Mr. Yates. Allow me to ask the Senator whether he did not submit himself to the same sort of decision in the Reconstruction measures. Those matters were before a caucus, and acted upon.
Mr. Sumner. In the caucus on Reconstruction I moved the amendment that in the future constitutions of the Rebel States the ballot should be required. A division was had. I allude to it now because interrogated openly in the Senate. A division was had, and there were two stand-up votes, when the motion was carried by a vote of 15 to 13. By 15 to 13 in that caucus it was voted to require suffrage for all in the future constitutions of the Rebel States.
Mr. Edmunds. And what would you have thought, if the thirteen had repudiated that action?
Mr. Sumner. To repudiate a proposition in favor of human liberty would have been a very different thing from repudiating a proposition against human liberty.
Mr. Fessenden. When the question is put to the Senator, what he would have thought, if the thirteen had repudiated it, he says that is a very different thing, being in favor of liberty.
Mr. Sumner. Very well, does not the Senator say the same?
Mr. Fessenden. I say there is no difference, where a man promises to do a thing with a full understanding; he has no right to violate it, whether it is one way or the other.
Mr. Sumner. The question is, whether the man does promise. There is the point.
Mr. Fessenden. Very well, then, my reply is, that, if there was no promise in the case of the thirteen to support the decision, there is no promise here; if there was a promise in the case of the thirteen to be bound by it and support it, as they did, then there was a promise here. The Senator may make the distinction, if he can.
Mr. Sumner. I will make the distinction clear. I have never said there was a promise in the case of the thirteen, as I insist there was no promise in the recent caucus. Had the Senator felt it his duty to come into the Senate and oppose the report, I should have been pained to find him on the side of wrong; but I am not ready to say that he would have been constrained by the caucus. But, plainly, the repudiation of a caucus vote for Human Rights is to be judged differently from the repudiation of a caucus vote adverse to Human Rights,—assuming, as I do, that there is no promise in either case.
…
Sir, I am tired of this talk of honor, in connection with the public business. This is too solemn; we are under too great responsibilities. Every Senator acts with honor. The Senator from Maine acts with honor, when he seeks to impose a rule which I think offensive to the spirit of the Constitution. The Senator from Illinois acts with honor, when he says that he will not be bound by the vote of this caucus in a particular case. Other Senators act with honor, when they refuse to be bound by the resolution in any of its terms. Every Senator acts with honor. He only acts otherwise who makes injurious imputations upon his associates.
Yes, Sir, let us have this caucus code. If it is to be administered with such severity, let us know it in advance, its terms and its conditions,—what extent of dishonor is to be visited upon those who do not adopt the caucus conclusions, and what extent of honor upon those who so steadfastly and violently carry them forward. Let us have the code. I believe, Sir, that the true code for the Senate is found in the National Constitution, in the rules of this body, and in the sentiments of right and wrong which animate every honest soul; and I believe that no advantage can be taken of any Senator by reminding him that he forbore at a particular moment to register his objection, just as if we were all there on trial, to be saved by speaking promptly. It was no such debate; we were there with friends and brothers, each respecting the sensibilities and convictions of his associates, and, by interchange of opinions, seeking harmony, but not submitting to a yoke.
After further remarks from Mr. Fessenden and Mr. Tipton, the substitute of Mr. Ross was rejected,—Yeas 15, Nays 19. The resolution, was then adopted,—Yeas 23, Nays 9.
July 10th, Mr. Sumner called up the following, introduced by him July 8th:—
“Resolved, That the resolution of the Senate, adopted the 5th of July last, limiting the business of the Senate, be, and hereby is, rescinded.”
In remarks that followed, he showed the character of the proceedings in the Twenty-Seventh Congress, which had been adduced as a precedent for the limitation of business. In reply to Mr. Fessenden, he said:—
I have simply done my duty, in calling attention to the past precedent which had been introduced into the discussion. When it was introduced by the Senator from Maine, I had no means of replying to it. I had not the Journal or the Globe with me, and I supposed, from the statement of the Senator, that it was a resolution practically adopted in this Chamber. I was not aware of what followed. I was not aware of the extent to which the whole spirit of the proposition was denounced. Nor was I aware that its original mover, Mr. Clay, was obliged to abandon his proposition,—that he magnanimously, justly, and considerately abandoned it. That is the true precedent in this body; and that is the precedent which, I submit, it would be better for the Senate to follow. Nothing, surely, could be lost by following it.
