[1] Mackeson, after doing good service at Bahwulpore, to facilitate the march of the Bengal column of the Army of the Indus, had made his way to Peshawur, where he had joined Colonel Wade. He was, therefore, engaged both in the eastern and western operations.

[2] Under Lieutenant Barr, of the Bengal Artillery, who has written a Narrative of Colonel Wade’s Operations, to which I would refer the reader for authentic details, conveyed in a pleasant, soldierly manner.

[3] See Shahamat Ali’s “Sikhs and Afghans”; also Mohun Lal’s Life of Dost Mahomed. The authority of the former, who must have translated the letters into Persian, is all-sufficient on such a point as this.

[4] Mackeson, Lord, and Cunningham.

[5] These were the prices fetched at the sale of the effects of Brigadier Arnold, who died at Caubul in the month of September.

[6] I may as well append the most important portion of it:

“G. O. October 2.—The whole of the 1st (Bengal) Division of Infantry, the 2nd (Bengal) Cavalry, and No. 6 Light Field Battery, will continue in Afghanistan, and a detachment of 30 Sappers, under an Engineer officer. Major-General Sir W. Cotton will command the troops in Afghanistan, and all reports to be made to him after the 10th instant.

“The 2nd Troop, 2nd Brigade Bengal Horse Artillery, her Majesty’s 16th Lancers, the 3rd Light Cavalry, 4th Local Horse, the remainder of the Sappers and Miners, a Company of 20th N.I., with Captain Farmer’s Company 21st N.I., and the detachment now in progress to head-quarters, under Captain Hopkins, 27th N.I., will move towards Hindostan on such day and order as will be hereafter issued.”

[7] “G. O. October 9.—Her Majesty’s 13th Light Infantry, three guns of No. 6 Light Field Battery, and the 35th N.I., to remain at Caubul, and to be accommodated in the Balla Hissar.

“The 48th N.I., the 4th Brigade, and detachment of Sappers and Miners and 2nd Cavalry, with a Ressalah of Skinner’s Horse, to be cantoned at Jellalabad.

“Ghuznee to be garrisoned by the 16th N.I., a Ressalah of Skinner’s Horse, and such details of his Majesty Shah Soojah’s as are available. The whole to be under the command of Major M’Laren.

“Candahar will have for its garrison the 42nd, 43rd N.I., 4th Company 2nd Battalion Artillery, a Ressalah of the 4th Local Horse, and such details of his Majesty Shah Soojah’s troops as may be available. Major-General Nott will command.”

[8] The Envoy said, that as Dost Mahomed had sent guns over the same road to Bameean, there was no reason why our guns should not go. The Doctor-General Harlan boasted that he had crossed the Hindoo-Koosh with artillery. But Macnaghten had not considered that the guns which Dost Mahomed sent along these roads were three-pounders, whilst ours were six-pounders. The troop came along the wheel-track of the Ameer’s guns, and reported “the breadth between the wheels less than half of that of ours.”

[9] The importance of this subject is so great, when viewed in connexion with the melancholy history of our subsequent disasters, that I cannot do better than give, in the Appendix, an account, which originally appeared in the Calcutta Review, of the difficulties thrown in the way of the engineers—an account, the authenticity of which is not to be questioned.

[10] The picturesque aspects of Caubul are well described by Lieutenant Rattray: “It is well-built and handsome, and is one mass of bazaars. Every street has a double row of houses of different heights, flat-roofed, and composed of mud in wooden frames. Here and there a larch porch of carved wood intervenes, giving entrance to the court-yard of the residences of the nobles, in the centre of which is a raised platform of mud, planted with fruit trees, and spread with carpets. A fountain plays near; and here, during the heat of the day, loll the chiefs at ease, listening, as they smoke their pipes, to the sound of the ‘saccringhi,’ or guitar, the falling water, or the wonderful tales of the Persian story-teller. The houses overhang the narrow streets; their windows have no glass, but consist of lattice-work wooden shutters, which push up and down, and are often richly carved and otherwise ornamented. The shop windows are open to the sun, and the immense display of merchandise, fruits, game, armour, and cutlery defies description. These articles are arranged in prodigious piles from floor to ceiling; in the front of each sits the artificer engaged in his calling, or from amidst the heaped-up profusion peeps out the trader at his visitors. The grand bazaar (Char Chouk, or Chutta) has a substantial roof, built in four arcades, which are decorated with painted panels, now nearly indistinct, and originally watered by cisterns and fountains which are neglected and dried up.”

[11] A passage in Lord Auckland’s unpublished minute of August 20, 1839, to which allusion has already been made, contains a summary of the efforts of the Supreme Government to supply Macnaghten with funds. It exhibits the fearful manner in which already the war was beginning to tell upon the finances of India.

[12] Moollah Shikore came through the Khybur with Prince Timour and Colonel Wade.

[13] “So completely is this poor man’s memory gone, that he never recognises a man he has once seen; that the commonest business requires half a dozen notes.”—[Burnes to Macnaghten: August 7, 1840. Unpublished Correspondence.] “He had lost his memory to such an extent that he could not recognise a person whom he had well known before, if he had not seen him even for a day.”—[Mohun Lal’s Life of Dost Mahomed.]

[14] “Every day complaints were made to us, and we permitted ourselves to interfere, by giving notes to the complainants, requesting the Moollah to settle their cases; but this did no good, for, instead of having redress to their grievances, they were beaten, and sometimes confined, for coming and complaining to us against the Shah’s authority. All the chiefs or heads of tribes received their allowances from certain villages, by obtaining an order from Moollah Shikore. If there was any man among them known to us, and whom we would wish to favour, the Moollah took care to annoy and vex him, by giving him an order to a distant village for such sums which he would likely spend during his journey; or else to poor villages, where there was very little chance of gaining anything.”—[Mohun Lal’s Life of Dost Mahomed.]

