“It constituted one of the great struggles between the large and the small States, which was constantly renewed in the Convention, and impeded it in every step of its progress in the formation of the Constitution. The struggle applied to the organization of each branch of the Legislature. The small States insisted upon an equality of vote and representation in each branch, and the large States upon a vote in proportion to their relative importance and population.… The small States at length yielded the point as to an equality of representation in the House, and acceded to a representation proportionate to the Federal numbers. But they insisted upon an equality in the Senate. To this the large States were unwilling to assent, and for a time the States were on this point equally divided.”[231]

This summary is in substantial harmony with my own abstract of the debates. I present it because I would not seem in any way to overstate the case. And here let me add most explicitly, that I lend no voice to any complaint against the small States; nor do I suggest any change in the original balances of our system. I insist only that the victory achieved in the Constitution by the small States shall not be made the apology for a pretension inconsistent with Human Rights. And now, for the sake of a great cause, the truth must be told.

It must not be disguised that this pretension has another origin, outside the Constitution. This is in the Ordinance of 1787, where it is positively provided that any State formed out of the Northwest Territory “shall be admitted, by its delegates, into the Congress of the United States on an equal footing with the original States in all respects whatever.” Next after the equal suffrage in the Senate stands this provision with its talismanic phrase, equal footing. New States are to be admitted on an equal footing with the original States in all respects whatever. This language is strong; but nobody can doubt that it must be read in the light of the Ordinance where it appears. Read in this light, its meaning cannot be questioned. By the Ordinance there are no less than six different articles of compact, “forever unalterable, unless by common consent,” constituting so many perpetual safeguards: the first perpetuating religious liberty; the second perpetuating Habeas Corpus, trial by jury, and judicial proceedings according to the course of the Common Law; the third perpetuating schools and the means of education; the fourth perpetuating the title of the United States in the soil without taxation, the freedom of the rivers as highways, and the liability of the people for a just proportion of the national debt; the fifth perpetuating the right of the States to be admitted into the Union on an equal footing with the original States; and then, next in order, the sixth perpetuating freedom,—being that immortal condition which is the golden bough of this mighty oak,—that “there shall be neither slavery nor involuntary servitude in the said Territory.” Now it is clear that subjection to these perpetual conditions was not considered in any respect inconsistent with that “equal footing” which was stipulated. Therefore, even assuming that States, when admitted, shall be on an “equal footing” with others, there can be no hindrance to any conditions by Congress kindred to those which were the glory of the Ordinance.

To all who, borrowing a catchword from Slavery, assert the Equality of States in derogation of fundamental conditions, I oppose the plain text of the Constitution, which contains no such rule, except in a single instance, and there the equality may be waived; and I oppose also the Ordinance of 1787, which, while requiring that new States shall be admitted on an “equal footing” with other States, teaches by its own great example that this requirement is not inconsistent with conditions of all kinds, and especially in favor of Human Rights. The Equality of States on the lips of Slave-Masters was natural, for it was a plausible defence against the approaches of Freedom; but this unauthorized phrase, which has deceived so many, must be rejected now, so far at least as it is employed against the Equal Rights of All. As one of the old garments of Slavery, it must be handed to the flames.

From this review it is easy to see that we approach the present question without any impediment or constraint in the Constitution. Not a provision, not a clause, not a sentence, not a phrase in the Constitution can be made an apology even for the present objection,—absolutely nothing; and here I challenge reply. Without any support in the Constitution, its partisans borrow one of the worst pretensions of Slavery, and utter it now as it was uttered by Slave-Masters. Once more we hear the voice of Slavery crying out in familiar tones, that conditions cannot be imposed on new States. Alas that Slavery, which we thought had been slain, is not entirely dead! Again it stalks into this Chamber, like the majesty of buried Denmark,—“in the same figure, like the king that’s dead,”—and then, like this same ghost, it cries out, “Swear!” and then again, “Swear!”—and Senators pledged to Freedom take up the old pretension and swear it anew. For myself, I insist not only that Slavery shall be buried out of sight, but that all its wretched pretensions hostile to Human Rights shall be buried with it.


The conditions upon new States are of two classes: first, those that may be required; secondly, those that must be required.

The first comprehends those conditions which the Nation may consider it advisable to require, before admitting a new member into the partnership of government. The Constitution, in positive words, leaves to the Nation a discretion with regard to the admission of new States. The words are: “New States may be admitted by the Congress into the Union,”—thus plainly recognizing a latitude under which any conditions not inconsistent with the Constitution may be required, as by a firm on the admission of a new partner. All this is entirely reasonable; but I do not stop to dwell on it, for the condition which I have at heart does not come under this head.

A fundamental condition in favor of Human Rights is of that essential character that it must be required. Not to require it is to abandon a plain duty; so it seems to me. I speak with all deference to others, but I cannot see it otherwise.

