EVENTS AT KARTOUM.
November 5.—Steamer Bordeen left this evening for Metemma. According to all accounts the presence of the steamers at Shendy and Metemma cause the Arabs great annoyance, for the Arab chief of Berber keeps calling for them to come down and help him; while they say, “If we do, then the steamers will pillage our houses.” I cannot get out of my head the Abbas catastrophe; that the Abbas (with her 970 bullet marks on her, her gun, and her parapets, which were bullet-proof), could be captured by force, seems impossible; that she ran upon a rock seems unlikely, for she had her sides defended by buffers, sunk one foot in water. I also had warned them against ever anchoring by the bank, also to take wood from isolated spots; in fact, as far as human foresight goes, I did all my possible. Why did you let them go? The matter was thus. I determined to send the Abbas down with an Arab captain. Herbin asked to be allowed to go. I jumped at his offer. Then Stewart said he would go, if I would exonerate him from deserting me. I said you do not desert me. I: I cannot go; but if you go, you do great service. I then wrote him an official; he wanted me to write him an order. I said “No, for though I fear not responsibility, I will not put you in any danger in which I am not myself.” I wrote them a letter, couched thus: “Abbas is going down; you say you are willing to go in her, if I think you can do so in honour—you can go in honour, for you can do nothing here, and if you go you do me service in telegraphing my views.” You will notice the number of Greeks. They were a bodyguard I ordered and paid highly, to prevent any treachery on the part of the crew. Thus the question of treachery was duly weighed by me and guarded against, as far as I could—both on the part of the crew and on the part of the inhabitants—and I told them to anchor mid stream, and not to take wood except in isolated spots.[188]
I escorted them by two steamers past every place where danger could be apprehended, viz., Berber and Shendy. They appear to have been captured in a comparatively thinly populated place, below Abou Hamed. I feel somehow convinced they were captured by treachery—the Arabs pretending to be friendly—and surprising them at night. I will own that, without reason (apparently, for the chorus was, that the trip was safe) I have never been comfortable since they left. Stewart was a man who did not chew the cud, he never thought of danger in prospective; he was not a bit suspicious (while I am made up of it). I can see in imagination the whole scene,[189] the sheikh inviting them to land, saying, “Thank God the Mahdi is a liar”—bringing in wood—men going on shore and dispersed. The Abbas with her steam down, then a rush of wild Arabs, and all is over! A spy said something of a chief having pretended to be friendly, and when the Abbas was near, rushing on her, but then he said the Abbas turned on them, and killed seventy-two or seventy-three (see back page of this Journal).[190] It is very sad, but being ordained, we must not murmur. I look on it as being a Nemesis on the death of the two Pashas.
I do sincerely hope you will have a strict examination into the question of Stewart, Power, and Herbin going down. What makes me think so much of the capture being by treachery is, that the two sailing-boats which went with the Abbas have not arrived at Debbeh, for if the Abbas struck on a rock, why could not the boats come on? I expect they were all caught at one coup. 11 p.m. last night Arabs fired twelve shells into the town from their Krupps on the South Front, they did not frighten us and did no harm. At midnight they fired two or three volleys of musketry with no effect. Four soldiers came in from the Arabs at Omdurman. They state the Mahdi sent a party of Arabs to Sennaar, the garrison sallied out and killed nearly all of them. Also that the Baggara Arabs, under pretence of getting better pasturage for their cattle, asked the Mahdi to let them go from his camp some distance, he agreed, and they the people no longer regard the Mahdi as before. Hussein Pasha Khalifa is good friends with the Mahdi. The Arabs came near Bourré and fired a few shots, and then went back. I expect that the Arabs sent the regulars out, and go through this as a mere form, one of these men[191] was with Slatin Bey when he surrendered, and says he did so when he had plenty of food and ammunition, and that he (Slatin) is on the best terms with the Mahdi. We shall not know the truth until the other Europeans get out of the Mahdi’s clutches.
Stewart had about £60 in gold with him, and every paper connected with our mission. I purposely kept none here, for one did not know what one day would bring forth; when he left on the 10th of September we had lost over 800 men killed, and 978 Remingtons, with a lot of ammunition on 4th of September, only six days before he left. Baker tells me news, he says Clifford Lloyd has left on account of row with Nubar, and that China and France have come to terms.
One shell from the Arabs went over the town and fell in the river.
I have mentioned that Stewart’s journal contained all events from 1st March, 1884, to 10th September, and if lost there is only the journal of the Doctor, which begins 7th March, 1884.