The resolution adopted by the Senate on Friday, while it remains, will only be of evil example. If hereafter quoted as a precedent, it may be at last for some purpose of oppression, when Senators will not all be as just as those I now have the honor of addressing. It may be seized then as an engine of tyranny. For one, Sir, I would leave no such weapon in this Chamber to be grasped hereafter by any hand.
The Senate refused to take up the resolution.
July 13th, Mr. Sumner made another attempt by the following resolution:—
“Resolved, That the rule of the Senate limiting business be suspended, so far as to allow the consideration of the bill (S. No. 124) to enforce the several provisions of the Constitution abolishing Slavery, declaring the immunities of citizens, and guarantying a republican form of government by securing the elective franchise to colored citizens.”
But he was not able to obtain a vote upon it, and the important bill was left on the table.
Speeches in the Senate, on the Third Reconstruction Bill, July 11 and 13, 1867.
July 8th, Mr. Trumbull, of Illinois, from the Committee on the Judiciary, reported a “Bill to give effect to an Act entitled ‘An Act to provide for the more efficient Government of the Rebel States,’ passed March 2, 1867.” This was the third Reconstruction measure of the present year. It was debated for several days. July 11th, Mr. Sumner said:—
MR. PRESIDENT,—Before offering amendments which I have on my table, I desire to call attention briefly to the character of this bill.
The subject of Reconstruction has been before Congress for many years. It first appeared in the Senate as a proposition of my own, as long ago as February, 1862. From that time it has been constantly present. If at any moment Congress has erred, it has been from inaction, and not from action. And now the same danger is imminent.
Mark, if you please, the stages. At every step there has been battle. Nothing could be proposed which was not opposed, often with feeling, sometimes even with animosity. I do not speak now of the other side, but of friends on this side of the Chamber, some of whom have fought every measure.
To my mind nothing has been plainer from the beginning than the jurisdiction of Congress. Obviously it was not for the Executive, but for the Legislative. The President was commander-in-chief of the army; that function was his. But he could not make States or constitutions, or determine how States or constitutions should be made. All that he did to this end was gross usurpation, aggravated by motives and consequences.
Unquestionably the jurisdiction was in Congress; and I shall never cease to lament that it was not asserted promptly and courageously. Our delay has postponed the establishment of peace and reconciliation. Much as the President has erred, Congress has not been without error also. The President erred from assuming powers which did not belong to him; Congress erred from declining to assume powers which belonged to it. The sins of the President were of commission; the sins of Congress were of omission. The President did the things he ought not to have done; Congress left undone the things it ought to have done.
In the exercise of unquestioned jurisdiction, Congress should at once have provided civil governments, through whose influence and agency the Rebel States might have been shaped into republican forms. Such a proceeding would have been more constitutional and more according to the genius of our institutions than that which was adopted. It is hard to reconcile a military government, or any government born of military power, with the true idea of a republic. Tardily, too tardily, Congress entered upon the work; and then began hesitations of another character. Even when assuming jurisdiction, it halted.
For a long time it refused to confer the suffrage upon the colored race. At last this was done.
Then it refused to exclude Rebels from the work of Reconstruction; and when at last it attempted something, its rule of exclusion was so little certain that an ingenious lawyer by a written opinion has set it aside.
There have been bills with riders, and after the passage of these bills there has been a supplementary bill with riders. And still further legislation is needed.
Surely these successive failures have their lesson. They admonish us now to make thorough work.
If you will not establish civil governments, with the military power simply as a support, then at least do not hesitate to vacate the existing governments, which are so many roots and centres of sedition. All the officers of these governments, from highest to lowest, exercise an influence adverse to a just reconstruction. They are in the way of peace and reconciliation. They increase the essential difficulties of forming new governments. Through their influence a hostile spirit is engendered and sustained. Such an obstacle should be removed.