The Constitution declares that “the United States shall guaranty to every State in this Union a republican form of government.” These are grand words, perhaps the grandest in the Constitution, hardly excepting the Preamble, which is so full of majestic meaning and such a fountain of national life. Kindred to the Preamble is this supreme obligation imposed on the United States to guaranty a republican government. There it is. You cannot avoid this duty. Called to its performance, you must supply a practical definition of a republican government. This again you cannot avoid. By your oaths, by all the responsibilities of your position, you must say what in your judgment is a republican government, and you must so decide as not to discredit our fathers and not to give an unworthy example to mankind. Happily the definition is already of record in our history. Our fathers gave it to us, as amid the thunders of Sinai, when they put forth their Declaration of Independence. There it stands in the very front of our Great Charter, embodied in two simple, self-evident truths,—first, that all men are equal in rights, and, secondly, that all just government is founded only on the consent of the governed,—the two together making an axiomatic definition which proves itself. Its truth is like the sun; blind is he who cannot see it. And this is the definition bequeathed as a freehold by our fathers. Though often assailed, even by Senators, it is none the less true. So have I read of savages who shot their arrows at the sun. Clearly, then, that is a republican government where all have equal rights and participate in the government. I know not if anything need be added; I am sure that nothing can be subtracted.

The Constitution itself sets the example of imposing conditions upon the States. Positively it says, no State shall enter into any treaty, alliance, or confederation; no State shall grant letters of marque and reprisal; no State shall coin money; no State shall emit bills of credit. Again it says, no State shall, without the consent of Congress, lay any duty of tonnage, or keep troops or ships of war in time of peace. All these are conditions in the text of the Constitution so plain and intelligible as to require no further elucidation. To repeat them on the admission of a State would be superfluous. It is different, however, with that highest condition of all, that the State shall be republican. This requires repetition and elucidation, so as to remove all doubt of its application, and to vitalize it by declaring what is meant by a republican government.


Here I might close this argument; but there are two hostile pretensions which must be exposed: the first founded on a false interpretation of “qualifications,” being nothing less than the impossible assumption, that, because the States may determine the “qualifications” of electors, therefore they can make color a criterion of the electoral franchise; and the second founded on a false interpretation of the asserted power of the States “to regulate suffrage,” being nothing less than the impossible assumption that under the power to regulate suffrage the rights of a whole race may be annihilated. These two pretensions are of course derived from Slavery. They are hatched from the eggs that the cuckoo bird has left behind. Strange that Senators will hatch them!

1. By the Constitution it is provided that “the electors in each State shall have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the State Legislature.” On this clause Senators build the impossible pretension that a State cannot be interrupted in its disfranchisement of a race. Here is the argument: Because a State may determine the qualifications of electors, therefore it may deprive a whole race of equal rights and of participation in the Government. Logically speaking, here are most narrow premises for the widest possible conclusion. On the mere statement, the absurdity is so unspeakable as to recall the kindred pretension of Slavery, that, because commerce is lawful, therefore commerce in human flesh is lawful also. If the consequences were not so offensive, this “argal” might be handed over to consort with that of the Shakespearean grave-digger. But the argument is not merely preposterous, it is insulting to the human understanding, and a blow at human nature itself. If I use strong language, it is because such a proclamation of tyranny requires it. Admitting that the States may determine the “qualifications” of electors, what then? Obviously it must be according to the legitimate meaning of this word. And here, besides reason and humanity, two inexhaustible fountains, we have two other sources of authority: first, the Constitution, in which the word appears, and, secondly, the dictionaries of the English language, out of both of which we must condemn the intolerable pretension.

The Constitution, where we find this word, follows the Declaration of Independence, and refuses to recognize any distinction of color. Search, and you will confess that there is no word of “color” in its text; nor is there anything there on which to found any disfranchisement of a race. The “qualifications” of different officers, as President, Vice-President, Senators, and Representatives, are named; but “color” is not among these. The Constitution, like the Ten Commandments and the Beatitudes, embraces all alike within its mandates and all alike within its promises. There are none who must not obey it; there can be none who may not claim its advantages. By what title do you exclude a race? The Constitution gives no such title; you can only find it in yourselves. The fountain is pure; it is only out of yourselves that the waters of bitterness proceed.

The dictionaries of our language are in harmony with the Constitution. Look at “Qualification” in Webster or Worcester, the two best authorities of our time, and you will find that the word means “fitness,” “capability,” “accomplishment,” “the condition of being qualified”; but it does not mean “color.” It embraces age, residence, character, education, and the payment of taxes,—in short, all those conditions which, when honestly administered, are in the nature of regulation, not of disfranchisement. The English dictionaries most used by the framers of the Constitution were Bailey and Johnson. According to Bailey, who was the earliest, this important word is thus defined:—

“(1.) That which fits any person or thing for any particular purpose.

“(2.) A particular faculty or endowment, an accomplishment.

According to Johnson, who is the highest authority, it is thus defined:—

“(1.) That which makes any person or thing fit for anything.

Example.—“It is in the power of the prince to make piety and virtue become the fashion, if he would make them necessary qualifications for preferment.—Swift.

“(2.) Accomplishment.

Example.—“Good qualifications of mind enable a magistrate to perform his duty, and tend to create a public esteem of him.—Atterbury.

