Mr. Wade said in reply: “It is republican in form, but is not that kind of republicanism that I approve of. If I had my way about it, nobody would be excluded from the franchise that was a male citizen of proper age, let his color be what it would. That would be the color of republicanism that I should like the best. But to deny that under the Constitution of the United States this constitution is republican in form is to deny that we have a republic at all.… The State of Massachusetts is a little forward on this subject. I am glad of it.”
Mr. Hendricks, of Indiana, Mr. Doolittle, of Wisconsin, Mr. Pomeroy, of Kansas, Mr. Howard, of Michigan, Mr. Garrett Davis, of Kentucky, Mr. Kirkwood, of Iowa, Mr. Buckalew, of Pennsylvania, Mr. Yates, of Illinois, Mr. Nye, of Nevada, and Mr. Edmunds, of Vermont, took part in the debate. In the course of Mr. Nye’s remarks, the following occurred.
Mr. Nye. But my conscientious friend from Massachusetts, I am terribly afraid, mistakes twinges of dyspepsia for constitutional scruples. [Laughter.]
Mr. Sumner. I never had the dyspepsia in my life.
Mr. Nye. I am glad to hear it; it is some other disease, then. [Laughter.] This word “white” is the nightmare of his mind.
Mr. Wade, speaking again, said: “The Senator from Massachusetts has a certain one idea that covers the whole ground.… All the opposition that he really has to it is because they put the word ‘white’ in their constitution.”
Mr. Sumner moved the proviso already moved on the Louisiana and Colorado bills, requiring as a fundamental condition that within the State there should be no denial of the elective franchise or of any other right on account of race or color, and that this condition should be ratified by the voters of the Territory; which was lost,—Yeas 5, Nays 34. The Senators voting yea were Mr. Edmunds, of Vermont, Mr. Fessenden, of Maine, Mr. Morgan, of New York, Mr. Poland, of Vermont, and Mr. Sumner.
The bill then passed the Senate,—Yeas 24, Nays 18. It also passed the House of Representatives, but did not receive the signature of the President.
At the next session of Congress, Mr. Wade introduced another bill for the admission of Nebraska, which he afterwards reported from the Committee on Territories. Notwithstanding its constitution with the word “white,” December 14th, he moved to proceed with the consideration of this bill. Mr. Sumner was against taking it up.
…
I hope you do not forget the great act of yesterday. By solemn vote, you have recorded yourselves in favor of Human Rights, and have established them here at the National Capital. And now, Sir, you are asked to set aside Human Rights, and to forget the triumph and example of yesterday. Before you is a constitution with the word “white,”—a constitution creating a white man’s government, such as is praised by Senators on the other side,—and you are asked to recognize that disreputable instrument. I am against any such government, and I trust the Senate will not proceed with its consideration.
Do not to-day undo the good work of yesterday, nor imitate that ancient personage who unwove at night the web woven during the day, so that her work never proceeded to any end. Do not, I entreat you, unweave to-day the beautiful web of yesterday.
Instead of undoing, let us do always; nor is there any lack of measures deserving attention. There is the Bankrupt Bill, practical and beneficent in character, and involving no sacrifice of Human Rights. This is a measure of real humanity, calculated to carry tranquillity and repose into the business of the country. Besides, it has been too long postponed.
Mr. Wade replied with some warmth, when the following passage occurred.
Mr. Sumner. Mr. President, I hope to be pardoned, if I make one word of reply to the Senator. He seemed to think his argument advanced by personal allusions to myself. If I understand him, he sought to show inconsistency on my part.
Mr. Wade. Yes, I think I did.
Mr. Sumner. I am at a loss to understand how the Senator can find inconsistency, unless he chooses to misunderstand facts. He assumed that I voted for the admission of Tennessee.
Mr. Wade. When you said you did not, I gave it up.
Mr. Sumner. My name is recorded, on all the yeas and nays, and they were numerous, against the admission of Tennessee; and the reason I assigned was, that the constitution contained the word “white.”
Mr. Wade. You voted for the Constitutional Amendment.
Mr. Sumner. Yes, I did vote for the Constitutional Amendment, in its final form;[46] but does the Senator consider himself bound to admit a Rebel State refusing the suffrage to freedmen? I wish my friend to answer that.
Mr. Wade. No, I do not.
Mr. Sumner. I knew he did not.
Mr. Wade. I do not know that I understand the Senator. Let me say that I should consider myself bound by the Constitutional Amendment, if the Southern States complied with it within a reasonable time; and that reasonable time, in my judgment, is nearly elapsed.
Mr. Sumner. Even with the word “white” in a constitution?
Mr. Wade. Without regard to that.
Mr. Sumner. Without regard to the rights of the freedman?
Mr. Wade. On complying with the requisitions of the Constitutional Amendment, I should vote for them.
Mr. Sumner. I do not agree with the Senator. I distinctly stated, when the Amendment was under discussion, that I did not accept it as a finality, and that, so far as I had a vote on this floor, I would insist that every one of these States, before its Representatives were received in Congress, should confer impartial suffrage, without distinction of color; and now I ask my friend what inconsistency there is, when I insist upon the same rule for Nebraska.
Mr. Wade. I cannot see how the Senator could have misled the Southern States with that. When they complied with all we asked of them in the Constitutional Amendment, I supposed we could not refuse to let them in on those terms.… Certainly I am as much for colored suffrage as any man on this floor; but when I make such an agreement as that, I stand by it always.
Mr. Sumner. When I make an agreement, I stand by it. But I entered into no such agreement, and I do not understand that the Senate or Congress entered into any such agreement. I know that certain politicians and editors have undertaken to foist something of this sort into the Constitutional Amendment; but there was no authority for it. The Committee on Reconstruction may have reported a resolution to that effect, but they never called it up, and I know well that I offered a resolution just the contrary.
