To this end our greenbacks must be absorbed or paid, and my proposition provides a way. As the greenbacks are withdrawn, coin will reappear to take their place in the banks and the business of the country. This will be specie payments.

Here I wish to remark that I fail to see the asserted dependence of our demand notes on our bonds. The bonds may be at par without bringing the notes to par, and so the notes may be at par without bringing the bonds to par. According to the experience of other countries, bonds and notes do not materially affect each other. The two travel on parallel lines without touching. Each must be provided for; and my present purpose is to provide for the demand notes.

There is strong reason why this is the very moment for this effort. According to statistical tables now before me, our exports are tending to an equality with our imports. During the five months of July, August, September, October, and November, 1869, there has been a nominal balance in our favor of $1,752,416; whereas during the same months of last year there was an adverse balance of $32,163,339. The movement of specie is equally advantageous. During the five months above mentioned there has been an import in specie of $10,056,316 against $5,273,116 during the same months last year, and an export in specie of $19,031,875 against $21,599,758 during the same months last year.[222] According to these indubitable figures, the tide of specie as well as of business is beginning to turn. It remains for us by wise legislation to take advantage of the propitious moment. Take the proper steps and you will have specie payments,—having which, all the rest will follow. Because I desire to secure this great boon for my country I now make this effort.

Mr. President,—The measure now before the Senate concerns interests vast in amount and influence. I doubt if ever before any nation has attempted to deal at once with so large a mass of financial obligations, being nothing less than the whole national debt of the United States. But beyond the proper disposition of this mass is the question of taxation, and also of the extent to which the payment of the national debt shall be assumed by the present generation, and beyond all is the question of specie payments. On all these heads my own conclusions are fixed. The mass of financial obligations should be promptly adjusted in some new form at smaller interest; taxes must be reduced; the payment of the national debt must be left in part to posterity; specie payments must be provided for.

The immediate question before the Senate is on a substitute reported by the Committee for the bill which I had the honor of introducing some weeks ago. Considering my connection with this measure, I hope that I shall not intrude too much, if I recur to the original bill and explain its provisions.

There are certain general objects which must not be forgotten in our present endeavor. I have already said that the taxes must be reduced. Here I am happy to observe that the popular branch of Congress, in the exercise of its constitutional prerogative, has taken the initiative and is perfecting measures to this end. I trust that they will proceed prudently, but boldly.

In harmony with this effort the expenditures of the Government should be revised and cut down to the lowest point consistent with efficiency. Economy will be an important ally. Even in small affairs it will be the witness to our purposes. Through these agencies our currency will be improved, and we shall be brought to specie payments, while the national credit will be established. Not at once can all this be accomplished, but I am sure that we may now do much.

As often as I return to this subject I am impressed by the damage the country has already suffered through menacing propositions affecting the national credit. I cannot doubt that in this way the national burdens have been sensibly increased. By counter-propositions in the name of Congress we have attempted to counteract these injurious influences. We have met words with words. But this is not enough.

There is another remark which I wish to make, although I do little more than repeat what I said on another occasion.[223] It is that a national debt, when once funded, does not seem to affect largely the condition of the currency. The value of the former is maintained or depressed by circumstances independent of the currency. But, on the other hand, the condition of the currency bears directly upon all efforts for increased loans; and this is of practical importance on the present occasion. The rules of business are the same for the nation as for an individual; nor can a nation, when it becomes a borrower, hope to escape the scrutiny which is applied to an individual under similar circumstances. Applying this scrutiny to our case, it appears that on our existing bonded debt we have thus far performed all existing obligations,—not without discussion, I regret to add, that has left in some quarters a lingering doubt with regard to the future, and not without an opposition still alive, if not formidable. But the case is worse with regard to that other branch of the national debt known as legal-tenders, where we daily fail to perform existing obligations, so that these notes are nothing more than so much failed paper. With regard to this branch of the national debt there is an open confession of insolvency, and each day renews the confession. Now, by the immutable laws of credit, which all legislative enactments are impotent to counteract or expunge, the nation must suffer when it enters the market as a borrower. Failing to pay these obligations already due, it must pay more for what it borrows. Nor can we hope for more than partial success, until this dishonor is removed.

With these preliminary remarks, which are rather hints than arguments, I come directly to the measure before the Senate; and here I begin with the first section.

