There was, of course, a lamentable falling off in the foreign trade of Java after the commencement of the war of the French revolution: some of the best markets were almost entirely closed to it, and the intercourse with the mother-country was nearly destroyed. The total of exports to Holland and her eastern possessions, from the year 1796 till 1806, amounted in value to only 7,097,963 Spanish dollars; the imports to 3,073,894 Spanish dollars; leaving a surplus of exports of 4,024,069 Spanish dollars. The Americans began to frequent the market of Batavia in 1798, and through them principally was the trade carried on till the conquest of the Island by the British, except during the short interval of the peace of Amiens. No specie (with which Holland chiefly paid for her eastern commodities) was imported from the mother-country from 1795 downwards, except during 1802-3 and 1803-4, during which there was only the very inconsiderable sum of about half a million of rupees imported.

It is impossible to convey a just idea of the native or foreign trade of Java, without adverting to the commercial and political state of the other islands of the Archipelago. Of these it may be stated generally, that the interior is possessed by the natives, collected under leaders who have taken advantage of the great extent of the country, in proportion to its population, to render themselves independent of the lawful sovereign; that the coast is occupied, in many places, either by pirates, by some of the ruder tribes whom it is dangerous to invade, or by adventurous traders, chiefly Maláyus and Búgis. These traders arrive in well-armed vessels, which some of them remain to protect; others travel up the country, not unfrequently to the distance of a hundred miles, and at the change of the monsoon return to their companions, charged either with plunder, or with the fruits of a commerce carried on with the natives at an exorbitant profit. The pirates, as they drive the peaceable and honest trader from the coast, recruit their numbers from among the seafaring men to whom he used to give employment. The decay of commerce is accelerated; and the natives retreat into the interior, where, for want of a market, they cease to collect the rich productions of their country, and rapidly sink into poverty and barbarism. The sea and the coast remain a scene of violence, rapine, and cruelty. The mouths of the rivers are held by lawless banditti, who interrupt the trade of those who inhabit their banks, and capture the vessels destined for the inland towns: the bays and harbours are entirely within their power; and in these smooth seas they are never driven a moment from their stations, or diverted by danger from their predatory vigilance. The sovereigns of the country have too little authority over their nominal subjects; and their resources are too confined for them to oppose any effectual resistance to these outrages. All restraints are withdrawn by the divisions and weakness of the native governments; and men, rendered desperate by the experience of lawless violence, are induced to join in the system of plunder against which they can find no protection.

This extensive, rich, and beautiful cluster of islands is thus deprived of all the advantages which it might derive from the sea with which it is surrounded; its harbours become the retreats of marauders, instead of the resort of peaceful commerce; its seafaring people are reduced to a state of nature. Where force decides right, no sovereign is possessed of paramount authority to sweep this pest from his shores; no vessel is safe, no flag is respected. The trade is thus confined to desperate adventurers only, to whom the existence of piracy is more advantageous than the unmolested security of navigation, as the danger which it creates drives away all competitors of a less daring character, and gives them a monopoly of these ports. It is too true, also, that European traders have materially contributed to the strength of the pirates, by the supply of arms and ammunition. At the port of Sambas, European vessels had not dared to touch openly for twenty years; but such means of resistance as the pirates were found to possess in two recent attacks upon it, could never have been collected without large supplies from British traders.

The small colonial craft, so necessary for the prosperity of these regions, cannot without great risk venture beyond the coast; while armed Malayan and Bugis práhus, and a few European speculators, engross most of the trade.

