[105] Major Rawlinson, preparatory to the commencement of the work of disarming, took a census of the inhabitants of the city, which greatly alarmed the people, as it was believed to be our intention to expel them. When it was found that they were only to be disarmed, they recovered their serenity, and submitted very patiently to the ordeal.

[106] “February 11.—I am becoming seriously alarmed about money. A lakh is the utmost that I shall be able to raise from the Candahar merchants, and with the most rigid economy this will hardly last us to the end of March—the godowns at the same time being opened to supply the troops. It seems, therefore, absolutely indispensable that the road should be opened from the south, either by Outram or ourselves.”—[Major Rawlinson’s MS. Journal.]

[107] “February 21.—Two Cossids reached me to-day from Leech, one with letters of the 13th and 15th, the other with letters of the 17th. Enclosed was a copy of a letter addressed to me by Major-General Elphinstone and Major Pottinger, requesting me to intimate to Major-General Nott their wish that he would evacuate Candahar and Khelat-i-Ghilzye, in pursuance of the agreement entered into at Caubul for the return of our troops to India. This letter appears to be genuine, but I cannot consider it in any way binding on us; and for the reasons stated in my letter to General Nott of the 1st instant, I still conceive that we are best consulting the interests of government in maintaining our position pending the receipt of further instructions from Calcutta.... The question regarding Shah Soojah is very perplexing. He is certainly nominally at the head of the government, and we can no longer be supposed to be here in support of his authority. Still, however, a month sooner or later in retiring can make little difference, and it seems to me indispensable that some definite arrangements, approved of by government, should be entered into for the future administration of the province before we withdraw our troops.”—[Major Rawlinson’s MS. Journal.]

[108] It ran thus: “Caubul, 25th December, 1841.—Sir,—It having been found necessary to conclude an arrangement, founded on that of the late Sir W. H. Macnaghten, for the evacuation of Afghanistan by our troops, we have the honour to request that you will intimate to the officer commanding at Candahar our wish that the troops now at that place and at Khelat-i-Ghilzye, together with the British authorities and troops within your jurisdiction, should return to India at the earliest convenient season. Newab Jubbar Khan, who is the bearer of this letter, will render you all the assistance in his power. He has been appointed Governor of Candahar on the part of the existing government.

”E. Pottinger.
“W. K. Elphinstone, M.-G.

“P.S.—If you require two or three days to make your preparations, you must not remain in the city, but proceed to your cantonment. Whatever you are obliged to leave behind, you will make over to the Newab Jubbar Khan.”

[109] “I have only to repeat,” wrote General Nott, on the 23rd of February, in reply to Major Rawlinson’s official letter on the subject of the evacuation orders received from Caubul, “that I will not treat with any person whatever for the retirement of the British troops from Afghanistan, until I shall have received instructions from the Supreme Government. The letter signed ‘Eldred Pottinger’ and ‘W. K. Elphinstone’ may, or may not, be a forgery. I conceive that these officers were not free agents at Caubul; and therefore their letter or order can have no weight with me.”—[MS. Correspondence.]

[110] Major Rawlinson’s MS. Journal.

[111] February 28.

[112] “I have been for some days past in communication with the Barukzye tribe, and have, I believe, succeeded in detaching them from the Douranee confederacy. They had deserted their villages and gone off to the desert; but, on a promise of protection, have now returned, and bound themselves to admit none of the enemy’s horse within their borders. The Alekozyes of the Urghundab also propose to enter into the same engagements; and if we can fairly detach these two powerful tribes, the Douranee cause must, I should think, expire of an atrophy.... Timour suggests that he should endeavour to get the Douranee chiefs to march on Caubul, in order to release the Shah from the Barukzyes, feigning that he has received his father’s instructions to this effect; and I see no objection to such an attempt being made. I also hear that the Caubul Janbaz insist on proceeding to the north, and that Meerza Ahmed has the greatest difficulty in restraining them.”—[Major Rawlinson’s MS. Journal.]

[113] “March 1.—The General now has made up his mind to take the field; and, after considering the case fully, I have determined that the Afghans must be turned out of the city. It is not as if the present affair were a mere transient disturbance. We are engaged in a regular national war, and Outram does not anticipate that we shall be able to take the field in sufficient force to put down all opposition before next winter. We must, therefore, look forward to a protracted struggle at Candahar all through the summer; and the security of the city appears to me, under such circumstances, indispensable.”—[Major Rawlinson’s MS. Journal.]

[114] A week before, a strong conviction of the necessity of the measure had forced itself upon his mind. But he was only too willing to postpone the execution of it. On the 22nd of February he wrote: “The Moollahs are now again stirring themselves, and I have very good grounds for supposing a large quantity of arms to be concealed. I almost fear that affairs are approaching that state when, for our immediate safety, we shall be obliged to incur the odium of expelling the Moollahs and Afghans from the city. It is not that these people can do us any serious injury within the city; but the probability of an insurrection inside the walls simultaneously with the disturbances outside, gives confidence to Meerza Ahmed’s party and dispirits our Parsewan adherents. It is to be considered, however, that if we expel the Afghans and retain the Parsewans, we shall embitter the national feeling against us with the rumour of sectarian animosity, and shall, moreover, sacrifice the Sheeah party in the event of our retirement. The most obvious necessity of self-preservation could alone, I think, warrant such a course, and I cannot doubt but that it is my duty to temporise as long as prudence will admit.”—[Major Rawlinson’s MS. Journal.]

[115] “No doubt much property has been sacrificed in carrying the measure into effect; but we have done all in our power to alleviate the evil. Valuable property, which the people were unable to take away with them, has been transferred to the safe keeping of the Hindoos and merchants who have remained, and the grain is to be all taken charge of by the commissariat, receipts in money being granted by us to the owners.”—[Major Rawlinson’s MS. Journal.]

[116] Captain Neill’s Recollections of Service in the East.

