In 1897 the menace of war hung heavy above America. Spain’s barbarous rule in Cuba had stirred the American conscience. It became plain that it was the duty of America to become the protector of the sunny island that cried out to it for deliverance from the oppression of the Old World power.
Cuba, under Spain’s management, was a pest hole of yellow fever. Her government was vile and corrupt. The Spanish rulers crushed remonstrances with blood and iron.
A new American navy was then being built. Before it began, Roosevelt himself said, America was not in a position to fight Spain or anyone else. Timidly and haltingly, contrasting strongly with America’s present-day naval programme, the work had been begun by the country. The need was felt for a man of energetic character, modern methods and foresight to put the fleet in condition for war. Roosevelt’s work as Police Commissioner had made him famous throughout the country, and the nation met with hearty approval President McKinley’s appointment of him as Assistant Secretary of the Navy.
It was Senator H. C. Lodge, of Massachusetts, a long and close friend of Roosevelt, who worked hardest for his appointment. Fifteen years before, Roosevelt had written “The History of the Naval War of 1812,” and since that time had taken a deep interest in the navy.
He was a strong opponent of that class of impractical men typified by a Senator who, in answer to a question as to what we would do if we were suddenly attacked by a foreign power, replied:
“We would build a battleship in every creek.”
Roosevelt, in his autobiography, thus describes how gingerly the American people went about the work of building the ships that later won the battle of Santiago Bay:
“We built some modern cruisers to start with, the people who felt that battleships were wicked compromising with their misguided consciences by saying that the cruisers could be used ‘to protect our commerce’—which they could not be, unless they had battleships to back them.
“Then we attempted to build more powerful fighting vessels, and as there was a section of the public which regarded battleships as possessing a name immorally suggestive of violence, we compromised by calling the new ships armored cruisers, and making them combine with exquisite nicety all the defects and none of the virtues of both types. Then we got to the point of building battleships.
“But there still remained a public opinion as old as the time of Jefferson which thought that in the event of war all our problem ought to be one of coast defence; that we should do nothing except repel attack; an attitude about as sensible as that of a prizefighter who expected to win by merely parrying instead of hitting.
“To meet the susceptibilities of this large class of well-meaning people we provided for the battleships under the name of ‘coast defence battleships,’ meaning thereby that we did not make them quite as seaworthy as they ought to have been, or with quite as much coal capacity as they ought to have had. Then we decided to build real battleships.
“But there still remained a lingering remnant of public opinion that clung to the coast defence theory, and we met this in beautiful fashion by providing for ‘seagoing coast defence battleships,’ the fact that the name was a contradiction in terms being of very small consequence as compared to the fact that we did thereby get real battleships.
“Our men had to be trained to handle the ships singly and in fleet formation, and they had to be trained to use the new weapons of precision with which the ships were armed.
“Not a few of the older officers, kept in the service under our foolish rule of pure seniority promotion, were not competent for the task; but a proportion of the older officers were excellent, and this was true of almost all the younger officers.
“They were naturally first-class men, trained in the admirable naval school at Annapolis. They were overjoyed that at last they were given proper instruments to work with, and they speedily grew to handle their ships individually in the best fashion. They were fast learning to handle them in squadron and fleet formation; but when war with Spain broke out they had as yet hardly grasped the principles of modern scientific naval gunnery.”
While bearing the title of Assistant to Secretary of the Navy John D. Long, Roosevelt’s work was soon felt in every department of the navy. He found out that many evils had grown up that would seriously handicap the department if suddenly brought face to face with the problem of preparing for war. He therefore began a thorough overhauling of the various bureaus, cutting red tape in every direction. The list of merchant vessels that could be drafted for an auxiliary navy was incomplete and full of errors. This he revised.
Meanwhile the good offices extended by the United States to bring about peace between Spain and the Cubans who had rebelled against her tyranny were refused by Spain. She even refused to consider selling Cuba to the United States. The natives cried to the United States for help.
The commercial interests of our country in Cuba also required protection. Public opinion began to demand armed intervention.
President McKinley, a man wholly inclined to peace, hesitated. Roosevelt, however, had become convinced that the interests of humanity required a declaration of war against Spain. He felt that Spain should be made to withdraw from American soil. He cited the Monroe Doctrine as one of his chief reasons.
