The proposition to pay bonds in greenbacks becomes futile and fatuous, when it is considered that such an operation would be nothing more than the substitution of greenbacks for bonds, and not a payment of anything. The form of the debt would be changed, but the debt would remain. Of the twenty-five hundred millions which we now owe, whether in greenbacks or bonds, every dollar must be paid, sooner or later, or be ignobly repudiated. By paying the interest of the bonds in coin, instead of greenbacks, the annual increase of the debt to this extent is prevented. But the principal remains to be paid. If this be attempted in greenbacks, it will be by an issue far beyond all the demands of the currency. There will be a deluge of greenbacks. The country must suffer inconceivably under such a dispensation. The interest on the bonds may be stopped by the substitution, but the currency will be depreciated infinitely beyond any such dishonest saving. The country will be bankrupt. Inconvertible paper will overspread the land, to the exclusion of coin or any chance of coin for some time to come. Farewell then to specie payments! Greenbacks will be everywhere. The multitudinous rats that swam the Rhine and devoured Bishop Hatto in his tower were not more destructive. The cloud of locusts described by Milton as “warping on the eastern wind” and “darkening all the land of Nile,” were not more pestilential.

I am now brought to the practical question, to which I have already alluded: How the public burdens shall be lightened. Of course, in this work, the Public Faith, if kept sacred, will be a constant and omnipresent agency, powerful in itself, and powerful also in its reinforcement of all other agencies.

It will not seem trivial, if I insist on systematic economy in the administration of the Government. All needless expenditure must be lopped off. Our swollen appropriations must be compressed. Extravagance and recklessness, so natural during a period of war, must give way to moderation and thrift. All this without any denial of what is just or beneficent. The rule should be economy without niggardliness. Always there must be a good reason for whatever we spend. Every dollar, as it leaves the National Treasury, must be able to exhibit its passport. Doubtless the army and navy can be further reduced without detriment to the public service. Beyond this great saving there should be a constant watchfulness against those schemes of public plunder, great and small, from which the Nation has latterly suffered so much. All these things are so plain as to be little more than truisms.

Another help will be found in the simplification of our system of taxation, so that it shall be less complex and shall apply to fewer objects. In Europe taxation has become a science, according to which the largest possible amounts are obtained at the smallest possible inconvenience. Instead of sweeping through all the highways and byways of life, leaving no single thing unvisited, the English system has a narrow range and visits a few select articles only. I see no reason why we should not profit by this example, much to the convenience of the Government and of the citizen. The tax-gatherer will never be a very welcome guest, but he may be less of an intruder than now. A proper tax on two articles, whiskey and tobacco, with proper securities for its collection, would go far to support the Government.

Still another agency will be found in some proper scheme for a diminution of the interest on our national debt, so far as this can be done without a violation of Public Faith; and this brings me to the very bill now before the Senate.

All are anxious to relieve the country from recurring liabilities, which come round like the seasons. How can this be done best? First, by the strict performance of all existing engagements, so that the Public Faith shall be our inseparable ally; and, secondly, by funding the existing debt in such ways as to provide a reduced rate of interest. A longer term would justify a smaller interest. There may be differences as to the form of the substitute, but it would seem as if something of this kind must be done.

Immediately after the close of the war, as the smoke of battle was disappearing, but before the national ledger was sufficiently examined to justify a comparison between liabilities and resources, there was a generous inclination to proceed at once to the payment of the national debt. Volunteers came forward with their contributions for this purpose, in the hope that the generation which suppressed the Rebellion might have the added glory of removing this great burden. This ardor was momentary. It was soon seen that the task was too extensive, and that it justly belonged to another generation, with aggrandized population and resources, in presence of which the existing debt, large to us, would be small. Here the census has its instructive lesson. According to the rate of increase in past years, our population will advance in the following proportion:—

The resources of the country, already so vast, will swell in still larger proportions. Population increasing beyond example, improved systems of communication expanding in every direction, and the mechanical arts with their infinite activities old and new,—all these must carry the Nation forward beyond any present calculation, so that the imagination tires in the effort to grasp the mighty result. Therefore to the future we may tranquilly leave the final settlement of the national debt, meanwhile discharging our own incidental duty, so that the Public Faith shall be preserved.