[117] “The plan of enticing the General to Telookham, delaying him there by keeping a body of horse in his vicinity, and then doubling back on the town, was all preconcerted by Meerza Ahmed; and on the night of the attack every chief in the country was present except the Noorzyes.”—[Major Rawlinson’s MS. Journal.]

[118] The gate had been closed for the night. Lieutenant Cooke was on guard, and was endeavouring to trace the movements of the enemy in the distance, when a villager drove his donkey, loaded with brushwood, over the bridge and demanded admission. He was told the gate would be opened for no one; upon which he growled out a malediction, and tossing the brushwood on the ground, said he would leave it there for the night, and take it into the town in the morning. The villager, having recrossed the bridge with his donkey, dived among the ruined huts opposite the Herat gate, and was out of shot in a moment. At the same instant flames burst forth from the brushwood, and the gate was fired.

[119] See the letter-press to Lieut. Rattray’s admirable drawings of the Scenery and Costumes of Afghanistan.

[120] The Ghazees had so damaged the canal banks, that the irrigation was destroyed, and there was every prospect of a failure of the crops; but through Rawlinson’s agency the people of the Urghundab were induced to labour at their repair, and in a short time the waters began again to flow in their accustomed course.

[121] General Nott to Major Rawlinson: March 25, 1842. [MS. Correspondence.]

[122] “In the charge of the horse under Saloo Khan, when after driving back our cavalry they were stopped by the fire of the guns and the light company of the 38th, which had been thrown out in advance, Yar Mahomed of Dehrawat, who was Saloo’s nephew, fell, and in another part of the field, Hubeeboollah, Akhondzadeh, and Mahomed Raheen, Noorzye, were wounded. The total loss of the enemy in killed and wounded I estimate, from all I could learn on the field and from the villagers, at about 150. We had a few men killed and some forty wounded. Amongst the latter are two cavalry officers, Chamberlaine, and Travers of the 2nd. The Douranee horse came on more boldly on this occasion than they had ever been seen to do before. Some of the 38th Sepoys, indeed, received sabre-cuts from our horsemen; but they cannot stand our artillery or musketry fire. They had been so taunted with cowardice, that they resolved to have one conflict with us before they quitted the vicinity of Candahar, and had not reinforcements gone out, they would have sustained, I doubt not, a much heavier loss, by making repeated charges on different parts of the camp during the afternoon.”—[Major Rawlinson’s MS. Journal.]

[123] Captain Neill’s Recollections of Service.

[124] Captain Neill.

[125] “A few squadrons of dragoons,” wrote Rawlinson in his journal, “would have swept the Douranee horse from the field; as it was, they were permitted to re-cross the river almost unmolested.”

[126] Major Rawlinson’s MS. Journal. Rawlinson adds: “Our own camp-followers, I also found, had committed extensive ravages, and when I endeavoured to persuade the people that our troops were there for their protection, they uniformly answered that they knew not whether they had most to fear from their friends or their enemies.”

[127] Major Leech to General Nott: Khelat-i-Ghilzye, March 9, 1842. MS.

[128] Two pounds.

[129] Shah Soojah claimed credit for having delayed his march.

[130] If there had been any one in Ghuznee acquainted with the use and practice of artillery, the garrison might have held out till April.

[131] “On the morning of the 10th, Poett and Davis were obliged to retire from their posts, and the survivors here now assembled in the two houses held by Colonel Palmer and the head-quarters of the corps. You cannot picture to yourself the scene these two houses presented; every room was crammed not only with Sepoys, but camp-followers, men, women, and children, and it is astonishing the slaughter among them was not greater, seeing that the guns of the citadel sent round-shot crashing through and through the walls. I saw high-caste men groping in the mud, endeavouring to discover pieces of unmelted ice, that by sucking them they might relieve the thirst that tormented them. Certainly, when that morning dawned, I thought it was the last I should see on this earth, and so did we all, and proceeded to make a few little arrangements ere the final attack on us took place. The regimental colours were burned, to prevent their falling into the hands of the enemy; I destroyed my watch, and flung it, and what money I had, over the wall of the ditch; I also burnt my poor wife’s miniature, first cramming the gold frame of it into a musket, being determined that one of the Ghazees should have his bellyful of gold ere I died. Hour after hour passed on, and still we sate expecting every minute to hear the shout of the final attack; but it came not. From our loopholes we saw the enemy swarming all around us—in every lane and house, and on the hill of the citadel—the place was black with their masses; and as they themselves afterwards told us, there were not less than ten thousand men thirsting for our blood.”—[Lieutenant Crawford’s Narrative.]

[132] Lieutenant Crawford says: “During the three preceding days’ fighting, Shumshoodeen had repeatedly offered us terms; but they were such as we could not accede to, inasmuch as they commenced by desiring we would surrender ourselves to him and abandon the Sepoys to the fury of the Ghazees. The Sepoys, it appears, had held a consultation among themselves, and believing they had no chance of their lives, determined on forcing their way out of the town and endeavour to get to Peshawur. When we first heard of this mad design and spoke to the men about it, they denied it; but, on the 10th, two Native officers came forward and told us they had made up their minds to go off that night—that if we chose to accompany them they would be exceedingly glad, but, if otherwise, they would go alone.”

[133] It is pleasant to record any act of individual heroism. The late Brigadier Nicholson, who fell at Delhi, in 1857, “then quite a stripling, when the enemy entered Ghuznee, drove them thrice back beyond the walls at the point of the bayonet before he would listen to the order given him to make his company lay down their arms. He at length obeyed, gave up his sword with bitter tears, and accompanied his comrades to an almost hopeless imprisonment.”—[Rattray.]