By these definitions this word means “fitness,” or “accomplishment,” and, according to the well-chosen examples from Swift and Atterbury, it means qualities like “piety” and “virtue,” or like faculties “of mind,” all of which are more or less within the reach of every human being. But it is impossible to extend this list so as to make “color” a quality,—absolutely impossible. Color is a physical condition affixed by the God of Nature to a large portion of the human race, and insurmountable in its character. Age, education, residence, property,—all these are subject to change; but the Ethiopian cannot change his skin. On this last distinctive circumstance I take my stand. An insurmountable condition is not a qualification, but a disfranchisement. Admit that a State may determine the “qualifications” of electors, it cannot, under this authority, arbitrarily exclude a whole race.

Try this question by examples. Suppose South Carolina, where the blacks are numerous, should undertake to exclude the whites from the polls on account of “color”; would you hesitate to arrest this injustice? You would insist that a government sanctioning such a denial of rights, under whatever pretension, could not be republican. Suppose another State should gravely declare that all with black eyes should be excluded from the polls, and still another should gravely declare that all with black hair should be excluded from the polls, I am sure that you would find it difficult to restrain the mingled derision and indignation which such a pretension must excite. But this fable pictures your conduct. All this is now gravely done by States; and Senators gravely insist that such exclusion is proper in determining the “qualifications” of electors.

2. Like unto the pretension founded on a misinterpretation of “qualifications” is that other founded on a misinterpretation of the asserted power of a State to make “regulations.” Listen to this pretension. Assuming that a State may regulate the elections without the intervention of Congress, it is insisted that it may disfranchise a race. Because a State may regulate the elective franchise, therefore it may destroy this franchise. Surely it is one thing to regulate, and quite another thing to destroy. The power to regulate cannot involve any such conclusion of tyranny. To every such wretched result, howsoever urged, there is one sufficient reply,—Non sequitur.

According to the Constitution, “the times, places, and manner of holding elections for Senators and Representatives shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by law make or alter such regulations, except as to the places of choosing Senators.” Here is the text of this portentous power to blast a race. In these simple words no such power can be found, unless the seeker makes the Constitution a reflection of himself. The times, places, and manner of holding elections are referred to the States,—nothing more; and even these may be altered by Congress. Being matters of form and convenience only, in the nature of police, they are justly included under the head of “regulations,” like the sword and uniform of the army. Do we not familiarly speak of a regulation sword and a regulation sash? Who will dare to say that under this formal power of regulation a whole race may be despoiled of equal rights and of all participation in the Government? This very pretension was anticipated by Mr. Madison, and condemned in advance. Here are his decisive words in the Virginia Convention:—

“Some States might regulate the elections on the principles of equality, and others might regulate them otherwise.… Should the people of any State by any means be deprived of the right of suffrage, it was judged proper that it should be remedied by the General Government.”[232]

Thus was it expressly understood, at the adoption of the Constitution, that Congress should have the power to prevent any State, under the pretence of regulating the suffrage, from depriving the people of this right, or from interfering with the principle of Equality.

Kindred to this statement of Mr. Madison is that other contemporary testimony which will be found in the “Federalist,” where the irrepealable rights of citizens are recognized without distinction of color. This explicit language cannot be too often quoted. Here it is:—

“It is only under the pretext that the laws have transformed the negroes into subjects of property that a place is denied to them in the computation of numbers; and it is admitted, that, if the laws were to restore the rights which have been taken away, the negroes could no longer be refused an equal share of representation with the other inhabitants.”[233]

This testimony is as decisive as it is authentic. Consider that it was given in explanation and vindication of the Constitution. Consider that the Constitution was commended for adoption by the assertion, that, on the termination of Slavery, “the negroes could no longer be refused an equal share of representation with the other inhabitants.” In the face of this assurance, how can it be now insisted, that, under the simple power to regulate the suffrage, a State may deny to a whole race that “equal share of representation” which was promised? Thus from every quarter we are brought to the same inevitable conclusion.

Therefore I dismiss the pretension founded on the power to make regulations, as I dismiss that other founded on the power to determine qualifications. Each proceeds on a radical misconception. Admit that a State may determine qualifications; admit that a State may make regulations; it cannot follow, by any rule of logic or law, that, under these powers, either or both, it may disfranchise a race. The pretension is too lofty. No such enormous prerogative can be wrung out of any such moderate power. As well say, that, because a constable or policeman may keep order in a city, therefore he may inflict the penalty of death,—or, because a father may impose proper restraint upon a child, therefore he may sell him into slavery. We have read of an effort to extract sunbeams out of cucumbers; but the present effort to extract a cruel prerogative out of the simple words of the Constitution is scarcely less absurd.


I conclude as I began, in favor of requiring conditions from States on their admission into the Nation; and I insist that it is our especial duty, in every possible way, by compact and by enactment, to assure among these conditions the Equal Rights of All, and the participation of every citizen in the government over him, without which the State cannot be republican. For the present I confine myself to the question of conditions on the admission of States, without considering the broader obligation of Congress to make Equal Rights coextensive with the Nation, and thus to harmonize our institutions with the principles of the Declaration of Independence. That other question I leave to another occasion.