At the same time be careful that Rebel influence is not allowed to prevail in the new governments. Of course this can be only by excluding Rebels during this transition period, until the new governments are formed. The rule of exclusion may be properly changed, when loyal and republican governments are established. Attention has already been called to cases deserving notice: as, for instance, naturalized citizens who have taken an oath to support the National Constitution and afterward became Rebels, but yet are not excluded; cadets at the Military and Naval Academies; persons who have contributed to Rebel loans or invested money in Rebel bonds or securities; contractors who furnished Rebel supplies; also persons who, as authors, publishers, editors, contributors, or as speakers or preachers, encouraged the secession of any State or the waging of war against the United States.
Considering what we hear with regard to the boards of registration,—that in some States they are of doubtful principles, that in others colored fellow-citizens are excluded, so that a large proportion of the electors have no representation in the boards,—it seems to me that we ought by positive words to provide that the boards shall be constituted without distinction of color. Colored persons may be chosen to office, and I cannot doubt that we shall soon welcome colored Senators and Representatives to the National Capitol. Meanwhile the boards of registration must be kept as open as these Chambers; and no commanding general can be allowed to set up a rule adverse to the rights of a race.
A system of public schools without distinction of color should be required. This important duty must not be left to caprice, or to the triumph of truth through local influence. Its performance should be enforced as essential to republican government. We have required suffrage for all; we should require also education for all.
Provision should be made to invalidate the decrees of court in the Rebel States which have not been voluntarily executed. This is necessary for the protection of loyal persons. Look, for instance, at Texas, where, according to recent report, immense sums have been taken by unjust decrees. If the remedy is not applied now, it is doubtful if the opportunity will not be lost forever.
In submitting a constitution to the people, it seems to me advisable that it should not be complicated by any election of officers, State or National, but that all elections should be postponed until after approval of the constitution by Congress.
There should also be penalties for the violation of the Act. The pardon of the President must not be allowed to confer a title to vote; and since officials have shown such a disposition to impair the efficacy of an Act by interpretation, reducing it to a mere shadow, we ought to provide that it shall be interpreted liberally.
In making these propositions, I ask that you should not hesitate simply because they may not be embraced within the terms of the original Acts. I would do now all that we can to make this measure of Reconstruction just and beneficent. I know no other rule worthy of the Senate or adequate to the occasion.
In carrying out these ideas, I propose to offer several amendments, which I will send to the Chair in order. I begin by an amendment as an additional section:—
“And be it further enacted, That every constitution in the Rebel States shall require the Legislature to establish and sustain a system of public schools open to all, without distinction of race or color.”
Mr. Trumbull objected to the amendment as not in order under the rule limiting the business of the session. The question of order was submitted to the Senate, and the amendment was ruled out of order,—Yeas 11, Nays 22.
Mr. Sumner then moved the following amendment, which he was sure must be in order, even under the stringent rule of the Senate:—
“Provided, That no person shall be disqualified as member of any board of registration by reason of race or color.”
Mr. Conkling, of New York, inquired “whether there is any doubt upon the law, as it stands now, that men otherwise qualified are eligible, notwithstanding they are black.” Mr. Sumner replied:—
I am accustomed to that class of questions on this floor. When, some two or three years ago, I felt it my duty to move, on one bill after another, that there should be no exclusion from the street cars on account of color, I was encountered by learned lawyers, and by none more constantly than my friend opposite, the Senator from Maryland [Mr. Johnson], with precisely the suggestion which my friend from New York now makes: that in point of law it was unnecessary; that under the actual law, which was none other than the Common Law, there could be no exclusion on account of color: and yet, in the face of that Common Law, Senators all know that there was an exclusion from the cars on account of color, and the grossest outrages committed. Colored persons were precipitated into the streets, into the mud, under a pelting rain, and they could obtain no redress; and when I asked for redress, grave Senators said, “Let them apply to the courts”; and it was suggested that perhaps I had better volunteer as counsel in court rather than appear in this Chamber. Now the question of my friend from New York is precisely in the same spirit. I cannot doubt, that, under the existing Reconstruction law, there can be no exclusion on account of color,—that nobody is for that reason disqualified from the exercise of any function. What is there to prevent a colored person from being a Senator of the United States? and who can doubt that within a very few months it will be our business to welcome a colored Senator on this floor? I cannot doubt it.
