[i-42] William H. Herndon, Lincoln’s law partner, relates (Herndon, i, 100): “He was a long time meeting these claims, even as late as 1848 sending to me from Washington portions of his salary as Congressman to be applied on the unpaid remnant of the Berry and Lincoln indebtedness. But in time he extinguished it all, even to the last penny.”

According to Nicolay (36): “It was not until his return from Congress, seventeen years after the purchase of the store, that he finally relieved himself of the last installment of his ‘national debt.’ ”

[i-43] Several decades thereafter, when reference was made in President Lincoln’s hearing to the large tracts of valuable land acquired by Surveyor-General Edward F. Beale, in California, the Executive may be said to have suffered no twinges of conscience if he remarked, as was reported: “Yes, they say Beale is monarch of all he surveyed.”

[i-44] Henry McHenry, in Herndon, i, 113.

[i-45] The Grigsby affair. (Master, 16-17.)

[i-46] Frank E. Stevens, in Magazine of History, February, 1905, pp. 86-90.

[i-47] William G. Greene, who was present, so quotes Lincoln; but Lamon (111) and Stevens (Black Hawk, 283) report him to have said: “Boys, the man actually threw me once fair, broadly so; and the second time, this very fall, he threw me fairly, though not so apparently so.”

[i-48] Magazine of History, February, 1905, pp. 86-90. See also Stevens’s Black Hawk, 281-83; Oldroyd, 516-17; Browne, 112-13; Lamon, 109-12; Herndon, i, 87-88; Nicolay and Hay, i, 94; Thayer, 239-40; Lincoln and Douglas, 194a-194b; Master, 39-40.

[i-49] The whole experience left a deep impression in Lincoln’s mind. After his first nomination to the Presidency, he received one day a delegation of college men, among whom was Professor Risdon M. Moore, the son of Jonathan, that quondam referee.

“Which of the Moore families do you belong to?” inquired the candidate, with a twinkle of the eye. “I have a grudge against one of them.”

To which the Professor, with a still merrier twinkle, replied: “I suppose it is my family you have the grudge against; but we are going to elect you President, and call it even.”

Thereupon Mr. Lincoln, narrating to those who were present the story of his defeat by Thompson, concluded with the words: “I never had been thrown in a wrestling-match until the man from that company did it. He could have thrown a grizzly bear.”

Nor did the reminiscences concerning that memorable encounter cease there. Discussing former days with old friends who visited him at the White House, President Lincoln several times referred to the occurrence. One of these interviews is thus related by Mr. Greene: “During the rebellion, in 1864, I had occasion to see Mr. Lincoln in his office at Washington, and, after having recalled many of our early recollections, he said, ‘Bill, whatever became of our old antagonist, Thompson,—that big curly-headed fellow who threw me at Rock Island?’ I replied I did not know, and wondered why he asked. He playfully remarked that if he knew where he was living, he would give him a post-office, by way of showing him that he bore him no ill-will.”

[i-50] Henry McHenry, in Lamon, 154; Browne, 104.

[i-51] Confidence in Lincoln as an arbitrator continued through his later career. This is evinced by the following telegram, quoted by Hill (250) from the Orendorff collection:—

[i-52] Address on Benjamin Ferguson, delivered at a meeting of the Washington Temperance Society on February 8, 1842.

[i-53] Lincoln read this book during a series of visits that he made for the purpose to the home of David Turnham, a constable, who owned the volume. It was entitled: “The Revised Laws of Indiana, adopted and enacted by the General Assembly at their eighth session. To which are prefixed the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution of the United States, and the Constitution of the State of Indiana, and sundry other documents connected with the Political History of the Territory and State of Indiana. Arranged and published by authority of the General Assembly. Corydon: Printed by Carpenter and Douglass. 1824.”

[i-54] Herndon, i, 52; Tarbell’s Early Life, 72.