[15] “Immediately consequent on his Majesty’s accession, certain feelings began to take root among the Douranees, in connexion with the presence of British troops, which promised ill for the future tranquillity of the country. Several of the most influential chiefs accompanied the Court from Candahar to Caubul and Jellalabad; and although it must have been with feelings of gratified pride that they beheld the leader of their order—their Shah Baba, or Father King, as he was familiarly named—seated upon the throne of his ancestors, yet it is also not unreasonable to suppose that their mortification must have been great at finding that they no longer possessed a dominant voice in the royal councils, or the ability, as formerly, to render the sovereign the victim of their intrigues, and that this conviction of their political influence being for ever superseded, must have led them to value the many personal advantages they had gained by the restoration, and to regard with peculiar hostility the intruders upon their fancied rights. At Candahar the progress of events had the same tendency to render the Douranees discontented, if not actually inimical. The chiefs who had remained with the tribes were of inconsiderable influence; but they still looked, under the revived Suddozye monarchy, to be admitted to the share of power which they deemed their right, and from which they had been jealously excluded by the Sirdars. No such participation whatever was extended to them. The present governor of the province, being altogether disqualified by his youth and inexperience to take an active part in the administration, the executive power was vested almost entirely in the hands of Wullee Mahomed Khan, the revenue manager, and the direction of the government was to the same extent dependent upon British guidance.”—[Major Rawlinson’s Report on the Assessment of the Douranee Tribes.—MS. Records.] I have met with no abler official paper than this in the whole course of my enquiries.

[16] The Supreme Government were desirous to place Burnes at Candahar, with Leech as his assistant; but Burnes was disinclined to leave Caubul; and the charge of the agency was entrusted to Leech. In the August minute already mentioned, Lord Auckland thus sketches the proposed political arrangements:—“Mr. Macnaghten will himself be, of course, as much as possible near to the King. * * * * I think a political agency, subordinate to the Mission at Caubul, should be maintained at Candahar, and that it cannot be better entrusted than to the approved zeal and ability of Sir Alexander Burnes. * * * I would not disturb Lieutenant Pottinger at Herat. His name is attached to the establishment of British influence in that city. He has had a most difficult task to execute, and I would suspend all opinion on the instructions with which it may be determined to furnish him, until I have a report of the result of the mission of Major Todd. I think, also, that Captain Bean should certainly remain in charge of the political functions which have been committed to him at Quettah. * * * Under these general arrangements, Major Leech will render assistance at Candahar to Sir A. Burnes, and perhaps Dr. Login to Lieutenant Pottinger at Herat; and Mr. Macnaghten will report in detail upon the number of officers whose aid will be indispensably necessary, under his own personal superintendence. He will have with him Major Todd, Lieutenant Macgregor, and presently Messrs. Lord, Leech, and Arthur Conolly. I am aware that the duties of his office will be complicated and extensive. He may have missions to send to Bokhara and Koondooz, and to other neighbouring states, and I would not stint him in assistance.”—[Minute of Lord Auckland: Simlah, August 20, 1839. MS. Records.]

[17] Keane, immediately before his departure, remarked to an officer who was to accompany him: “I wished you to remain in Afghanistan for the good of the public service; but since circumstances have rendered that impossible, I cannot but congratulate you on quitting the country; for, mark my words, it will not be long before there is here some signal catastrophe.”—[Calcutta Review.]

[18] Some of these parties were detachments of Sikh troops.

[19] The Khyburees fell upon them in their stockaded position before attacking Jellalabad. The Nujeebs were suffering severely from sickness at the time. One half of them, it is said, were ineffective when the Khyburees fell upon them.

[20] Two companies of the 27th Native Infantry, under Lieutenant Laing—a very gallant officer, who fell honourably at Caubul in the winter of 1841-42, were sent by Sir John Keane to reinforce Ferris at Ali-Musjid. Afterwards, two companies of the 21st, with one of sappers, were despatched to throw provisions into the fort. On their return they were attacked by the Khyburees in great force, and worsted, with the loss of their cattle. Another party, sent by Sir John Keane to throw ammunition into Ali-Musjid, was also attacked; two officers were severely wounded, and some men killed; but the convoy ultimately reached its destination. M’Leod, with his sappers, did good service on this occasion.

[21] The private letters of Lieutenant Loveday (quoted in the Asiatic Journal) throw some light upon the incidents of the capture. “In one court-yard I saw a heap of their dead, some forty or fifty—some very fine handsome fellows—their shields shot through, and broken swords and matchlocks lying about in every direction, telling of the fierce fight. There was still, however, a small party who obstinately held out in an inner apartment; there was no going at them except by a narrow passage, which admitted but of one at a time; three or four attempted it, and were instantly shot dead. We offered them quarter, but they would not trust us. At last I was sent up alone, when they surrendered. * * * * I then went to the mother of Shah Newaz, who is the new Khan, and who made his escape from prison seven years ago. This poor creature, with a few old women, had been shut up in a distant apartment ever since the flight of her son, miserably fed and miserably clothed. I explained in a few words what had taken place; our capture of the fort, the death of Mehrab Khan, and the near approach of her son, whom our government had placed on the Musnud. You may readily fancy the scene: what with surprise and joy, she burst into tears, said she was my slave, and would have thrown herself at my feet if I had not prevented her. On the following day a few of Mehrab Khan’s servants brought the body of their master for burial—a fine looking man. There was one little hole in his breast, which told of a musket-ball having passed through. He had no clothes on, except his silk pyjammahs. One of his slaves whispered me for a shawl; alas! I had nothing of the kind, but luckily remembered a brocade bed-cover, which I had bought in my days of folly and extravagance at Delhi. I called for it immediately, and gave it to the Khan’s servants, who were delighted with this last mark of respect, and wrapping up the body in it, placed their deceased master on a charpoy, and carried him to the grave.”