Here is a notable difference between the United States and other countries, where population and resources have arrived at such a point that future advance is very gradual. With us each decade is a leap forward; with them it marks a gradation sometimes scarcely appreciable. This difference must not be forgotten in the estimate of our capacity to deal with a debt larger than that of any European power except England. But we must confess our humiliation, as we find that our debt, with its large interest in coin, secured by mortgage on the immeasurable future of the Nation, is less regarded abroad than the English debt, with its smaller interest and its more limited security. Our sixes will command only seventy-four per cent. in the market of London, while the three per cent. consols of England are freely bought at ninety-four per cent. One of our bonds brings twenty per cent. less than an English bond, although the interest on it is one hundred per cent. more. I know no substantial reason for this enormous difference, except in the superior credit established by England. With the national credit above suspicion, our debt must stand as well, and, as our multiplying resources become known, even better still. Thus constantly are we brought to the same lesson of Public Faith.

In spite of the general discredit of our national stocks abroad, Massachusetts fives payable in 1894 sell at the nominal price of 84, with the pound sterling at $4.44, equal to 91½ in our gold, with the pound sterling at $4.83. There can be no other reason for this higher price than the superior credit enjoyed by Massachusetts; and thus again is Public Faith exalted. Why should not the Nation, with its infinite resources, surpass Massachusetts?

The bill before us proposes a new issue of bonds, redeemable in coin after twenty, thirty, and forty years, with interest at five per cent., four and one half per cent., and four per cent., in coin, exempt from State or municipal taxation, and also from national taxation, except the general tax on income,—these bonds to be used exclusively for the conversion of an equal amount of the interest-bearing debt of the United States, except the existing five per cent. bonds and the three per cent. certificates. These proposed bonds have the advantage of being explicit in their terms. The obligations of the Government are fixed clearly and unchangeably beyond the assaults of politicians.

A glance at the national debt will show the operation of this measure. The sum-total on the 1st of February, 1868, according to the statement from the Treasury, was $2,514,315,373, being, in round numbers, twenty-five hundred millions. Out of this may be deducted legal-tender and fractional notes, as currency, amounting to $388,405,565, and several other smaller items. The following amounts represent the portions of debt provided for by this bill:—

This considerable sum may be funded under the proposed bill.

If this large portion of the national debt, with its six per cent. interest in coin, can be funded at a less interest, there will be a corresponding relief to the country. But there is one way only in which this can be successfully accomplished. It is by making the Public Faith so manifest that the holders will be induced to come into the change for the sake of the longer term. All that is done by them must be voluntary. Every holder must be free to choose. He may prefer his short bond at six per cent., or a long bond at five per cent., or a longer at four and one half per cent., or a still longer at four per cent. This is his affair. There must be no compulsion. Any menace of compulsion will defeat the transaction. It will be nothing less than Repudiation, with a certain loss of credit, which no saving of interest can repay. You must continue to borrow on a large scale; but who will lend to the repudiator, unless at a destructive discount? Any reduction of interest without the consent of the holders will reduce your capacity to borrow. A forced reduction of interest will be like a forced loan. While seeming to save interest, you will lose capital. Do not be deceived. Any compulsory conversion is only another form of Repudiation. It is tantamount to this declared crime. It is the same misdeed, taking still another shape,—as Proteus was the same heathen god in all his various transformations. It is Repudiation under an alias.

Happily the bill before us is free from any such damning imputation. The new bonds are authorized; but the holders of existing obligations are left free to exercise their judgment in making the change. I am assured by those who, from practical acquaintance with business, ought to know, that these bonds will be rapidly taken for the five-twenties.

The same bill, in its second section, sets apart $135,000,000 annually to the payment of the interest and the reduction of the principal of the national debt; and this is to be in lieu of a sinking fund. This is an additional security. It is another assurance of our determination to deal honestly.

The third section of the same bill is newer in its provisions, and, perhaps, more open to doubt. But, though uncertain with regard to it in the beginning, I have found that it commended itself on careful examination. On its face it provides for a system of conversion and reconversion. The holder of lawful money to the amount of $1,000, or any multiple of $1,000, may convert the same into the funded debt for an equal amount; and any holder of the funded debt may receive for the same at the Treasury lawful money, unless the notes then outstanding shall be equal to $400,000,000. If bonds in the funded debt shall be worth more than greenbacks, the latter would be converted into bonds according to the ordinary laws of trade. The latest relation of these two is as follows: $100 greenbacks equal seventy-one dollars gold; $100 five per cent. equal seventy-six dollars gold. If the greenbacks are convertible into the five per cent., they will, of course, be converted while the above relation continues. This must be so long as the national credit is maintained abroad and the demand for our securities continues there. By this process our greenbacks will be gradually absorbed, and those that are not absorbed will be lifted in value. It would seem as if bonds and greenbacks must both gain from this business, and with them the country must gain also. Here would be a new step to specie payments.