I wish the correspondent of the Times to know this, and to be told that the Doctor has promised me that the Times shall have the first offer of that journal. Stewart was wounded near the Palace, at 6 a.m. on Sunday, 25th May, in the arm (flesh wound). If Sennaar has beaten back the Arabs a second time I cannot see how it is possible to abandon the garrison, and if they are to be relieved, I see at least a delay of four months; all this could be avoided by handing the Soudan over to the Sultan with a subsidy. When Stewart left we were at the lowest ebb, the Arabs from Kordofan had arrived with their guns, and our three steamers were just in from Sennaar, with seven shot holes in them.
Hansall, the Austrian Consul, has a daily journal; Power and Herbin had one also.
I have captured[192] all the European telegrams which we sent and which we received. I shall hand them over to you, as they are in cipher, and as you may have the F. O. cipher books, you can peruse them. Stewart (as I have said) carried off the cipher books with him; he had two copies of the journal, but I did not like to ask him to leave one here, as I said, have bolted—they are his best horsemen—also that “you can send one home, while you keep the copy to refer to.”
I send with this the Firman of Towfik and the letters[193] respecting the troops withdrawing, which I received at Cairo on the 23rd January, 1884, and which have not been promulgated.
If Stewart, Power, and Herbin died because they would not change their religion, they are as much martyrs as Peter or Paul.
A black boy of ten years was caught by the Arabs outside of the Lines this morning, collecting grass, and he escaped from them this evening and came back to the town; he is a smart boy.
If the Abbas is taken, the Mahdi has the small seal I used in my former time, and he captured at fall of Berber my large seal, so he has both. If it is true, the Abbas must have been captured between Abou Hamed and Merowé, on or about the 18th September. Now, on the 18th September the Arabs must have known of Kitchener being at Debbeh, since he wrote to me from that place on 31st August. Probably Stewart was lulled into security in feeling himself so near Merowé, and on account of the news the Sheikh gave him of the advance of the expedition.
Abou Hamed is one hundred miles from Merowé, which, with the current, the Abbas could do in twelve hours, and there is only one small cataract to pass, which is, by all accounts, an easy one. Stewart had a supreme contempt for the Soudanese people, and for their courage, which I do not share. That our men are not heroes, I agree, but we had against us the feeling that the Arabs were ten times our numbers, while we had received no reinforcements whatever.[194] If he (Stewart) has fallen, it is because he was carried away by the idea the Arabs would not dare to do anything. Power had the same defect, viz., over-rashness in not considering the material they had to support them. You may be very strong yourself, but your strength is of no avail if you are supported by weaker vessels. The rate of progress of a fleet is decided by the speed of the slowest vessel, so up here one ought to work as if the whole mass was as cowardly as the greatest coward in the force. If the Abbas went on a rock she had two boats (which I expressly mentioned to Stewart were to be taken in case of such an accident), and they could have got into them, and, with the current, got down easily. I sent, in 1878, a boat with a large tank, in which were four hippopotami (infants); it got down to Cairo in fifty days from here, and Stewart had the Reis, or pilot of that boat, in the Abbas. Humanly speaking, when Stewart left here the condition of Kartoum was desperate; while, on the other hand, when once the Abbas passed Berber, which we escorted her past, the certainty was she would reach Dongola, and even we discussed whether Dongola might not have fallen, and agreed that the Abbas even in that case could have got down to Wadi Halfa, in which case I told Stewart to go on with her to Cairo. Men may not remember the case of Captain ..., who took a middy up against Taepings with him, which middy was killed. Middy’s father ... made a great row about this. Why did ... take the middy up, &c. I say, in defence of my letting Stewart go, that both he, Power, and Herbin felt our situation here was desperate after the defeat at El foun—that I had, over and over again, said it was impossible for me to go, physically impossible, because even my servants would have betrayed me (even if I had felt inclined to leave), and I would die here (even going so far as to have two mines brought to the palace with which to blow it up if the place fell). These three men’s ideas were that it was shabby to leave me, but when I showed them they could do no possible good by being prisoners, and when I said I shall send the Abbas with the journal, then, first, Herbin, then Stewart, and then Power, said they would go in her. A long conversation took place between me and Stewart, he wishing me to order, I declining to do so, on account of eventualities which might arise: it ended in my writing the letter I alluded to in former pages of the journal. I avow I was glad they went, 1. because I thought it was quite safe; 2. because I knew if Europe knew of the state of affairs the Government would be shamed into action.