Mr. Doolittle. The Senator from Massachusetts will allow me?
Mr. Sumner. Certainly.
Mr. Doolittle. The Committee on Reconstruction reported a resolution, that, if each State should adopt this Amendment, and the Amendment should become a part of the Constitution, be adopted by a sufficient number of States, then the States might be accepted. That was what they reported.
Mr. Johnson. It was a bill.
Mr. Wade. That was the understanding I alluded to.
Mr. Brown. That was not acted upon.
Mr. Sumner. It was not acted on. I suppose that those who had it in charge did not venture to invite a vote upon it.
Mr. Doolittle. It was laid on the table by a vote in the House of Representatives, upon the yeas and nays.
Mr. Sumner. It never became in any respect a legislative act; therefore nobody entered legislatively into the agreement attributed to me. How the Senator could attribute it to me, in the face of constant asseveration that I would not be a party to any such agreement, surpasses comprehension.
…
So far as the Senator considered the merits of the question, I will not now reply. There may be a time for that, and the magnitude of the issue may justify me even in setting forth arguments already adduced. If I repeat myself, it is because you repeat an effort which ought never to have been made. But I enter my most earnest protest. To my mind this is a most disastrous measure. I use this word advisedly; it is disastrous because it cannot fail to impair the moral efficiency of Congress, injure its influence, and be something like a bar to the adoption of a just policy for the Rebel States. Sir, we are now seeking to obliterate the word “white” from all institutions and constitutions there; and yet Senators, with that great question before them, rush swiftly forward to welcome a new State with the word “white” in its constitution. In other days we all united, and the Senator from Ohio was earnest among the number, in saying, “No more Slave States!” I now insist upon another cry: “No more States with the word ‘white’!” On that question I part company with my friend from Ohio. He is now about to welcome them.
The motion of Mr. Wade was adopted,—Yeas 21, Nays 11,—and the bill was before the Senate for consideration. Mr. Gratz Brown then offered the proviso, offered formerly by Mr. Sumner,[47] requiring, as a fundamental condition, that there should be no denial of the elective franchise or of any other right on account of race or color, and upon the further condition that this requirement be submitted to the voters of the Territory. In the earnest debate that ensued, Mr. Sumner spoke repeatedly, especially in reply to Mr. Wade, setting forth again the objections already made to the admission of Colorado.
December 19th, Mr. Sumner said:—
I have another word for the Senator from Ohio. He does not see the importance of this question. It is the question of every day, a commonplace question. There is the precise difference between the Senator from Ohio and other Senators. There have been times when the Senator has most clearly seen the importance of a question of Human Rights. The Senator has not forgotten a contest in which he took part with myself against an effort to precipitate Louisiana back into this Chamber with a constitution like that of Nebraska. Now the Senator remembers it well. The Senator from Illinois [Mr. Trumbull] tried to put that constitution through the Senate; but, with all his abilities and the just influence that belonged to his position, he could not do it. The Senator from Ohio will not be instructed by that example. He now makes a kindred effort, seeking to introduce into the Union a State which defies the first principle of Human Rights. The Senator becomes the champion of that community. He who has so often raised his voice for Human Rights now treats the question as trivial: it is a technicality only; that is all.
Sir, can a question of Human Rights be a technicality? Can a constitution which undertakes to disfranchise a whole race be treated in that effort as only a technicality? And yet that is the position of the Senator. Why, Sir, the other day he did openly arraign the constitution of Louisiana, and the effort of our excellent President, Abraham Lincoln, who pressed it upon us. The constitution of Louisiana was odious; it should not have been presented to the Senate; and I doubt if there is any Senator on the right side who does not now rejoice that it was defeated.
Then followed a passage with Mr. Kirkwood, of Iowa, who volunteered to consider that Mr. Sumner had attacked the constitution of Iowa, when he had made no allusion to it.
Mr. Kirkwood. He compares the case of the Territory of Nebraska to that of the lately rebellious States. I think there is a great difference between them. The people of the Territory of Nebraska are loyal men; the people of the late rebellious States are not loyal; and when he compares the one with the other, I think he does injustice to himself and to the people of that Territory.
Mr. Sumner. I made no such comparison.
Mr. Kirkwood. He speaks of the constitution submitted by some persons in Louisiana as odious, as offensive, and compares the constitution of Nebraska and the constitution of that State, or proposed State, intending to convey the idea, I presume, that the constitution of Nebraska is odious and offensive. Now I wish to say to that Senator that the constitution of Nebraska and the constitution of Iowa in this particular are identical. Does he call the constitution of Iowa odious and offensive?… The people of Iowa are as loyal as the people of Massachusetts are.
Mr. Sumner. No doubt about it. I never said otherwise.
Mr. Kirkwood. But he said our constitution was offensive.
Mr. Sumner. I made no allusion to the constitution of Iowa.
Mr. Kirkwood. But you made an allusion to a constitution precisely similar in this identical point to that of Iowa.… I repeat again, I cannot see the difference between characterizing the constitution of Iowa as odious and offensive and characterizing the constitution of another State that agrees with it precisely in terms in that way.
Mr. Summer. May I ask the Senator if he considers that provision in the constitution of Iowa right or wrong?
Mr. Kirkwood. I conceive it to be the business of the people of Iowa, and not the business of the Senator from Massachusetts. The people of Iowa will deal with it in their own way, when they see fit; and, as a loyal people, they have the right to do so; and so, I apprehend, have the people of Nebraska.