[134] How strongly Outram felt on the subject of the withdrawal policy may be gathered from the following passage in a letter to Sir Richmond Shakespear: “As this is not a time to mince matters, no sooner did I see the orders of government to General Pollock to withdraw the Jellalabad garrison, and to retire to India under any circumstances (except the Sikhs rising against us, which, by-the-by, that measure would have brought about most probably), than I wrote, in the most earnest manner I was capable of, pointing out that our bitterest foe could not have devised a more injurious measure, whether viewed politically or in a military light; but expressing my trust that Mr. Clerk would act on the responsibility vested in him to prevent so ruinous a step. My mind is now set at rest by General Pollock’s determination, now gleaned from your letters. I honour the General, therefore; and should he be allowed to carry out his views, we shall have mainly to thank him, not only for retrieving our honour in Afghanistan, but for saving India to us, the loss of which would ultimately result from disgracefully succumbing to the Afghans now.... Nothing is easier than to retrieve our honour in Afghanistan previously to finally withdrawing, should the government so determine; and I pray God, Lord Ellenborough may at once see the damnable consequences of shirking the undertaking, and order accordingly; otherwise the disaster of Caubul will be but the commencement of our misfortunes.”—[Major Outram to Sir Richmond Shakespear: March 15, 1842. MS. Correspondence.]

[135] Major Outram to Sir Richmond Shakespear: March 15, 1842. MS. Correspondence.

[136] “There are some officers in camp who think that Brigadier England’s detachment will be sacrificed between this and the Kojuck; but with such fine examples as those set by Woodburn on the Helmund, Anderson at Tazee, and Wymer at Assyai, surely there ought to be no doubt of success between this and the Kojuck, when no natural obstacles to signify intervene.”—[Lieutenant Hammersley to Major Outram: March 18, 1842. MS. Correspondence.]

[137] Major-General England to Government: April 2, 1842. Published Papers.

[138] Nott had resolutely refused to send any troops to meet England’s detachment, though earnestly pressed by Rawlinson to do so. The General urged that he could not afford to send troops to the Kojuck, whilst he was liable at any time to be called upon to proceed to the relief of Khelat-i-Ghilzye. Rawlinson pointed out the immense evils attending a total deprivation of treasure, and said that even the compulsory abandonment of Candahar might follow the failure of General England to effect the passage of the Kojuck. Nott, however, was obdurate. The detachment was not sent. Wymer’s brigade, however, was then out to the southward of Candahar, and it was believed that the object of the movement was to support the party advancing through the Kojuck. Nott withdrew the brigade to Candahar, and an impression gained ground among the enemy that we had endeavoured to open our communications with the troops below, but had drawn back in despair.

[139] Of the 20th Bombay Native Infantry. He was greatly esteemed as a gallant and good soldier. “They have a fine fellow at the head of the light battalion,” wrote Hammersley to Outram, a few days before the brigade left Quettah, “and it is to be hoped that he will inspire the crest-fallen with a little ardour.”—[MS. Correspondence.]

[140] “General England and his staff were dismounted, and standing in conversation not far from where the light companies had rallied. I joined them. It was useless to stand and lament over what could not be recalled. A retreat was determined upon. I observed to the General that the day might be retrieved, and offered to lead into the entrenched position with a hundred men properly supported; and I am confident that I should have succeeded. The men were in courage, and anxious to recover the bodies of their comrades. The General replied, he had not men. I proposed that the left hill should be attacked first, as it commanded the smaller one. The enemy were certainly in strength, and very bold, but our men burned with rage at seeing their comrades cut up before their eyes. I think I pressed my offer three times, the last time volunteering to lead with eighty men; but the General felt he had too few, and that the stake was too great.”—[Colonel Stacy’s Narrative of Services in Beloochistan and Afghanistan in the Years 1840, 1841, 1842.]

[141] It appears to have been England’s intention, after the disaster on the 28th, to have commenced his retreat on the same evening; but Colonel Stacy persuaded him not to move until the following morning. On the 29th he struck his camp and marched to Hykerzye, halted at Koochlag on the 30th, and on the 31st reached Quettah.

[142] Hammersley complained that the General’s letter was so very unsatisfactory, that if it had not been for some private letters, he would have been left in ignorance of the real nature of the events that had occurred. The original letter, now before me, is worth quoting. England seems to have been so unwilling to state distinctly that he had been defeated, that even when writing officially to General Nott on the 1st instant, he shrunk from a plain statement of the circumstances of the case; so that Nott, writing to him on the 18th, could only say: “I have been favoured with your letter of the 1st instant, &c.... I have also heard of the affair you had with the enemy on the 28th ult.” The letter to Nott is, however, less obscure than the letter to Hammersley, which runs thus:

“Camp, three miles south of Hykulzye, 2 P.M.

“My dear Hammersley,—I wish you would acquaint Colonel Marshall, that as the insurgent force has been much reinforced from Candahar, and have so strongly protected themselves with breastworks, &c., on the ground commanding our line of route this side of Hykulzye, I shall fall back to Hykerzye to-morrow, my presence here being now of no use, and inviting their insults; and it is probable that as the position at Hykerzye is not a good one, having much broken ground in its rear, that I shall further fall back on Cutchlak. I have had so many men killed and wounded by the enemy, that my baggage is increased whilst my means of defending it is lessened. If Colonel Marshall, through your information, thinks the Cutchlak Pass occupied, he may make such efforts as his numbers will enable him to keep it open and communicate with us; and as the enemy is a hundred to one stronger than any one imagined, I must wait for the reinforcements till I try them again. Meanwhile, the fortification of Quettah must be proceeded with vigorously. Show this to Colonel Marshall and Major Waddington.

“Sincerely yours (in haste),

“R. England.”

[143] “April 1.—The Douranees having received positive accounts from Mahomed Sadig of the advance of Brigadier England with treasure, have resolved to make an effort to intercept it. Saloo Khan accordingly, with Mahomed Azim (Noorzye), Fyz Tullub, Hubeeboollah, Sooltan Mahomed (Barukzye), &c., have gone off by the desert to the Kojuck Pass. The body of horse with the chiefs is about 1000; but they expect to raise some 4000 or 5000 of the Noorzye, Atchekzye, Barukzye, and Populzye Ooloos to assist in holding the pass.”—[Major Rawlinson’s MS. Journal.]