The above observations apply more particularly to the coasts of Borneo and the adjacent islands; but they are, in a great measure, applicable to many parts of Sumatra. The unfortunate king of Acheen, who has long been intimately connected with the British establishments, is a young man of estimable qualities, with a title ancient and undisputed, though perhaps a weak prince. All his chiefs acknowledge his authority, though none submit to his control. Native traders from the coast of Coromandel, and Europeans from Pinang, frequent every river; and the profit derived from their dealings furnishes the inhabitants with inducements and means to throw off their allegiance. The king, too feeble to reduce the revolters, is only able to keep up a state of continual alarm and warfare, to which the mutual jealousies among the petty usurpers themselves mainly contribute. The trade of his dominions is in a great measure carried on like smuggling, by armed boats running out at a favourable moment, hiding themselves from danger, or fighting their way through opposition, as occasion may require, and laying their account with making up for frequent losses by exorbitant profits. In some places, these almost independent bands are commanded by Malabar chuliahs; and, in most instances, the petty chiefs whom they elevate to authority are foreign vagrants. Those places which, from their vicinity to the residence of the king, are least able to resist his power, are supported in their opposition by the interests of the English traders; and it is not to be forgotten, that when he made a partial attempt to regain his authority over all the neighbouring country, they petitioned the European authority to prevent, by its interference, his levying a duty upon his own subjects. The petition was attended to; and the king was compelled, by the command of strangers, to forego the only means by which he could have preserved his dominions from anarchy and confusion. At the period, therefore, when the resources of his kingdom would have been unfolding themselves, by the improving industry of a well-regulated population, it is falling into decay, through the personal imbecility and political weakness of the monarch; and, breaking into detached fragments, is about to form as many separate principalities, as formerly there were independent governments throughout all the Archipelago[66].

That there has been, at some time, a more extensive commerce on the shores of the Archipelago is highly probable, and that there might be cannot be doubted. The great resources, vegetable and mineral, with which they abound, such as spices, camphor, gold, and diamonds, and the facilities which they enjoy for navigation, offer means and inducements of the highest nature. The general character of the people, also, as far as it can be ascertained, appears equally favourable to commercial intercourse. They are represented as mild, inoffensive, not indisposed to industry, free from any obstinate prejudices of superstition, and altogether of a different temper from that of the few who remain in a constant state of warfare on the coast.

Another favourable circumstance is the existence of sovereigns, whose rights, however infringed, are in principle acknowledged, and who have never been known to favour, what must be considered the chief misfortune of these countries, and the source of almost all the rest, the horrible system of piracy. The evil is manifest, and the remedy is not of difficult discovery. Were legitimate and acknowledged sovereigns assisted in resuming their due authority, piracy and rebellion might be destroyed, these shores would be peopled with their native inhabitants, whose industry, awakened and invited by the opening of a safe navigation to the capitals, would in fleets of small vessels, so essential to the prosperity of the Eastern settlements, bring the produce of the interior down the innumerable rivers, and communicate to countries, beyond the reach of foreign adventurers the comforts of civilised life.

A few years of repose to these islands, and of safe uninterrupted commerce, with its attendant blessings, would repay with gain incalculable, what they now claim from the benevolence and philanthropy, if not from the justice of Europeans, who have so essentially contributed to their degradation. If left neglected, without capital, without a safe navigation, almost without laws, the government disunited, the people groaning under vassalage and slavery, these races must descend still further in the scale of degradation, until scarcely a vestige will remain to vindicate the records of their history; and their political existence will only be testified by acts of piracy perpetrated on defenceless vessels, which from accident or ignorance may visit their inhospitable shores.

In all their Eastern settlements, the favourite policy of the Dutch seems to have been to depress the native inhabitants, and give every encouragement to the Chinese, who, generally speaking, are only itinerants and not children of the soil, and who follow the almost universal practice of remitting the fruits of their industry to China, instead of spending them where they were acquired. The Chinese, in all ages equally supple, venal, and crafty, failed not, at a very early period, to recommend themselves to the speculating Hollanders. They have, almost from the first, been their agents; and in the island of Java, in particular, they acquired from them the entire monopoly of the revenue farms and government contracts. Many of the most respectable Dutch families were intimately connected with the Chinese in their contracts and speculations, and whole provinces had been sold in perpetuity to some of them, the extensive population of which were thus assigned over to their unfeeling oppression, for the purpose of raising temporary supplies of money.