Mr. Sumner. The Senator from Iowa has not been in this body very long. Had he been here longer, he would have known that toward the people of Iowa, by vote and voice, I have always been true. One of my earliest efforts in this Chamber, now many years ago, was in protection of the interests of the people of Iowa. On that occasion, as the record shows, I received from the Senators of Iowa expressions of friendship and kindness which I cannot forget. I have never thought of that State except with kindness and respect. I have never alluded to that State except with kindness and respect. I have made no allusion to Iowa to-night. I have not had Iowa in my mind to-night. And, Sir, for one good reason: it is my habit, when I speak, so far as I am able, to speak directly to the question. Iowa has not been before us; her constitution has not been under discussion; therefore I have had no occasion to express any opinion upon it.
But there is another constitution which has been before us, and on which I have been asked to vote. On that constitution I express an opinion. I say it contains an odious and offensive principle; and I doubt if the Senator from Iowa would undertake to say that an exclusion from rights on account of color would be properly characterized otherwise than as odious and offensive. I did not know that the constitution of Iowa was open to that objection, or at least it was not in my mind, when I spoke; but I do know that the constitution of Nebraska is open to that objection, and therefore I pronounce it odious and offensive. It contains a disfranchisement of men on account of color, and it is a little difficult to speak of that without losing a little patience. It is difficult at this time, when we have such great responsibilities with regard to the States lately in rebellion, to look upon a candidate State like that of Nebraska, coming forward with a constitution containing this principle of disfranchisement, without the strongest disposition to use language which I do not want to use,—language of the utmost condemnation. Such a constitution at this moment from a new State does not deserve any quarter. Such a constitution ought to be a hissing and a by-word; and I am at a loss to understand how any Senator, at this time, not entirely insensible to our great responsibilities with regard to the States lately in rebellion, can look upon a new constitution like this except as a hissing and a by-word. Sir, it is a shame to the people that bring it here; and it will be a shame to Congress, if it gives it its sanction. I use that language purposely, and I stand by it, even at the expense of the criticism of the Senator from Iowa.
But, in saying this, I intend no reflection upon Iowa. That State is not before us. Iowa is not a new State, or Territory rather, applying for admission; nor is it, thank God, a rebel State; but it is a true loyal State, which in other days, some years ago, in haste and under sinister influence, introduced words into its constitution which the Senator from that State now brings forward in this Chamber, not for condemnation, but from his tone I should suppose for praise. Sir, he should rather follow another example, and throw a cover over that part of the constitution of his State which is unworthy the civilization of our times.
I am sorry to have been led into these remarks. I was astonished that the Senator should compel me to make them. When I go back to the earlier days, I think that perhaps I might have expected other things from a Senator of Iowa.
And now, Sir, I come again to the question which in the opinion of the Senator from Ohio is so trivial,—nothing more than a question of assumpsit.
Mr. Wade. A common count in assumpsit.
Mr. Sumner. A common count.
…
January 8th, after the holidays, the question was resumed, when Mr. Sumner said:—
…
But, Sir, the course of the Senate on this bill fills me with anxiety. Since the unhappy perversity of the President, nothing has occurred which seems to me of such evil omen. It passes my comprehension how we can require Equal Rights in the Rebel States, when we deliberately sanction the denial of Equal Rights in a new State, completely within our jurisdiction and about to be fashioned by our hands. Others may commit this inconsistency; I will not. Others may make the sacrifice; I cannot.
It seems as if Providence presented this occasion in order to give you an easy opportunity of asserting a principle infinitely valuable to the whole country. Only a few persons are directly interested; but the decision of Congress now will determine a governing rule for millions. Nebraska is a loyal community, small in numbers, formed out of ourselves, bone of our bone and flesh of our flesh. In an evil hour it adopted a constitution bad in itself and worse still as an example. But neither the tie of blood nor the fellowship of party should be permitted to save it from judgment. At this moment Congress cannot afford to sanction such wrong. Congress must elevate itself, if it would elevate the country. It must itself be the example of justice, if it would make justice the universal rule. It must itself be the model it recommends. It must begin Reconstruction here at home.
With pain I differ from valued friends around me, and see a line of duty which they do not see. Such is my deference to them, that, if the question were less clear or less important, I should abandon my own conclusions and accept theirs. But when the question is so plain and duty so imperative, I have no alternative.
Let me add, that, in taking the course I do, I have nothing but friendly feelings for the Territory of Nebraska, or for the men she has sent to represent her in the Senate. I wish to see Nebraska populous and flourishing, and the home of Human Rights secured by irrevocable law; and as for her Senators, I know them now so well that I shall have peculiar pleasure in welcoming them on this floor. But there are voices from Nebraska which I wish you to hear.
Here Mr. Sumner read letters against the admission of Nebraska with her present constitution, and then proceeded.
In looking at this question, we are met at the threshold by the fact that in a vote of nearly eight thousand there was a majority of only one hundred in favor of this disreputable constitution.[48] At the call of less than four thousand voters, you are to recognize a State government which begins its independent life by defiance of fundamental truths. I am at a loss to understand the grounds on which this can be done, unless, in anxiety to gratify the desires of a few persons and to welcome the excellent gentlemen from Nebraska, you are willing to set aside great principles of duty at a critical moment of national history. It is pleasant to be “amiable”; but you have no right to be amiable at the expense of Human Rights. It is pleasant to be “lenient,” as the Senator [Mr. Wade] who is urging this bill expresses it; but take care, that, in lenity to this Territory, you are not unjust. There can be no such thing as “lenity” where Human Rights are in question.
The other Senator from Ohio [Mr. Sherman] does not leave room for discretion. He says we are bound by the Enabling Act passed some time ago. Assume that the Senator is right, and that the Enabling Act creates an obligation on the part of Congress,—all of which I deny,—I insist that there has been no compliance with this Act, either in form or substance.