[i-55] Alban Jasper Conant, in Liber Scriptorum, 172; and in McClure’s Magazine, March, 1909, p. 514. That Lincoln’s picture of close application was not overdrawn may be inferred from this paragraph in Lamon (140), based on the recollections of an old settler: “ ‘He used to read law,’ says Henry McHenry, ‘in 1832 or 1833, barefooted, seated in the shade of a tree, and would grind around with the shade, just opposite Berry’s grocery store, a few feet south of the door.’ He occasionally varied the attitude by lying flat on his back, and ‘putting his feet up the tree,’—a situation which might have been unfavorable to mental application in the case of a man with shorter extremities.” See, also: Nicolay and Hay, i, 112-13; Herndon, i, 101-02; Browne, 121-23.

[i-56] Report of an interview by Albert B. Orr, with C. F. Warden, in the McKeesport (Pa.) Times, February 12, 1909: also a letter from Mr. Orr to the author.

[i-57] In response to the writer’s inquiries Henry B. Rankin of Springfield, Illinois, at one time a clerk in Lincoln and Herndon’s office, furnished a statement that is of topographical interest. The communication was addressed to the Hon. James R. B. Van Cleave of that city, through whose courtesy it is here published:

“The route Mr. Lincoln went over, in and out of Springfield from Salem when he made his home in that village was entirely on the south side of the Sangamon river, not the north as the travel from that vicinity has been for the past fifty years. There was no bridge over the Sangamon river in its entire length while Mr. Lincoln was at Salem. The first bridge over this river was built in the early ’40s at the then Carpenter’s Mills in this county. The next at Petersburg a few years later, in the ’40s, and via Athens in 1843.

“Mr. Lincoln’s trips to Springfield were usually made by the road as now located, for the first few miles bearing south out from Salem,—from that on into the city there have been more or less minor changes since, at various places,—on to the junction with the present ‘Jacksonville and Springfield road,’ and via it, entered the city on the west. Quite occasionally he walked from Salem to Springfield, and these trips were ‘across country,’ skirting the bluffs and breaks on the south bank of the Sangamon river ‘as the crow flies,’—by shortest angles, some five miles shorter trip in.

“I have heard Mr. Lincoln in the old Lincoln and Herndon law office refer to these trips on foot into the city across the then unfenced prairie and woods. So many writers about Mr. Lincoln’s early years have traveled over the road from Springfield to Petersburg via Athens,—now the nearest and always chosen one,—that you will please pardon me for the stress I place on the difference between the two roads. The road south of Salem across the ‘Rocky ford’ of ‘Rock Creek,’ and several other streams,—then called ‘creeks,’ had to bear westerly after leaving the Sangamon bottoms south of Salem, and cross these creeks at the most favorable places between banks best fitted to span crude bridges over. This made the ‘foot-path way’ from Springfield to Salem, a much shorter one than the wagon road between them. This wagon road as then traveled was fully twenty-five miles between Salem and the Capital City.”

[i-58] A reminder of this toilsome period is to be found, many years later, in the letter addressed to J. M. Brockman:—

[i-59] The Revised Laws of Illinois, edition of 1833, pp. 99-102, §1 and §9. Hill (57-58) is the only writer on Lincoln that has taken notice of this prohibition.

[i-60] There appears to be some ground for controversy as to when Lincoln was admitted to the bar. He, himself, preparing notes of his life for the Scripps biography, sometime during 1860, wrote: “In the autumn of 1836 he obtained a law license.” (See Works, vi, 33.)

And Jesse W. Weik, Herndon’s collaborator, referring to the records, states (Century Magazine, June, 1904, p. 279): “The first step in Lincoln’s legal career is thus set forth in an entry found in the records of the Circuit Court of Sangamon County, Illinois, dated March 24, 1836. ‘It is ordered by the Court that it be certified that Abraham Lincoln is a person of good moral character.’ After this necessary preliminary, as appears from the records of the clerk of the Supreme Court, he was on September 9 duly licensed to practise in all the courts of the State.”