On Java, the Chinese have been generally left to their own laws and the regulations of their own chiefs; and being, for the most part, merely temporary residents in the country, they devote themselves to the accumulation of wealth, without being very scrupulous about the means of obtaining it: when, therefore, they acquire grants of land, they generally contrive to reduce the peasants speedily to the condition of slaves. The improvement of the people, which was never much attended to by the Dutch, was still less so by the Chinese, and the oppression which they exercised in the vicinity of Batavia had opened the eyes of the Dutch themselves. A report of the Council of Batavia, a short time prior to the landing of the English, accordingly states, that "although the Chinese, as being the most industrious settlers, should be the most useful, they on the contrary have become a very dangerous people, and are to be considered as a pest to the country; for which evil," they add, "there appears to be no radical cure but their expulsion from the interior." Wherever the Chinese formed extensive settlements in Java, the native inhabitants had no alternative but that of abandoning the district or becoming slaves of the soil. The monopolising spirit of the Chinese was often very pernicious to the produce of the soil, as may be seen even at this day in the immediate vicinity of Batavia, where all the public markets are farmed by them, and the degeneracy and poverty of the lower orders are proverbial.

The Chinese of Batavia are a very numerous body, and possess considerable wealth. They are active and industrious, enterprising and speculative in the highest degree in the smallest or most extensive concerns, and equally well adapted for trade or agriculture; but, at the same time, they are cunning, deceitful, covetous, and restless, and exceedingly unwarlike in their habits and dispositions. This is the character given of them by Mr. Hogendorp, who, in considering the injurious consequences of their extensive influence on Java, has drawn a very just and able representation of it[67].

In all the Malayan states, the Chinese have made the greatest efforts to get into their hands the farming of the port duties, and this has generally proved the ruin of the trade. In addition to these circumstances it should be recollected, that the Chinese, from their peculiar language and manners, form a kind of separate society in every place where they settle, which gives them a great advantage over every competitor in arranging monopolies of trade. The ascendancy of the Chinese requires to be cautiously guarded against and restrained; and this, perhaps, cannot be better done, than by bringing forward the native population, and encouraging them in useful and industrious habits.

Some of these observations regarding the Chinese are, in a high degree, applicable to the Arabs who frequent the Malayan countries, and under the specious mask of religion prey on the simple unsuspicious natives. The Chinese must, at all events, be admitted to be industrious; but by far the greater part of the Arabs are mere useless drones, and idle consumers of the produce of the ground: affecting to be descended from the Prophet and the most eminent of his followers, when in reality they are commonly nothing better than manumitted slaves, they worm themselves into the favour of the Malayan chiefs, and often procure the highest offices under them. They hold like robbers the offices which they have obtained as sycophants, and cover all with the sanctimonious veil of religious hypocrisy.

Under the pretext of instructing the Maláyus in the principles of the Mahometan religion, they inculcate the most intolerant bigotry, and render them incapable of receiving any species of useful knowledge. It is seldom that the East is visited by Arabian merchants of large capital, but there are numerous adventurers who carry on a coasting trade from port to port, and by asserting the religious claims of Sheikh, generally obtain an exemption from all port duties in the Malayan states. They are also not unfrequently concerned in piracies, and are the principal promoters of the slave-trade.

This may serve, in some degree, to illustrate the necessity of establishing an equal and uniform system of port regulations throughout the whole of the Malayan countries; for if the Chinese, on the one hand, are permitted to farm import and export duties in different ports, they have every facility allowed them to form combinations, in order to secure a monopoly to Chinese traders; and on the other hand, if the Arabs, under religious pretexts, are entirely exempted from duties, they may baffle all competition, and engross the trade of the Malayan countries to the exclusion of European traders altogether.

Let the Chinese and Arabs still trade to the eastward. Without them, the trade would be reduced to less than one-third of even what it is at present, for it is only through the stimulus which they give to the industry of the country that its resources are to be developed: but let their trade be regulated; and above all, let them not be left in the enjoyment of immunities and advantages, which are neither possessed by Europeans, nor the indigenous inhabitants of the country. Since the reduction of the Dutch influence in the East, several of the ports formerly dependant on them have almost become Arab colonies. The evil is obviously increasing every day, and can only be checked by encouraging the native population, and regulating on equal terms the duties of the Malayan and other Eastern ports.

In many other respects besides those which we have stated, the commercial policy adopted by the Dutch, with regard to the Eastern islands and the Malayan states in general, was contrary to all principles of natural justice, and unworthy of any enlightened and civilized nation[68].