The bill closes with a provision authorizing contracts in coin, instead of greenbacks, according to the agreement of parties. This authority is in harmony with the other provisions of the bill, and is still another step toward specie payments.

I am now brought to the last branch of this discussion, in which all the others are absorbed: I mean the necessity of specie payments, or, in other words, the necessity of coin in the place of inconvertible paper. Other things are means to this end: this is the end itself. Until this is accomplished, Financial Reconstruction exists in aspiration only, and not in reality.

The suspension of specie payments was originally a war measure, like the suspension of the Habeas Corpus. It was so declared by myself at the time it was authorized. Pardon me, if I quote my own words in the debate on the bill:—

As a war measure, it should cease with the war, or so soon thereafter as practicable. It should not be continued a day beyond positive exigency. While the war lasted, it was a necessity, as the war itself. Its continuance now prolongs into peace this belligerent agency, and projects its disturbing influence into the most distant places. Like war, whose greatest engine it was, it is the cause of incalculable evil. Like war, it troubles the entire Nation, deranges business, and demoralizes the people. As I hate war, so do I hate all its incidents, and long to see them disappear. Already in these remarks I have pictured the financial anarchy of our country, the natural reflection of the political; but the strongest illustration is in a disordered currency, which is present to everybody with a dollar in his pocket.

The derangement of business may be seen at home and abroad. It is not merely derangement; it is dislocation. Everything is out of joint. Business has its disease also, showing itself in opposite conditions: shrunk at times, as with paralysis; swollen at times to unhealthy proportions, as with elephantiasis. The first condition of business is stability, which is only another form of security; but this is impossible, when nobody can tell from day to day the value of the currency. It may change in a night. The reasonable contract of to-day may become onerous beyond calculation to-morrow. There is no fixed standard. The seller is afraid to sell, the buyer afraid to buy. Nobody can sell or buy a farm, nobody can build or mortgage a house, except at an unnatural hazard. Salaries and all fixed incomes suffer. The pay of every soldier in the army, every sailor in the navy, every office-holder from the President to the humblest postmaster, is brought under this tyrannical influence. Harder still, innocent pensioners, wards of the Nation, must bear the same doom. Maimed soldiers, bereaved widows, helpless orphans, whose cup is already full, are compelled to see their scanty dole shrink before their sight till it seems ready to vanish in smoke.

A greenback is a piece of paper with a promise on its face and green on its back, declared to be money by Act of Congress, but which the Government refuses to pay. It is “failed paper” of the Government. The mischief of such a currency is everywhere, enveloping the whole country and penetrating all its parts. It covers all and enters all. It is a discredit to the national name, from which the Nation suffers in whole and in detail. It weakens the Nation and hampers the citizen. There is no national enterprise which it does not impede. The Pacific Railroad feels it. There is not a manufacture or business which does not feel it also. There is not a town, or village, or distant place, which it does not visit.

A practical instance will show one way in which individuals suffer on an extensive scale, being generally those who are least able. I follow an ingenious merchant, Mr. Atkinson, of Boston, whose figures sustain his conclusion, when I insist that our present currency, from its unstable character, operates as an extra tax of more than one hundred millions annually on the labor and business of the country; and this vast sum is taken from the pockets of the people, not for the support of the Government, but to swell the unreported fund out of which the excesses of the present day are maintained. There are few business men who would not put the annual loss in their affairs, from the fluctuation in the currency, somewhere from one to five per cent. One per cent. is the lowest. Mr. Hazard, of Rhode Island, puts it at two per cent. Now the aggregate sales in the fiscal year ending June, 1867, were over eleven thousand millions ($11,000,000,000) in currency, excluding sales of stocks or bonds. One per cent. on this prodigious amount represents a tax of one hundred and ten millions, paid annually by consumers, according to their consumption, and not in any degree according to their ability. This is one instance only of the damages annually paid on account of our currency. If we estimate the annual tax at more than one per cent., the sum-total will be proportionally larger. Even at the smallest rate, it is many millions more than all the annual expenses of our Government immediately preceding the Rebellion.