But Hill (61) asserts: “He was legally qualified on March 24, 1836, and his professional life properly dates from that day.”

Reaffirming this conclusion, Mr. Hill writes to the author: “There is no doubt that Lincoln was legally admitted to practice March 24, 1836, as is shown by the papers on file; but casting back to find out when he was admitted to the bar, Lincoln undoubtedly relied upon the rolls of attorneys for the year 1836, in which his name appeared September 9th of that year.”

Summarizing the facts, Judge John P. Hand, of the Illinois Supreme Court, said in a Lincoln memorial address delivered on February 11, 1909: “He was licensed as an attorney, September 9, 1836, enrolled March 1, 1837, and commenced practice April 21, 1837.” (See Illinois Reports, ccxxxviii, 13; and MacChesney, 204.)

Yet beyond a doubt, Lincoln appeared as an attorney in actions at law, previous to April 21, 1837. Following the rather offhand ways of the day, he tried some cases at the bar, as we have seen, before all the requirements for his admission had been complied with. The present writer ventures the opinion that, according to statute, three steps must have been taken before a person was, at this period, legally qualified to practice as an attorney or counselor at law, within the State. First, he had to obtain a certificate “of his good moral character,” from a County Court; second, he had to secure a license signed by two justices of the Supreme Court; and third, having taken the oath of office, he had to have his name entered on the roll kept by the clerk of that court. It was not, therefore, until Lincoln had been formally enrolled that his career as a lawyer may correctly be said to have begun. (See Revised Laws of Illinois for 1833, pp. 99-100; and a decision of the Supreme Court, December Term, 1840, in the matter of E. C. Fellows, an attorney who had failed to have his name enrolled—Illinois Reports, iii, 369.)

[ii-1] Nicolay, 53. See, also, Browne, 150-51; Coffin, 94.

[ii-2] This narrative of the interview has been collated from the several accounts of it given by Mr. Speed at various times. See Oldroyd, 145-46; Whitney, 16-17; Browne, 152-53; Clarke, 341-42; Herndon, i, 175-76. See, also, Arnold, 53-54; Brooks, 80; Coffin, 95; Hapgood, 61-62.

[ii-3] There are a number of variations in the different accounts of this episode, but the essential facts appear to be as here related. Comprehensive versions are given by Arnold, 39-40; Stowe, 19-20; Holland, 55-56; Browne, 119-20; Onstot, 89-90; Brockett, 710; Jayne, 10; Noah Brooks, in Harper’s Magazine, July, 1865, p. 226.

[ii-4] According to Major Stuart, Lincoln was his partner from April 27, 1837, to April 14, 1841; Judge Stephen T. Logan’s, from April 14, 1841, to about September 20, 1843; and William H. Herndon’s, from about September 20, 1843, until the death of Mr. Lincoln. There appears to be some ground for the belief that the last partnership was formed some months later than is here stated.

[ii-5] The oft-repeated statement that Lincoln disdained to keep accounts has, in his case as in that of another eminent lawyer, Patrick Henry, been confuted by the evidence of the fee-books themselves.

[ii-6] Onstot, 58.

[ii-7] The parallel between Lincoln and his running mate in the successful canvass of 1860 might be drawn at this point also. Referring to Hamlin’s early days in the practice of law, his biographer says: “He handled a good deal of money belonging to his clients, and it often happened that they did not call for it until some time after it had been collected. Mr. Hamlin, therefore, had at times considerable sums of money in his possession, and on one occasion he told a friend what disposition he made of such money and his reasons. He said, ‘When I collect money for a client, I inclose it in an addressed package, and lock the package up in my trunk until it is called for. I will not touch or use that money for my purposes under any circumstances, unless, of course, the owner should authorize it. The money belongs to the owner. I have no more right to use it, even if I could replace it in five minutes, than I would have to take money that he might happen to have in his pocket-book.’ ” (Hamlin, 45.)