From authentic accounts it appears, that they attempted to destroy and eradicate from a vast range of countries the most advantageous produce of the land, in order to favour their own petty traffic, and burnt a large proportion of the residue, in order to keep up their monopoly price in Europe on a small proportion of this produce. Against errors of this kind, it is to be hoped the more enlightened policy of the present era will be an effectual preventive; but there are others, so interwoven with the interests of these islands, and so local in their nature, that they may not so easily attract the attention of the governing power.

One feature of the Dutch policy in the Eastern Isles seems to have been the exclusion of all foreign trade, whether European or native; excepting at certain specified ports under their own immediate control. This policy was as much connected with the general government of the country, as with the commercial profits of the Company; for in an Archipelago of such unparalleled extent, inhabited by tribes of such various characters, formidable in a high degree from their very want of civilization, it was necessary to bring forward some of the most powerful and most favourably situated of these numerous states, and to hold them answerable for the proceedings of the several districts under their influence. Such views gave rise to the establishment of certain regular and determined trading ports, and led to the vigilant suppression of all attempts at competition and independence on the part of the inferior states.

Had this measure been combined with a liberal encouragement of the home trade, as it may be denominated, between these privileged ports established by the Dutch, and the various countries under their influence, little doubt can be entertained that it would have tended materially to promote the civilization and general improvement of all the neighbouring nations. Very different, however, was the object of the Dutch agreements with the different rajas of the Eastern Archipelago. In some cases it was to secure a monopoly of all the tin, pepper, camphor, and other saleable articles produced in their dominions; in others it was to bind the chiefs themselves to destroy the only saleable articles that their country could furnish, lest the monopoly price of the Dutch should be injured by a greater quantity of such produce being brought to market. The Dutch genius, though exclusively devoted to commerce, has never yet been able to discover the truth of the maxim, that in the long run it may be as gainful "to make small profits on large sales as large profits on smaller sales;" their policy, on the contrary, has not been inaptly compared to a man putting out one of his eyes to strengthen the sight of the other.

It must be admitted, that the line of conduct pursued by the English towards the Malayan nations, had by no means been of a conciliatory or prepossessing character. Our intercourse with them had been carried on almost exclusively through the medium of adventurers little acquainted with either the country or people, who have been frequently more remarkable for boldness than principle[69]. Indeed, the want of any settled basis of traffic, and the long indifference of the British government to the complaints of either party, had produced so many impositions, reprisals, piracies, and murders, that any eastern trader must have felt himself very much in the situation of a dealer in spirits, tobacco, and blankets, among the Indians of North America. It was the remark of Mr. Farquhar, than whom no man is more extensively acquainted with the interests and resources of East insular India, that the indifference of the British government must have originated solely in the want of information or incorrectness of knowledge; since it is not improbable, that the riches of Sumatra and Borneo are equal to those either of Brazil or New Spain; and it is only from the disadvantages under which we had hitherto entered into the competition, that these great sources of wealth had so long been engrossed by other nations[70].

The doctrine, that a colony should always be considered a distant province of the mother-country, has been foreign to the political creed of the Dutch; and at any rate the radical want of strength in the government of Batavia may have prevented them from venturing to act upon it. Of course, they must always have contemplated the prosperity of the eastern tribes with the invidious regret of a rival shopkeeper, and regarded their progress in civilization with the jealousy of a timid despot. The fact sufficiently establishes the truth of this remark.

Independently of the effects of the European influence just described, the causes which have tended most to the depression of the Malayan tribes, and the deterioration of their character, are the civil commotions to which every state is liable, from the radical want of strength in the sovereign; the constant wars between the petty chieftains and heads of villages; the ill-defined succession to the throne, from the doctrine of primogeniture being imperfectly recognized; the prevalence of piracy in all the Eastern Seas; the system of domestic slavery, and all its concomitant evils, as wars for the purpose of procuring slaves, and the want of confidence between family and family, man and man; the want of a generally-established, and recognized system of laws, civil and criminal; the want of a similar system of commercial regulations respecting port duties, anchorage, and other charges, to prevent arbitrary exactions and impositions in the various Malayan ports; and, finally, the monopoly of the trade assumed by the Malayan rajas. Had Java remained permanently annexed to the British crown, the redress of these evils would have been, in a great measure, in the power of the English nation: the undertaking would have been worthy of their general character, and there was no other nation that could have possessed the means in an equal degree, even if it had indeed possessed the inclination.