Meanwhile I protest against the false glosses originally fastened upon the Constitution by Slavery, and, now continued, often in unconsciousness of their origin, perverting it to the vilest uses of tyranny. I protest against that exaggeration of pretension which out of a power to make “regulations” and to determine “qualifications” can derive an unrepublican prerogative. I protest against that pretension which would make the asserted Equality of States the cover for a denial of the Equality of Men. The one is an artificial rule, relating to artificial bodies; the other is a natural rule, relating to natural bodies. The one is little more than a legal fiction; the other is a truth of Nature. Here is a distinction which Alexander Hamilton recognized, when, in the debates of the Convention, he nobly said:—

“As States are a collection of individual men, which ought we to respect most,—the rights of the people composing them, or of the artificial beings resulting from the composition? Nothing could be more preposterous or absurd than to sacrifice the former to the latter.”[234]

High above States, as high above men, are those commanding principles which cannot be denied with impunity. They will be found in the Declaration of Independence, expressed so clearly that all can read them. Though few, they are mighty. There is no humility in bending to their behests. As man rises in the scale of being while walking in obedience to the Divine will, so is a State elevated by obedience to these everlasting truths. Nor can we look for harmony in our country until these principles bear unquestioned sway, without any interdict from the States. That unity for which the Nation longs, with peace and reconciliation in its train, can be assured only through the Equal Rights of All, proclaimed by the Nation everywhere within its limits, and maintained by the national arm. Then will the Constitution be filled and inspired by the Declaration of Independence, so that the two shall be one, with a common life, a common authority, and a common glory.


ELIGIBILITY OF A COLORED CITIZEN TO CONGRESS.

Letter to an Inquirer at Norfolk, Va., June 22, 1868.

This letter appeared in a Richmond paper.

Senate Chamber, June 22, 1868.

DEAR SIR,—I have your letter of the 18th, in reference to the eligibility of a colored man to Congress.

I know of no ground on which he could be excluded from his seat, if duly elected; and I should welcome the election of a competent representative of the colored race to either House of Congress as a final triumph of the cause of Equal Rights. Until this step is taken, our success is incomplete.

Yours truly,

Charles Sumner.


INDEPENDENCE, AND THOSE WHO SAVED THE ORIGINAL WORK.

Letter on the Soldiers’ Monument at North Weymouth, Mass., July 2, 1868.

Senate Chamber, July 2, 1868.

MY DEAR SIR,—I wish that I could take part in the interesting ceremonies to which you invite me; but my duties will keep me here.

On the anniversary of the birth of our Nation you will commemorate the death of patriots who gave their lives that the Nation might live. Grateful to our fathers, who at the beginning did so much, we owe an equal debt to those who saved the original work.

The monument which you rear will be national in its character. Dedicated on the anniversary of Independence, it will have for its special object to guard forever the memory of those through whom the first fruits of Independence have been secured.

Our fathers established the National Independence; our recent heroes have made it perpetual through those vital principles which can never die. Honor to the fathers! Honor also to the sons, worthy of the fathers!

Accept my best wishes; believe me, my dear Sir, very faithfully yours,

Charles Sumner.

Gen. B. F. Pratt.


COLORED SENATORS,—THEIR IMPORTANCE IN SETTLING THE QUESTION OF EQUAL RIGHTS.

Letter to an Inquirer in South Carolina, July 3, 1868.

The following letter, from a South Carolina paper, is one of many in the same sense which found its way to the public.

Senate Chamber, July 3, 1868.

DEAR SIR,—I have never given any opinion in regard to the Senatorial question in your State, except to express regret that the golden opportunity should be lost of making a colored citizen Senator from South Carolina.

Such a Senator, if competent, would be a powerful support to the cause of Equal Rights. His presence alone would be a constant testimony and argument. Nothing could do so much to settle the question of Equal Rights forever in the United States. The howl against the negro, which is sometimes heard in the Senate, would cease. A colored Senator would be as good as a Constitutional Amendment, making all backward steps impossible.

I write now frankly, in reply to your inquiry, and without any purpose of interfering in your election. You will pardon my anxiety for the cause I have so much at heart.

Accept my best wishes, and believe me, dear Sir, faithfully yours,

Charles Sumner.

To Thaddeus K. Sasportas, Esq., Columbia, S. C.


FINANCIAL RECONSTRUCTION THROUGH PUBLIC FAITH AND SPECIE PAYMENTS.

Speech in the Senate, on the Bill to Fund the National Debt, July 11, 1868.


We denounce all forms of Repudiation as a national crime [prolonged cheers]; and the national honor requires the payment of the public indebtedness, in the utmost good faith, to all creditors, at home and abroad, not only according to the letter, but to the spirit of the laws under which it was contracted. [Applause.]—Chicago Platform, May, 1868.


Fundamentum est autem justitiæ fides, id est, dictorum conventorumque constantia et veritas.—Cicero, De Officiis, Lib. I. Cap. 7.


SPEECH.

The Senate having under consideration the Bill for funding the National Debt and for the Conversion of the Notes of the United States, Mr. Sumner said:—

MR. PRESIDENT,—After a tempest sweeping sea and land, strewing the coast with wrecks, and tumbling houses to the ground, Nature must become propitious before the energy of man can repair the various losses. Time must intervene. At last ships are launched again, and houses are built, in larger numbers and fairer forms than before. A tempest has swept over us, scourging in every direction; and now that its violence has ceased, we are occupied in the work of restoration. Nature is already propitious, and time, too, is silently preparing the way, while the national energies are applied to the work.