[ii-8] This principle was recognized as early as Cicero’s time. In his Ninth Philippic, eulogizing Servius Sulpicius, that most profound of Roman advocates, the orator said, according to Forsyth’s version: “He did not consider himself a lawyer rather than a servant of justice, and his constant endeavor was to temper the severity of law, by reference to principles of equity. He had less pleasure in advising that actions should be brought, than in removing all cause for litigation.”

[ii-9] Works, ii, 142. Lincoln’s comment—“the nominal winner is often a real loser”—suggests the similarity between his advice and that of Professor Porson, as expressed in that learned humorist’s mock examination questions for students:—

“What happens if you win your cause?”

“You are nearly ruined.”

“What happens if you lose your cause?”

“You are quite ruined.”

[ii-10] Browne’s Lincoln and Men, i, 338; Browne, 220.

[ii-11] For a few of these stories the reader is referred to Onstot, 20; Stringer, i, 218; McClure’s Yarns, 380; Gallaher, 46-47; Lincolnics, 30-31; MacChesney, 299-300; Depew’s Speech, February 12, 1909, pp. 6-7; Dr. George M. Angell, in Bloomington (Ill.) Pantagraph, February 12, 1909.

Lincoln was not the only great lawyer concerning whom such anecdotes might be told. The eminent New England advocate, Jeremiah Mason, is said to have been equally successful in bringing about compromises. “Mr. Mason,” writes one who knew him well, “magnified his position by exerting all his influence to prevent litigation, or the commencement of suits upon mere quibbles, or for the purpose of procrastination, or to gratify personal vindictiveness, or retaliation. He was eminently a peacemaker, and was instrumental in healing many a wound, and in preventing the useless expenditure of money, by a set of litigants, who were in the habit of annoying (employing?) lawyers to aid them in schemes of malice or revenge.” (John P. Lord, quoted in Hillard’s Memoir and Correspondence of Jeremiah Mason, 46.)

[ii-12] Browne’s Lincoln and Men, i, 339.

[ii-13] Herndon, ii, 14.

[ii-14] Browne, 218-19. Lincoln’s expedient for preventing trivial litigation was similar in its essence to that of the New York attorney concerning whom Edwards, in his Pleasantries about Courts and Lawyers, tells this anecdote:—

“In a certain part of our State, two Dutchmen, who built and used in common, a small bridge over a little stream which ran through their farms, had a dispute concerning certain repairs which it required. One of them declined to bear any portion of the expense necessary to the purchase of two or three planks. The aggrieved party went to a neighboring attorney and placing ten dollars, in two notes of five dollars each, in his hand, said—

“ ‘I’ll give you all dish monies if you’ll make Hans do justice mit de pridge.’

“ ‘How much will it cost to repair this bridge?’ asked the attorney.

“ ‘Well, den, not more ash five tollars.’

“ ‘Very well,’ said the legal gentleman, pocketing one of the notes and giving the Dutchman the other, ‘take this and go and get the bridge repaired. It’s the best course you can take.’

“ ‘Yaas,’ responded the client slowly, ‘y-a-a-s, dat ish more better as to quarrel mit Hans.’

“But as he went home, he shook his head frequently, as if unable, after all, quite clearly to see how he had gained anything by going to the lawyer.”

[ii-15] This narrative is based on two interviews, secured for the author from Henry Rice, in the autumn of 1907 and in the spring of 1908, respectively. See, also, Markens, 24.

[ii-16] Lincoln’s refusal to take what he considered a bad case is in harmony, as far as civil actions go, with the practice of every high-minded lawyer. David Hoffman, of the Baltimore bar, drawing up, early in the nineteenth century, a code of ethics for the guidance of his students throughout their professional careers, prescribed as the eleventh of fifty resolutions: “If, after duly examining a case, I am persuaded that my client’s claim or defense (as the case may be) cannot, or rather ought not to be sustained, I will promptly advise him to abandon it. To press it further in such a case, with the hope of gleaning some advantage by an extorted compromise, would be lending myself to a dishonorable use of legal means in order to gain a portion of that, the whole of which I have reason to believe would be denied to him both by law and justice.”