The prevalence of piracy on the Malayan coasts, and the light in which it was viewed as an honourable occupation, worthy of being followed by young princes and nobles, is an evil of ancient date, and intimately connected with the Malayan habits. The old Malayan romances, and the fragments of their traditional history, constantly refer with pride to piratical cruizes.

In addition to other causes, which I shall not stop to specify, the state of the eastern population, and the intolerant spirit of the religion of Islam, have eminently tended to increase the practice. The Arab Sheikhs and Sayeds, whatever doctrines they failed to inculcate, never neglected to enforce the merit of plundering and massacring the infidels; an abominable tenet, which has tended more than any other doctrine of the Kóran to the propagation of this religion. Numerous and various are the tribes of the Eastern Isles which have not embraced the religion of Islam to this day, and consequently are reckoned infidels: cruizes against such were, and are, constantly certain of receiving the approbation of all the Arab teachers settled in the Malayan countries. The practice of piracy is now an evil so extensive and formidable, that it can be put down by the strong hand alone; though precautions against its recurrence might be taken, by rendering, under the system of acknowledged ports, every chieftain answerable for his own territory.

Connected with this evil, though of much wider extent, is the system of slavery in the Malayan countries, which, to apply the energetic language of Mr. Pitt to this subject, has been none of the least efficient causes of keeping down these regions "in a state of bondage, ignorance, and blood." In the beginning of the year 1805, the Marquis Wellesley abolished slavery throughout India; and, on the 4th of June, 1811, the Earl of Minto, by an order to emancipate all the government slaves at Malacca, and to direct that hereafter no slaves should be purchased or received on account of government, gave to the Malayan nations an earnest of his sentiments on the subject. It is certainly to the credit of our countrymen in the East, that they have ever opposed all attempts to introduce the abominable slave traffic into our settlements there. It was prohibited at Madras by an act of the Governor and Council, of so early a date as 1682.

The sources of slavery in the Malayan countries are chiefly piracy at sea, captivity in war, manstealing along the coast, and the penalties enacted in the Malayan law respecting debts and sundry misdemeanors. The surviving crews of vessels which fall into the hands of the pirates are generally disposed of by sale at the first market. The captives taken in the constant wars which the Malayan chieftains carry on against each other, are generally employed in domestic occupations, tending cattle, and cultivating the ground, where there is no opportunity of bringing them to market. This, however, is seldom the case, since such numbers are constantly required by the Arabs and Chinese traders, and heretofore by the Dutch. Many of the Arab trading vessels are almost exclusively navigated by the slaves of the owner; and in their progress from island to island, they find little difficulty in recruiting their crew, by receiving presents of slaves, or if that should fail, by kidnapping the unfortunate natives. This forms a strong argument against admitting the unrestricted range of the islands to either Chinese or Arab traders; for while this is permitted, the abolition of the system of kidnapping would be absolutely impossible. The pagan tribes in the vicinity of the Mahometans, such as those on Báli, and some of the tribes of Celebes, the Harafúras, the black Papúas or oriental negroes, the original inhabitants of Hálamahíra, Coram, and other easterly nations, are in a great measure the victims of the kidnapping system, and being infidels are considered as fair booty.

Nothing has tended more decidedly to the deterioration of the Malayan character, than the want of a well defined and generally acknowledged system of law and commercial regulation. The Malayan nations had, in general, made considerable progress in civilization, before the introduction of the Mahometan religion among them: they had, accordingly, regular institutions of their own, some of which were probably of considerable antiquity, derived from the continent of India, and consequently radically different from those of the Arabs.