To know what to do, we must comprehend the actual condition of things, and how it was brought about. All this is easy to see, if we will only look.


It is a mistake of too constant occurrence to treat the financial question by itself, without considering its dependence upon the abnormal condition through which the country has passed. The financial question, in all its branches, depends upon the political, and cannot be separated. I might use stronger language. It is a part of the political question; and now that Reconstruction seems about to be accomplished, it is that enduring part which still remains.


Our present responsibilities, whether political or financial, have a common origin in that vast Rebellion, when the people of eleven States, maddened by Slavery, rose against the Nation. As the Rebellion was without example in its declared object, so it was without example in the extent and intensity of its operations. It sought nothing less than the dismemberment of our Nation and the establishment of a new power with Slavery as its quickening principle. The desperate means enlisted by such a cause could be encountered only by the most strenuous exertions in the name of Country and of Human Rights. Here was Slavery, barbarous, brutal, vindictive, warring for recognition. The tempest or tornado can typify only feebly the ravage that ensued. There were days of darkness and despair, when the national existence was in peril. Rebel armies menaced the Capitol, and Slavery seemed about to vindicate its wicked supremacy.

Looking at the scene in its political aspects, we behold one class of disorders, and looking at it in its financial aspects, we behold still another,—both together constituting a fearful sum-total, where financial disorder mingles with political. Turn, first, to the political, and you will see States, one after another, renouncing their relations with the Nation, and constituting a new government, under the name of Confederacy, with a new Constitution, making Slavery its corner-stone,—all of which they sought to maintain by arms, while, in aggravation of these perils, Foreign Powers gave ominous signs of speedy recognition and support. Look next to the financial side, and you will see business in some places entirely prostrate, in others suddenly assuming new forms; immense interests destroyed; property annihilated; the whole people turned from the thoughts of peace to the thoughts of war; vast armies set on foot, in which the youthful and strong were changed from producers to destroyers, while life itself was consumed; an unprecedented taxation, commensurate with the unprecedented exigency; and all this followed by the common incidents of war in other countries and times,—first, the creation of a national debt, and, secondly, the substitution of inconvertible paper as a currency. In this catalogue of calamities, political and financial, who shall say which was the worst? Certainly it is difficult to distinguish between them. One grew out of the other, so that they belong together and constitute one group, all derived ultimately from the Rebellion, and directly depending upon it. So long as Slavery continued in arms, each and all waxed in vastness; and now, so long as any of these remain, they testify to this same unnatural crime. The tax-gatherer, taking so much from honest industry, was born of the Rebellion. Inconvertible paper, deranging the business of the country at home and abroad, had the same monstrous birth. Our enormous taxation is only a prolongation of the Rebellion. Every greenback is red with the blood of fellow-citizens.

To repair these calamities, political and financial, the first stage was the overthrow of the Rebellion in the field, thus enabling the Nation to reduce its armaments, to arrest its accumulating debt, and to cease anxiety on account of foreign intervention so constantly menaced. Thus relieved, we were brought to a resting-place, and the Nation found itself in condition to begin the work of restoration.


Foremost came the suppression of Slavery, in which the Rebellion had its origin. Common prudence, to say nothing of common humanity, required this consummation, without which there would have been a short-lived truce only. So great a change necessarily involved other changes, while there was the ever-present duty to obtain from the defeated Rebels, if not indemnity for the past, at least security for the future. It was impossible to stop with the suppression of Slavery. That whole barbarous code of wrong and outrage, whose first article was the denial of all rights to an oppressed race, was grossly inconsistent with the new order of things. It was necessary that it should yield to the Equal Rights of All, promised by the Declaration of Independence. The citizen, lifted from Slavery, must be secured in all his rights, civil and political. Loyal governments, republican in form, must be substituted for Rebel governments. All this being done, the States, thus transformed, will assume once more their ancient relations to the Nation. This is the work of Political Reconstruction, constituting the new stage after the overthrow of the Rebellion.


Meanwhile there has been an effort and a longing for Financial Reconstruction also,—sometimes without sufficiently reflecting that there can be small chance for any success in this direction until after Political Reconstruction. Here also we must follow Nature, and restore by removing the disturbing cause. This is the natural process. Vain all attempt to reconstruct the national finances while the Rebellion was still in arms. This must be obvious to all. Vain also while Slavery still domineered. Vain also while Equal Rights are without a sure defence against the oppressor. Vain also while the Nation still palpitates with its efforts to obtain security for the future. Vain also until the States are all once more harmonious in their native spheres, like the planets, receiving and dispensing light.