[144] “You will understand the insinuation,” wrote one of the most chivalrous of the many chivalrous officers who served beyond the Indus (James Outram). “If he is ever heard to libel our Sepoys in that manner, surely it will be noticed by our officers.”—[MS. Correspondence.]

[145] After adverting to the reported intention of England to leave Quettah with a small supply of money and ammunition, but not to push through the Kojuck, Nott goes on to say: “This I deeply regret; firstly, because I cannot send a force to the southern side of the pass; secondly, I require a large supply of ammunition, which I have for two years been endeavouring to get, but without success; thirdly, four lakhs of rupees will be of little use here—the troops and establishments are going on for four months in arrears; fourthly, your moving into Pisheen with a convoy, known by the whole country to be intended for Candahar, and then halting or retiring to Quettah, will have the very worst effects throughout Afghanistan, and will be more injurious to my present position than 20,000 of the enemy in the field. I sincerely hope that you have not moved, or that you have determined to push across the Kojuck with all the force you can muster.”—[General Nott to General England: April 2, 1842. MS. Records.]

[146] “I strongly advised Brigadier England, through Lieutenant Hammersley, in letters I addressed to them both so long ago as the 10th ultimo (March), to await at Quettah the junction of the remainder of his brigade, unless very urgent circumstances should require his more immediate advance to meet an advance from Candahar. The latter, so far from being the case, General Nott requested might not be attempted.”—[Major Outram to Captain Durand: April 3, 1842. MS. Correspondence.]

[147] General Nott to General England: April 2, 1842. MS. Records.

[148] General England to General Nott: April 10, 1842. MS. Records.

[149] There is so fine a soldierly flavour about this letter, that I give it entire in the Appendix.

[150] Colonel Stacy’s Narrative.

[151] Colonel Stacy’s Narrative.

[152] “These fine fellows had been led forward by Colonel Wymer, at daybreak, to occupy the heights commanding the pass from Chummemo to the western side, to secure General England’s party a safe passage. I have never seen our Sepoys to such advantage. It was impossible to climb the precipitous hills in pantaloons; this part of their dress had, therefore, been discarded, and the men were in their doties. As they showed on every accessible point, they were the admiration of all. I can easily imagine how painful it must have been to the Bombay regiments to find the Candahar troops in full possession of the pass before they were allowed to enter it.”—[Colonel Stacy’s Narrative.]

[153] “I have only,” wrote Nott, “to repeat my sentiments—namely, that I will not sanction a rupee being given from the British treasury to these people. I have for three years viewed with deep regret the ruinous system of giving away large sums to the chiefs and Sirdars of Afghanistan, which I sincerely believe has brought upon us all our present difficulties in this country. I have offered to guarantee the personal safety of Saloo Khan if he returns to his allegiance by a certain day. If there are any other chiefs who can make it appear that they are worthy of the indulgence of my guarantee for their personal safety, I will take their wishes into consideration; but I will make them no other promises. This does not apply to Mahomed Atta or to Meerza Ahmed, as I will not receive these two men on any terms, without the order of higher authority.”—[General Nott to Major Rawlinson: April 9, 1842. MS. Correspondence.]

[154] See Colonel Stacy’s Narrative, and his correspondence with Major Rawlinson. Rawlinson, however, doubted whether the negotiations with Saloo Khan would have a favourable result: “Had a long conference,” he wrote on the 10th of May, “with Atta-oollah Khan, who has come in to treat for his brother, Saloo; and the latter, if his agent is to be believed, certainly desires to espouse our cause. Knowing, however, as I do, Saloo’s ambition and avarice, I question very much whether we shall come to any satisfactory arrangement with him. We merely require Saloo Khan’s co-operation, in order to facilitate the re-establishment of our dawk communication; but the Khan talks of rank, power, and pay, as the return he has a right to expect for joining us, and is not likely to be satisfied with any moderate measure of conciliation.”—(Major Rawlinson’s MS. Journal.) Saloo Khan, however, in the sequel rendered good service and proved his fidelity in the face of strenuous opposition from some of the other chiefs: “His falling off from the cause of Islam,” wrote Rawlinson in his Journal, “has plunged him into personal difficulties. He has been twice attacked by Mahomed Sadig and Meer Afzul, and has been wounded, together with his brother and his nephew.”

[155] MS. Correspondence.

[156] MS. Correspondence.

[157] MS. Correspondence.

[158] MS. Correspondence.

[159] “Letters are said to have been received from the ex-Sirdars announcing their intended journey to this place, according to Meerza Ahmed’s invitation which was sent to them in January last. Mahomed Reza Khan of Seistan is also said to have promised to assist them with 100 camels, and to send horsemen to escort them to this frontier. This news appears to be vraisemblable in the extreme. If the ex-Sirdars can get away from Shuhur-i-Babek, either with or without the connivance of the Persian Government, nothing is more likely than that they should make an attempt to recover Candahar; and I should greatly dread their appearance on this frontier, for we are enabled to keep up the form, and something of the power of a local government, almost solely from the adherence to us of the old Barukzye retainers—people on whose fidelity we could not possibly depend if the Sirdars took the field against us.”—[Major Rawlinson’s MS. Journal: April 4, 1842.]

[160] “A messenger from Shah Persund Khan of Laush reports that two of the horsemen sent down to Kohun-dil-Khan in January by Meerza Ahmed returned lately, and gave out that they were only a few days in advance of the Sirdars, who had left Shuhur-i-Babek secretly, and were coming here viâ Seistan.”—[Major Rawlinson to General Nott: April 8, 1842. MS. Correspondence.]

[161] Kohun-dil-Khan did not make his appearance in person in the Candahar territory till the beginning of 1843, when we had announced to the Persian Government that we had withdrawn behind the Sutlej, and were indifferent as to what became of the Sirdars of Afghanistan.

[162] Mr. Maddock to General Pollock: February 24, 1842. Published Papers.