Some difficulty appears to have occurred in adapting these institutions to the general tenor of the Mahometan law, and many anomalous ones appear accordingly to have sprung up in different states. These occur in every part of jurisprudence, whether commercial, civil, or criminal, and are recited in the Undang úndang and Adat Maláyu, which are the systems of national law among the Maláyus. They vary considerably from each other in different states, and still more from the generally acknowledged principle of Mahometan law, as received by the Arabs. Hence there is, in almost every state, a constant struggle between the adherents of the old Malayan usages and the Hájis, together with other religious persons, who are desirous of introducing the laws of the Arabs, in order to increase their own importance.

Among the numerous and important evils which result from this complex and ill-defined system, may be reckoned its affording an opening for the caprice and tyranny of the rulers, and producing a general insecurity both of person and property.

The state of the Moslem religion is very different here from what it is in the old Mahomedan states, such as Persia, Turkey, or Arabia. In many of the Eastern Islands paganism still remains: in some districts there are many Christians, and the Chinese swarm in every Malayan country, and live intermingled with the Mahomedans. This mixture of religion and tribes has tended, in some degree, to soften the intolerance of the Mahomedan system among the Malayan nations, and neither the positive authority of Islam, nor the persuasions of their Arab teachers, have hitherto been able to induce them to abandon entirely their own peculiar usages and customs. With some of these usages, especially those which relate to wrecks on the Malayan shores, and the commercial regulations of the different ports, it becomes incumbent on the supreme European authority to interfere. In revising these, the opportunity might perhaps be taken to procure the abandonment of some of those maxims and usages, which have the strongest tendency to prevent their improvement, and counteract the habits of civilized life.

A circumstance highly injurious to the commerce of the Malayan nations is the trading monopoly, which in most of the Malayan ports is actually assumed by the chiefs. Of this monopoly there is no trace in the Undang úndang of the Maláyus, or in the fragments of their history which have yet come to light, and it is a question whether this pernicious practice has not been copied from the monopoly regulations of the Dutch. Where this system has been fully carried into effect, it has generally succeeded effectually in repressing industry and commercial enterprize; and where it has been for some time established, its evils have been felt so deeply, that it may be presumed the Malayan chiefs might be induced to relinquish it in favour of a regulated commerce, whenever they might regain the power of collecting regular duties in lieu of it. The Malayan laws and customs are fortunately of a very different kind from those adopted among the great nations of the continent in their vicinity. These nations, especially the Siamese and Cochin Chinese, have long been accustomed to look up to the Chinese, with whom they coincide in religion and manners, and from whom they have adopted their exclusive maxims of foreign intercourse. The Málayus, on the other hand, though accustomed to look up to the Arabs as their religious instructors, seldom hesitate to admit the superiority of both the Europeans and Chinese, both to themselves and to the Arabs, in the arts of life and general science; and it is certainly our interest to encourage them in this mode of thinking, and to prevent the increase of the Arab influence among them.

The Dutch nation appears to have pursued, as a principle of policy, the propagation of Christianity among the Eastern Islands. The same object had been previously followed by the Portuguese with great success, and there are now several small islands in the Malayan Archipelago, inhabited almost exclusively by Christians of the Catholic persuasion. In many other islands the Protestant persuasion has made considerable progress, and teachers, in the flourishing times of the Batavian Regency, were dispersed over all the low chain of islands which extend from Báli and Lumbok (Sásak) to the great island Timor. The islands in which the Christian faith has been most extensively diffused are the great island Endé or Meng' arái, the great island of Tímor, and the several small islands in the vicinity, and Amboina. In many of these islands the natives having no written character of their own, have been instructed in the Roman character, and taught to read Malayan and other dialects in it There have also been various formularies printed for their use, and translations have been executed for them in some of their languages, which have little or no affinity to the Malayan. The propagation of Christianity among these islands is obviously liable to none of those objections which have been urged against its missionaries on continental possessions. A great proportion of the natives are still pagans, under the influence of a wild and almost unintelligible superstition, the principles of which are not recorded in books, but are handed down, like stories of ghosts, fairies, and witches, with all the uncertainty of tradition. In most instances, the people, though they stand in great awe of the priests or enchanters, or dealers with invisible spirits, are very little attached to the superstition in which they are educated. Many of them are said to be very desirous of procuring instruction, and in some places they look up with a degree of veneration to the Mahomedans, as a people who have received something which they still want.