[22] In his minute of August 20, Lord Auckland wrote on this subject:—“Mr. Macnaghten has authority, as respects the Khelat territories, to declare the annexation of the provinces of Shawl, Moostung, and Cutch Gundaya to the Afghan dominions; and I have but to add, that it is my strong opinion that no power should be left in the hands of Mehrab Khan, who has shown himself our bitter and deceitful enemy, wholly unworthy of our confidence. For this object, it will, I conceive, be sufficient to occupy Khelat itself, and to hold it and the districts adjacent, in addition to Moostung and Shawl, under our provisional management or superintendence, for the very short period that will elapse, until it may be seen what final arrangement can be made respecting it, either by bringing it also under the direct rule of the Shah, or placing the claimant, Shah Newaz Khan (or any other Beloochee chief), in possession of it.”—[MS. Records.]

[23] “As to Mehrab Khan himself, he may have claims upon Shah Soojah-ool-Moolk, arising out of the important succour given to his Majesty in his expedition in 1834, and Mr. Macnaghten will naturally not fail to second any proposition of a liberal personal support to the chief which the Shah may be disposed to make, in generous acknowledgment of those services.”—[Lord Auckland’s Minute: August 20, 1839. MS. Records.]

[24] The winter, however, was not wholly unproductive of military events. A detachment was sent out under Colonel Orchard to reduce the fort of Pushoot, which lies some fifty miles to the north-east of Jellalabad, and to expel the “refractory chief” of the surrounding district. The affair was a successful failure. Repeated attempts were made by the Engineer, Pigou, to blow in the gate, after the Ghuznee fashion; but the heavy rains had damaged the powder, which was naturally bad; and every effort was unsuccessful. As there was no hope of effecting an entrance in this manner; as Abbott and his artillery had vainly exhausted their ammunition, and a considerable number of our men had fallen under the fire of the fort, Orchard drew off the assailants. Soon after their withdrawal, however, the enemy evacuated the place.

[25] MS. Correspondence.

[26] MS. Correspondence.

[27] Finding that he had little hope of so establishing his influence among the petty Oosbeg states, as to enable him, with their assistance, to make an effort to regain his lost dominions, the Ameer had contemplated a flight into the Persian territories. But the Governor of Balkh intercepted the fugitive, and invited him to that place. Jubbar Khan went on the part of the Ameer, and was detained until the arrival of Dost Mahomed himself. Then the Ameer was informed that the Khan of Bokhara desired the presence at his capital of the ex-ruler of Caubul. Sorely perplexed, and almost helpless, but not without some misgivings, Dost Mahomed then went to Bokhara.

[28] Jellalabad, February 23, 1840. MS. Correspondence.

[29] Mehrab Khan, the Wullee of Maimouna, said to Arthur Conolly, in the autumn of 1840, “My ancestors were content to serve the King of Caubul, and when members of that house fell into misfortune, they found hospitality here. Shah Soojah is again upon his throne at Caubul; but now another Suddozye King calls upon me to submit only to Herat, and your English agent advises me to send my son there. On the other hand, the Commander of the Faithful claims allegiance for Bokhara. The Khan Huzzrut desires me to put myself under him; and you know how I was forced to act when the Persian Asoph-ood-dowlah crossed the Moorghaub.”

[30] Sir W. Macnaghten to Mr. Robertson, April 1, 1840.

[31] On the 21st of March, Macnaghten had written to the Agra Governor: “Lord Auckland tells me that the Russian force consists only of 3000 cavalry Cossacks, 800 mounted artillerymen, and twelve light field-pieces; but Burnes tells me that he knows, from good information, that the force is much larger. Let us hope the armada may be dispersed before it reaches Bokhara, whatever may be the strength of it. If the Russians are likely to establish themselves there, we had better be up and doing.”—(MS. Correspondence.)

But on the 15th of April he wrote from Jellalabad: “You will see from Captain Abbott’s report how contemptible is the enemy with which the Russians have to contend, and I fear they will experience no obstacle to their progress all the way to Bokhara. Had we not been here, they would by this time next year have established themselves without the slightest opposition or difficulty in Afghanistan. They appear to have completely gained over (whether by promises or threats) the King of Bokhara, who turns a deaf ear to all our advances.”—(MS. Correspondence.)

On the 23rd, the Court having then commenced its progress to Caubul, the Envoy wrote in a still less confident strain: “All accounts concur in stating that the Russians have reached Khiva, and I anticipate anything but a bed of roses unless something be done to distract people’s attention from the intrigues ahead, by putting a stop to those in our rear. We are now on the field of battle on which Shah Soojah lost his throne in 1810. What must his Majesty’s feelings be now?”

[32] May 10, 1842.

[33] “The price of flour in the Herat bazaar was, about this time, one Company’s rupee for less than four Hindostanee seers; and the whole supply from Toorkistan, the markets of which had been opened by our negotiations with Khiva. On our arrival at Herat, although the harvest had been reaped, five maunds of flour were with difficulty procured in the bazaar; and to meet the demand which the arrival of the Mission (consisting of about 120 persons) occasioned, we had immediately to send for supplies to Seistan.”—[Facts relating to Herat, by Dr. J. S. Login.]