Nothing is more sensitive than Credit, which is the essential element of financial restoration. A breath will make it flutter. How can you expect to restore the national credit, now unnaturally sensitive, while the Nation is still uneasy from those Rebel pretensions which have cost so much? Security is the first condition of Financial Reconstruction; and I am at a loss to find any road to it, except through Political Reconstruction. All this seems so plain that I ought to apologize for dwelling on it. And yet there are many, who, while professing a desire for an improvement in our financial condition, perversely turn their backs upon the only means by which this can be accomplished. Never was there equal folly. Language cannot picture it. Every denial of Equal Rights, every impediment to a just reconstruction in conformity with the Declaration of Independence, every pretension of a “white man’s government” in horrid mockery of self-evident truths declared by our fathers, and of that brotherhood of mankind declared by the Sermon on Mars Hill, is a bar to that Financial Reconstruction without which the Rebellion still lingers among us. So long as a dollar of irredeemable paper is forced upon the country, the Rebellion still lives, in its spurious progeny.

Party organization and Presidential antagonism have thus far stood in the way, while at each stage individual perverseness has played its part. The President has set himself obstinately against Political Reconstruction; so also has the Democratic Party; others have followed, according to the prejudices of their nature; and so the national finances have suffered. Not the least of the offences of Andrew Johnson is the adverse influence he has exerted on this question. All that he has done from the beginning has tended to protract the Rebellion and to extend the disorder of our finances. And yet there are many not indifferent to the latter who have looked with indifference upon his criminal conduct. So far as their personal interests depended on an improved condition of the finances, they have already suffered; but it is hard that the country should suffer also. Andrew Johnson has postponed specie payments, and his supporters of all degrees must share the responsibility.

Such is my confidence in the resources of our country, in the industry of its people, and in the grandeur of its destinies, that I cannot doubt the transcendent future. Alas that it should be interrupted by unwise counsels, even for a day! Financial Reconstruction is postponed only. It must come at last. Here I have no panacea that is not as simple as Nature. I know of no device or trick or medicine by which this cure can be accomplished. It will come with the general health of the body politic. It will come with the renovated life of the Nation, when it is once more complete in form, when every part is in sympathy with the whole, and the Rebellion, with all its offspring, is trampled out forever. In such a condition of affairs, inconvertible paper would be an impossibility, as much as a bill of sale for a human being.


Meanwhile there are certain practical points which must not be forgotten. Foremost among these I put the absolute dependence of the national finances upon the faithful performance of all our obligations to the national freedmen. Pardoned Rebels will never look with complacency upon the national debt, or the interest which testifies semiannually to its magnitude. Their political colleagues at the North will be apt to sympathize with them. Should the scales at any time hang doubtful, it is to others that we must turn to adjust the balance. Therefore, for the sake of the national finances, I insist that the national freedmen shall be secured and maintained in Equal Rights, so that local prejudices and party cries shall be unavailing against them. You who have at heart the national credit, on which so much depends, must never fail to cherish the national freedmen, treating their enemies as if they were your enemies. Every blow at them will rebound upon yourselves.


In dealing with the financial question, there are two other points of ever-present importance: first, the necessity of diminishing, so far as practicable, the heavy burden of taxation so oppressive to the people; and, secondly, the necessity of substituting specie for inconvertible paper. Here are two objects, which, when accomplished, will add infinitely to the wealth and happiness of the country, besides being the assurance that the Nation has at last reached that condition of repose so much longed for.

Before considering these two points in detail, I venture to remark that there is one condition, preliminary in character and equally essential to both, through which taxation will be lightened and specie payments will be hastened. I refer to the Public Faith, which must be sacredly preserved above all question or suspicion. The word of our Nation must be as good as its bond; and nobody must attempt to take a tittle from either. Nothing short of universal wreck can justify any such bankruptcy. Let the Public Faith be preserved, and all that you now seek will be easy.

A virtuous king of early Rome dedicated a temple on the Capitol Hill itself to a divinity under the name of Publica Fides, who was represented with a wreath of laurel about her head, carrying ears of corn and a basket of fruit,—typical of honor and abundance sure to follow in her footprints. In the same spirit another temple was dedicated to the god Terminus, who presided over boundaries. The stones set up to mark the limits of estates were sacred, and on these very stones there were religious offerings to the god. The heathen maledictions upon the violator were echoed also by the Hebrews, when they said: “Cursed be he that removeth his neighbor’s landmark: and all the people shall say, Amen.”[235] In those early Roman and Hebrew days there was no national debt divided into bonds; there was nothing but land. But a national bond is as well defined as a piece of land. Here, then, is a place for the god Terminus. Every obligation is like a landmark, not to be removed without curses. Here, also, is a place for that other divinity, Publica Fides, with laurelled head, and hands filled with corn and fruit.

Public Faith may be seen in the evil which springs from its loss and in the good which overflows from its preservation. It is like honor: and yet, once lost, more than dishonor is the consequence; once assured, more than honor is the reward. It is a possession surpassing all others in value. The gold and silver in your Treasury may be counted; it stands recorded, dollar for dollar, in the national ledger; but the sums which the unsuspected credit of a magnanimous nation can command are beyond the record of any ledger. Public Faith is more than mines of silver or gold. Only from Arabian story can a fit illustration be found, as when, after all human effort had failed, the Genius of the Lamp reared the costly palace and stored it with beauty. Public Faith is in itself a treasury, a tariff, and an internal revenue, all in one. These you may lose; but if the other is preserved, it will be only for a day. The Treasury will be replenished, the tariff will be renewed, the internal revenue will be restored. With Public Faith as an unfailing law, the Nation, like Pactolus, will sweep over golden sands; or, like Midas, it will change into gold whatever it touches. Keep, then, the Public Faith as the “open sesame” to all that you can desire; keep it as you would keep the philosopher’s stone of fable, having which, you have all.