Fluctuations in the measure of value are as inconvenient and fatal as fluctuations in the measures of length and bulk. A dollar which has to-day one value and to-morrow another is no better than a yard which has to-day one length and another to-morrow, or a bushel which has to-day one capacity and another to-morrow. It is as uncertain as “Equity” measured by the varying foot of successive chancellors, sometimes long and sometimes short, according to the pleasant illustration of Selden in his “Table-Talk.” Such fluctuations are more than a match for any prudence. Business is turned into a guess, or a game of hazard, where the prevailing anarchy is overruled by accident:—

In such a condition of things the gamblers have the advantage. The stock exchange becomes little better than a faro bank. By such scenes the country is demoralized. The temptation of excessive gains leads from the beaten path of business. Speculation without money takes the place of honest industry, extending from the stock exchange everywhere. The failed paper of the Government teaches the lesson of bankruptcy. The Government refuses to take up its notes, and others do likewise. These things cannot be without a shock to public morals. Honesty ceases to be even a policy. Broken contracts prepare the way for crime, which comes to complete the picture.

Our foreign commerce is not less disturbed; for here we are brought within the sphere of other laws than our own. Gold is the standard of business throughout the civilized world. Until it becomes again the standard among us, we are not, according to the familiar phrase of President Lincoln, in “practical relation” with the civilized world. We are States out of the great Union. Our currency has the stamp of legality at home, but it is worthless abroad. In all foreign transactions we are driven to purchase gold at a premium, or to adopt a system of barter which belongs to the earlier stages of commerce. Corn, wheat, and cotton are exchanged for the products we desire, and this traffic is the coarse substitute for that refined and plastic system of exchanges which adapts itself so easily to all the demands of business. Commerce with foreign powers is prosecuted at an incalculable disadvantage. Our shipping, which in times past has been the pride of the Nation, whitening every sea with its sails, is reduced in number and value. Driven from the ocean by pirate flags during the Rebellion, it cannot struggle back to its ancient supremacy until the accustomed laws of trade once more resume their rule.

There are few who will deny the transcendent evil which I have set forth. There are few who will advocate inconvertible paper as currency. How shall the remedy be applied? On this question, so interesting to the business and good name of the country, there are theories without number,—some so ingenious as to be artificial rather than natural. What is natural is simple; and I am persuaded that our remedy must be of this character.

The legal-tender note, which we wish to expel from our currency, has two different characters: first, as mere currency, for use in the transactions of business; and, secondly, as real value, from the assurance that ultimately it will be paid in coin, according to its promise. These two different characters may be sententiously expressed as availability and convertibility. The notes are now available without being convertible. Our desire is to make them convertible,—in other words, the equivalent of coin in value, dollar for dollar. On the 1st of June last past these notes were $388,675,802 in amount.

Discarding theories, however ingenious, and following Nature, I call attention to a few practical points, before reverting to those cardinal principles applicable to this subject, from which there can be no appeal.

First. The present proposition for funding is an excellent measure for this purpose, being at once simple and practical: not that it contains any direct promise for the redemption of our currency, but because it places the national debt on a permanent footing at a smaller interest than is now paid. By this change three things essential to financial reconstruction are promoted: economy, stability, and national credit. With these once established, specie payments cannot be long postponed.

Secondly. Another measure of immediate value is the legalization of contracts in coin, so that henceforth all agreements made in coin may be legally enforced in coin or its equivalent. This would establish specie payments wherever parties desired, and to this extent begin the much-desired change. Contracts in coin would increase and multiply, until the exception became the rule. There would for a time be two currencies; but the better must gradually prevail. The essential equity of the new system would be apparent, while there would be a charm in once more looking upon familiar faces long hidden from sight, as the hoarded coin came forth. Nor can any possible injury ensue. The legalization is applicable only to future contracts, as the parties mutually agree. Every citizen in this respect would be a law to himself. If he chose in his own business to resume specie payments, he could do so. There would be a voluntary resumption by the people, one by one. But this influence could not be confined to the immediate parties. Beyond the contagion of its example, there would be a positive necessity on the part of the banks that they should adapt themselves to the exigency by the substitution of proper commercial equivalents; and thus again we take another step in specie payments.