Remember that this was when the last telegram[195] from Egerton was to the effect that “Her Majesty’s Government would pay on delivery for all who came down, if I contracted with Arabs.” Stewart’s idea was that every order of Her Majesty’s Government, or wish that they expressed, was indisputable. We often discussed the nuisance we must have been to Her Majesty’s Government in being sent up here, and I think he was, to some degree, actuated by a desire to aid Her Majesty’s Government when he went down, for then it only left one nuisance (myself), and I had so completely exonerated Her Majesty’s Government by my letters, and the notes in his journal, that they might, as far as I was concerned, have let the garrison fall. On my part, I do not think I could have done Her Majesty’s Government a better service than to have, at any rate, tried to send Stewart down with Power and Herbin, for certainly it only left a small remnant here of Europeans (one of whom is mad), and the French government could no longer say a word. Next, Stewart knew everything, and could tell Her Majesty’s Government the pros and cons, from their point of view, and with feelings akin to theirs, which they would accept from Stewart, and never without suspicion from me (in which they are justified, for I do not look on things from their point of view). I told Stewart also, “I know you will act conscientiously and honourably; but I know your opinions, and, therefore, as you have all my views on the Soudan in your journal, I beg you will, in answering queries of Her Majesty’s Government, make extracts from the journal, and state ‘General G. says this, or that,’ while you are at full liberty to give your opinion, even if it differs from mine, but let Her Majesty’s Government know when I answer and when you answer.” Stewart, the night he left, wrote at my dictation a series of questions, which I answered on half-margin of the same paper, and in which I said, “If Her Majesty’s Government have not acted up to time when you get down, then it is too late, and it is no use doing anything.”
A curious thing has happened; my friend Kitchener sent up the post; he wrapped the letters in some old newspapers (he gave me no news in his letter), the old newspapers were thrown out in the garden: there a clerk who knew some English found them blowing about, and gave them to the apothecary of the hospital, who knows English. The doctor found him reading them, saw date 15th September, and secured them for me; they are like gold, as you may imagine, since we have had no news since 24th February, 1884!
These papers gave us far more information than any of your letters. Did K. send them by accident or on purpose? Abyssinian ambassadors in London, Walmer Castle, &c.; my black troops beating back Ras Aloula at Keren, not recognizing the Hewitt Treaty, and killing 194 of the Abyssinians, at Keren, vide Standard, 1 and 15 September. Lord Wolseley seen off at Victoria Station, for the Gordon relief expedition!! NO! for the relief of Soudan garrisons. Khedive expressing delight at seeing Lord N., while during the audience the Khedive displayed great cordiality towards Lord N. Abdel Kader saying you would have four hard fights. I do not believe it.[196]
It appears that these newspapers were chucked out of the Palace; but that a man saw the papers were thrown out, and said to the cavass, “Give me those papers to wrap up tobacco.” The cavass gave them, and the doctor’s assistant going to the shop saw them, and seeing the date, took them, and then the doctor got them.
I think that the defeat of Ras Aloula, at Keren, if true, is splendid; when the Abyssinian Ambassadors were being entertained at Walmer Castle. The Hewitt Treaty, instead of aiding us, appears only to have added to our enemies.
It does seem wonderful if Her Majesty’s Government have made a treaty with King John to give over Bogos, i.e. Keren, i.e. Senheit, to him (with other places), that orders were not sent to the fortress to evacuate; but if the papers we secured are true, that Ras Aloula was beaten back, it is evident no such orders were given. What an extraordinary state of affairs! Mitzakis, in his letter to Greek Consul here of date 25th of August, says, that possession will be taken of Keren (i.e. Senheit, i.e. Bogos) at once, and then we have the telegram from Massowa that Ras Aloula has attacked Keren, and lost heavily (vide the Standard of 1st September). By these papers, miraculously secured, I see we have made Minister of Interior Abdel Kader Pasha; according to all accounts up here, he is “Abdel Kader and the Forty Thieves in one.”[197]
November 6.—Three horsemen and four footmen (Arabs) came opposite Bourré to-day on right bank of the Nile, and fired a few shots, and went off on our firing two shots from Krupp. Also, the Arabs came down with their guns to the White Nile end of Lines, and fired on the Santals. A soldier of ours came in from Sheikh el Obeyed with his wife and child; he says Sheikh el Obeyed died four days ago (to the great relief of Sanderson), now we have only the city to deal with. Two more soldiers came in from Arabs at Omdurman. The Arabs fired seven rounds from their guns on the Lines near the White Nile. A post was captured by Sheikh el Obeyed (with European letters, coming from Kassala) just before his death; the porter of these letters was killed.