Looking at the Enabling Act, we find that it has not been complied with in form. This can be placed beyond question. By this Act it is provided that a “Convention” of the people of Nebraska shall be chosen by the people, that the election for such “Convention” shall be held on “the first Monday in June thereafter,” and that “the members of the Convention thus elected shall meet at the capital of said Territory on the first Monday in July next.” Now, in point of fact, such Convention was duly chosen, and it met, according to the provisions of the Enabling Act. Thus far all was right. But, after meeting, it voluntarily adjourned or dissolved, without framing a constitution. Afterward the Territorial Legislature undertook to do what the Convention failed to do. The Territorial Legislature adopted a constitution, and submitted it to the people; and this is the constitution before you. Plainly there has been no compliance with the Enabling Act, so far as it prescribes the proceedings for the formation of a constitution. Nothing can be clearer than this. The Act prescribes a Convention at a particular date. Instead of a Convention at the date prescribed, we have the Legislature acting at a different date; so that there is an open non-compliance with the prescribed conditions. It is vain, therefore, to adduce it. As well refer to Homer’s Iliad or the Book of Job.
But the failure in substance is graver still. By the Enabling Act it is further provided “that the constitution, when formed, shall be republican, and not repugnant to the Constitution of the United States and the principles of the Declaration of Independence.” Here are essential conditions which must be complied with. The constitution must be “republican.” Now I insist always that a constitution which denies Equality of Rights cannot be republican. It may be republican according to the imperfect notions of an earlier period, or even according to the standard of Montesquieu; but it cannot be republican in a country which began its national life in disregard of received notions and the standards of the past. In fixing for the first time an authoritative definition of this requirement, you cannot forget the new vows to Human Rights uttered by our fathers, nor can you forget that our republic is an example to mankind. This is an occasion not to be lost of acting not only for the present in time and place, but for the distant also.
But there is another consideration, if possible, more decisive. I say nothing now of the requirement that the new constitution shall be “not repugnant to the Constitution of the United States,” but I call attention to the positive condition that it must be “not repugnant to the principles of the Declaration of Independence.” And yet, Sir, in the face of this plain requirement, we have a new constitution which disfranchises for color, and establishes what is compendiously called “a white man’s government.” This new constitution sets at nought the great principles that all men are equal and that governments stand on the consent of the governed. Therefore, I say confidently, it is not according to “the principles of the Declaration of Independence.” Is this doubted? Can it be doubted? You must raze living words, you must kill undying truths, before you can announce any such conformity. As long as those words exist, as long as those truths shine forth in that Declaration, you must condemn this new constitution. I remember gratefully the electric power with which the Senator from Ohio [Mr. Wade], not many years ago, confronting the representatives of Slavery, bravely vindicated these principles as “self-evident truths.” “There was a Brutus once that would have brooked the eternal Devil” as easily as any denial of these. Would that he would speak now as then, and insist on their practical application everywhere within the power of Congress, and thus set up a wall of defence for the downtrodden!
Thus the question stands. The Enabling Act has not been complied with in any respect, whether of form or substance. In form it has been openly disregarded; in substance it has been insulted. The failure in form may be pardoned; the failure in substance must be fatal, unless in some way corrected by Congress.
Nobody doubts that Congress, in providing for the formation of a State constitution, may affix conditions. This has been done from the beginning of our history. Search the Enabling Acts, and you will find these conditions. They are in your statute-book, constant witnesses to the power of Congress, unquestioned and unquestionable.
Thus, for instance, the Enabling Act for Nebraska requires three things of the new State as conditions precedent.
First. That Slavery shall be forever prohibited.
Secondly. That no inhabitant shall be molested in person or property on account of religious worship.
Thirdly. That the unappropriated public lands shall remain at the sole disposition of the United States, without being subject to local taxation, and that land of non-residents shall never be taxed higher than that of residents.
Read the Act, and you will find these conditions. Does any Senator doubt their validity? Impossible.
But this is not all. In addition to these three conditions are three others, which in order, if not in importance, stand even before these. They are contained in words already quoted, but strangely forgotten in this debate:—
“That the constitution, when formed, shall be republican, and not repugnant to the Constitution of the United States and the principles of the Declaration of Independence.”
Consider this clause: you will find it contains three conditions, each of vital force.
First. The constitution must be “republican.” It does not say “in form” merely, but “republican”: of course “republican” in substance and reality.
Secondly. The constitution must be “not repugnant to the Constitution of the United States.” But surely any constitution which contains a discrimination of rights on account of color must be “repugnant” to the Constitution of the United States, which contains no such discrimination. The text of the National Constitution is blameless; but the text of this new constitution is offensive. Hence its repugnancy.
Thirdly. The constitution must be “not repugnant to the principles of the Declaration of Independence.” These plain words allow no equivocation. Solemnly you have required this just and noble conformity. But is it not an insult to the understanding, when you offer a constitution which contains a discrimination of rights on account of color?
Now in all these three requirements, so authoritatively made the conditions of the new constitution, Nebraska fails, wretchedly fails. It is vain to say that the people there were not warned. They were warned. These requirements were in the very title-deed under which they claim.
Mr. President, pardon me, I entreat you, if I am tenacious. At this moment there is one vast question in our country, on which all others pivot. It is justice to the colored race. Without this I see small chance of security, tranquillity, or even of peace. The war will still continue. Therefore, as a servant of truth and a lover of my country, I cannot allow this cause to be sacrificed or discredited by my vote. Others will do as they please; but, if I stand alone, I will hold this bridge.
The persistence of Mr. Sumner was encountered by Mr. Wade, who said:—
“I think it is the business of the statesman to overlook these little small technicalities which gentlemen argue about in this body. They make a great fuss about the word ‘white’ in a constitution of a State where there are no blacks,—where the question is a simple abstraction.”
Mr. Cowan, of Pennsylvania, dealt with the question of Equality, but with pleasantry.
“My honorable friend, the Senator from Massachusetts, is six feet three inches in height, and weighs two hundred and twenty pounds; I am six feet three inches in height, and weigh one hundred and ninety pounds, if you please. That is not equality. My honorable friend from Maine here is five feet nine inches”——
Mr. Fessenden. And a half. [Laughter.]