[163] “The information received with respect to the conduct of Shah Soojah during the late transactions is necessarily imperfect, and, moreover, of a somewhat contradictory character. It is not probable that the insurrection against our troops should have originated with him. It is most probable, and it is almost proved, that he has adopted it, and, powerless in himself, is prepared to side with either party, by which he may hope to be maintained upon his precarious throne.”—[Governor-General in Council to Sir Jasper Nicholls: March 15, 1842. Published Papers.]

[164] Mr. Maddock to General Nott: April 19, 1842. Published Papers.

[165] This is not only a remarkable letter in itself. It is remarkable for its misadventures. Its outer history is somewhat curious. It never found its way into the published volume of correspondence, and its existence was only to be inferred from the fact of a reference to it in another letter. It was at last brought to light by the inquiries in Parliament of Lord Lansdowne and Lord Palmerston. It was to be found nowhere in England; but a copy was at last elicited from India. The Governor-General then declared that “the original despatch of the 13th of May never reached the office, and must have been lost in transit. The duplicate was received and acknowledged on the 11th of July. It is the practice of the Secretary’s office to keep the unreported papers on all important subjects for each month together, and to forward copies of them to the Secret Committee by the monthly Overland Mail. The despatch in question was inadvertently put up in its proper place in the May bundle of reported papers, instead of being left for a time, as it should have been, among the unreported papers of July. Hence, when the July papers were copied for transmission to the Secret Committee, this despatch was omitted.” Nothing less explanatory than this was ever offered in the way of explanation. It does not appear whether the original letter miscarried altogether on its way to Lord Ellenborough, or whether it miscarried only on its way to the office. There is an equal obscurity about the history of the duplicate which was “received and acknowledged on the 11th of July.” It might be inferred from this that it was received on the 11th of July, and acknowledged on the same day. But it happens that the duplicate was despatched on the 30th of May—and ought surely to have come not among the July, but among the June papers. In this letter of the 11th of July the Secretary says: “I am directed to state that the original letter has never reached me, and that the duplicate has only lately been received and laid before the Governor-General, whose previous instructions to you appeared to render any special reply to this communication unnecessary.”—[MS. Records.] In the face of so distinct a denial as this, little can be said, except that in a letter from Pollock of May 20th, which was duly acknowledged, reference is made to the letter of the 13th. If that letter had not been received, some allusion certainly ought to have been made by Government to its non-receipt.

[166] There was no scarcity of provisions at Jellalabad at this time. But, to secure a continued supply, Pollock was sensible of the necessity of encouraging a belief throughout the country that the intentions of the British Government inclined towards a forward movement. “We are all quiet here,” he wrote on the 6th of May to Mr. Clerk, “grain coming in in abundance; at least, in as great quantities as we could expect after the dreadful alarm into which this force seems to have put the whole country. Every village was deserted. I did my utmost to protect them from plunder, and in most cases succeeded; and the consequence is that we, in a measure, command the resources of the country.” And on the 11th of the same month, writing again to Mr. Clerk, he said: “While I remain here I can command supplies, and I have no doubt that I shall be able to do so as long as the natives suppose that we intend remaining in the country; but if they thought otherwise, our supplies would be stopped.”—[MS. Correspondence.]

[167] Published Correspondence relating to Military Operations in Afghanistan.

[168] MS. Correspondence. In his journal, too, Rawlinson wrote: “The order to retire came upon us like a thunderbolt. We had not, from Lord Ellenborough’s former letter, thought such a measure possible until Caubul should be retaken. As there is no discretionary power, however, vested in General Nott by the late letter, he has only had to consider the best way of carrying the order into effect.”—[MS. Journal.]

[169] The 2nd, 16th, and 38th.

[170] “In a late letter to government,” he wrote to the Commander-in-Chief on the 24th of May, “you will have seen how anxious I was that any proposed movement towards Peshawur should be communicated to no one from whom it could be withheld. The moment such a thing is known, it is probable supplies will cease to come in; we should be in difficulty about forage; all who are now friendly would be ready to oppose us; and if I had not time to secure the pass, the consequences might be serious indeed.”—[Published Papers relating to Military Operations in Afghanistan.]

[171] In this letter of the 20th of May, Pollock says: “I have already, in my letter dated the 13th inst., entered on the subject (of withdrawing to Peshawur), and must receive a reply before I shall be able to move.” If that letter of the 13th had not been received and read, surely this allusion to it would have called forth a remark to that effect.

[172] It was outwardly only an acknowledgment of the General’s inability to retire at an earlier period—but there was more meaning in it than this, for on the same day the Chief Secretary wrote to Nott: “I am directed to inform you that, in consequence of the very defective state of the means of movement possessed by Major-General Pollock, it appears to be out of his power to retire from Jellalabad until October, when his retirement will certainly take place.”—[Published Papers.]

[173] Major Pottinger to General Pollock: Tezeen, April 20, 1842. Published Papers. Together with this letter from Pottinger came a paper from Akbar Khan himself. It was without seal and signature, for the Sirdar was fearful of compromising himself with his countrymen, and the document might have fallen into their hands. After some allusions to the painful past, and a declaration that he was unable to restrain the disorganised mob of Afghans from attacking the English army, the Sirdar went on to say: “If I allow the English, who are my guests, to depart according to your suggestion; or according to Pottinger Sahib’s advice, if I allow the English ladies to depart before the gentlemen, in either case all Mahomedans will look upon me as their enemy, and the whole multitude will be opposed to me. Under these circumstances I beg you to reflect, that not having come to an understanding with you, and having made enemies of them, how can I exist?... I prefer your friendship to the throne of Caubul, because, if I was to go to Caubul now, the men of Caubul would push me forward, and then it would be difficult to release my guests and to be on friendly terms with you. On this account I have written to show my friendship for your government. Please God my services shall exceed the injuries I have done you.”

[174] General Pollock to Major Pottinger: Jellalabad, April 26, 1842. Published Papers.

