearing, and in each movement of his body.”

Bolívar’s first care was to put an end to the dispute with Riva-Agüero, but finding all friendly overtures unsuccessful, he resolved upon using force. The country seemed on the verge of a civil war, when his own troops mutinied against the ex-President. He disappeared from public life, and the danger was averted.

Bolívar remained absolute master of Peru. He thought that all America was now his.