These observations on the Malayan Islands in general, apply to no part of the Archipelago more than to the important and great island of Borneo.

Borneo is not only one of the most fertile countries in the world, but one of the most productive in gold and diamonds[71]. Its camphor is the finest known, and it is thought capable of producing every kind of spice. Its eastern coasts, which abound in sago, also furnish a greater quantity of birds'-nests, sea-slug, and other commodities in great demand in the Chinese market, than the other islands of the East; but the interior has never been explored by Europeans. It may be conjectured, that the ignorance of the state of the country is one of the principal causes that no European settlement on it has hitherto proved advantageous, but has generally been abandoned after a short trial. The only exception to this observation is the Dutch settlement of Bánjer-másin, which continued from 1747 to 1810, when it was formally abandoned by Marshal Daendals to the Sultan, by agreement, for the sum of fifty thousand Spanish dollars. The Sultan soon after sent an embassy, inviting the English to settle; and previous to the conquest of Java, the Earl of Minto received the ambassadors at Malacca, and accepted their invitation.

The only territory to which the Dutch had any claim on the island of Borneo, was the coast from Súkadána to Mempáwa; this territory they acquired by virtue of a cession from the Sultan of Bantam in 1778. They destroyed Súkadána, and established factories at Pontiána and Mempáwa, which however they abandoned as unproductive after a period of fourteen years.

In no other part of the island of Borneo has there been any European settlement. The English, in 1772, intended to have established a factory at Pásir, but they abandoned the design on some commotions taking place in that state. Its object was to make Pásir a depót for opium and India piece goods, and for the contraband trade in spices. In 1774, a short time after the first settling of Balambángan, Mr. Jesse was deputed as Resident to Borneo proper, and concluded a treaty with that state, by which he acquired for the settlement of Balambángan the exclusive trade in pepper, stipulating in return to protect Borneo from the piratical incursions of the Súlu and Mendanáwi men. Neither of the parties, however, fulfilled its agreement, though the Residency at Borneo was continued for some years after the first breaking up of the settlement of Balambángan in 1775.

On the north-east of Borneo proper lies a very considerable territory, the sovereignty of which has been long claimed by the Súlu government; a very considerable part of this, together with the islands off the coast, have been for upwards of forty years regularly ceded to the English by the Súlus, and has also at different periods been assumed by them, without any objection on the part of the government of Borneo proper. This ceded district, extending from the river Ki-manis on the north-west, which forms the boundary of Borneo proper, to the great bay on the north-east, is undoubtedly a rich and fertile country, though in a rude and uncultivated state, and it is admirably situated for commerce, notwithstanding the different failures of Balambángan may seem to indicate the contrary. Balambángan is one of the small islands off the northern extremity of the island of Borneo, and included in the Súlu grant to the English. It would be foreign to the present object to enter into any details concerning the history of the settlement of Balambángan, but it may be proper to mention, that all the gentlemen who were engaged in the last attempt were convinced that the bottom of the great Malúdu Bay would have been infinitely preferable as a settlement on every account. Balambángan is exactly analogous, in every respect, to Pinang; it does not admit of territorial extension, and must exist, if at all, by commerce solely. Malúdu, on the other hand, is a dependency on the island of Borneo, which admits of any degree of territorial extension, may always subsist any number of inhabitants by its own produce, and is said to communicate, by a land carriage of little more than forty miles, with the central lakes in the vicinity of the gold countries.