Mr. Johnson [of Maryland]. How many?
Mr. Sumner. That I do not know. But I ask you who look to the colored vote in these States as the means of security and peace, through which you are to find protection for this Republic, and for white fellow-citizens there as well as for the colored themselves, to see that this stigma is not put upon them by any commanding general pretending to act by virtue of our legislation. It is not enough to tell me, that, under the actual law, colored persons may be designated. To that I reply, in the State of Virginia they have not been designated; and I wish now that Congress should declare that any exclusion on account of color is without the sanction of law.
And that brings me to the inquiry of my friend from Illinois, as to the penalty, I think, or as to the extent of the remedy.
Mr. Trumbull. The question was, whether your proviso afforded any remedy.
Mr. Sumner. That I will answer. My proviso affords precisely the same remedy that it afforded on the Railroad Bills. It is in nearly the same terms. I followed those terms, because I know my friend likes good precedents, and we have enough of those on the question of the street cars. The Senate adopted that proviso at least half a dozen times. There it is, without penalty, and yet it has been most efficacious, not only in these streets, but as an example throughout the country. Adopt this proviso now, and I am sure it will be most efficacious with our generals even without any penalty. Should they exclude fellow-citizens on account of color, it will be a violation of law and a failure of duty; there can be no votes of thanks for them,—“no hope of golden spurs to-day.”
Mr. Conkling replied: “I do not wish, for one, to vote for an amendment which I think carries nothing with it, but which simply incumbers the bill with unnecessary, and I might say verbose provisos.”
The amendment was rejected by a tie-vote,—Yeas 18, Nays 18.
At the next stage of the bill, Mr. Sumner renewed his amendment. In reply to Mr. Edmunds, of Vermont, Mr. Sumner said:—
I will not spend time. There has been an abuse which has come to our knowledge. We know that in whole States colored persons are excluded from the boards, and this justifies our intervention.
On this second trial the amendment was adopted,—Yeas 21, Nays 8.
Mr. Sumner offered the following:—
“And be it further enacted, That there shall be no elections of State or National officers under any new constitution until after the same has been approved by Congress.”
This was objected to by Mr. Trumbull, as out of order under the rule, and so decided by the Senate.
Mr. Sumner then moved the following amendment:—
“And be it further enacted, That in each of these States all judgments and decrees of court which have not been voluntarily executed, and which have been rendered subsequently to the date of the Ordinance of Secession in each State respectively, shall be subject to appeal to the highest court in the State, organized after the State shall be admitted again by Congress into the Union; but no such appeal shall be allowed, unless the motion for the same shall have been lodged in the court, or clerk’s office of the court, in which the decree was rendered, within sixty days after the governor appointed under this Act shall have entered upon the discharge of the duties of his office, and for all judgments rendered subsequently to such date, within sixty days after the same have been rendered.”
Mr. Trumbull objected to it as out of order under the rule. Mr. Sumner said:—
My attention has often been called to the necessity of such a provision, by gentlemen from the South, and especially by lawyers there. They tell me that without some such provision the grossest injustice will be done. Throughout the whole Rebellion the local tribunals were sitting to administer justice; yet it was not justice, but injustice, that they administered. Under their decrees private rights were overthrown; and I doubt not that my friend from Illinois has recently read the account of an extensive injustice in Texas, where private property to an almost incalculable amount was taken away by these unjust decrees.
Should there not be a remedy? I think all will say that there should be. This is, if I may so express myself, the last time of asking. If those States are once organized as States and received into the Union, I know not if we have the power of applying a remedy. That we have now I am sure. I cannot doubt our constitutional power at this moment to set aside all those decrees, so far as they have not been voluntarily submitted to, or subject them, according to the provision of my amendment, to appeal in a higher tribunal after the reorganization of justice in these States. Is not the provision reasonable? Is it not to serve the ends of justice? If you do not accept it now, can you accept it at any time hereafter? And if you do not accept it now or hereafter, will not these parties go without remedy? On that question I do not pronounce dogmatically. I do not mean to say that they will be absolutely without remedy; but I do not easily see their remedy. I see difficulties in the way, while at this moment I see no difficulties in the way.