[34] “When Major Todd, in June, 1839, arrived as envoy at Herat, he selected Moollah Hussan, a Mahomedan priest of great respectability, as bearer of a letter of friendship to the Khan Huzzrut (Supreme Lord) of Khiva, called also Khaurism Shah, or King of Khaurism. Moollah Hussan, arrived at Khiva when the state was threatened with a Russian invasion, was well received; and on his return was accompanied by an Oosbeg Lord, Shookkurroola Bre by name, as ambassador from the Khan Huzzrut to the Indian Government. The letter borne by this ambassador accepted of the tender of British friendship, and made several demands which could not be complied with on the responsibility of Major Todd. It was in answer to this mission that the Envoy deputed me to visit the Court of Khiva.”—[Captain Abbott’s Narrative of a Journey from Herat to Khiva: Preliminary Remarks.] For an account of Captain Abbott’s personal adventures, with a glimmering here and there of his political negotiations, I would refer the reader to his interesting volumes. Abbott says, at the commencement of his narrative: “We (Todd and Abbott) separate under circumstances sufficiently gloomy. I leave him in the very stronghold of robbers. I go myself as agent of the British Government to a Court, of the language and manners of which I am utterly ignorant, and to accomplish that of which the most sanguine have no hope. It is simply a matter of duty, and as such entered upon cheerfully, and with full determination to carry my efforts to the utmost.”

[35] Ghorian, the frontier post of Herat, had been taken by the Persians in 1838. When, in the spring of 1840, the perfidy of Yar Mahomed was discovered, the Wuzeer expressed some contrition, and an anxiety to prove his sincerity, by fitting out an expedition for the recovery of Herat. All that he wanted was money. If the British agent would advance him two lakhs of rupees, he would speedily recover Ghorian. The money was advanced; and of course Ghorian was not recovered. It was believed by the Mission that, whilst pretending to make his preparations for the expedition, the Wuzeer was sending messages to the Persian commandant at Ghorian, telling him not to be under any apprehensions, for that although the British desired him to recover the place, he had no intention of making the attempt.

[36] In Council, the Commander-in-Chief was consistently opposed to the project of an advance on Herat or the countries beyond the Hindoo-Koosh. On the 25th of May he wrote in his journal: “In a quiet way, without any formality, I placed in the Governor-General’s hands to-day in Council a paper detailing the numbers of regiments and troops or companies of artillery now beyond our frontier. It is very great: 1 troop and 5 companies of Artillery; 1 regiment of Native Cavalry; 9 regiments of European and 15½ of Native Infantry; 2½ companies of Golundauze, and 2 companies of Sappers. I remarked at the foot that this aggregate exceeded, except in horse artillery and cavalry, the two armies which, in 1803, beat down the great army of Scindiah, under Lake and Wellesley. I did this in the hope of inducing Lord Auckland to pause before he sanctioned any advance upon Balkh or to Herat, for we can ill afford any such extension of our force. In truth, we are much weaker now than in 1838, when the first augmentation was ordered in view to our later campaign.”—[MS. Journal of Sir Jasper Nicolls.]

[37] MS. Correspondence. See also letters to Mr. Robertson, Major Todd, and Sir J. R. Carnac;—quoted in first edition.

[38] 30,000 rupees (or 3000l.) per annum.

[39] In connection with the Ghilzye affairs at this time, comes in the unpleasant story of the surrender of Wulloo Khan. I believe that the following account of the transaction, which appeared in a Calcutta journal, is substantially correct: “Wulloo Khan, after his beating, wished to make terms. Anderson allowed him to go into Candahar to do so. He was successful, and received a dress of honour from Major Leech, and one from the Shah-zadah ruling Candahar. He declared he had been instigated to resistance by men in Candahar, and that he would show their letters. He returned to Anderson, and then to his home; when hearing that Lieutenant Nicolson and Shah-zadah Timour were near, relying on the pledged words of our political agent, Major Leech, and the Shah-zadah Futteh Jung, Wulloo Khan went to make his obedience, and was immediately seized and made prisoner. His letters and dress of honour, together with a strong protest against such proceedings from Anderson, may have saved his head, but he is sent prisoner to Caubul.” The writer adds, that “three of the prisoners made over to Lieutenant Nicolson and the Shah-zadah Timour had their heads struck off;” but I have before me a specific declaration, made by the Envoy in a letter to Lord Auckland, dated November 24, 1840, that “not a single political execution has taken place since his Majesty’s accession to power.”

[40] Lieutenant Walpole Clerk—a young officer of conspicuous gallantry and zeal.

[41] The defence of the former place by Captain Lewis Brown, and of the latter by Captain Bean, are among the most noticeable incidents of the war, and deserve more extended notice than I can give them in this place. I am compelled to leave it to others to chronicle more minutely the progress of events in Upper Sindh.

[42] Commenting on the neglect of all ordinary precautions, by which the insurrection had been suffered to make so much head in Upper Sindh, Burnes, on the 7th of August, wrote to Macnaghten:—“In April, 1839, when called upon by you to state officially what should be done to chastise the treachery of the chief of Khelat, I recommended, in common with yourself and Lord Keane, his deposition; but I as plainly stated in my letter of the 10th of that month, ‘that while our troops continued at Shawl, this may be an unnecessary arrangement (to raise national troops), but both at Moostung and Cutchee very energetic measures will be required to these countries; and happily their resources are such, that this will amply repay the labour and expense.’ Was this vigour displayed by his Majesty’s Government on the spot, or by our own authorities? One of his Majesty’s governors has joined the insurgents, and the political agent was taken by surprise on an occasion which the slightest foresight might have anticipated. What right have we to expect that any chief placed in power shall flourish by us, unless his government is better than that which we have overthrown? Did Shah Newaz muster or even organise his troops? Did he point out the necessity for payment, or the means of making them superior to his adversaries? We advanced him a lakh of rupees, and allowed him to continue most at Caubul, while we withdrew all our troops. Khelat is the capital of Beloochistan—a poor but vast country, stretching from the mountains in sight of the Indus to the confines of Persia. Through this wide tract our discomfiture affects our reputation; the only solace in it will be found in our chief, not our troops being vanquished.”-[Papers privately printed.]