Francis E. Leupp, in his book “The Man Roosevelt,” thus describes Roosevelt’s attitude at this time:
“One Sunday morning in March, 1898, we were sitting in his library discussing the significance of the news that Cervera’s squadron was about to sail for Cuba, when he suddenly rose and brought his hands together with a resounding clap.
“‘If I could do what I pleased,’ he exclaimed, ‘I would send Spain notice today that we should consider her dispatch of that squadron a hostile act. Then, if she didn’t heed the warning, she would have to take the consequences.’
“‘You are sure,’ I asked, ‘that it is with unfriendly intent that she is sending the squadron?’
“‘What else can it be? The Cubans have no navy; therefore the squadron cannot be coming to fight the insurgents. The only naval power interested in Cuban affairs is the United States. Spain is simply forestalling the “brush” which she knows, as we do, is coming sooner or later.’
“‘And if she refused to withdraw the orders to Cervera’—
“‘I should send out a squadron to meet his on the high seas and smash it! Then I would force the fighting from that day to the end of the war.’”
The President’s Cabinet was divided in its opinion. The President himself, surrounded by men of different views, remained in a quandary.
One day the President learned that Roosevelt had stated what course he would pursue. McKinley sent for Roosevelt and heard his plans.
Later in the day, at a Cabinet meeting, McKinley remarked:
“Gentlemen, not one of you have put half so much enthusiasm into your expressions as Mr. Roosevelt, our Assistant Secretary of the Navy. He has mapped out a programme for the impending war!”
“Let’s ask him to explain it!” one of the secretaries said, rather jocosely.
McKinley sent for Roosevelt and asked him some leading questions. Roosevelt urged that Spain be warned that she must take the consequences if the fleet came to our waters. McKinley remarked that, as the country was still at peace with Spain, to interfere with her fleet would be an act of war. Roosevelt replied that Spain should be made to understand that the sending of her fleet to America would be considered by us an act of war. Roosevelt then launched upon his war plan. With characteristic gestures and expressions he set forth what he would do to Spain if she did not consent to the just demands of the United States.
The members of the Cabinet complimented him, patted him on the back, and, as he bowed himself out, wondered whether this was just a radical young enthusiast or indeed a born leader. Some of them afterward told of the scene in the Cabinet chamber, and the tale was gossiped throughout official circles as a good joke on Roosevelt.
Meanwhile, with the care of the fleet resting largely on his shoulders, Roosevelt toiled to secure from Congress appropriations that would put it in first-class fighting condition.
Interesting, in view of our modern naval appropriations, is the following incident in Roosevelt’s battles to secure naval appropriations:
On one occasion he asked for $500,000 for the purpose of buying ammunition. Congress gave it to him. A few months later he asked for $800,000 more. Congress asked what had become of the first $500,000.
“We spent it for powder and guns used in target practice,” said Roosevelt.
“What will you do with this $800,000?” a Congressman queried.
“Spend it in the same way,” Roosevelt promptly replied.
In addition to improving the marksmanship of the navy Roosevelt also took many other important steps in preparation for war. Feeling that the United States must soon land troops in Cuba, he bought and equipped transports. He found jealousy existing between regular officers and engineer officers, and worked hard to remove this. He formed the United States warships stationed on the Atlantic into one squadron and drilled them so that they could act in concert if war came. He selected depots for fuel, provisions and munitions.
When Admiral Dewey found coal and ammunition at Hong Kong at the outbreak of the war, and was thus enabled to reach Manila a week ahead of his time, it was due to the foresight and energy of Roosevelt that this was accomplished.
There were profiteers in those days, too. Roosevelt, in buying ships to carry naval supplies, found himself forced to do business with them. Ships were scarce, and sometimes those available were offered by their owners at exorbitant prices. Here is the way Leupp heard Roosevelt handle a lawyer who was representing one of these extortionate firms:
“Don’t you feel ashamed to come to me today with another offer after what you did yesterday? Don’t you think that to sell one rotten ship to the government is enough for a single week? Are you in such a hurry that you couldn’t wait even over Sunday to force your damaged goods upon the United States? Is it an excess of patriotism that brings you here day after day in this way or only your realization of our necessities?”
“Why our clients”——began the lawyer.