Thirdly. Another measure of practical value is the contraction of the existing currency, so as to bring it on a par with coin, dollar for dollar. Before alluding to any of the expedients to accomplish this precious object, it is important to arrive at some idea of the amount of currency of all kinds required for the business of the country. To do this, we may look at the currency before the Rebellion, when business was in its normal condition. I shall not occupy space with tables, although they are now before me, but content myself with results. From the official report of the Treasury it appears that on the 1st of January, 1860, the whole active circulation of the country, including bank circulation, bank deposits available as currency, specie in bank, specie in Treasury, estimated specie in circulation, and deducting reserves, amounted to $542,097,264. It may be assumed that this sum-total was the amount of currency required at the time. From the same official tables it appears that on the 1st of October, 1867, the whole active circulation of the country, beginning with greenbacks and fractional currency, and including all the items in the other account, amounted to $1,245,138,193. Thus from 1860, when the currency was normal, to 1867, some time after the suspension of specie payments, there was an increase of one hundred and thirty per cent. Omitting bank deposits for both years, the increase was one hundred and forty-six per cent. Making due allowance for the increase of population, business, and Government transactions, there remains a considerable portion of this advance which must be attributed to the abnormal condition of the currency. I follow various estimates in putting this at sixty or seventy per cent., representing the difference of prices at the two different periods, and the corresponding excess of currency above the requirements of the country. Therefore, for the reduction of prices, there must be a reduction of the currency; and this must be to the amount of $300,000,000. So it seems, unless these figures err.

Against the movement for contraction, which is commended by its simplicity and its tendency to a normal condition of things, we have two adverse policies,—one, the stand-still policy, and the other, worse yet, the policy of inflation. By the first the currency is left in statu quo,—stationary,—subject to the influence of other conditions, which may operate to reduce it. Better stand still than move in a wrong direction. By the latter the currency is enlarged at the expense of the people,—being at once a tax and a derangement of values. You pamper the morbid appetite for paper money, and play the discarded part of John Law. You blow up a bladder, without thinking that it is nothing but a bladder, ready to burst. As the volume of currency is increased, the purchasing power of each dollar is reduced in proportion. As you add to the currency, you take from the dollar. You do little more than mark your goods at higher prices, and imagine that they have increased in value. Already the price is too high. Do not make it higher. Already the currency is corrupted. Do not corrupt it more. The cream has been reduced to skimmed milk. Do not let it be reduced to chalk and water. Let there be national cream for all the people.

Obviously any contraction of the currency must be conducted with caution, so as to interfere as little as possible with existing interests. It should be understood in advance, so that business may adapt itself to the change. Once understood, it must be pursued wisely to the end. I call attention to a few of the expedients by which this contraction may be made.

1. Any holder may have liberty to fund his greenbacks in bonds, as he may desire; so that, as coin increases, they will be merged in the funded debt, and the currency be reduced in corresponding proportion.

2. Greenbacks, when received at the Treasury, may be cancelled, or they may be redeemed directly, so far as the coin on hand will permit.

3. Greenbacks may be converted into compound-interest notes, to be funded in monthly instalments, running over a term of years, thus reaching specie payments within a brief period.

4. Another expedient, more active still, is the application of the coin on hand to the payment of greenbacks at a given rate,—say $6,000,000 a month,—selecting for payment those holders who present the largest amount of five-twenties for conversion into the long bonds at a low rate of interest, or shall pay the highest premium on such bonds.

I mention these as expedients, having the authority of financial names, calculated to operate in the same direction, without violent change or spasmodic action. Under their mild and beneficent influence the currency would be gradually reduced, so that the final step, when taken, would be hardly felt. With so great an object in view, I do not doubt its accomplishment at an early day, if the Nation only wills it. “Where there is a will, there is a way”; and never was this proverb truer than on this occasion. To my mind it is clear, that, when the Nation wills a currency in coin, then must this victory over the Rebellion be won,—provided always that there is no failure in those other things on which I have also dwelt as the conditions precedent of this final victory.

How vain it is to expect Financial Reconstruction until Political Reconstruction has been completed I have already shown. How vain to expect specie payments until the Nation has once more gained its natural vigor, and it has become one in reality as in name! Let this be, and the Nation will be like a strong man, in the full enjoyment of all his forces, coping with the trials of life.

There must also be peace within our borders, so that there shall be no discord between President and Congress. Therefore, so long as Andrew Johnson is President, the return to specie payments is impossible. So long as a great party, called Democratic, better now called Rebel, wars on that Political Reconstruction which Congress has organized, there can be no specie payments. So long as any President, or any political party, denies the Equal Rights of the freedman, it is vain to expect specie payments. Whoso would have equity must do equity; and now, if you would have specie payments, you must do this great equity. The rest will follow. When General Grant said, “Let us have peace,” he said also, “Let us have specie payments.” Among all the blessed gifts of peace there is none more certain.