[43] This, however, was not until the beginning of November. Loveday had then been for some months in captivity.

[44] Unpublished Correspondence of Sir W. H. Macnaghten.

[45] About this time Macnaghten had been much vexed by the conduct of General Nott, who, from first to last, treated the royal family of Caubul with the supremest contempt. Nothing could induce him to behave towards any one of them with ordinary respect. At last Macnaghten was compelled to lay his complaints before the Supreme Government. “It was with much regret,” he wrote to Lord Auckland, “that I felt compelled to refer to government a difference of opinion between myself and Sir Willoughby, but if such an outrage as that committed by General Nott is to be tolerated and justified, there must be an end of our efforts to make it be believed that Shah Soojah is king of this country. I know how embarrassing these references are, and I should have been happy to have saved government the trouble of passing orders on the question, had Sir Willoughby so far supported me as to have conveyed a censure to General Nott for the deliberate and gratuitous violence which he had committed. The animus by which he has been actuated is apparent throughout—he refused to pay the Prince the common compliment of calling upon him, although told that such a civility was expected. There is, I regret to say, a feeling too prevalent amongst the officers of the force against his Majesty, who is considered the sole cause of their detention here—and I hope that though they may not be compelled to treat the royal family with becoming respect, yet that they will not be permitted to offer them a direct insult with impunity.”

[46] “His Lordship in Council has a strong desire, in which he looks for your concurrence, to uphold the military position of Brigadier Roberts. Whenever the regular troops shall be withdrawn from Afghanistan, he will be your first military authority; and every British officer employed in that country, should be led to look to him. His Lordship can only express his approbation of the care which is exhibited by the Brigadier for the force committed to his charge, and he will be glad when circumstances will permit him to carry into effect his views for its discipline and comfort.”

[47] MS. Correspondence of Sir W. H. Macnaghten. Caubul: Aug. 12, 1840.

[48] MS. Correspondence of Arthur Conolly. Caubul: May 16, 1840.

[49] See “The British on the Hindoo-Koosh,” an admirable series of papers published in more than one Indian periodical, and in Stocqueler’s Memorials of Afghanistan. In referring to these papers, I acknowledge, with pride, my obligations to a brother’s pen.

[50] He arrived at Bajgah on his way from Kooloom, and volunteered his services to Hay.

[51] Saleh Mahomed, of whom mention will be made in a subsequent part of this narrative, told Captain Johnson that the conduct of the European non-commissioned officers had disgusted him and his men, and moved them to desert.

[52] Major Pottinger, who was subsequently employed as Political Agent in this part of the country, has left on record an account of the causes of this general disaffection, a part of which will be found in the Appendix.

[53] Writing on the 1st of October, the Envoy thus sketched the aspect of affairs: “The result of the victory at Bameean has not been by any means such as I could have wished. Dost Mahomed will not come in, and the Wullee of Khooloom will not give him up. The latter has omitted to reply to Dr. Lord’s last overture, so I imagine we must retreat from Syghan, re infectâ. Two of the Dost’s sons have escaped from Ghizni, and they will no doubt endeavour, and probably with success, to raise a disturbance in the Ghilzye country. In short, the aspect of affairs is by no means agreeable, and we shall have abundance of work on our hands for next season. Bajore, Khooloom, and divers other places it will be requisite to visit with our arms before the country can be called settled. Amongst a bigoted people accustomed to anarchy, it never can be difficult to scatter the seeds of rebellion.”—[MS. Correspondence of Sir W. H. Macnaghten.]

[54] MS. Correspondence of Sir W. H. Macnaghten. The Envoy took a very gloomy view of this affair. In another letter, he says, “You will have heard of the disaster at Joolgah, which I think was a worse affair than that of Pushoot.

[55] Sir W. H. Macnaghten to Lord Auckland: October 31, 1840. Unpublished Correspondence.

[56] Some of the troopers were pursued for a considerable distance. “I learn,” wrote the Envoy, on November 6, “that two squadrons of them were pursued for a mile or two by twenty Douranees.”

[57] A detachment of our troops was then returning to India. The Company’s European regiment, and Captain Garbett’s troop of Horse Artillery, marched from Caubul; and the 48th Native Infantry joined the escort at Jellalabad. At the same time, Sir Willoughby Cotton, who had commanded the troops in Afghanistan, set his face towards India: and the command temporarily devolved on Sir R. Sale.

[58] Sir W. H. Macnaghten to Mr. Robertson: Jan. 12, 1841. MS. Correspondence.

[59] MS. Correspondence.

[60] Writing to the same correspondent shortly afterwards, he cautioned him not to expect any very speedy or extensive reforms; and, above all, not to look for any favourable financial results. “By-and-by his Majesty,” said the Envoy, “will, I hope, be able to make both ends meet. At present, pecuniary assistance to a considerable extent will be indispensable. As I said when we first reached Candahar, the country must be looked upon as an outwork, requiring large expenditure to keep it in repair. You are a little too sanguine, I think, in your hope of a speedy and universal reform in this country. For thirty years the inhabitants of most of the districts have never paid a fraction of revenue, until they were coerced into payment by the presence of troops. The habit has grown into second nature with them, and we cannot expect them to subside at once into the condition of cheerful tax-payers.”—[Unpublished Correspondence.]

[61] See Major Rawlinson’s “Douranee Report,” quoted in the Appendix.