Mr. Cowan. I beg the honorable Senator’s pardon. I would not diminish his stature an inch or half an inch, nor take a hair from his head; and he weighs one hundred and forty pounds, if you please. Is that equality? The honorable Senator from Massachusetts is largely learned; he has traversed the whole field of human learning; there is nothing, I think, that he does not know, that is worth knowing,—and this is no empty compliment that I desire to pay him now; and he is so much wiser than I am, that at the last elections he divined exactly how they would result, and I did not. [Laughter.] He rode triumphantly upon the popular wave; and I was overwhelmed, and came out with eyes and nose suffused, and hardly able to gasp.
Mr. Sumner. You ought to have followed my counsel.
Mr. Cowan. Why should I not? What was Providence doing in that? If Providence had made me equal to the honorable Senator, I should not have needed his counsel, and I should have ridden, too, on the topmost wave. [Laughter.]
January 9th, the amendment of Mr. Gratz Brown was rejected,—Yeas 8, Nays 24. The Senators voting in the affirmative were Mr. Cowan, of Pennsylvania, Mr. Edmunds, of Vermont, Mr. Fessenden, of Maine, Mr. Grimes, of Iowa, Mr. Howe, of Wisconsin, Mr. Morgan, of New York, Mr. Poland, of Vermont, and Mr. Sumner.
Mr. Edmunds then moved the following amendment:—
“That this act shall take effect with the fundamental and perpetual condition that within said State of Nebraska there shall be no abridgment or denial of the exercise of the elective franchise or of any other right to any person by reason of race or color, excepting Indians not taxed.”
It will be observed that this differs from Mr. Sumner’s in not requiring the submission of the fundamental condition to the voters of the Territory. This amendment was lost by a tie-vote,—Yeas 18, Nays 18. At the next stage of the bill, being again moved by Mr. Edmunds, it was adopted,—Yeas 20, Nays 18. The bill was then passed by the Senate,—Yeas 24, Nays 15.
In the other House, the proviso adopted by the Senate was changed, on motion of Mr. Boutwell, of Massachusetts, so as to require that the Legislature of the State should by a solemn public act declare consent to the fundamental condition, and the bill was then passed,—Yeas 103, Nays 55. In this amendment the Senate concurred.
February 8th, the bill was again passed in the Senate, by a two-thirds vote, over the veto of the President,—Yeas 31, Nays 9; and February 9th, in the other House, by a two-thirds vote,—Yeas 120, Nays 44. And so the bill became a law.[49] Colorado was less fortunate.[50]
Thus the protracted struggle for Equal Rights in Nebraska, establishing a fundamental condition, was crowned with success, preparing the way for similar requirement in the Rebel States.
Speech in the Senate, on two Bills and a Joint Resolution relating to the Metric System, July 27, 1866.
May 18th, Mr. Sumner moved the appointment by the Chair of a special committee of five, to which all bills and measures relating to the metric system should be referred; and the motion was agreed to.
May 23d, the Chair appointed Mr. Sumner, Mr. Sherman, of Ohio, Mr. Morgan, of New York, Mr. Nesmith, of Oregon, and Mr. Guthrie, of Kentucky. Two bills and a joint resolution which had passed the House of Representatives were referred to the committee, and July 16th reported to the Senate by Mr. Sumner, with the recommendation that they pass, namely:—
“A Bill to authorize the use of the metric system of weights and measures.”
“A Joint Resolution to enable the Secretary of the Treasury to furnish to each State one set of the standard weights and measures of the metric system.”
“A Bill to authorize the use in post-offices of weights of the denomination of grams.”
July 27th, on motion of Mr. Sumner, these were taken up and passed.
MR. PRESIDENT,—At another time I might be induced to go into this question at some length; but now, in these latter days of a weary session, and under these heats, I feel that I must be brief. And yet I could not pardon myself, if I did not undertake, even at this time, to present a plain and simple account of the great change which is now proposed.
There is something captivating in the idea of weights and measures common to all the civilized world, so that, in this at least, the confusion of Babel may be overcome. Kindred is that other idea of one money; and both are forerunners, perhaps, of the grander idea of one language for all the civilized world. Philosophy does not despair of this triumph at some distant day; but a common system of weights and measures and a common system of money are already within the sphere of actual legislation. The work has already begun; and it cannot cease until the great object is accomplished.
If the United States come tardily into the circle of nations recognizing a common system of weights and measures, I confess that I have pleasure in recalling the historic fact that at a very early day this important subject was commended to Congress. Washington, in a speech to the First Congress, touched the key-note, when he used the word “uniformity” in connection with this subject. “Uniformity,” he said, “in the currency, weights, and measures of the United States is an object of great importance, and will, I am persuaded, be duly attended to.”[51] Then again in a speech to the next Congress he went further, in expressing a desire for “a standard at once invariable and universal.”[52] Here he foreshadowed a system common to the civilized world. It is for us now to recognize the standard he thus sententiously described. All hail to a standard “invariable and universal”!
I shall not occupy time in developing the history of these efforts on the part of our Government; but I cannot forbear mentioning that Mr. Jefferson, while Secretary of State, made an elaborate report, where he proposed “reducing every branch to the same decimal ratio already established in the coins, and thus bringing the calculation of the principal affairs of life within the arithmetic of every man who can multiply and divide plain numbers.”[53] Here is an essential element in the common system we seek to establish. This was in 1790, when France was just beginning those efforts which ended at last in the establishment of the metric system. The subject was revived at different times in Congress without definite result. President Madison, in his annual message of 1816, called attention to it in the following words:—
“The great utility of a standard fixed in its nature and founded on the easy rule of decimal proportions is sufficiently obvious. It led the Government at an early stage to preparatory steps for introducing it; and a completion of the work will be a just title to the public gratitude.”[54]
Out of this recommendation originated that call of the Senate which drew forth the masterly report of John Quincy Adams on the whole subject of weights and measures, where learning, philosophy, and prophetic aspiration vie with each other. After reviewing whatever had appeared in the past, and subjecting it all to careful examination, he says of the French metric system, then only an experiment:—
“This system approaches to the ideal perfection of uniformity applied to weights and measures, and, whether destined to succeed or doomed to fail, will shed unfading glory upon the age in which it was conceived and upon the nation by which its execution was attempted and has been in part achieved.”[55]
This was in 1821, when the metric system, already invented, was still struggling for adoption in France.