Nor must it be forgotten that there can be no departure in any way from the requirements of Public Faith. This is a perpetual obligation, complete in all respects, and just as applicable to the freedman as to the bond-holder. Repudiation in all its forms, direct or indirect, whether of the freedman or the bond-holder, must be repudiated. The freedman and bond-holder are under the same safeguard, and there is the same certain disaster from any repudiation of either. Unless the Public Faith is preserved inviolate, you cannot fund your debt at a smaller interest, you cannot convert your greenbacks, you cannot comply with the essential terms of Reconstruction. Amid all surrounding abundance you are poor and powerless, for you are dishonored. Do not say, as an apology, that all should have the same currency. True as this may be, it is a cheat, when used to cover dishonor. The currency of all should be coin, and you should lift all the national creditors to this solid platform rather than drag a single citizen down. A just Equality is sought by levelling up instead of levelling down. In this way the national credit will be maintained, so that it will be a source of wealth, prosperity, and renown.

Pardon me, if now, by way of recapitulation, I call your attention to three things in which all others centre. The first is the Public Faith. The second is the Public Faith. The third is the Public Faith. Let these be sacredly preserved, and there is nothing of power or fame which can be wanting. All things will pay tribute to you, even from the uttermost parts of the sea. All the sheaves will stand about, as in the dream of Joseph, and make obeisance to your sheaf. Good people, especially all concerned in business, whether commerce, banking, or labor, our own compatriots or the people of other lands, will honor and uphold the nation which, against all temptation, keeps its word.

NO REPRISALS ON INNOCENT PERSONS.

MR. PRESIDENT,—Before entering upon this discussion, I wish to read a brief telegram, which came by the cable last evening, as follows:—

Add to this important information the well-known fact, that the United States have already ratified treaties with North Germany and Bavaria, and that we are engaged in negotiating treaties with other powers, for the settlement of this vexed question, and we may surely approach this discussion without any anxiety, except for the honor of our country.

Permit me to say, at the outset, that the declared object of the present bill is all lost in certain special features, which are nothing less than monstrous, and utterly unworthy of a generous Republic hoping to give an example to mankind. Surely, Sir, it is noble to reach out and protect the rights of the citizen at home and abroad; but no zeal in this behalf should betray us into conduct which cannot be regarded without a blush.

This bill proposes to confer upon the President prodigious powers, such as have never been lavished before in our history. They are without precedent. On this account alone they should be considered carefully; and they should not be granted, unless on good reason. If it be shown that they are not only without precedent, but that they are inconsistent with the requirements of modern civilization, that they are of evil example, and that they tend directly to war,—then, on this account, we should hesitate still more before we venture to grant them. Not lightly can a nation set itself against the requirements of civilization; not lightly can a nation do an act of evil example; not lightly can a nation take any step toward war. The whole business is solemn. Nothing graver could challenge the attention of the Senate.

Two powers are conferred upon the President: first, to suspend commercial relations with a foreign government, and, secondly, to arrest and detain in custody any subject of a foreign government found within the jurisdiction of the United States. The suspension of commercial relations, and the arrest of innocent foreigners, simply at the will of the President,—these are the two powers. It would be difficult to imagine greater.

We have had in our own history the instance of an embargo, when all our merchant ships were kept at home and forbidden to embark in foreign commerce. That measure was intended to save our commerce from insult and our sailors from impressment. This was done by Act of Congress. I am not aware of any instance, in our own history or in the history of any other country, where there has been a suspension of commercial relations with any foreign power, unless as an act of war. The moment war is declared, there is, from the fact of war, a suspension of commercial relations with the hostile power. Commerce with that power is impossible, and there can be no contract even between the citizens or subjects of the two powers. But this is war. It is now proposed to do this same thing and to call it peace. The proposition is new, absolutely new. Not an instance of history, not a phrase in the Law of Nations, sanctions it. I need not say how little congenial it is with the age in which we live. The present object of good men is to make war difficult, if not impossible. Here is a way to make war easy. To the President is given this alarming power. In Europe war proceeds from the sovereign: in England, from the Queen in Council; in France, from Louis Napoleon. This is according to the genius of monarchies. By the Constitution of our Republic it is Congress alone that can declare war. And yet by this bill One Man, in his discretion, may do little short of declaring war. He may hurl one of the bolts of war, and sever the commercial relations of two great powers. Consider well what must ensue. Suppose the bolt is hurled at England. All that various commerce on which so much depends, all that interchange of goods which contributes so infinitely to the wants of each, all that shipping and all those steamers traversing the ocean between the two, all the multitudinous threads of business by which the two peoples are woven together, warp and woof, as in a mighty loom,—all these must be severed.