Then I encounter the objection that this is not in order. Why not? Is it not to carry out your Reconstruction Bill, to smooth difficulties, to remove wrong, to establish justice? It may not have been specially foreshadowed in the original bill or the supplemental bill; but I submit that it is entirely germane to both those bills. Besides, it is commended by an intrinsic justice, which should make it acceptable at any time.
The amendment was decided to be out of order.
Mr. Sumner then offered this amendment:—
“And be it further enacted, That all the provisions of this Act, and of the Acts to which this is supplementary, shall be construed liberally, to the end that all the intents thereof may be fully and perfectly carried out.”
There was no objection of order to this amendment, and it was agreed to without a division.
After further amendment the bill was ingrafted upon a House bill on the same subject and passed,—Yeas 32, Nays 6. Being referred to a Conference Committee, the report of the Committee was adopted: in the Senate, Yeas 31, Nays 6,—and in the House, Yeas 111, Nays 23.
July 13th, on the report of the Conference Committee in the Senate, Mr. Sumner said:—
And now, as we are about to dismiss this subject for the present session, I cannot forbear again expressing regret that the measure has not been made more complete,—in one word, more radical. This is the third bill of Reconstruction on which we have acted. We ought never to have acted on more than one; and had the Senate been sufficiently radical, had it founded its bill on clear, definite principle, there would have been no occasion for more than one. Just so far as we have failed to found ourselves on clear, definite principle, our bills have failed; and should there be failure under the present bill, it will be precisely on that account.
I shall never cease to lament that Congress did not at once assume jurisdiction of the whole region, and in the exercise of its plenary authority establish civil governments, supplying ample military support. Such a Reconstruction would have been founded on principles to defy the criticism of history. I trust that what we have done will be judged leniently hereafter. I know, however, that it is not above criticism. Of course, such Reconstruction would have removed out of sight all existing State governments and municipal governments set up by Rebel authority, or by the President in the exercise of usurped power. In my opinion, it is not too late to do this last work. Even if you decline to establish civil governments, I think, that, under the Military Bill, you should go forward and brush away all the existing governments there. From information, private and public, out of every one of the Rebel States, I am led to this conclusion. Those governments, whether State or municipal, are just so many engines of Rebel influence. They stand in the way of Reconstruction. They prevent the beneficent operation of your work. But the Senate has declined that path. I regret it, and now at this last moment record my regret.
I am sorry to add that the Senate has declined to require of these people conditions which I think essential to republican government. One of these is a system of public education. I can never cease to mourn the failure in this regard. Here is a paper from New Orleans, which has come to me since I have been at my desk to-day, edited by colored persons,—and an excellent paper it is,—“The New Orleans Tribune” of July 9, 1867, which contains an article entitled “Public Schools,” from which I will read a brief sentence:—
“Who will open the public schools to all children? We are of opinion that it will only be done by a colored mayor with colored members of the city council. This opinion is justified by facts.”
The article then sets forth the impediments in the way of public schools. And yet, in the face of such intelligence from the Rebel States, we decline to require a system of public education as an essential element in these new governments. I lament it; and I desire again to record this sentiment.
I fear also, Mr. President, that in the operation of this bill you will find that we have not been sufficiently explicit in the exclusion of Rebel influence. I have made my best effort to remove doubts and to enlarge the exclusion. But, in saying this, I desire to add, that, in my judgment, all exclusions belong to what I call the transition period. When Reconstruction is accomplished, the time will come for us to open the gates,—but not till then.
July 19th, the bill was vetoed by the President, and on the same day it was re-passed by a two-thirds vote of both Houses: in the Senate, Yeas 30, Nays 6,—and in the House, Yeas 109, Nays 25; so that it became a law.[234]
Remarks in the Senate, on a Bill to enforce several Provisions of the Constitution by securing the Elective Franchise to Colored Citizens, July 12, 1867.