[ii-17] Holland, 126; Browne, 162. But see Lamon, 317, for McHenry’s account of a somewhat similar interview that had a different termination.

[ii-18] “Never stir up litigation. A worse man can scarcely be found than one who does this.” (Notes for Law Lecture, in Works, ii, 142.)

[ii-19] Tarbell, i, 248; McClure’s Yarns, 359-60.

[ii-20] Lamon, 325.

[ii-21] It should, perhaps, be noted that in refusing Matteson’s case Lincoln turned his back on one of his own influential clients, whom he had represented in the Supreme Court but a short time before this happened. See the appeal of Constant vs. Matteson et al., argued at the January term of 1859, in the Second Grand Division. (Illinois Reports, xxii, 546-62.)

[ii-22] James Judson Lord to William H. Herndon, in Herndon, ii, 14-15, note; Letter of Mrs. Katherine Lord Driscoll to the author.

[ii-23] General John H. Littlefield, in Success, February, 1901, p. 600; Lincolnics, 31. An interview, somewhat like these two, culled from the practice of the eminent Southern lawyer and statesman, Robert Toombs, is thus related by his biographer: “On one occasion he said to a client who had stated his case to him, ‘Yes, you can recover in this suit, but you ought not to do so. This is a case in which law and justice are on opposite sides.’ The client told him he would push the case, anyhow. ‘Then,’ replied Mr. Toombs, ‘you must hire some one else to assist you in your damned rascality.’ ” (Stovall, 18-19.) Another distinguished Southerner, Alexander H. Stephens, held equally conscientious opinions as to what constitutes a lawyer’s duty. These views, based on a long and honorable career, occupy a notable place in his Recollections. (See Stephens, 383-89.)

[ii-24] Rev. John Putnam Gulliver, in the New York Independent, September 1, 1864. The article is reprinted in Carpenter, 309-17.

[ii-25] Atkinson, 28-29; Lamon, 40, note.

[ii-26] For details concerning these and other similar incidents the reader is referred to: Curtis’s Lincoln, 77; Browne, 646-47; Brooks, 426; Carpenter, 78, 114-15; Hill, 131, 198; Tarbell, i, 254; Bateman, 30-32; Flower, 63; Emerson, 5-9; Works, ii, 70, 368; ibid., iii, 32; ibid., ix, 26, 84-85; Debates, 13, 26; Scribner’s Magazine, February, 1878, p. 565. See, also, Speed, 18.

[ii-27] From the response by Justice David Davis, of the United States Supreme Court, to resolutions presented upon the death of Lincoln, at a session of the Federal Circuit Court held in Indianapolis, May 19, 1865.

[ii-28] Ex-Chief Justice Caton’s address to the Supreme Court of Illinois, May 3, 1865, in Caton, 12; Illinois Reports, xxxvii, 13.

[ii-29] Barrett, 818; Browne, 235-36; Nicolay and Hay, i, 303-04.

[ii-30] Swett to Herndon, in Herndon, ii, 246-47.

[ii-31] Whitney, 261.

[ii-32] Lamon, 324.

[ii-33] This account of the incident is based chiefly on statements made by District Attorney Ward Hill Lamon, himself (Lamon, 322), and by Judge David Davis, who probably referred to the affair in a story which he recalled, with unimportant variations, many years later, for the entertainment of Ratcliffe Hicks, a contributor to the Century Magazine of February, 1894, p. 638. Henry C. Whitney, it should be added, writing after Lamon but before Hicks, contradicted the former’s narrative in almost every important particular. A careful reading, however, of Whitney’s book (at pages 130-32 and 534), leads to the conclusion that the error lies with him rather than with Lamon and Davis; for he obviously confused the Patterson trial, in his memory, with another Champaign County case.