“Yes, I know all about your clients,” burst in the Assistant Secretary. “I congratulate them on having an attorney who will do work for them which he wouldn’t have the face to do for himself. I should think, after having enjoyed the honors you have at the hands of the government, you’d feel a keen pride in your present occupation! No, I don’t want any more of your old tubs. The one I bought yesterday is good for nothing except to sink somewhere in the path of the enemy’s fleet. It will be God’s mercy if she doesn’t go down with brave men on her—men who go to war and risk their lives, instead of staying home to sell rotten hulks to the government!”
Finally war came. The battleship Maine on February 15, 1898, was blown up in Havana Harbor and 260 American sailors were killed.
Afterward a court of inquiry met to determine what had caused the explosion. The jury disagreed. Be that as it may, the spark had been applied to the powder magazine. America was in a convulsion—its voice was for war.
On April 20 President McKinley declared war on Spain.
Roosevelt had suggested that when war came it would be wise for the United States to seize the Philippine Islands, then under Spanish possession. He it was who, when the War Department proposed to supplant Dewey, successfully urged that he be retained at the Asiatic station. “Keep the Olympia! Provide yourself with coal,” he cabled to Dewey at this time.
No sooner had President McKinley declared war than Roosevelt sent a still more vital message to Dewey, ordering him to sail into the port of Manila and to capture or destroy the Spanish fleet.
Those who, at the Cabinet meeting, scoffed at Roosevelt’s plan for a war now remembered that he had advocated this very act in his programme and that the officer who had so splendidly captured Manila was the very man Roosevelt had managed against strong opposition to keep on the job.
Roosevelt’s reputation as a picker of men was further illustrated at this time by the interest he took in Lieutenant Sims, then American naval attaché at Paris.
Sims had written to his superiors letter after letter pointing out how backward our fleet was in marksmanship. He had definite plans for teaching Yankee sailors how to shoot. Those in authority considered Sims an alarmist, but Roosevelt grew concerned as he noted the small proportion of hits to shots made by our ships. He then sounded the slogan that “the shots that hit are the shots that count.”
Roosevelt could do little then in support of Sims, but when he became President he remembered Sims and appointed him to lead in revolutionizing the fleet’s training in marksmanship. It was due to Sims—now the admiral who has served this country so well in the present war—that the fighting efficiency of the navy, as far as gunnery went, became three times more effective.
ROOSEVELT ADDRESSING AN INTERESTED AUDIENCE
The following account and appreciation of Admiral Dewey’s work derives a special interest from the fact that it was written by Colonel Roosevelt shortly after the battle of Manila:
“Admiral Dewey was sent to command the fleet on the Asiatic station primarily because he had such a record in the past that the best officers in the navy believed him to be peculiarly a man of the fighting temperament and fit to meet emergencies, and because he had shown his willingness to assume heavy responsibilities.
“For our own sakes, and in particular for the sake of any naval officer who in the future may be called upon to do such a piece of work as Dewey did, let us keep in mind the further fact that he could not have accomplished his feat if he had not had first-class vessels and excellently trained men; if his warships had not been so good and his captains and crews such thorough masters of their art.
“A man of less daring courage than Dewey would never have done what he did; but the courage itself was not enough. The Spaniards, too, had courage. What they lacked was energy, training, forethought. They fought their vessels until they burned or sank; but their gunnery was so poor that they did not kill a man in the American fleet. Even Dewey’s splendid capacity would not have enabled him to win the battle of Manila Bay had it not been for the traditional energy and seamanship of our naval service, so well illustrated in his captains, and the excellent gun practice of the crews, the result of years of steady training.”
Roosevelt never lost his interest in the navy. Admiral Chadwick wrote a book on the early period of the American navy. As soon as the book was published Senator Lodge hurried to the White House, hoping to surprise Mr. Roosevelt with the news of the publication.
“I see,” he remarked, “that Admiral Chadwick has written a book on the American navy.”
“Yes,” broke in Roosevelt, “I have read it. It’s bully. I didn’t think Chadwick was equal to it.”
Roosevelt felt that his work for the navy was done at the outbreak of the war.
“I have nothing more to do,” he said. “I must go to war myself.”
He was urged to keep his position. The women of the Cabinet reminded him that he had six children.
“I have done what I could to bring about the war,” he said; “now I have no right to ask others to fight it out while I stay home.”
He resigned to go to the front.