March 26, 1867, Mr. Sumner asked, and by unanimous consent obtained, leave to introduce a bill to enforce the several provisions of the Constitution abolishing Slavery, declaring the immunities of citizens, and guarantying a republican form of government, by securing the elective franchise to colored citizens, which was read twice by its title and printed. He then remarked on the importance of the bill, and said that it was intended to cut the Gordian knot of the Suffrage question throughout the country.
At the session beginning July 3d, he made constant efforts for its consideration, challenging objection and argument.
July 12th, he moved its consideration, calling it “the Capstone of Reconstruction”; but the Third Reconstruction Bill was pressed by Mr. Trumbull, of Illinois, to the exclusion of the other. Mr. Sumner would not antagonize his bill with that. As soon as the other measure was disposed of, he pressed his bill again. It was objected to by Mr. Edmunds, of Vermont, as not in order under the rule of the session limiting business,[235] and the question of order was referred to the Senate. On this Mr. Sumner said:—
My argument is precisely this, and I ask the attention of my friend from Maryland [Mr. Johnson]. We all know his eminence at the bar of the Supreme Court, and I submit to him this: We have already by Reconstruction Acts conferred the suffrage upon colored persons in the Rebel States; now is it not important that our legislation should be completed and rounded by conferring the suffrage in the other States as conferred in the Rebel States? You have conferred it in the Rebel States.
Mr. Johnson. What has that to do with the other States?
Mr. Sumner. Will you have the great right of suffrage depend upon Act of Congress in one half of the Union, and not upon Act of Congress in the other half? If you can pass an Act for one half, can you not for the other half? I know the answer, that in the Rebel States the fact of rebellion gives a power we have not in the other States. But the present bill is founded not simply on the fact of rebellion, but on the clause in the National Constitution by which we are bound to guaranty a republican form of government throughout the whole country; also on the other clause by which Slavery is abolished throughout the whole country, and we are empowered by proper legislation to enforce it; also that further clause by which the rights of citizens are secured throughout the whole country, and we are empowered by proper legislation to enforce it. Here are three sources of power, equally applicable to all the States, Rebel or Loyal. And now I submit that such an Act for the Loyal States is only the just complement to our action in the Rebel States.
How can you look the Rebel States in the face, when you have required colored suffrage of them and fail to require it in the other States? Be just; require it in the Loyal States as you have required it in the Rebel States. There is an unanswerable argument, and I submit it on the question of order. If we are privileged to consider only matters in aid of the original Reconstruction measures, then do I say that this bill is in aid of those measures, for it gives to them completeness and roundness. Without this bill your original measures are imperfect, ay, radically unjust. I know it is said there is one title to legislation over the Rebel States which we have not with regard to the Loyal States,—to wit, that they have been in rebellion. But the great sources of power in the two cases are identical; they are one and the same.
There is the guaranty clause in the National Constitution, the sleeping giant of the Constitution, never until this recent war awakened, but now it comes forward with a giant’s power. There is no clause like it. There is no text which gives to Congress such supreme power over the States. Then, as I have so often said, are the two other clauses. Your power under the Constitution is not less complete than beneficent.
I am not to be betrayed into the constitutional argument. I am now on the question of order. I say that this bill is essential to perfect the original Reconstruction measures. You should not return to your homes without this additional Act by which Reconstruction is finished. If any Senator has any reason to bring against this bill, if any one can suggest a doubt of its constitutionality, I should like to hear the reason or the doubt, and I shall be ready to answer it. I invite discussion. I challenge the expression of any reason against it, or of any doubt with regard to its constitutionality; and I ask Senators to look at it as a great measure of expediency as well as of justice. How will you settle this question in the Loyal States? Here are Delaware, Maryland,—my friend over the way will not be sensitive when I allude to his State,—and Kentucky, in each of which this measure will be the salvation of Union citizens. In other States, like Pennsylvania, it will rally at once—I am speaking now on the question of expediency—twenty thousand votes to the Union cause. In Indiana, too, it will settle the Suffrage question. I say nothing of Iowa. There is Wisconsin.
Mr. Trumbull. They all vote there now.
Mr. Sumner. Under the decision of the Supreme Court. So much the better. There is Connecticut. It would obtain three thousand votes there for the good cause. A short Act of Congress will determine the political fortunes of Connecticut for an indefinite period by securing three thousand additional votes to the right side. There is New York, also, where the bill would have the same excellent beneficent influence.