The next power conferred on the President is like unto the first in its abnormal character. It is nothing less than authority, in his discretion, to make reprisals, by seizing innocent foreigners happening to be in the United States. The more this is considered, the more it must be regarded with distrust.

Reprisals belong to the incidents of war in the earlier ages, before civilization had tempered the rudeness of mankind. All reprisals are of doubtful character. Reprisals on persons are barbarous. I do not say, that, according to the received rights of war, some terrible occasion may not arise even for this barbarous agency; but I insist that it is frowned upon by all the best authorities even in our own country, that it is contrary to enlightened reason, and that it is utterly without any recent example. Admitting that such reprisals are not entirely discarded by writers on the Law of Nations, they are nevertheless condemned. By the rights of war, as once declared, the lives of prisoners taken on the field of battle were forfeit. Early history attests the frequency of this bloody sacrifice. Who now would order the execution of prisoners of war? The day has passed when any such outrage can be tolerated. But it is hardly less barbarous to seize innocent persons whom business or pleasure has brought within your peaceful jurisdiction, under the guaranty of the Public Faith.

I am unwilling to occupy time on a matter which is so clear in the light of modern civilization, and of that enlightened reason which is the handmaid to civilization. And yet the present effort will justify me in exposing the true character of reprisals, as seen in the light of history.

Reprisals were recognized by the Greeks, but disowned by the Romans. According to Bynkershoek, who is so much quoted on the Law of Nations, “there is no instance of such wickedness in the history of that magnanimous people; neither do their laws exhibit the least trace of it.”[239] This is strong language, and is in itself a condemnation of this whole agency. It is of the more weight, as the author is our austerest authority on questions of the Law of Nations, giving to the rights of war the strongest statement. According to him, reprisals are nothing less than “wickedness” (improbitas), and unworthy of a magnanimous people. During the Middle Ages, and afterwards, reprisals were in vogue; but they never found favor. They have been constantly reprobated. Even when formally sanctioned, they have been practically excluded by safeguards and conditions. In a treaty between Cromwell and the States-General there was a stipulation against reprisals, “unless the prince whose subject shall conceive himself to have been injured shall first lay his complaint before the sovereign whose subject is supposed to have committed the tortious act, and unless that sovereign shall not cause justice to be rendered to him within three months after his application.”[240] This stipulation was renewed under Charles the Second.[241] The same principle was declared by the Grand Pensionary, De Witt, who, in the name of the United Provinces, protested, “that reprisals cannot be granted, except in case of an open denial of justice,” and “that, even in case of a denial of justice, a sovereign cannot empower his subjects to make reprisals, until he has repeatedly demanded justice for them.”[242] A similar rule was also declared in the famous letter to the King of Prussia, in the case of the Silesian loan, written by Murray, afterward Lord Mansfield, and much praised by Montesquieu and by Vattel.[243] Here it is said: “The Law of Nations, founded upon justice, equity, convenience, and the reason of the thing, and confirmed by long usage, does not allow of reprisals, except in case of violent injuries, directed or supported by the State, and justice absolutely denied, in re minime dubia, by all the tribunals, and afterwards by the prince.”[244] This is clear and strong. I might quote authorities without end to the same point. I content myself with adding the words of General Halleck, who, after saying, in his admirable manual, that “reprisals bring us to the awful confines of actual war,” proceeds to lay down the rule, that reprisals, even on property, can be only “where justice has been plainly denied or most unreasonably delayed.”[245] This rule commends itself as proper and just. It is your duty to apply it on the present occasion. But, in the face of the authorities in our own country, judges, jurists, publicists, and commentators, in long array, according to whom our own claim of allegiance is coincident with that of England,—and then, again, in face of the well-known and much-heralded disposition of foreign powers, including England, to settle this whole question by treaty, is it not absurd to say that here is a case for reprisals of any kind?