I expect that the naming of the expedition the Gordon Relief Expedition is because the fiction “that Her Majesty s Government has no responsibility towards the Soudan and its garrisons” is going to be held to, and that the object of the expedition thus named, will be considered as accomplished, if Kartoum is reached; but in that case, how can the sending up Stewart and me be explained? It was certainly because our Government thought they were responsible that we were sent; also if Her Majesty’s Government has no responsibility, why did the troops attack Osman Digma, and relieve Tokar?[198]
The Sheikh el Obeyed’s death will be a heavy blow to the Arabs, for his following will no longer hold together.
Another soldier, with his wife, has come in at Omdurman.
These men report Sheikh el Obeyed dead, and that he is succeeded by his son Achmet, and that not more than 1000 or 1500 are with him; the Mahdi and the Arabs are against any attack on the Kartoum Lines. A good many Baggara are still with Mahdi, who is daily losing followers.
A soldier was severely wounded this morning at Bourré.
They say Sheikh el Obeyed died of chagrin. He would not go and see the Mahdi, who sent him word to give up all his property.
What a fury King John will be in, if it is true Keren has fired on and killed his men; he will swear it is Towfik’s treachery. I wonder who are the Treaty Powers—Towfik and King John, or our Government and King John? Keren is only three days from Massowah, and it is not likely they would invent this telegram. It makes one laugh, to think of this addition to our enemies kindly given us.
The soldier (who came in with his wife and two children) says that Sheikh el Obeyed captured a post with the Arab and European letters; that he sat for some time in a comatose state, and then died; that his people are all dispersing. This is a great comfort, for we will have (D.V.) no fighting there. A soldier and his mother have come in. They say the Mahdi moved his camp to-day four hours further off. This evening the Arabs fired six times, with their guns, on the Lines near the White Nile.
I knew Harrison[199] would come. Extract A[200] on the other side shows you, A, if you cannot protect dhows now, how will you do so if all the Soudan falls into hands of the Mahdi? Also extract B respecting rebellion in Hedjaz, will show all their lands are in a fermenting state, and will be well worked up by the Mahdi if he ever gets to Kartoum. Another man who came in says the Mahdi has drawn closer to Omdurman, and has not gone further off. I have an idea the Arabs will make a try to take the place. A soldier was wounded on the Lines near the White Nile this evening; he was fishing, and got hit. It certainly does seem most miraculous that Suakin should be besieged[201] and dhows captured close to it; no lesson has yet been taught these Arabs.
November 7.—We captured two cows to-day at Bourré. Mahdi’s camp is now alongside of Faki Mustapha’s, which is one hour and a half from the Fort Omdurman.
A large body of Arabs left, with caravan, the Dem of Faki Mustafa, in a north-west direction, towards the Gabra Wells, the Kababish headquarters. The Dem of the Mahdi is not far from the river, by which I conjecture he has his Krupps in position near there. Church parade going on, average size. I am anxious for the flank of the lines ending on the White Nile,[202] and have sent up a steamer to stay there. Four soldiers, one slave and two women came from the Arabs to Omdurman. The Mahdi means to attack Omdurman; he has received 120 camels of ammunition; Slatin is in chains. These men say the Mahdi and the Arabs have not the least intention of risking their skins against the fort, but will shove on the Black Regulars they have captured. It is like fighting one’s own flesh and blood; it is not fair warfare.[203]
If I am inclined to be vicious I have some little excuse, with women yelling for dhoora, under the Palace windows! Church parade to-day, and the approach nearer to us of the Mahdi’s camp, and his sending for and getting 120 camel loads of ammunition, does not show he is wanting in confidence, for if he did fear, he would never have sent for 500,000 rounds of ammunition; or if he had sent for it, he would have stopped its coming, had he feared the advance. The fact is that the Tokar affair, with the non-following up of the victory,[204] has given him great confidence, which is strengthened by his Arabs capturing dhows and firing on the lines of Suakin with impunity. Perhaps the non-firing on Suakin for three days (August 30) means that the Hadendowa Arabs have gone to assist Berber! I wonder whether it has not been observed, that Suakin is perfectly useless if the Soudan is in the hands of the Mahdi. I declare I think he (the Mahdi) has a fair chance of getting to Mecca, if the rebellion in the Hedjaz goes on, and he gets Kartoum.