[ii-34] Letter from Abraham Lincoln to H. Keeling, dated March 3, 1858, and quoted from manuscript in Herndon, i, 326.

[ii-35] Shaw’s letter of June 13, 1866, quoted from manuscript in Herndon, i, 323.

[ii-36] Holland, 130; Stowe, 22.

[ii-37] Joseph Gillespie’s manuscript letter of October 8, 1886, quoted in Herndon, ii, 13-14; Lamon, 321-22. Gillespie was, to a precise degree, Lincoln’s contemporary at the bar. Their enrollment dates from the same year—1837.

[ii-38] The same figure of speech was used, to describe a similar attitude of mind, by that other eminent lawyer, Horace Binney, leader for many years of the Philadelphia bar. In his private record, written for the eyes of his children, we find: “I never prosecuted a cause that I thought a dishonest one, and I have washed my hands of more than one that I discovered to be such after I had undertaken it.” (Binney, 443.)

[ii-39] For the details of this anecdote the author collated the accounts in Browne, 228; Lamon, 324; and Stringer, i, 217. According to the last-mentioned authority, however, Lincoln was found, not at the tavern, but in the Postville Park, playing townball with the boys.

[ii-40] Whitney, 130-32, 262; see, also, 136. It was probably concerning this incident that the same colleague wrote in another work; “On one occasion, Swett and I sat on a bench in the extreme rear of the court-room while Lincoln closed to the jury on our side, and we were utterly astonished at the cruel mode in which he applied the knife to all the finespun theories we had crammed the jury with.” (Whitney’s Life, i, 175.)

[ii-41] The authenticity of this story has been questioned. It certainly calls for confirmation, as the first case in which Lincoln appeared before the State Supreme Court, according to the printed records (Illinois Reports, iii, 456-57), was that of Scammon vs. Cline. Here he was associated with another attorney, James L. Loop, of Belvidere, and represented, not the appellant, but the defendant in error. The discrepancies are striking rather than vital. From the peculiar nature of that case Lincoln may well, at the time, have made the brief oral statement attributed to him; and, as we know, the decision which followed was, in fact, against his client. On the other hand, perhaps the scene did not take place during the argument on Scammon vs. Cline. If Judge Treat’s narrative is correct in every particular, Lincoln must have made his first bow before the Supreme Court sometime during the three and a half years of practice that preceded this hearing. And he might have done so, too, without that fact appearing in the records. For the reporter, finding the early material incomplete, and seeking to limit the size of the published volumes, did not include all the cases. It may be added that an account of this incident has, in some form, been accepted by Herndon, i, 322-23; Lamon, 321; Schurz, 16; Leland, 61; and Stoddard, 119. All these men knew Lincoln—some of them throughout almost his entire legal career. That they believed him capable of the course described in the anecdote is, perhaps, as significant as the story itself.

An essay, giving the results of careful researches into the case of Scammon vs. Cline, by Richard V. Carpenter, was printed in the Journal of the Illinois State Historical Society for October, 1911, pp. 317-23.

[ii-42] “Judge Davis often delegated his judicial functions to others. I have known of his getting Moon of Clinton to hold court for him in Bloomington for whole days; Lincoln to hold an entire term, and frequently to sit for short times; and I even knew of Colonel Bryant of Indiana to hold court for him in Danville. All judgments rendered by these lawyers were voidable. Time has probably now cured them. It was a hazardous business for them and the sheriff and suitors in their cases.” (Whitney’s Life, i, 192.)

One of these irregular judges, it may be said in passing, more than returned the compliment, some years later, by elevating Davis to the bench of the United States Supreme Court; and the legality of that appointment has not been questioned.

[iii-1] It would not be correct, however, to say, as is sometimes said, that Lincoln won every case which he should have won. Contemporary lawyers testify to the contrary.

[iii-2] Herndon, ii, 3; Whitney, 251.