From every inquiry, however, and the result of some experience, and much reflection, it may be stated, that no settlement which is founded on a commercial, instead of a territorial basis, is likely to succeed in that quarter. We have already acquired territorial rights, and therefore the only question seems to be, whether these cannot be turned to advantage, as well by cultivation as by commerce. The Dáyaks, or original inhabitants of Borneo, are said to be not only industrious, but particularly disposed to agriculture, and so manageable, that a handful of Maláyus have, in numerous places, reduced many thousands of them to the condition of peaceful cultivators of the ground. Indeed nothing seems wanting but a government strong enough to afford efficient protection to person and property. In the case of the Dáyaks, it must be considered as an advantage, that they have not hitherto adopted the religion of Islam, and would consequently be more ready from the first to regard us as their friends. It ought to be calculated among the inducements to form a settlement on Borneo, that in that quarter our territorial arrangement would interfere with the claims or the rights of no European nation. To recommend, however, the immediate establishment of a settlement at this particular spot, and on a basis so new, would obviously be premature, as notwithstanding the length of time we occupied Balambángan, not only the interior of Borneo was almost unknown, but until lately, even a great part of its coasts. This supineness in the government of Balambángan is perhaps not unexampled. The want of local information has, indeed, often proved fatal to the infant settlements of the English. "Colonies and settlements of every kind," says the author of the Letter on the Nagrais Expedition, "must at first be attended with many difficulties, which however a judicious perseverance will surmount, if there be not some original fault in the establishment. It must be obvious to every one, that the English never made a settlement, in which they were not impeded by some unforeseen difficulties, so as at least frequently to make abandoning the infant establishment appear the most prudent step, without even hoping any return for the prodigious expense which may have been incurred by the undertaking."​—"Various reasons," adds that author, "may be ascribed for this event; but incapacity in the person entrusted with the management, and the want of previous examination of the place, seem to me the most common and the most considerable." Without stopping to inquire how far the want of success in our several attempts to settle Balambángan may have been fairly attributable to either of these causes, it may be confidently asserted, that the last establishment failed chiefly from its being solely of a military nature, without either professional merchants or mercantile adventurers being attached to it.

These observations respecting Balambángan apply to it chiefly as a territorial establishment; but there is no doubt that it would speedily attain commercial importance. Many of the commercial advantages which recommended its selection still exist, to an equal or greater extent; especially those which related to Cochin China, Champa, and Cambodia. But this digression has already exceeded its reasonable limits, and it is necessary to revert to the more immediate point under consideration, the commerce of Java. Any account of this commerce would be imperfect, which after stating the extent to which it is carried, and the mode in which it is conducted with the adjacent islands in the same Archipelago, should omit to mention the advantages of an intercourse with Japan, and some notices on the Japan trade.

The history of the Dutch connexion with that country is well known, and can never be forgotten. Perhaps there is not such an instance in the annals of commerce, of the disgraceful arts to which mercantile cupidity will resort, and the degradation to which it will submit for the attainment of its object, as in the Dutch proceedings at Japan; nor is there, perhaps, a more remarkable example of the triumphant success, and complete disappointment of commercial enterprize. As it may be interesting to many readers to see an authentic history of the origin, fluctuations, and decline of the Dutch Japan trade, and as even a very succinct statement of it would swell this chapter to a disproportioned size, I have placed a short history of it in the Appendix to this work, to which I beg leave to refer those who have any curiosity for such details[72]. From the year 1611, when the Dutch established commercial relations with Japan, till 1671 (a period of sixty years), their speculations were unrestricted and their profits were enormous. This was the golden age of their trade: they opened a mine of wealth, and they fondly thought it inexhaustible, as well as rich and easily wrought. In 1640, the Company obtained a return in gold, that yielded a profit of upwards of a million of guilders. They had been accustomed to procure, for some time previous to 1663, a return of silver to the extent of two hundred chests of one hundred pounds each, and it was suggested that it would be desirable for as many chests of gold of the same weight to be sent in future. The golden and silver ages of Japan commerce being past, the latter half of the seventeenth century began with what the Dutch called its brazen age, that is its export of copper, which has ever since continued the staple of the Japan market. The trade was on the decline during the whole of the last century, and had become of so little importance about 1740, that the Company deliberated upon the expediency of its total abandonment. From employing, as at one time, eight or nine ships, and exporting copper alone to the amount of more than thirty thousand píkuls, of one hundred and twenty-five pounds each, it diminished to the use of two vessels, and the purchase of cargoes of five or six thousand píkuls. The Appendix contains an account of the nature of the trade, and the result of the Dutch adventures of 1804-5 and 1806, and of our own in 1813.