And yet, in the face of this plain commandment, on which hangs so much of all that is most prized in national existence, we are called to break faith. It is proposed to tax the national bonds, in violation of the original bargain on which the money was lent. Sometimes the tax is to be by the Nation, and sometimes by the States. The power to do this wrong you may possess, but the right never. Do what you will, there is one thing you cannot do: you cannot make wrong right. It is in vain that you undertake to set aside the perpetual obligation which you have assumed. Against every such pretension, whether by speech or vote, there is this living duty, which will survive Congress and politician alike. Puny as the hand of a child is the effort to undo this original bargain. The Nation has promised six per cent. interest, payable semiannually in coin, nor more nor less, without any abatement; and then, having bound itself, it proceeds to guard against the States by declaring specifically that the bonds shall be “exempt from taxation by or under State authority.” Such is the bargain. There it is; and it must continue unchanged, except by the consent of the parties, until the laws of the universe tumble into chaos.

The rogue in Shakespeare exclaims, “What a fool Honesty is! and Trust, his sworn brother, a very simple gentleman!” In equal levity it is said, “Tax the bonds,” although, by the original bargain on which the money was obtained, amid the trials of war for the safety of the Nation, it was expressly stipulated that these bonds should not be taxed. Nevertheless, tax the bonds! Of course, by taxing the bonds the bargain is brutally broken,—and this, too, after the Nation has used the money. Such a transaction in common life, except where bankruptcy had supervened, would be intolerable. A proud Nation, justly sensitive to national honor, as the great Republic through whose example liberal institutions are commended to mankind, cannot do this thing.

The proposition to tax the bonds, in open violation of the original bargain, is similar in spirit to that other enterprise, which, under various discordant ensigns, proposes to pay the national bonds with inconvertible paper. Here at once, and on the threshold, Public Faith interposes a summary protest. On such a question debate even is dangerous; the man who doubts is lost. The money was borrowed and lent on the undoubting faith that it was to be paid in coin. Nothing to the contrary was suggested, imagined, or dreamed, at the time. Behind all forms of language, and even all omissions, this obligation stands forth, in the nature of the case, explained and confirmed by the history of our national loans, and by the official acts of successive Secretaries of the Treasury interpreting the obligations of the Nation.


So much stress is laid upon the language of the five-twenties that I cannot let it pass. The terms employed were precisely those in previous bonds of the United States where the principal was paid in coin, some of which are still outstanding. Had there been any doubt about the meaning, it was fixed by the general understanding, and by special declarations of responsible persons speaking for the Nation. On 26th May, 1863, Mr. Harrington, the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, in an official letter, says: “These bonds will, therefore, be paid in gold.” On 15th February, 1864, Mr. Field, also Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, writes: “I am directed by the Secretary to say that it is the purpose of the Government to pay said bonds, like other bonds of the United States, in coin, at maturity.” On 18th May, 1864, Mr. Chase, at the time Secretary of the Treasury, wrote: “These bonds, according to the usage of the Government, are payable in coin.” Mr. Fessenden, while Secretary of the Treasury, in his annual report to Congress, expressed the same conclusion; and his successor, Mr. McCulloch, in a letter of 15th November, 1866, says: “I regard, as did also my predecessors, all bonds of the United States as payable in coin.” There are also numerous advertisements from the Treasury, and from its business agents, all in the same sense.

Here is a succession of authorities, embracing high functionaries of the United States, all concurring in affixing upon these bonds the obligation to pay in coin. As testimony to the meaning of the bonds, it is important; but considering that all these persons represented the National Treasury, and that they were the agents of the Nation for the sale of these very bonds, their representations are more than testimony. Until their authority is disowned by Congress, and their representations discarded, it is difficult to see why their language must not be treated as part of the contract, at least in all sales subsequent to its publication. It must not be forgotten that these original sales were mainly to bankers and brokers, and in large amounts, for the purpose of resale to small purchasers seeking investments. It was in reply to parties interested in these resales that the letters of Assistant Secretary Field and Mr. Chase were written, pledging the Nation to payment in coin. At the date of these important letters Congress was in session, and, although the opportunity was constant, there was no protest against the meaning thus authoritatively affixed to these obligations. The bonds were in the market, advertised and sold daily, with a value established by the representations of these national agents; and Congress did not interfere to set aside these representations. By subsequent Acts similar loans were authorized, and nobody protested. There was the supplementary clause of 3d March, 1864, for the issue of eleven millions of these bonds, to cover an excess subscribed above the amount authorized by the original Act. This was debated in the Senate on the 1st of March; but you will search the “Globe” in vain for any protest. Then came other Acts, at different dates, by which the loan was further enlarged to its present extent, and all the time these representations were uncontradicted. Against them there was no Act of Congress, no protest, nothing. If this is not “acquiescence,” then I am at a loss to know how acquiescence can be shown. Therefore do I insist that these representations are a part of the contract by which the Nation is bound.