[175] General Pollock to Government: Jellalabad, April 28, 1842. In reply to this letter, the Chief Secretary wrote: “It is not consistent with the honour of the British Government to enter into any terms for the making of a provision for so great a criminal. We might engage to spare his life if he were to fall into our hands, because it would be difficult so to bring him to trial as to protect the government from a colourable charge of violently prosecuting an unworthy revenge; but no more than this can be done, and this only if he should promptly do all he can to repair the crimes he has committed.”—[Published Papers.]

[176] Major Pottinger to General Pollock: May 3, 1842. I have quoted from the original in Pottinger’s hand-writing. But the letter is given among the published papers, with the usual official emendations. Thus the passage, “They have asked for the money, if it is paid, to be given to Sir-Bolund Khan”—is printed, “They have asked for the money, &c., to be given to his Colund Khan.” It may puzzle the future historian to discover who “his Colund Khan” may have been.

[177] General Pollock to Major Pottinger: Jellalabad, May 10, 1842. Published Papers. Lord Ellenborough was unwilling that any money should be paid for the release of the captives; but was inclined to exchange Dost Mahomed and his family for the prisoners in the hands of the Sirdar. “Undoubtedly,” he wrote, “on the 26th of April, you remained authorised, by the instructions of the 24th of February, to give money on the public account for the release of individual prisoners; and if, previously to the receipt of my letter of the 25th of April, you should have concluded a negotiation for the release of any individual prisoners on that condition, the Governor-General would feel himself under the necessity of sanctioning any payment of money to which you may have then pledged yourself. After the receipt of that letter, you will, of course, in any future negotiation, have adhered to the instructions contained in it. It cannot but be a subject of much regret that you should have considered it to be necessary, under any circumstances, to have had any communication whatever of a diplomatic nature with Mahomed Akbar Khan, in whom it must be impossible for any one to place any trust.”—[Published Papers.] Akbar Khan, at this time, seems almost to have considered the release of his father and family as hopeless; and Pollock did not think he was authorised to propose an exchange of prisoners; for although, on the 24th of February, Lord Auckland suggested that he “might speak of the release of Dost Mahomed as an event which might not be altogether impossible,” he did not know how far such a measure might be sanctioned by Lord Ellenborough. Moreover, Pollock believed that the exchange had only been authorised in the event of his being able to treat for the release of the whole of the British prisoners; and they were not all in the hands of Akbar Khan.

[178] The questions were—“1st, What were the terms negotiated by Sir W. Macnaghten with the rebels? 2nd. What alteration was made by Major Pottinger? 3rd. What does Major Pottinger allude to when he talks of breach of faith? 4th. What were the manner and causes of Sir W. Macnaghten’s murder?” I have found the information conveyed in Captain Mackenzie’s answers of some use in the course of my narrative.

[179] On that day Akbar Khan sought an interview with Lady Macnaghten. Painful as such a meeting must have been, the bereaved widow was not in a position to refuse to see her husband’s murderer. He spoke very kindly to her; and as she sat in silent sorrow before him, he declared that he would give his right arm that the deed which he so much regretted might be undone.

[180] Captain Johnson’s Journal. The writer adds: “At the commencement of the defile, and for some considerable distance, passed two or three hundreds of our poor miserable Hindostanees, who had escaped up this unfrequented road from the massacre of the 12th. They had not a rag to cover them, and were all more or less frost-bitten, wounded, or starving. The poor wretches were huddled together in thirties and forties, so as to impart to each other a little animal heat, as other warmth was denied them by the barren, inhospitable wilderness around them. We afterwards learnt that scarcely one of these poor wretches escaped from the defile in which they had taken shelter; and that, driven to the extremes of hunger, some of them had for a few short hours sustained life by feeding on their dead comrades. The wind was blowing bitterly cold at our bivouac. No shelter of any kind for the ladies of our party during the whole night. Happiness is comparative; and truly fortunate did General Elphinstone, Brigadier Shelton, and myself consider ourselves when one of our Afghan attendants told us to accompany him inside a miserable cow-shed, which on our first entrance was so blackened with the dense smoke from a good blazing fire in the centre of the hut, that we could see none of the objects around us, until we had stretched ourselves at length on the floor, and consequently out of the influence of the smoke, when we perceived our companions to be three or four half-starved Hindostanees, who had accompanied our party. Our attendant wished to eject them; but we too truly sympathised with their sufferings to permit such an act of tyranny. We shortly afterwards got an invitation from Mahomed Akbar to join him and his party to dinner inside the fort. The room of our reception was not much better than that we had left. We had, however, a capital dinner, some cups of good tea, and a luxurious rest for the night, the room having been heated with a good blazing fire and lots of smoke, with no outlet for either, except the door and a small hole in the roof.”—[MS.]

[181] Captain Johnson says in his journal: “Both Mahomed Akbar and his chiefs were most attentive in escorting over in safety the ladies and their children and wounded Europeans.” There is other testimony to the same effect: “Many of the ladies, being mounted on ponies, were obliged to dismount and ride astride on the chargers of their Afghan acquaintance, to avoid getting wet. Nothing could exceed the politeness and attention of Mahomed Akbar on this occasion, who manifested the greatest anxiety until all had crossed over in safety.”—[Eyre’s Rough Notes of Imprisonment in Afghanistan.] “The chiefs gave us every assistance. Mahomed Akbar Khan carried Mrs. Waller over behind him on his own horse. One rode by me to keep my horse’s head well up the stream. The Afghans made great exertions to save both men and animals struggling in the water.”—[Lady Sale’s Journal.]

[182] “Jan. 17, 1842.—Early in the morning we were, to our surprise, told to prepare for a march higher up the valley, and further removed from Jellalabad, from which place Tugree is about thirty miles distant. All our hopes, which we had entertained hitherto of being escorted to Jellalabad, are now blighted, and we see plainly that we are nothing more nor less than prisoners, until such time as General Sale shall evacuate Jellalabad, or Dost Mahomed Khan be permitted by our government to return to the country. Started at nine, and arrived at Budeeabad, almost at the top of the valley, and close to the first range of hills towards Kafiristan. It belongs to Mahomed Shah Khan, is nearly new, and has a deep ditch and fausse-braie all round it. Our abode consists of five rooms on two sides of a small square. This space is to accommodate nine ladies, twenty gentlemen, and fourteen children, and in the Tei-Khana are seventeen European soldiers and three European women—all prisoners.”—[Captain Johnson’s Narrative of his Captivity. MS.]