The Mahdi may, and I daresay has good information from Cairo, as to the intention of the expedition, or he may reason, “They will relieve Kartoum, leave me alone in my camp, and go back.” If the Government instructions are definite, and going to be carried out at any cost, and if they are to the effect that a Rapid Retreat is to take place, then nothing more is to be said. All I ask for then, is to be put out of my place here,[205] to go on my way, and be no more employed. That is not an unreasonable demand, for my mission here was a special one, and not obligatory, like a military duty, and in my position of Governor-General I am quite justified in having said and done everything for the people over whom I was placed by Towfik (following the “fiction” that he was independent) that I thought would secure them safety. If it is determined to abandon Sennaar and Kassala (following the fiction that the King of Abyssinia will look after them), also the Equator, to their fate, after their gallant defence, there is nothing more to be said, and the sooner this action is performed the better, if it is to be performed at all. To execute the operation, if it is confined to the evacuation of Kartoum, I can be of no possible use, and I do not care to wait and see the Mahdi walk in on your heels into Kartoum, which we have held against him for so many months; neither do I wish to see Her Majesty’s forces dogged by these Arabs all the way to Wady Halfa, or to receive the remonstrances of those who have stuck to me. I am sure I have now written so fully on all these subjects that there can be little room for further discussion: you have to make up your mind and act. I have fully expressed my views and desires, and shall take, or try to take, very philosophically your decision; though I do most emphatically protest against this abandonment, which will lead to greater disasters, and is unworthy of our country.
The men who came in to-day say the Mahdi will attack Omdurman to-morrow. The following decisions have to be taken if the rapid retreat is carried out:—
1. Are the Government stores to be destroyed?
2. Are you prepared to supply transport for all who wish to go down?
3. Will you disarm the Shaggyeh ere you leave?
4. What will you do with the steamers?
I declare I should tremble to give these orders. As Governor-General I never would do it.
5. Will you write to Sennaar and Kassala, and inform them of what you mean to do, and exonerate me?
(A slave came in from the Arabs. He says the Arabs will not attack the lines; that the regulars are all over with the Mahdi on the left bank.)
6. Will you negotiate with the Mahdi (no use, I expect) in re the deliverance of the prisoners (European) he has with him?
7. Would you object to aiding the black troops to go to Sennaar and to fight out the question, with the view of saving Sennaar and Kassala garrisons?
Two soldiers and one slave came in from Arabs at Omdurman; they say the Mahdi will not attack directly, that Slatin is in chains for writing to Kartoum; also Saleh Pasha. The Arabs fired two rounds from their guns towards the lines near the White Nile this evening. They fell short.
Supposing Kartoum evacuated, then Sennaar and Kassala fall. The Arabs now fire on the lines at Suakin, and capture dhows in the Red Sea, and there is a revolt in the Hedjaz. What is to prevent the Mahdi’s adherents gaining Mecca, where there are not 2,000 men. Once at Mecca, we may look out for squalls in Turkey, &c.
If decision is taken on the Rapid Retreat proceeding, the consuls should be warned on your arrival.
If the British Government had only given us Zubair Pasha in March, when I asked for him, we would not have lost Berber, and would never have wanted an expedition. We would have beaten the Mahdi without any exterior help; it is sad, when the Mahdi is moribund that we should by evacuation of Kartoum, raise him again. The defect I laboured under has been that I presented no rallying point to the people, not being of their nation or creed.[206]
The Arabs began musketry fire on Bourré at 1 p.m., and before this morning. It was quite like old times, when it used to go on for months. I never got accustomed to it, for I knew what troops we had, and it always murdered sleep.
November 8.—It must be obvious that if Zubair was with you, and installed as Governor-General, with a semi-independent position and a subsidy, in the present decaying position of the Mahdi, and your temporary presence, he would rally around him a huge following, who are now disgusted with the Mahdi and his dervishes, but who will be obliged to hold to him, because you evacuate; even those people with us, we per force oblige to join the Mahdi. Zubair’s installation would save you all the bother of the Sennaar evacuation. You would have only to stay up here a couple of months, and perhaps have to keep a detachment at Berber and Dongola (in order that Zubair might get up more munitions) for a time. You have now boats fitted for the communication by the Nile, via Abou Hamed, and Zubair could soon put them along the Nile in a chain. As for the slave trade,[207] the Mahdi will be ten times worse than Zubair, and you could make the payment of the subsidy (to Zubair) contingent on his not doing it on any vast scale. The Zubair solution is the sort of half-way house between rapid retreat and continued occupation, either by Turks or yourself.
The Mahdi could never get the people to rise against Zubair; it will be only because they are presented with no rallying point, and per force they will join him if you leave. They never would have joined the Mahdi if Zubair had come up. It is only because Zubair was not here that Berber fell.