[62] Major Rawlinson went out to India as a cadet on the Bombay Establishment in 1827. He was a fellow-passenger of Sir John Malcolm, from whom he imbibed his earliest taste for Oriental literature. In 1828, having passed, whilst yet a cadet, an examination in the Hindostanee language, he was posted to the 1st Grenadier Regiment, with which he served until 1833. In this interval he passed in two other languages, Mahratta and Persian. In 1833, when Lord William Bentinck despatched a party of officers to Persia to drill the army of Abbas Meerza, Rawlinson, still an ensign, was selected as adjutant of the detachment. In Persia he continued to serve until the rupture with that state. During a space of nearly three years he was in military command of the province of Kermanshah, living entirely among the Persians, and becoming as familiar with their language and literature as with his own. He graduated in diplomacy under Sir John M‘Neill, by whom he was entrusted with various political duties, and strongly recommended to Lord Auckland for employment in Afghanistan.]

[63] Other grounds of complaint may have subsequently arisen, but this dilatoriness was the first offence. Leech pleaded in extenuation that he had been removed from one appointment to another, before he had had time to make up the financial statements of his last mission; and sent in a list of no less than eight different accounts of which he had to bring up the arrears.—[Major Leech to Sir W. H. Macnaghten: June 30, 1840.]

[64] It would be foreign to the objects of this work to discuss the question of Nott’s supercession. It was at one time a fertile subject of discussion in India, involving, as it did, a general question of military rank in the higher grades. General Willshire was an older officer and an older lieutenant-colonel than General Nott, and the Indian Commander-in-Chief had decreed that the relative ranks of the major-generals should be determined, not by the dates of their brevets as such, but by the dates of their lieutenant-colonels’ commissions.

[65] 25,000 rupees (2500l.) per mensem.

[66] I cannot refrain from quoting here a letter on this subject from Todd to Outram, written before his removal from political employment:

“Your kind letter of November 3rd reached me a few days ago. I would fain send you an adequate return, but I am out of sorts, and, besides, have but little to tell you. Shakespear’s proceedings have been in all respects admirable. The zeal, perseverance, and judgment he has displayed throughout his arduous undertaking, entitle him to the highest praise; and I trust he will be rewarded as he deserves. The property restored by Russia is valued at upwards of a crore of rupees; and the number of merchants and others released, exceeds 600. The news was received at Khiva with every demonstration of joy; and Shakespear’s name has been inserted in the calendar of Oosbeg saints! The Russians, by liberating their captives immediately on the arrival of Shakespear and his ‘company,’ have given a strong proof that they are unwilling or unable to renew their attempt on Khiva; and I hope that they will now be prevented taking up that formidable position on the road to India. I cannot help congratulating myself on even the small share which I have had in these proceedings. Had I waited for orders, the Russians might have been within a few marches of Khiva; and had we been satisfied with the tales of Sir Alexander’s agents, we should have now believed the Russians 300,000 strong, and to be within as short a distance of Caubul. The road between Teheran and this place is infested by roving bands of Toorkomans, who have been let loose on Persian Khorassan by the Khan of Khiva. His Highness thinks that he is thus doing us service; but I have written to undeceive him in this matter, and I have pointed out to him that the practice of man-stealing is abhorrent to us, whether the man be a Russian or a Persian. His conduct on this occasion reminds me of an answer given to me by Mahomed Shah’s Wuzeer, one Meerza Mahomed, a great oaf. I had been superintending some artillery practice at Teheran. A jackass having been placed at the target, I remonstrated against the cruelty of putting up one of God’s creatures as a mark, when wood or canvas would answer every purpose. The Wuzeer replied, ‘On my eyes be it, I will stick up a pony next time.’ As if I had specially pleaded the case of jackasses.

“Sheil thinks that the prospect of a settlement of our differences with Persia is as distant as ever, and is strongly opposed to my plan of allowing the Shah to keep Ghorian, and retaining possession of Kharrack.”

[67] Major Rawlinson to General Nott, Feb. 18, 1841.—Quoted in Stocqueler’s “Life of Sir William Nott.”

[68] Major Rawlinson to Sir W. H. Macnaghten, March 11, 1841.—[MS. Records.]

[69] MS. Correspondence.

[70] Captain Woodburn to General Nott, July 6, 1841.—Stocqueler’s “Life of Sir William Nott.”

[71] MS. Correspondence.

[72] Nott’s disparagement of the Janbaz so irritated Macnaghten, and displeased Lord Auckland, that his removal from Candahar was contemplated. The following extracts from Macnaghten’s correspondence show what was thought on the subject:—“September 2.—Between you and me, Lord A. is much displeased with General Nott for his light and indiscriminate censure and disparagement of the Janbaz; and I think his displeasure will be increased when he peruses the General’s subsequent and most uncandid despatch, in which he omitted all notice of the exemplary conduct of the Janbaz at Secunderabad.” “September 5.—You are not likely to have Nott with you much longer. His conduct in respect to the Janbaz has elicited the severest displeasure of government, by whom he has been declared disqualified for his present important command.”—[MS. Correspondence.]

[73] MS. Correspondence.

[74] Captain Macgregor.—[See Macgregor’s Report on the Causes of the Caubul Outbreak.]

[75] Shelton had come up from India with the 44th, through the Punjab. His brigade was employed against the refractory tribes of the Sunghoo-Khail in the month of February, and reduced them to a fitting state of subjection; but not without the loss of two valuable officers. Lieutenant Pigou, of the Engineers, was blown to pieces, whilst endeavouring to force in, with powder, the gates of a fort; and Captain Douglas, Assistant-Adjutant-General, was shot dead by the side of the Brigadier.

[76] A small pony, says Lieutenant Rattray, was backed by an officer to scramble down the ditch and over the wall.

[77] For Brigadier Roberts’ Correspondence on the subject of the Cantonment Barracks, see Appendix.

[78] For a pleasant descriptive sketch of the amusements of the English at Caubul, see Mr. Gleig’s account of the Operations of Sale’s Brigade in Afghanistan.

[79] Sir W. H. Macnaghten to Major Rawlinson. MS. Correspondence.