[183] Lady Sale’s Journal.

[184] “Last night, Mahomed Akbar and I had a long conversation. He was very anxious for the release of his father, and made many promises in his name if we would release him. I pointed out that at least two months must elapse before we could in any way have the instructions of government regarding the release of the Ameer. I can see no objection to the release of the Ameer, unless government intends making an example of the city of Caubul. Our release and that of the hostages at Caubul appears to depend upon his release. His family’s release requires that of the women here. I wish for these last something could be done; but I fear not. You must use your influence. They tell me we shall be forwarded to Peshawur if you evacuate Jellalabad; and the Sirdar begs me that I write you on the subject. I have explained that I have no authority now, and said that I cannot promise anything of the sort. I hope government will see nothing prejudicial to its interests to release the Dost and family.”—[Major Pottinger to Major Macgregor: Lughman, January 18, 1842. MS. Correspondence.]

[185] “January 19.—Changed my clothes for the first time since leaving Caubul, January 6, and was fortunate enough to have a clean shirt. My feet had become so swollen that I could not again put on my boots when once pulled off. My eyes still very sore from the effects of the snow on the march.”—[Captain Johnson’s Narrative of his Captivity. MS.]

[186] Subsequently the materials were served out to the prisoners and dressed by their own Hindostanee servants.

[187] “January 29.—The Sirdar and Sooltan Jan came to see us. Made a bet with the latter of 1000 rupees that Dost Mahomed Khan, the ex-Ameer, will be released by the 30th of January, and will return to Afghanistan. The former gave 1000 rupees to be distributed among us for the purpose of purchasing sugar and other little luxuries. My share is fifty rupees; which sum is very acceptable, as I have not had a pice about me since leaving Caubul.”—[Captain Johnson’s Narrative. MS.]

[188] It was dangerous to send military or political news in the ordinary form of epistolary correspondence. So the officers at Jellalabad hit upon the expedient of dotting off letters in old newspapers, so as to form words and sentences—“an easy mode of carrying on secret correspondence not likely to be detected by an Asiatic.” These dotted letters communicated to the prisoners the tidings of Wild’s repulse in the Khybur Pass—the despatch of General Pollock to Peshawur—and the arrival of Dr. Brydon at Jellalabad.

[189] The letter is given in the Appendix.

[190] See Appendix.

[191] The 1st of April was not forgotten. It is a curious proof of the irrepressible love of practical joking which clings to our countrymen in all places and in all situations, that the prisoners in Afghanistan, on the 1st of April, turned their misfortunes into food for a joke. Captain Johnson says: “April 1, 1842.—Was awakened early by M—— telling me a letter had been received by L—— from Macgregor at Jellalabad, informing him that our ransom had been effected for three and a half lakhs of rupees, and that we were to start in five or six days. Was up in an instant—off to L——; and heard the story confirmed by him. The report spread through the whole fort, among our servants as well as the Europeans, in less than a minute. All was intense delight; when, on its being a little sobered down, to my horror, I was told that the story was all fudge. I was half mad with rage at being made such an April fool of, on a subject which, of all others in our situation, should have been the last for any of our party to have expended his wit upon.”—[Captain Johnson’s Narrative of his Captivity. MS.]

[192] “Up to this date, Mirza Báudín Khan (who had saved Captain Mackenzie’s life on the assassination of Sir William Macnaghten, and who had previously to the breaking out of the insurrection informed that officer of the advent of Akbar Khan at Bámian) had been the keeper of the prison. This man was secretly well affected to the English, and professed an especial friendship for Troup and Mackenzie, to whom he immediately confided his intention of marching out with the prisoners and his garrison (the majority of whom he had gained over) to meet Sale’s troops as soon as he should hear of their proximity; for he naturally expected that the General would have followed up his decisive victory over Akbar by marching direct upon Badeeabad, distant from Jellalabad not forty miles. As evening drew on, he became very anxious, frequently visited the ramparts to look out for the British force, and, passing over Sale as of no account in the matter, grievously abused Macgregor for not coming to the rescue. This might have been very easily accomplished, not only without risk, but with an effect on the fortunes of Akbar and his party, which might have saved much subsequent misery to the captives; expense, and bloodshed, in the advance upon Caubul; and vacillation and moral cowardice in the councils of the supreme government. But Sale came not, although the road was quite open; and the following morning the friendly gaoler was deposed, and his place taken by the Nazir or chief-steward of Mahomed Shah Khan, whose insolence and brutality contrasted disagreeably with the conduct of Báudín Khan.”—[MS. Memorandum.]

[193] “April 9.—The whole of this day and yesterday passed in the greatest suspense. Reports reached us to-day that the Sirdar and Mahomed Shah Khan had arrived at the fort of the latter, about two miles distant from us. The rout of the Afghan army appears to have been perfect, and we hear that they have lost all their guns, camp-equipage, and private property. All our guard appear very mysterious—group together—and talk in whispers. The inhabitants of the fort have removed their property and left their homes. Towards the afternoon, several of our guard, with whom we had been in the habit of conversing, and who had always been kind to us, on our asking them what would become of us, would shake their heads and say, ‘You are in the hands of God.’ A frightful stillness appeared to prevail. By degrees we began to hear fearful rumours that we were all to be massacred at sunset. Whether these first originated in the imaginations of some of our party, or in those of the Afghans, I cannot say—but knowing the revengeful temper of those in whose hands we were, nothing appeared to us more probable; and our anxiety and suspense increased as the day wore on. At about sunset a report was brought in that Mahomed Shah Khan was on his way to visit us. Even this was a relief to us, as we knew that what would happen to us must take place shortly. In about ten minutes he arrived with a large party of his followers. On coming up to us, our alarms were at an end as concerned our lives, as he regarded us civilly, and shook hands with the whole of us. We all sate down together. He entered slightly into the defeat of the day before yesterday, and told us that we must be in readiness to leave Budeeabad in the morning, without, however, giving us any hint as to our destination; nor had any of us inclination to ask questions of him. His will is law to us. After sitting for some time he wished us ‘Good evening,’ and withdrew. He slept in the fort that night, and we were busy making preparations for the morrow’s march. These, however, were shortly at an end. All my worldly goods and chattels might be stowed away in a towel or a handkerchief.”—[Captain Johnson’s Narrative of his Captivity. MS.]