6.30 a.m.—Arabs streaming across from the White Nile to Bourré. Some Arabs on the right bank of the Blue Nile look as if they are coming down that bank to the North Fort. I have ordered up the steamers Ismailia and Husseinyeh. The Arabs have found our weak point, i.e. prolongation of our lines at Bourré, but the steamers will drive them out.
7.30 a.m.—Fight still going on, steamer coming up the river. 8.30 a.m.—Steamers went up and drove the Arabs off the right bank of the Blue Nile, who were enfilading our lines. The firing, which has been continuous for four hours, has pretty well ceased. Up to this we have had no killed or wounded, I am glad to say. During the night the Arabs on the left bank of the White Nile (Mahdi’s camp) fired three shells against the lines ending on right bank of the White Nile. A soldier fellaheen is thought to have deserted to the Arabs last night. 9 a.m.—The Arabs have collected in the vicinity of Omdurman Fort a heap of cows, who seem drawing down towards the fort. I have ordered Ismailia to go down. I expect they will drive the cows on to the fort, and try and explode the mines. The Arabs on the White Nile are firing on the lines with their Krupp. 10 a.m.—Arabs are leaving the vicinity of Bourré, and going back to their Dem near the White Nile. The Arabs near Omdurman village are firing across the river towards Mogrim.
The Austrian Consul when taking his morning ride was surprised at seeing two balls strike the water near, and so he returned. 10.45 a.m.—The battles are over, and all is quiet. What a worry all this is! The rockets from Omdurman drove back the advance of the cows; it was an ingenious attempt, if meant.[208]
I expect the Arabs fired away 30,000 rounds to-day. We had one man killed in small steamer, and one wounded; in the fort we had two wounded, and one man was wounded by bursting of rocket tube at Omdurman. I hate these rockets with sticks. Hale’s are the only decent ones; not that the sticks have anything to do with their bursting. The composition in these climates shrinks away from the case, and the fire flares up the whole of the exterior and interior of the rocket. I expect we are going to have a series of these festivities, which are so wearisome. In the Abbas there was a heap of money orders, &c., connected with the merchants here, so sure did they think she would get down. Six soldiers came in from the Arabs, also four slaves, who report the Arabs are thinking of putting a post at Halfeyeh. (I hope they will not.) The Mahdi has about 8,000 men of sorts with him. Slatin is in chains, also Saleh Pasha. Hussein Pasha Khalifa is great friends with the Mahdi. Omdurman captured sixteen cows when they came near the fort, also one slave. They killed one Arab. The men who came in say the Arabs mean to continue this day’s festivities every day. They do not seem to care much about the advance of the expedition, or are uncommonly confident or ignorant. I do not at all enjoy the thought of these daily festivities, they are “abrutissant,” as the Austrian Consul says.
It is very curious what a very little effect all our immense preparations at Dongola, &c., has had on the course of events; one may say they have not had up to the present the least, while I have weakened myself by sending down my steamers[209] and four hundred men (not, however, of the best quality). I expect we will have the festivity to-morrow on the White Nile end of the Lines, which is our weakest part. I must not be blamed at looking forward to a repetition of the past miseries; we truly have had a wearisome time for 241 days! Another soldier has come in; he says the Mahdi thought Kartoum could be bombarded from his new camp, but finds it cannot be done. If Lord Wolseley did say he hoped to relieve Kartoum before “many months,” he must have a wonderful confidence in our powers of endurance, considering that when he is said to have made this utterance, we had been blockaded six-and-a-half months, and are now in our ninth month. I am quite sure of one thing, that the policy followed up till lately (and the policy which may be carried out, of abandoning Sennaar, etc.) is one which will act detrimentally on our army; for what officer, if he was in a fortress, could have any confidence that it might not be thought advisable to abandon him. Her Majesty’s Government told me, or rather my friend Baring told me[210] I was not to leave Kartoum for the Equator until I had permission. I have his telegram (so that if it was possible, or if I could do it) if I did leave Kartoum, I should be acting against orders. This Soudan business will cost me £3000[211] beyond my pay, at least, which I will not ask them or allow them to pay. I shall get it from others, and I shall get another £1000 to buy Stewart’s journal, if he has been killed or captured.