This brief sketch shows how from the beginning the National Government has been looking to a system common to the civilized world. And now this aspiration seems about to be fulfilled. The bills before you have already passed the other House; if they become laws, as I trust, they will be the practical commencement of the “new order.”
Before proceeding to explain the proposed system, let me exhibit for one moment the necessity of change, as illustrated by weights and measures in the past.
Language is coeval with man as a social being. Weights and measures are hardly less early in origin. They are essential to the operations of society, and are naturally common to all who belong to the same social circle. At the beginning, each people had a system of its own; but as nations gradually intermingle and distant places are brought together by the attractions of commerce, the system of one nation becomes inadequate to the necessities of the composite body. A common system becomes important just in proportion to the community of interests. Next to diversity of languages, discordant weights and measures attest the insulation of nations.
The earliest measures were derived from the several parts of the human body. Such was the cubit, which was the distance between the elbow and the end of the middle finger, being about twenty-two inches. Such also were the foot, the hand, the span, the nail, and the thumb. These measures were derived from Nature, and they were to be found wherever a human being existed. But they partook of the uncertainty in the proportions of the human form. When Selden, in his “Table-Talk,” wittily likened Equity, so far as it depended on the Chancellor, to a measure determined by the length of the Chancellor’s foot, he exposed not only the uncertainty of Equity, but also the uncertainty of such a measure.
Even in Greece, where Art prevailed in the most beautiful forms, the famous stadium was none the less uncertain. It was the distance that Hercules could run without taking breath, being six hundred times the length of his foot.
Our own standards, derived from England, are of an equally fanciful character. The unit of length is the barley-corn, taken from the middle of the ear and well dried. Three of these in a straight line make an inch. The unit of weight is a grain of wheat, taken, like the barley-corn, from the middle of the ear and well dried. Of these, twenty-four are equal to a pennyweight. Twenty pennyweights make an ounce, and twelve ounces make a pound. The unit of capacity is derived from the weight of grains of wheat. Eight pounds of these make one gallon of wine measure.
Nor are the extreme vagueness and instability of these standards the only surprise. There is no principle of science or convenience in the progression of the different series. Thus we have two pints to a quart, three scruples to a dram, four quarts to a gallon, five quarters to an ell, five and a half yards to a perch, six feet to a fathom, eight furlongs to a mile, twelve inches to a foot, sixteen ounces to a pound, twenty units to a score.
Then, as if the only ruling principle governing the selection were discord, we have different measures bearing the same name, such as the wine pint and the dry pint, the ounce Troy and the ounce avoirdupois. Take these last two measures as illustrating the prevailing confusion. Both seem to come from France. The Troy weight is supposed to derive its name from the French town of Troyes, where a celebrated fair was once held. The term “avoirdupois” is French, and seems to have been part of a statute which declared how weights should be determined. But Troy and avoirdupois are different measures.
These measures, having constant differences, had accidental differences also, in different parts of England, and also in different parts of our own country. Even where the names are alike, the measures are often unlike. In England the diversity was almost infinite, so that these same measures differed in different counties, and sometimes in different towns of the same county. Latterly in the United States the standard has been regulated by law, but the confusion from the measures still continues. The question naturally arises, why such confusion has been allowed so long without correction. The answer is easy. Except in rare instances, the triumphs of science are slow and gradual. Traditional prejudice must be overcome. Each nation is attached to its own imperfect system, as to its own language. Even though inferior to another, it has the great advantage of being known to the people that use it. To this constant impediment it is proper to add the intrinsic difficulty of establishing a uniform system of weights and measures which shall satisfy the demands of civilization in scientific precision, in immediate practical applicability, and in nomenclature.
Take, for instance, the application of the decimal system, which seems at first sight simple and complete. It is unquestionably an immense improvement on the old confusion; but even here we encounter a difficulty in the circumstance, long since recognized by mathematicians, that our scale of decimal arithmetic is more the child of chance than of philosophy. I know not if any better reason can be given for its adoption than because man has everywhere reckoned by his ten fingers. On this account it is often called “natural.” But, considering whether the number ten possesses any intrinsic excellence, convenience, or fitness, as a ratio of progression, good authorities have answered in the negative. It is the duplication of an odd number, which can furnish neither a square nor a cube, and which cannot be halved without departure from the decimal scale. In this scale we seem to see always those early days when “wild in woods the noble savage ran,” and for arithmetic used fingers or toes. An octaval system, founded on the number eight, would have been better adapted to the divisions of material things. Among us the decimal system is adopted for money; but you all know that we are not able to carry it into rigid practice. Thus convenience, if not necessity, requires the half-dollar, the quarter-dollar, the half-dime, and the three-cent piece. In fact, eight divisions to the dollar, as prevailed in Spain, are more available in the business of life than the decimal division. The number eight is capable of indefinite bisection. The progression beginning with two would proceed to four, eight, sixteen, thirty-two, sixty-four, and so on.
The decimal scale is made easy of use by the happy system of notation borrowed from the Hindoos, which might be applied equally well to an octaval scale; but at this time it would be vain to propose a change in the radix of the numerical scale. The number ten is the recognized starting-point, and gives its name to the scale. It only remains for us at present to follow other nations in applying it to an improved system of weights and measures.