[194] “April 10.—Up at daylight; had a cup of tea and was ready for the march. Took out my saddle to put on my horse; found that some rascal had stolen my stirrups. This was soon rectified by a piece of rope. As I was about saddling my horse, which was a good Hissar-stud animal, Mahomed Shah Khan sent a man to tell me that this was to be his property, and that he would furnish me with some other beast, as none of us were to be permitted to ride horses for fear of making our escape.... In the mean time, Mahomed Shah Khan, having heard that Lady Macnaghten was possessed of a great number of magnificent shawls and valuable jewels, which she had been so lucky as to have saved up to this time, went inside and coolly commanded her, without sending any previous message, to open her boxes. These were all very soon ransacked; and shawls and jewels to the amount of near two lakhs of rupees were taken possession of by this chief of freebooters—politely telling her ladyship that she might retain one or two shawls and any particular jewel for which she might have more value than another. Many of the little things were also taken possession of by a young whelp—the worthy son of so worthy a sire. Remonstrance was useless. About 9 A.M. we started; but still without the slightest knowledge of where we were going.”—[Captain Johnson’s Narrative of his Captivity. MS.]

[195] Captain Johnson’s Narrative. MS.

[196] On the 20th, Mrs. Waller, who had been necessitated to perform the dreadful march from Budeeabad on horseback, was delivered of a daughter. She was allowed an interval of one day’s rest, and was then hurried onwards by the same distressing mode of conveyance.

[197] General Elphinstone’s remains were sent by Akbar Khan, for interment, to Jellalabad. The General’s faithful servant, Moore, accompanied the body. “I have the honour to inform you,” wrote Pottinger to Pollock, on the 26th of April, “that Mahomed Akbar Khan yesterday despatched to you the body of the late Major-General Elphinstone. It was, however, intercepted by a party of the Ghilzyes, under the supposition that the Prince in Caubul had sent it, the party made prisoners, and the European servant, who had been allowed to accompany it, wounded. The savages, however, on hearing that Mahomed Akbar Khan had sent it, deputed one of their number to learn the truth. The Sirdar is much grieved at the accident, and now sends a party, with Private Moore, the General’s servant, to replace the corpse and forward it on. The Sirdar at present is unable to release the two servants from the hostility of the intermediate clans; but he promises to do so as soon as a person may arrive sufficiently powerful to protect them.”—[Major Pottinger to General Pollock: Castle of Afzool Khan, Tezeen, April 26, 1842. MS. Records.] The General’s remains subsequently reached Jellalabad, and were interred with military honours.

[198] I am informed that one of Conolly’s inducements to visit Bokhara was the hope of persuading Stoddart outwardly to recant his profession of Mahomedanism. My informant, who was at this time at Caubul, writes: “Arthur Conolly availed himself of a certain margin left him in his instructions for visiting Kokund and Bokhara, to proceed to the latter place, principally to obtain Stoddart’s release, and also with a view to his restoration to that precious faith in a Divine Redeemer, which he had outwardly denied. True it is, that He who cannot lie has declared that whosoever denies Him before men, him will He deny before God the Father; but, if ever an act of apostasy called for tears of compassion, it is that of the martyr Stoddart, for he, too, like Cranmer, died for the Faith which he once denied. Long before Conolly’s arrival, the Ameer of Bokhara, who was accounted even by his own countrymen an incarnation of perfidy and ferocity, had been led by the contempt with which his letter to the Queen had been treated by the Foreign Office, to wreak his vengeance on the only individual of the offending nation in his power. By his order, Stoddart was kept in a loathsome prison, frequently severely beaten, which never extorted a groan from him, and starved into a state of pitiable weakness. Meanwhile, he was repeatedly ordered to become a Mahomedan, which he steadfastly refused to do. To conquer his obstinacy, the Ameer threw him into the Chah-i-Seeah (or black pit), a place of torment for the vilest criminals. It is such a pit as that into which Jeremiah was cast, the bottom of it being composed of indescribable filth—men’s bones, decomposed animal matter, &c. In it, amongst other vermin, are large ticks, which bury themselves in the flesh of the victim, producing noisome sores. Before life was extinct, Stoddart was drawn up from this horrible dungeon, and, on reviving somewhat, was exposed in one of the great gates of the city, all who entered being instructed to spit in his face and buffet him. Still he refused to abjure Christianity. The next day he was again severely beaten, his grave dug before his face, and it was announced to him that, unless he pronounced the Mahomedan confession of faith, in that very grave he would forthwith be buried alive. Hitherto, this noble gentleman’s resolution had not failed him; but in this fearful moment of temptation, when mere human nature could sustain no more, to use his own expression,—‘The grating of the spades against the sides of the grave jarred on his shattered nerves beyond endurance.’ Certain Mahomedans, whose sympathy had been enlisted by his noble constancy, besought him almost with tears to spare them the disgrace of his murder, and to pronounce the confession as a mere matter of form; and thus, almost unconsciously, he with his mouth owned the Arabian impostor as the true Prophet of God. Arthur Conolly’s arrival, exhortations, and prayers speedily produced the blessed effect aimed at. Stoddart renounced Mahomedanism (having previously refused to live with the wife assigned him as a new convert), and thus subjected himself to a new series of cruelties and indignities which, as we have seen, ended in his and Conolly’s public martyrdom.”—[MS. Memorandum.]