Who, then, can hesitate? Look at it in any light you please. Regard it as the completion of these Reconstruction measures, as a constitutional enactment, or as a measure of expediency to secure results we all desire at the approaching elections, and who can hesitate? There has been no bill before you for a long time of more practical value than this. I hope there will be no question about proceeding with it, and that we may pass it before we separate to-night.
Mr. Edmunds. I agree with my friend from Massachusetts, that the bill has very great merit. It has supreme moral merit. I agree to every word of it. I am a little afraid, it is true, that there is a higher law that will bind us not to pass it, for want of power.
Mr. Sumner. Want of power! Will the Senator be good enough to state the reason?
Mr. Edmunds. No, not on this point, because it is not relevant to this question of order.
Mr. Sumner. But, as the Senator is going into the question of the want of power, I really wish he would deign to enlighten us upon that.
Mr. Edmunds. My friend will have to go without it, so far as I am concerned, for I shall not make it.
Mr. Sumner. Then I shall begin to think the Senator cannot.
Mr. Edmunds. That is not a very dangerous state of things; but there are others who can.
The Senate decided the motion out of order,—Yeas 12, Nays 22.
July 13th, and again on the 15th, Mr. Sumner made another effort, by a resolution suspending the rule limiting business, so as to allow the consideration of this bill; but he could not get a vote on the resolution. The Senate rose without touching it.
Remarks in the Senate, on a Bill for the further Security of Equal Rights in the District of Columbia, July 16, 1867.
July 16th, Mr. Sumner offered a petition from citizens of Washington, setting forth, that, under the existing charter of Washington, colored persons are excluded from office, and praying relief. He supported the petition with the following bill “for the further security of Equal Rights in the District of Columbia”:—
“Be it enacted, &c., That in the District of Columbia no person shall be excluded from any office by reason of race or color, and all parts of laws making any such discrimination are hereby repealed.”
The bill was read, when Mr. Sumner asked unanimous consent to proceed with its consideration.
I think there can be no objection to this bill. It is simply to carry out what is understood to be the effect of existing legislation, but which practically does not seem to be its effect. At the late election in the District it appeared that by the terms of the charter colored persons could not be qualified as aldermen, as common-councilmen, or as assessors; and on examining the charter, which I have now on my desk, I find that by its terms, strictly construed, these offices are confined to free white persons. By our legislation, all persons, without distinction of color, can be voters, but nothing is said about being office-holders. I cannot doubt, that, under the Constitution, and particularly since the recent legislation, the discrimination adverse to colored persons is void; but practically it is not so regarded. I submit, therefore, that it is proper in Congress to remove this grievance.
Mr. Buckalew, of Pennsylvania, objected to its consideration, when Mr. Sumner gave notice that he should endeavor to call it up the next day. He gave further notice, that, if any objection were made, he should move to suspend the rule limiting business so far as to allow this bill to be considered.
July 17th, on motion of Mr. Sumner, the Senate proceeded to consider the bill. Mr. Hendricks, of Indiana, then said:—
“The Senator from Massachusetts was the author of the proposition that the colored people should vote. He made the commencement of that policy with the District of Columbia. He now claims—and I believe his party friends have come up to his position—that that is to be made universal throughout the States. I suppose he will be frank enough to inform us whether it is intended as the commencement of the policy that negroes shall be allowed to become office-holders, to hold both Federal and State offices throughout the country,—whether he regards this as the inauguration of that policy. I suppose he does, from the fact that he expressed with a great deal of warmth, the other day, the desire that he might see colored Senators here in a very short time. If we are to regard it as the inauguration of the policy, it is well enough to know it.”
Without any reply, Mr. Sumner asked for a vote, when the bill was passed,—Yeas 25, Nays 5.
July 18th, in the other House, the bill was reported by Mr. Wilson, of Iowa, from the Judiciary Committee, with the following substitute, intended to avoid in legislation the repetition of the phrase “race or color.”