A system of weights and measures born of philosophy, rather than of chance, is what we now seek. To this end old systems must be abandoned. A chance system cannot be universal: science is universal; therefore what is produced by science may find a home everywhere. If we consider the proper elements or characteristics of such a system, we find at least three essential conditions. First, the new system must have in itself the assurance of unvarying stability, and, to this end, it should be derived from some standard in Nature by which to correct errors creeping into the weights and measures from time or imperfect manufacture. Secondly, the parts should be divided decimally, as nearly as practice will warrant, in conformity with our arithmetic. Thirdly, it should be such as to disturb national prejudices as little as possible.
To a common observer the difficulties of finding an unvarying standard are not readily apparent. But philosophy shows that all things in Nature are undergoing change; so that there would seem to be no invariable magnitude, the same in all countries and in all times, as Cicero pictured the great principles of Natural Law,[56] by which a lost standard on an inaccessible island might be reproduced with mathematical certainty. There is but one magnitude in Nature which, so far as we know, approximates to these requisites. I refer to the length of the pendulum vibrating seconds, which in our latitude is about 39.1 inches. This length, however, varies in travelling from the equator to the pole, and it also varies slightly under different meridians and the same latitude; but the law of variation has been determined with considerable accuracy. One element in this variation is the difference of temperature. In his report on weights and measures, Mr. Jefferson proposed that we should find our standard in the pendulum. At the same time, the French Government, just struggling to throw off ancestral institutions, conceived the idea of a new system, which, founded in science, should be common to the civilized world.
The French began not only by discarding old systems, but also by discarding a measure derived from the pendulum. They conceived the idea of measuring an arc of the earth’s meridian, and finding a new unit in a subdivision of this immense span. The work was undertaken. An arc of the meridian, embracing upward of nine degrees of latitude, and extending from Dunkirk, in France, to the Mediterranean, near Barcelona, in Spain, was measured with scientific care. Illustrious names in French science, Méchain and Delambre, were engaged in the work, which proceeded, notwithstanding domestic convulsion and foreign war. The Reign of Terror at home and invasion from abroad did not arrest it. Seven years elapsed before the measurements were completed, when other nations were invited to coöperate in the establishment of the new system.
The unit of measure was one ten-millionth part of the distance between the equator and the north pole thus measured. It received the name of metre, from the Greek, signifying measure. A bar of platinum, representing this length, was prepared with all possible accuracy. This bar was deposited in the archives of France as the perpetual standard. Other bars have been copied from it and distributed throughout France and in foreign countries.
There is something transcendental in the idea of this measurement of the earth in order to find a measure for daily life. It was an immense undertaking. But the conception seems to have been vast rather than practical. There is reason to believe, from later labors, that there was a serious error in the work. Thus, the distance of 10,000,000 metres from the equator to the north pole, established by the French observers, is too small by 935 yards, according to Bessel,—by 1,410 yards, according to Puissant,—and by 1,967 yards, according to Chazallon. Sir John Herschell also testifies with the authority of his great name against the accuracy of this result. If there be an error such as is supposed, then the metre ceases to be what it was called originally, one ten-millionth part of the distance from the equator to the north pole.
Even assuming that there is no error, and that the metre is precisely what it purports to be, yet it is not easy to see how the artificial standard can be corrected by recurrence to the standard in Nature. The massive work originally undertaken will not be repeated. The astronomers of France will not verify the accuracy of the bar of platinum, which is the artificial standard, by another scientific enterprise, requiring years for completion. Therefore, for all practical purposes, the metre is really nothing else than a bar of platinum with a certain length preserved in the archives of France. It is not less arbitrary as a standard than the yard or foot, and it can be perpetuated in practice only by distribution of exact copies from the original bar, which is the assumed metre.
I have thus explained the origin and character of the metre, because I desire that the admirable system founded on it should be seen actually as it is. To my mind, it gains nothing from the theory which presided at its origin. Its unit is not to be regarded as a certain portion of the distance between the equator and the north pole, but as an artificial measure determined with peculiar care. Had the same or any other unit been selected without measurement of the earth, the metric system would not have been less beautiful or perfect.
Look now at the system. The metre, which is assumed to be one ten-millionth part of the distance from the equator to the pole, is, in fact, 39⅓ inches, or 39.37 inches, in length. It is especially the unit of length; but it is also the unit from which are derived all measures of weight and capacity, square or cubic. It is at once foundation-stone and cap-stone. It is foundation-stone to all in the ascending series, and cap-stone to all in the descending series.
The unit of surface measure, or land measure, is the are, from the Latin area, and is the square of ten metres, or, in other words, a square of which each side is ten metres in length.
The unit of solid measure is the stere, from the Greek, and is the cube of a metre, or, in other words, a solid mass one metre long, one metre broad, and one metre high.
The unit of liquid measure is the litre, from the Greek, and is the cube of the tenth part of the metre, which is the decimetre; or, in other words, it is a vessel where by interior measurement each side and the bottom are square decimetres.
The unit of weight is the gram, also derived from the Greek, and is the one-thousandth part of the weight of a cubic litre of distilled water at its greatest density,—this being just above the freezing-point.