[80] Brigadier Roberts says, that when the Kohistanee expedition of 1840, which nearly had such a disastrous termination, was first projected, it was looked upon as a mere party of pleasure, and that ladies were talking of joining it. It does not appear whether they had any notion of participating in the pleasures of the popular expedition to Zao.

[81] Major Pottinger’s Budeeabad Report.

[82] Pottinger was of opinion that the Ghilzyes, the Kohistanees, and the Douranees, were all leagued together; and that the compact between them was formed about the end of September.

[83] Sir Jasper Nicolls’ MS. Journal—some passages of which may be cited in illustration of this part of the inner history of the war:

“March 12.—My letter of the 10th of November will be found difficult to parry, after all; and I regret to say, that the immense expenditure cannot long be borne. A million a year will not cover our charges; and Lord Auckland’s answers to the last week’s applications prove to me that he begins to feel it.

“March 21.—We are called upon to make early and large remittances to the Upper Provinces; and fifty lakhs have been ordered (their requisitions increased in a week to eighty lakhs). Thirty lakhs went last week to Bombay, and twenty-nine are now at Ferozepore, waiting for transmission. This will never do. Even if we had a firmer hold of Afghanistan than we have, we should be compelled to give it up, for a drain of a million a year will infallibly swamp us. Even a good share of the Punjab would not cover this great charge. Lord Auckland is not inclined to look this in the face, and acknowledge by a loan the unfortunate result of our successes.

“March 26.—Lord Auckland sent home a long minute regarding Herat.... He means to preserve our footing in Afghanistan. Mr. Bird and Mr. Prinsep approve of this, though the latter roundly and justly asserts that it cannot be done under a crore and a quarter (a million and a quarter) annually; and that no present mode of extending our receipts to that extent, is open to us. Lord Auckland wrote a note to ask our opinions on the subject. Mr. Maddock never circulated the note. Sir W. Casement and myself were therefore silent. We are clearly in a great scrape. That country drains us of a million a year and more; and we only in truth are certain of the allegiance of the people within range of our guns and cavalry.... One part of Lord Auckland’s paper only will be received for a time. He states our resources to be only a crore less than when we crossed the Indus. The Accountant-General says, that on the 30th of April we may expect the reduction to amount to three crores and three-quarters. I told Prinsep that he had been very complaisant not to point this out.”

[84] Sir Jasper Nicolls’ MS. Journal, March 29.—“At last the advertisement for a loan is prepared, and will shortly appear. Though Lord Auckland did not advert to a deficiency of three-and-a-half crores in his paper on Afghanistan, he now acts upon it. This will force on the Court a decision as to our maintaining our position in that quarter at such a price, for they will assuredly never pay even the charges of the Shah.

“May 12.—Before I close this book (volume of the Journal), I would record my opinion, that the whole thing will break down. We cannot afford the heavy, yet increasing drain upon us. Nine thousand troops between Quettah and Kurachee; at least 16,000 of our army and the Shah’s to the north of Quettah. The King’s expenses to bear in part—twenty-eight political officers to pay, besides Macnaghten—Dost Mahomed’s allowance—barracks—a fort or two to build—loss by exchange, &c., &c. To me it is alarming. The silver does not return, and it is becoming scarce.”

[85] “You will have seen that Government is opening a new five per cent. loan. What can this be for? I apprehend it augurs ill for the Chinese settlement, and that we shall have that work to do over again.”—[Sir W. H. Macnaghten to Major Rawlinson: April 20, 1841.—MS. Correspondence.]

[86] Sir Jasper Nicolls’ MS. Journal, May 20.—“Here is a very untoward account of the Afghan finances. It will never do to have India drained of a million and a quarter annually for a rocky frontier, requiring about 25,000 men and expensive establishments to hold it even by threats, as at present. The specie, too, is drawn away not to return. Little comes from China. How is it to end? Money is not rapidly subscribed to the loan, because it gains twelve to eighteen per cent. for short periods elsewhere—amongst natives, twenty-four per cent. or more. Unless a large accession of Punjab territory comes in to connect us safely with Caubul, and to aid our very heavy expenses, we must withdraw.”

[87] MS. Correspondence of Sir W. H. Macnaghten.

[88] The retrenchments, too, were to touch the Court. “I have suggested sundry retrenchments,” he wrote to Rawlinson, “which, though necessary, will be most unpalatable to his Majesty and his myrmidons.”

[89] “The Ghilzyes, however, had another grievance—viz., that during the rule of Ameer Mahomed Khan (Dost Mahomed’s brother), who had managed partially to subdue this wild tribe, he had effected a reduction in their pay of 13,000 rupees, which was restored to them in 1839, on the return of the Shah; but was again reduced on the present occasion. Further, they were held responsible for thefts committed beyond their respective boundaries.”—[Captain Macgregor’s Report.—MS. Records.]

[90] MS. Records. See the Duke of Wellington’s Comments on this subject in the Appendix.

[91] The 37th Native Infantry and the 5th Cavalry were not a part of the relieved brigade.

[92] “October 11.—One down, t’other come on, is the principle with these vagabonds; and lucky for us that it is so. No sooner have we put down one rebellion than another starts up. The Eastern Ghilzyes are now in an uproar, and our communications with Jellalabad are completely cut off. This state of things—Inshallah!—will not last long. Only imagine the impudence of the rascals in having taken up a position, with four or five hundred men, in the Khoord-Caubul Pass, not fifteen miles from the capital. I hope they will be driven out of that either to-day or to-morrow; but the pass is an ugly one to force. They fired last night upon the 35th Regiment, and succeeded in killing or wounding twenty-four Sepoys. Tugao has been the nursery, and Humza Khan the dry-nurse of this insurrection. Tugao will be visited, I hope, in a day or two, and I have solicited his Majesty to put Humza in durance vile, and to confiscate all his property. This émeute of ours is particularly provoking just as I am about to quit Afghanistan. I had hoped to leave the country in perfect tranquillity; and I still think that it will be quieter than ever it was, after the insurrection is put down. It is particularly provoking that Macgregor is absent with a large portion of our force at this juncture. My accounts from Burn at Gundamuck are very satisfactory. The efforts of the rebels to raise the tribes are as unavailing as incessant. His Majesty’s name has been freely used, as usual; no wonder—it is a tower of strength; but never was a more foul calumny uttered than that which would associate his Majesty with our enemies.”—[Sir W. H. Macnaghten to Major Rawlinson. MS. Correspondence.]