“The word ‘white,’ wherever it occurs in the laws relating to the District of Columbia or in the charter or ordinances of the city of Washington or Georgetown, and operates as a limitation on the right of any elector of said District or either of said cities to hold any office or to be selected and to serve as a juror, be and the same is hereby repealed; and it shall be unlawful for any person or officer to enforce or attempt to enforce said limitation after the passage of this Act.”
The substitute was adopted, and the bill thus amended passed,—Yeas 90, Nays 20.
July 19th, the Senate concurred in the amendment, and, on motion of Mr. Harlan, of Iowa, further amended the bill by an additional section authorizing “the necessary grand and petit jurors for the June term of the Criminal Court for the year 1867.” This amendment, though not relating to Equal Rights, was concurred in by the House.
July 20th, the bill was duly enrolled and transmitted to the President for his signature, but was not returned by him before the adjournment, the same day, so that it failed to become a law. Mr. Sumner complained that Senators “proposed to go home and leave Equal Rights in the District without the protection we owe them.”
November 21st, on the first day of the meeting of Congress after the adjournment, Mr. Sumner introduced the same bill as it had passed both Houses, and asked the Senate to proceed with it at once; but this was prevented by the objection of Mr. Davis, of Kentucky. Mr. Sumner forbore calling it up for eleven consecutive days of the session, to see if within that time it would be returned to Congress, with or without objections. It was not returned, and on application at the Department of State it was ascertained that it had not been received there.
December 5th, the bill was taken up, on motion of Mr. Sumner, discussed, and again passed,—Yeas 32, Nays 8.
December 9th, it passed the House,—Yeas 104, Nays 39.
December 11th it was presented to the President.
December 20th, Congress adjourned for the holidays.
The President, by a message, January 24, 1868, in reply to an inquiry of the Senate, stated that it was presented for his approval December 11, 1867, but that “Congress by their adjournment [December 20th] prevented the return of the bill within the time prescribed by the Constitution.”
January 7th, Mr. Sumner a third time introduced the same bill. Mr. Sherman, of Ohio, thought “we ought to consider whether it is not already a law.” Mr. Edmunds, of Vermont, said that “this bill has become a law, if it has not been returned with a veto.” Under these circumstances, the bill was referred to the Judiciary Committee to consider its true condition and the question of further legislation.
February 11, 1869, the bill being once more before the Senate, Mr. Sumner moved it again, as appears by the following passage.
Mr. Sumner. I move that the Senate proceed to the consideration of Senate bill No. 228.
Mr. Drake [of Missouri]. What is it?
Mr. Sumner. A bill for the further security of Equal Rights in the District of Columbia. I will make one minute’s explanation, and then the Senate will see that it ought to be passed. This bill has already twice passed both Houses of Congress, but immediately before recesses, and it has fallen from the President failing to return it with his veto, and from the unsettled condition of the practice or law in such cases.
The Presiding Officer [Mr. Morgan, of New York, in the chair]. It requires the unanimous consent of the Senate to consider the bill at this time.
Mr. Drake. I appeal to the honorable Senator from Massachusetts on behalf of a poor and most worthy woman——
Mr. Sumner. Why should the Senator make that appeal to me? I appeal on behalf of all the colored people in this District, who ask the passage of this bill.
Mr. Conkling [of New York]. Whether the objection should be made or not depends perhaps upon this, which I should like to inquire: Has not this bill not only passed twice, I think three times, but has it not become a law certainly once?
Mr. Sumner. It has not become a law; at least, it has not found place in the statute-book, and the courts have declined to recognize it as law. Under the circumstances, it has seemed the best and the shortest way for Congress to pass it again, so as to remove all doubt.
The bill passed the Senate without a division, and, March 2d, it again passed the other House without a division. Again it failed to receive the signature of the President, nor was it returned with his objections.
March 6th, at the opening of a new Congress, with a new President, Mr. Sumner introduced it again, and asked unanimous consent to proceed with its consideration; but Mr. Vickers, of Maryland, objected.
March 8th, it passed the Senate without a division; March 15th, passed the other House,—Yeas 111, Nays 46; March 18th, was approved by the President, and so at last became a law.[236]
Remarks in the Senate, on a Bill to strike out the Word “White” in the Naturalization Laws, July 19, 1867.