Another soldier is in from the Arabs at Omdurman which fort has captured four more cows, that is twenty to-day (a cow is worth £20 in town!) £400! There is one thing which is quite incomprehensible. If it is right to send up an expedition now, why was it not right to send it up before? It is all very well to say one ought to consider the difficulties of the Government, but it is not easy to get over a feeling, that “a hope existed of no expedition being necessary, owing to our having fallen.” As for myself, personally, I feel no particular rancour on the subject, but I own I do not care to show I like men, whoever they may be, who act in such a calculating way, and I do not think one is bound to act the hypocrite’s part, and pretend to be friendly towards them. If a boy at Eton or Harrow acted towards his fellow in a similar way, I think he would be kicked, and I am sure he would deserve it. I know of no sort of parallel to all this in history, except it be David with Uriah the Hittite, and then there was an Eve in the case, who, I am not aware of, exists in this case. Remember, also, that I do not judge the question of abandoning the garrisons or not: what I judge is the indecision of Government. They did not dare say “abandon the garrison,” so they prevented me leaving for the Equator, with the determination not to relieve me, and the hope (well! I will not say what their hope was) (“March, April ... August, why! he ought to have surrendered, he said, six months”)—there is my point of complaint. The second is the FICTION that it is the Egyptian Government which governs Egypt; it is a silly story, for every one sees through it. Can one imagine a greater farce, than Lord Northbrook asking Towfik for the “assistance of Egyptian Government to carry out this, or that.” I expect the two roared with laughter over it (sorry I cannot manage a sketch of the scene). (Baring would never laugh, it is too serious, like jesting in church). The third grievance is that Treaty with Abyssinia, under the screen of the “FICTION,” (if it is true it has been made); however it is a dead letter, I am glad to say.
November 9th.—Four soldiers, five slaves, of whom two are women, came in, from the Arabs to-day. Desultory firing on and from the Arabs at Omdurman, and the White Nile Lines.
Of the men who came in, one is a slave of Slatin Bey. The Mahdi does not mean to fight direct; the Khalifas[212] and the Arabs want to fight direct. Omdurman killed some of their men; the Arabs have munitions; Slatin is in chains. These men brought in their rifles. The Arabs lost at Bourré heavily, some bodies came floating down the river to-day. A soldier came in from the Arabs. A few Arabs came and fired on the fort at Omdurman, and wounded a slave in it.
The people up here would reason thus, if I attempted to leave: “You came up here, and had you not come, we should have some of us got away to Cairo, but we trusted in you to extricate us; we suffered and are suffering great privations, in order to hold the town. Had you not come we should have given in at once and obtained pardon; now we can, after our obstinate defence, expect no mercy from the Mahdi, who will avenge on us all the blood which has been spilt around Kartoum. You have taken our money and promised to repay us; all this goes for nought if you quit us; it is your bounden duty to stay by us, and to share our fate; if the British Government deserts us that is no reason for you to do so, after our having stood by you.”[213] I declare positively, and once for all, that I will not leave the Soudan until every one who wants to go down is given the chance to do so, unless a government is established, which relieves me of the charge; therefore if any emissary or letter comes up here ordering me to come down, I will not obey it, but will stay here, and fall with the town, and run all risks. These remarks are produced by the extraordinary confidence of the Arabs, combined with the Abyssinian Treaty and other significant remarks in the newspaper Kitchener sent me—Gordon Relief Expedition—who, I expect knows more than I do, and that “that more is that the Expedition has come up for me personally.” I hope, if things do come to the worst, and that the Expedition goes back, my steamers (after abstraction of the Fellaheen troops) will be sent back to this place, with £150,000 which Baring promised me! (or as much as I wanted), and as much provisions as can be possibly spared; also a gun to replace the one lost (or said to be lost) in the Abbas trying to communicate with Europe and Cairo. Unless Zubair is absolutely required at Cairo, I would also like him to come up, or (to save appearances) allowed to escape. I hope that Stewart’s supposed death, if by treachery, will be avenged in a signal way, on the way down.[214]
A boy was captured, during the cow business at Omdurman, but he said his father was with the Arabs, so I let him go back.
I have now got all the “telegrams,” European, “sent from” and “received in Soudan” for “1883-84,”—splendid collection, full of interest. What would the Standard give for them? However, I think I can afford to be generous, and so I shall send them down with this Vol. VI.[215]
The fort at Omdurman captured twenty-one cows this evening; this is splendid—forty-one cows in two days.