[iii-3] Hill, 225-26.

[iii-4] Whitney, 259; Whitney’s Life, i, 177.

[iii-5] Anthony Thornton, in the Chicago Tribune, February 12, 1900, p. 14.

[iii-6] Illinois Reports, xxxvii, 15.

[iii-7] Whitney, 262-63; Whitney’s Life, i, 196.

These tributes to Lincoln’s honorable methods again recall the principles that contributed not a little toward Horace Binney’s preëminence. In the review of his career he wrote: “I at all times disdained to practise any stratagem, trick or artifice for the purpose of gaining an advantage over my adversary; and unless I thought him unfair, I was generally willing that he should see all my cards while I played them. I can truly say that I am not conscious of having lost anything by this candor; but, on the contrary, have repeatedly gained by it. If my client was at any time suspected, I had no reason to think that I was, by either the Court or the bar; and how many balancing cases, in the course of thirty-five years’ practice, this sort of reputation assisted, I need not say.” (Binney, 443.)

[iii-8] Herndon, i, 326-28; Atlantic Monthly, April, 1867, p. 412.

Whatever the practice at the Springfield bar may have been, Lincoln’s objection to the making of a fictitious plea was of course not finical. No less an authority than Chief Justice Holt had said: “The attorney, if he puts in a false plea to delay justice, breaks his oath, and may be fined for putting a deceit on the Court.” (Pierce vs. Blake, Salkeld’s Reports, ii, 515. See, also, Johnson vs. Alston, Campbell’s Reports, i, 176.)

[iii-9] Whitney, 263-64; Herndon, ii, 17-18. It should be noted that April 24, 1856, fell on a Thursday, not a Saturday. Whether the 4 is a misprint for 6, or whether this term of court extended to Saturday, May 24, or whether the error lies elsewhere, cannot now be determined.

[iii-10] Browne’s Lincoln and Men, i, 360-62.

[iii-11] Lincoln to Trumbull, December 18, 1857, in the Century Magazine, February, 1909, p. 620.

[iii-12] Justice David Davis from the bench of the Federal Circuit Court, at Indianapolis, May 19, 1865.

[iii-13] Holland, 130; Lamon’s Recollections, 19-20; Stowe, 22; Browne, 162.

[iii-14] Koerner, ii, 110.

[iii-15] Recollections of Colonel Richard J. Hinton, in the Chicago Times-Herald, November 17, 1895.

[iii-16] Holland, 80. See, also, Nicolay and Hay, i, 307; Ward, 205, 270; Browne, 238.

[iii-17] Mrs. Norman B. Judd, in Oldroyd, 523; also, in Tarbell, i, 277-78. A report of Lincoln’s argument, rather full, though far from complete, has been reprinted from the Chicago Daily Press, in Works, ii, 340-54, and Tarbell, ii, 324-30.

[iii-18] Admissions that seemed to be of a more damaging nature than those which were made in this case have at times been known to assist, rather than interfere with, the winning of a verdict. How far counsel may go, along such lines, was illustrated in the practice of Daniel Webster. A more brilliant, though less scrupulous, advocate than Lincoln, he went the limit.

Once in Boston, defending a man who had been indicted for forgery, his first act—at the very beginning of the trial, before a witness had been called—was to arise and say: “May it please the Court, we admit the forgery, so that evidence on this point will be unnecessary. We deny that the note was uttered in this county.”

The astonishment of those present gave way to comprehension, when it became evident that the prosecution could easily have made out a case of forgery against the prisoner; but that it could not so readily have proven, what was of equal importance, the issuing of the forged instrument in Suffolk County. For want of sufficient proof, on this very point, the defendant was acquitted. He might have fared differently if both the questions of forgery and utterance had been presented to the jury. It is not unlikely that had they listened to evidence on the crime itself, those facts would have so overshadowed other considerations in their minds as to bring about a conviction. Webster’s avowal prevented this, and saved his unworthy client.