In the early days reprisals were directed against persons as well as property. Even against property it was done with hesitation, only in cases free from all doubt, and after ample appeal to the sovereign for justice. Against persons it was done very rarely. Grotius, our greatest master, who brought the rules of International Law to the touchstone of reason, asserts that all reprisals are vindicated by custom rather than by Nature. His language is, that this rule “is not indeed authorized by Nature, but generally received by custom.”[246] Since then the tendency has been to a constant mitigation of this pretension, even as regards property. Without burdening this discussion with cases, which are numerous, I give a summary of Wheaton in these words: “It appears to be the modern rule of international usage, that property of the enemy found within the territory of the belligerent state, or debts due to his subjects by the Government or individuals, at the commencement of hostilities, are not liable to be seized and confiscated as prize of war.”[247] This rule, which is applicable to the condition of things on the breaking out of war, attests the care with which the modern Law of Nations watches the rights of individuals, and how it avoids making them suffer. Thus even debts are not liable to seizure. How much more should an innocent person be exempt from any such outrage!

It is when we consider the modern rule with regard to persons, instead of property, that we are impressed still more by its benignity. Here I quote, first a British authority, and then an American. Mr. Phillimore, the author of the very elaborate and candid treatise on the Law of Nations, so full of various learning, after admitting that reprisals, “strictly speaking, affect the persons as well as the goods,” proceeds to say, that, “in modern times, however, they have been chiefly confined to goods”; and then adds, in words worthy of consideration now, that “it is to be hoped that the reprisal of persons has fallen, with other unnecessary and unchristian severities, into desuetude; and certainly, to seize travellers, by way of reprisal, is a breach of the tacit faith pledged to them by the State, when they were allowed to enter her borders.”[248] The same enlightened conclusion is expressed by Dana, in his excellent notes to Wheaton, as follows: “The right of making reprisals is not limited to property, but extends to persons; still, the practice of modern times discountenances the arrest and detention of innocent persons strictly in the way of reprisal.”[249] Thus do British and American publicists concur in homage to a common civilization.

If we look at the reason of the modern rule which spares persons, we shall find it in two different considerations, each of controlling authority: first, that an innocent person cannot be seized in a foreign country without a violation of the Public Faith; and, secondly, that no private individual can be justly held responsible for the act of his Government. On the first head Vattel speaks as follows: “The sovereign who declares war can no more detain the subjects of the enemy who are found in his states at the time of the declaration than he can their effects. They have come into his dominions on the Public Faith. In permitting them to enter his territories and continue there he tacitly promised them full liberty and full security for their return.”[250] In the same sense Halleck says, “Travellers and passing guests are in general excepted from such liability.”[251] Here again Grotius speaks with the authority of a Christian lawgiver, saying that by the Law of Nations there can be no reprisals “on travellers or sojourners.”[252] The other reason was assigned by Mr. Webster, in his correspondence with the British Government in relation to the “Caroline.” The British Government having acknowledged the act of McLeod in burning this vessel as their act, Mr. Webster at once declared, that, after this avowal, the individuals engaged in it could not be held personally responsible, and he added words worthy of memory at this juncture: “The President presumes that it can hardly be necessary to say that the American people, not distrustful of their ability to redress public wrongs by public means, cannot desire the punishment of individuals, when the act complained of is declared to have been an act of the Government itself.”[253] Weighty words, by which our country is forever bound. The same principle is adopted by Halleck, in his text-book, when he says, “No individual is justly chargeable with the guilt of a personal crime for the act of the community of which he is a member.”[254] All these authorities furnish us the same lesson, and warn against the present proposition. Shall we at the same time violate the Public Faith and wreak a dishonorable vengeance on an innocent traveller or sojourner, making him the scapegoat of his country? Shall we do this outrage to the stranger within our gates?

Another argument may be found in the extent to which reprisal on persons has been discarded by modern precedents. It is denounced, not only by authority, but also by practice. I have already said that the proposition to suspend commercial relations is without an example in history. The other proposition is without example since the hateful act of the first Napoleon, condemned afterward by himself, when, at the breaking of the short-lived Peace of Amiens, he seized innocent Englishmen who happened to be in France, and detained them as prisoners, precisely as is now proposed under the present bill. Among the numerous victims of this tyrannical decree was Lord Elgin, the father of the late Sir Frederick Bruce, on his return from Constantinople, where he had been ambassador. There was also an ingenious scholar, of feeble health, but exquisite attainments, Joseph Forsyth, author of one of the best books ever written on Italy.[255] He, too, was seized. In the preface to his admirable work his family have recorded the outrage. Read it, if you would know the judgment that awaits such a transaction. There is also another record in the pages of the English historian who has pictured the events of that time.