The only original document I kept here, and which I was as near as possible giving to Stewart, is the Firman I have already mentioned, which I send with this,[216] proclaiming the abandonment of the Soudan by Towfik.[217] If the Mahdi had got this he would have crowed, though he may know of it, for I showed it, not knowing well its contents, to Hussein Pasha Khalifa (vide Stewart’s Journal, which went down, and in which I criticise my having done so). I felt inclined to give it to Stewart, who, I felt confident, would get down, because I thought if found with me the Mahdi might say, “Why, you had the order to give up the country from Towfik, and you did not”; but, then, I thought as I shall be killed ere he takes the town it does not make much difference if here or with Stewart, so I kept it. I call attention to the fact that every document (except above-mentioned telegrams, of which Stewart had taken copies) went down with him (Stewart), and that will show how sure I felt that he and Power would get down, for otherwise, if I had doubted, I would never have let my original instructions go; now I have not a single paper. I cannot quote textually: all went with Stewart; but I have my memory, and I even give you the Telegrams. I have not written any dispatch concerning Stewart or Power. I dare not, with my views, say their death is an evil;[218] if true. I am sorry for their friends and relations. Stewart was a brave, just, upright gentleman. Can one say more? Power was a chivalrous, brave, honest gentleman. Can one say more? Herbin, I liked very much; he was a most agreeable and gentlemanly Frenchman, and very sharp. The diplomatic ... called him names in a telegram; but I found him fairly just,[219] though naturally with a French bias. For my part I cannot see what harm the French can do us if they had a voice in Egypt; and I can see much good arising from it. I declare if they had had a voice in Egypt the present state of affairs would never have existed. If you can find no chivalry in your own house, you had better borrow it from your neighbour. We fired yesterday 41,000 rounds of Remington ammunition, and we fired less than the Arabs.
November 10.—This morning forty Arabs came down near Omdurman Fort, and fired on it—angry about the capture of cows last evening.
One soldier and one slave came in from the Arabs at Omdurman. Seven Arabs on camels went across from the Blue Nile towards Halfeyeh. I fear a reconnoitring party, previous to their putting a post there. To day is the day I expected we should have had some one of the Expedition here. Hicks’ defeat was known at Cairo on the 21st or 22nd November, since which reinforcements to extent of nine persons reached this place (up to date) from Cairo—“for which the Egyptian Government” (according to the fiction) “is solely and entirely to blame”!!!!!
The man who was wounded by the mine is dead. If man knew what the future would bring forth he would be pretty miserable. Look at the telegram on other side, written in December 1883.[220] I would not read those telegrams, or Stewart’s Journal, for a good deal, when I think how we kept feeding on delusions for so many months. A soldier and slave have come in from the Arabs at Omdurman; five more soldiers and three slaves came in later on in the day; they say Slatin is released from his chains; that there is a rumour of the advance of the Expedition direct on Kartoum from Debbeh; that Luigi and Yusef, two priests, are still in Obeyed, having refused to become Muslim; that the Arabs lost heavily at Bourré the day before yesterday. Why Kitchener[221] did not tell me the route the Expedition would take is inexplicable, for it could have done no possible harm, seeing the Mahdi has his spies everywhere, and it was easy to have couched this information in terms I could have understood, and the Mahdi could not have understood. The Fellaheen soldier did go to the Mahdi.[222]
November 11.—This morning, 6 a.m., 200 Arabs came to north of Omdurman Fort, and fired vollies towards the village of Tuti and the Fort; the Fort answered, and the footmen of the Arabs retreated; then the Arab horsemen made the footmen go back again, and so on, four or five times; at last they retired. We had three soldiers and one woman wounded; only one wound was at all serious. Arabs must have fired five thousand rounds; evidently they do not wish much to fight. Nineteen Arabs came along the right bank of the White Nile from Halfeyeh to Goba, and captured a donkey, this even the Shaggyeh could not stand, and so I suppose one hundred sallied out and some fifteen horsemen; then came a running fight across the plain, but it was evident the horsemen would not head the Arabs; however, from the roof, it was evident four or five Arabs were killed, and the pursuit is still going on. You may imagine the Arabs have a good deal of confidence, for their nineteen men were distant at least ten miles of desert from their camp and were at a. They were going along b b when they were discovered with the captured donkey. Five at least of these Arabs got away. The Arabs are sure to come down to avenge this. Noon.—Arabs coming down from their camp. Ismailia getting steam up. North Fort reports (?) “Captures, 3 Remingtons! 3 spears! 3 swords! and the killing of 20? 5 got away?” The Arabs are halted on the sand hills. Five soldiers and one woman came in from the Arabs at Omdurman, report, “Arab rocket-tube broken; carriage of gun broken; the Arabs deserting; rumoured advance of the expedition; quarrels going on; Slatin in chains.” The Shaggyeh say they killed twenty Arabs, but they only say they captured nine arms, so eleven must have been unarmed!!!