It is said that in the five-twenty bonds there are words promising interest in coin, but nothing with regard to the principal. Forgetting the contemporary understanding and the official interpretation, and assuming that at maturity the bond is no better than a greenback, it becomes important to know the character of this obligation. On its face a greenback is a promise to pay a certain number of dollars. It is paper, and it promises to pay “dollars.” Here is an example, which I take from my pocket: “The United States promise to pay to the bearer five dollars”—not five dollars in paper, or in some other substituted promise, but “five dollars,” which can mean nothing else than the coin known over the world with the stamp of Spain, Mexico, and the United States, being a fixed value, which passes current in every zone and at the antipodes. The “dollar” is an established measure of value, like the five-franc piece of France, or the pound sterling of England. As well say, that, on a promise to pay so many francs in France, or so many pounds sterling in England, you could honestly acquit yourself by handing over a scrap of printed paper, inconvertible in value. This could not be done. The promise in our greenbacks carries with it an ultimate obligation to pay the silver dollar whose chink is so familiar in the commerce of the world. The convertibility of the greenback is for the present suspended; but when paid, it must be in coin. To pay with another promise is to renew, and not to discharge the debt. But the obligation in our bonds is to pay “dollars” also, whenever the bonds are paid; it may be after five years, or, in the discretion of the Nation, not till twenty years, but, when paid, it must be in “dollars.” Such is the stipulation; nor could the addition of “coin” or “gold” essentially change this obligation. It is contrary to reason that a bond should be paid in an inferior obligation. It is dishonest to force inconvertible paper without interest in payment of an interest-bearing obligation. The statement of the case is enough. Such an attempt disturbs the reason and shocks the moral sense.

Between the bond and the greenback there is an obvious distinction, doubly attested by the Act of Congress creating them both,—for they were created together. This distinction appears, first, in the title of the Act, and, secondly, in its provisions. According to its title, it is “An Act to authorize the issue of United States notes, and for the redemption or funding thereof, and for funding the floating debt of the United States.”[236] In brief, greenbacks were made a legal tender, and authority was given to fund them in these bonds. This appears in the very title of the Act. Now the object of funding is to bring what is uncertain and floating into a permanent form; and accordingly greenbacks were funded and placed on interest. The bonds were a substitute for the greenbacks; but the new theory makes the greenbacks a substitute for the bonds. To carry forward still further the policy of the Act, it was provided that the greenbacks might be exchanged at once for bonds; and then, by the Act of 11th July, 1862,[237] it was further provided that these very greenbacks “may be paid in coin,” at the direction of the Secretary, instead of being received in exchange for certificates of deposit, which were convertible into bonds,—thus treating the bonds as the equivalent of coin. The subsequent repeal of these provisions does not alter their testimony to the character of these bonds. Thus, at every turn, we are brought to the same conclusion. The dishonor of these obligations, whatever form it may assume, and whatever pretext it may adopt, is nothing but Repudiation.


The word Repudiation, now so generally used to denote the refusal to pay national obligations, has been known in this sense only recently. In the early dictionaries of our language it had no such signification. According to Dr. Johnson, it meant simply “divorce,” “rejection,” as when a man put away his wife. It began to be known in its present sense when Mississippi, the State of Jefferson Davis, dishonored her bonds. From that time the word has been too familiar in our public discussions. It was not unnatural that a State mad with Slavery should dishonor its bonds. Rejecting all obligations of humanity and justice, it easily rejected the obligations of Public Faith. Slavery was in itself a perpetual repudiation, and slave-masters were unblushing repudiators. Such an example is not fit for our Nation at this great period of its history.

It is one of the calamities of war, that, while it compels the employment of large means, it blunts the moral sense, and breeds too frequently an insensibility to the obligations incurred. A national debt shares for the time the exceptional character of war itself. Contracted hastily, it is little regarded except as a burden. At last, when business is restored and all things assume their natural proportions, it is recognized in its true character. The country accommodates itself to the pressure. This time is now at hand among us, if not arrested by disturbing influences. Unhappily, the demands of Public Faith are met by higgling and chaffering, and we are gravely reminded that the “bloated bond-holders” now expect more than they gave,—forgetting that they gave in the darkness of the war, at the appeal of the Nation, and to keep those armies in the field through which its existence was preserved,—forgetting also that among these bond-holders, now so foully stigmatized, were the poor, as well as the rich, all giving according to their means. It was not in the ordinary spirit of money-lending that those contributions were made. Love of country entered into them, and made them more than money. If the interest was considerable, it was only in proportion to the risk. Every loan at that time was a contract of bottomry on the Nation,—like money lent to a ship in a strange port, and conditioned on its arrival safe at home,—so that it failed entirely, if Slavery, by the aid of Foreign Powers, established its supremacy. God be praised, the enemy has been overcome! It remains now that we should overcome that other enemy, which, hardly less malignant than war itself, would despoil the Nation of its good name and take from it all the might of honesty. And here to every citizen, and especially to every legislator, I would address those incomparable words of Milton in his sonnet to Fairfax:—