[93] Captain Younghusband, of the 35th, Captain Wade, the Brigade-Major of the force, and Lieutenants Mein and Oakes, of the 13th, were wounded in this affair.

[94] Sir W. H. Macnaghten to Captain Macgregor: October 17, 1841. MS. Records.

[95] Sir W. H. Macnaghten to Captain Macgregor: October 18, 1841. MS. Records.

[96] Sir W. H. Macnaghten to Major Rawlinson.—[MS. Correspondence.]

[97] “The only officer killed, Wyndham, a captain of the 35th Native Infantry, fell nobly. Himself lame from a hurt, he had dismounted at that moment of peril to save the life of a wounded soldier, by bearing him from the combat on his charger. When the rear-guard broke before the onset of the Ghilzyes, Wyndham, unable to keep pace with the pursued, turned, fought, and, overpowered by numbers, fell beneath the swords and knives of an unsparing foe.”—[Calcutta Review.]

[98] I must give Mohun Lal’s own words, in spite of their eccentric phraseology: “On the 1st of November,” he writes, “I saw Sir Alexander Burnes, and told him that the confederacy has been grown very high, and we should fear the consequence. He stood up from his chair, sighed, and said he knows nothing but the time has arrived that we should leave this country.”—[Letter of Mohun Lal to J. R. Colvin, Esq., January 9, 1842.—MS. Records.] In a letter to another correspondent, Mohun Lal makes a similar statement; and adds that, upon the same night, Taj Mahomed called upon Burnes, to no purpose, with a like warning: “On the 1st of November I saw him at evening, and informed him, according to the conversation of Mahomed Meerza Khan, our great enemy, that the chiefs are contriving plans to stand against us, and therefore it will not be safe to remain without a sufficient guard in the city. He replied, that if he were to ask the Envoy to send him a strong guard, it will show that he was fearing; and at the same [time] he made an astonishing speech, by saying that the time is not far when we must leave this country. Taj Mahomed, son of Gholam Mahomed Khan, the Douranee chief, came at night to him, and informed what the chiefs intended to do, but he turned him out under the pretended aspect that we do not care for such things. Our old friend, Naib Sheriff, came and asked him to allow his son, with 100 men, to remain day and night in his place till the Ghilzye affair is settled—but he did not agree.”—[Letter of Mohun Lal to Dr. James Burnes.—MS. Correspondence.]

[99] This is stated on the authority of Sir William Macnaghten: “I may be considered culpable,” he said, in an unfinished memorandum, found after his death, “for not having foreseen the coming storm; to this I can only reply that others, who had much better opportunities of watching the feelings of the people, had no suspicion of what was coming. The late Sir A. Burnes was with me the evening before the insurrection occurred, and it is a singular fact that he should have congratulated me on my approaching departure at a season of such profound tranquillity.”—[Unpublished Papers of Sir W. H. Macnaghten.] See further illustrations of this subject in Appendix.

[100] “The principal rebels,” wrote Sir William Macnaghten, in a letter to Lord Auckland, of which only a fragment has been recovered, “met, on the night before, and [relying] on the inflammable disposition of the people of Caubul, they first gave out that it was the order of his Majesty to put all infidels to death, and this, of course, gained them a great accession of strength. But his Majesty has behaved throughout with the most marked fidelity, judgment, and prudence. By forged orders from him for our destruction, by the well-known process of washing out the contents of a genuinely sealed paper, and substituting their own wicked inventions. * * * *” (Sentence left imperfect.)—[Correspondence of Sir W. H. Macnaghten.]

[101] Statement of Emaum-oollah-Khan—a chuprassie in the service of Lieutenant John Conolly.—[MS. Records.]

[102] Hyder Khan, who had been cutwal of the city, and had been removed through Burnes’s instrumentality, is said to have brought fuel for the purpose from some contiguous hummams or baths.

[103] Statement of Bowh Singh, a chuprassie in Sir A. Burnes’s service.

[104] This is Bowh Singh’s statement. He says: “His brother, Captain Burnes, went out with him, and was killed dead before Sir Alexander.” Mohun Lal says that Charles Burnes was killed before his brother went down to the garden.

[105] “A lakh and seventy thousand rupees (17,000l.) of public money, besides my private property, amounting to upwards of ten thousand rupees.”—[Captain Johnson’s Journal.—MS. Records.]

[106] In 1834.—[See Book I., Chapter VII.]

[107] This, however, in all probability is a very exaggerated statement. There were, probably, not more than two or three hundred people in the Caubul bazaars opposing the march of the regiment. Eyewitnesses affirm that the latter fought with little gallantry on this occasion. It is said, too, that Futteh Jung, instead of encouraging the Hindostanees, encouraged the insurgents.

[108] Statement of Brigadier Shelton.—MS. Records.

[109] Private Correspondence.

[110] Journal of Captain Johnson.—MS.

[111] Letter from Captain Colin Mackenzie to Lieutenant Eyre.—[Eyre’s Journal.]

[112] Letter of Mohun Lal to Mr. Colvin, Private Secretary to the Governor-General.—MS.