Such are main elements of the metric system. But each of these has multiples and subdivisions. It is multiplied decimally upward, and divided decimally downward. The multiples are from the Greek. Thus, deca, ten, hecto, hundred, kilo, thousand, and myria, ten thousand, prefixed to metre, signify ten metres, one hundred metres, one thousand metres, and ten thousand metres. The subdivisions are from the Latin. Thus, deci, centi, milli, prefixed to metre, signify one tenth, one hundredth, and one thousandth of a metre. All this appears in the following table.
| Metric Denominations and Values. | Equivalents in Denominations in use. |
|---|---|
| Myriametre, 10,000 metres, | 6.2137 miles. |
| Kilometre, 1,000 metres, | .62137 mile, or 3,280 feet and 10 inches. |
| Hectometre, 100 metres, | 328 feet and 1 inch. |
| Decametre, 10 metres, | 393.7 inches. |
| Metre, 1 metre, | 39.37 inches. |
| Decimetre, ⅒ of a metre, | 3.937 inches. |
| Centimetre, ¹⁄₁₀₀ of a metre, | .3937 inch. |
| Millimetre, ¹⁄₁₀₀₀ of a metre, | .0394 inch. |
These same prefixes may be applied in ascending and descending scales to the are, the litre, and the gram. Thus, for example, we have in the ascending scale, decagram, hectogram, kilogram, and myriagram,—and in the descending scale, decigram, centigram, milligram.
In this brief space you behold the whole metric system of weights and measures. What a contrast to the anterior confusion! A boy at school can master the metric system in an afternoon. Months, if not years, are required to store away the perplexities, incongruities, and inconsistencies of the existing weights and measures, and then memory must often fail in reproducing them. The mystery of compound arithmetic is essential in the calculations they require. All this is done away by the decimal progression, so that the first four rules of arithmetic are ample for the pupil.
Looking closely at the metric system, we must confess its simplicity and symmetry. Like every creation of science, it is according to rule. Master the rule and you master the system. On this account it may be acquired by the young with comparative facility, and, when once acquired, it may be used with despatch. Thus it becomes labor-saving and time-saving. Among its merits I cannot hesitate to mention the nomenclature. A superficial criticism has objected to the Greek and Latin prefixes; but this forgets that a system intended for universal adoption must discard all local or national terms. The prefixes employed are equally intelligible in all countries. They are no more French than English or German. They are common, or cosmopolitan, and in all countries they are equally suggestive in disclosing the denomination of the measure. They combine the peculiar advantages of a universal name and a definition. The name instantly suggests the measure with exquisite precision. If these words seem scholastic or pedantic, you must bear this for the sake of their universality and defining power.
Unquestionably it is difficult for one generation to substitute a new system for that learned in childhood. Even in France the metric system was tardily adopted. Napoleon himself, on one occasion, said impatiently to an engineer who answered his inquiry in metres, “What are metres? Tell me in toises.” It was only in 1840 that the system was definitely required in the transaction of business. Since then it has been the legal system of France. Cloth is sold by the metre; roads are measured by the kilometre; meat is sold by the kilogram, or, as it is familiarly abridged, by so many kilos.
It is generally admitted that the names are too long, although nobody has been able to suggest substitutes, unless we regard the various abridgments in that light. But no abridgment should be allowed to sacrifice the cosmopolitan character which belongs to the system. Thus, in England a nomenclature is proposed which would secure short names; but these would be different in each language, and entirely different from the French names. This is a mistake. The names in all languages should be identical, or so nearly alike as to be recognized at once. This may be accomplished by an abbreviated nomenclature.
For instance, we may say met, ar, lit, and gram; and, in describing the denomination, we may say, in the ascending scale, dec, hec, kil, and in the descending scale, dec, cen, and mil,—indicating respectively 10, 100, 1000, and ⅒, ¹⁄₁₀₀ and ¹⁄₁₀₀₀. Compounding these, we should have, for example, kilmet, killit, kilgram, and cenmet, cenlit, cengram. These abbreviations might be substantially the same in all languages. They would preserve the characteristics of the unabridged terms, so that the simple mention of the measure, even in this abridged form, would disclose the proportion it bears to its fellow-measures. Previous measures have been represented by monosyllables, as grain, dram, gross, ounce, pound, stone, ton. Where a word is often repeated, in the hurry of business, it is instinctively abridged. We shall not err, if we profit by this experience, and seek to reduce the new nomenclature to its smallest proportions.
Twelve words only are required by this system. Learning these, you learn all. There are five designating the different units of length, surface, solid capacity, liquid capacity, and weight. Then there are the seven prefixes, being four in the ascending scale, expressing multiples, or augmentations, of the metre or other units, derived from the Greek, and three in the descending scale, expressing subdivisions, or diminutions, of the metre and other units, derived from the Latin. These twelve words contain the whole system.
In closing this chapter on the unquestionable advantages of the metric system, I must not forget that it is already the received system in the majority of countries. At the Statistical Congress assembled at Berlin in 1863, it appeared that it was adopted partly or entirely in Austria, Baden, Bavaria, Belgium, France, Hamburg, Hanover, Hesse, Mecklenburg, the Netherlands, Parma, Portugal, Sardinia, Saxony, Spain, Switzerland, Tuscany, the Two Sicilies, and Würtemberg. Since then, Great Britain, by an Act of Parliament, has added her name to this list. The first step is taken there by making the metric system permissive, as is proposed in the bills before Congress. The example of Great Britain is of especial importance to us, since the commercial relations between the two countries render it essential that these should have a common system of weights and measures. On this point we cannot afford to differ from each other.
The adoption of the metric system by the United States will go far to complete the circle by which this great improvement will be assured to mankind. Here is a new agent of civilization, to be felt in all the concerns of life, at home and abroad. It will be hardly less important than the Arabic numerals, by which the operations of arithmetic are rendered common to all nations. It will help undo the primeval confusion of which the Tower of Babel was the representative.
As the first practical step to this great end, I ask the Senate to sanction the bills which have already passed the other House, and which I have reported from the special committee on the metric system. By these enactments the metric system will be presented to the American people, and will become an approved instrument of commerce. It will not be forced into use, but will be left for the present to its own intrinsic merits. Meanwhile it must be taught in schools. Our arithmetics must explain it. They who have already passed a certain period of life may not adopt it; but the rising generation will embrace it, and ever afterwards number it among the choicest possessions of an advanced civilization.