I wish the Senate would note the difference between this section in my bill and in the substitute of the Committee. I proposed to authorize the issue of $500,000,000 of Ten-Forty five per cents., and prescribe the use to which the proceeds of such bonds should be applied. The Committee propose $400,000,000 of Ten-Twenty five per cents., and leave the application of the proceeds the subject of discretion. Between the two propositions there are several differences: first, in the amount; secondly, in the length of the bond; and, thirdly, in the application of the proceeds.

Here I beg to observe that the original sum of $500,000,000 was not inserted by accident, or because it was a round and euphonious sum. Nothing of the kind. It was the result of a careful examination of the national debt in its details, especially in the light of the national credit. It was adopted because it was the very sum required by the nature of the case. At least so it seemed to me. A brief explanation will show if I was not right.

The year 1862, which marks the date of our legal-tenders, marks also the date of a new system in regard to our loans. Senators are hardly aware of this change. Previously our standard for sixes was an immutable loan for twenty years. By the new system this immutability was continued as to the right of demand by the bondholder, but the right of payment was reserved to the nation at any time after five years. This change, as we now see, gave positive advantages to the nation. Its disadvantages to the bondholder were so apparent that it encountered resistance, which was overcome only after undaunted perseverance and final appeal to the people. Now, by recurring to the schedule of the national debt, you will find that the first loan within the sphere of this discretionary system is the Five-Twenties of 1862, which, on the 1st of February last, after deducting the purchased bonds, were $500,000,000. This, therefore, is the first loan falling within our discretion, the first loan we are privileged to pay before maturity, and the first loan presenting itself for payment. In these incidents the loan of 1862 has precedence,—it stands first.

But there is a reason, which to my mind is of peculiar force, why this first loan should be paid in coin at the earliest possible day. It seems to me that I do not deceive myself, when I consider it conclusive on this question. The loan of 1862 is the specific loan which has been made the objective point of all the movements under the banner of Repudiation. It is the loan to which this idea first attached itself. It is the loan first menaced. Therefore, to my mind, it is the loan which should be first provided for. I know no way, short of universal specie payments, by which the national credit can be so effectually advanced.

Why in the amendment of the Committee the amount of the proposed issue is placed at $400,000,000 I am at a loss to conceive. Here is no equivalent of any one loan, nor of two or more loans. It is an accidental sum, and might have been more or less for the same reason that it is what it is. The term Ten-Twenties seems also accidental, as it is unquestionably new. Of course it is assumed that the amount proposed of Ten-Twenties at five per cent. will absorb an equal amount of Five-Twenties at six per cent., irrespective of any particular loan; but I am at a loss to see on what grounds the holders of the sixes can be induced to make the exchange. Will the substitute bonds be considered of equal value? I affirm not. But assuming that they are acceptable, how shall they be acceptably distributed? Shall the first comer be first served? If all were at the same starting-point, the palm might be justly bestowed upon the most swift. In the latitude allowed, stretching over all the Five-Twenties, there would be opportunity for favoritism; and with this opportunity there would be temptation and suspicion.

The change from a Ten-Forty bond to a Ten-Twenty bond, as proposed by the Committee, is a change, so far as I can perceive, made up of disadvantages. To the nation there is the same rate of interest, and there is the same fixed period during which this interest must be paid; while, on the other hand, the period of optional payment is reduced from thirty years to ten years. If there be advantage in this reduction, I do not perceive it. If at the expiration of ten years we are in a condition to pay, we may do so as readily under a Ten-Forty as under the Ten-Twenty proposed. If during the subsequent ten years of option our advancing credit enables us to command a lower rate of interest, surely we may do so just as favorably under one as under the other. There is no benefit within the bounds of imagination, so far at least as I can discern, which will not redound to the nation from Ten-Forties as much as from Ten-Twenties. On the other hand, it is within possibilities, from disturbance in the money markets of the world, or from other unforeseen circumstances, that it may not be convenient during the short optional period of the Committee to obtain the necessary coin without a sacrifice. The greater latitude of payment leaves the nation master of the situation, to pay or not to pay, as is most for the national advantage.

Furthermore, the loan proposed by the Committee has not, to my mind, the elements of success promised by the other loan. It is assumed in both cases that the coin for the redemption of the existing obligations shall be obtained in Europe. Then we must look to the European market in determining the form of the new loan. Now I have reason to believe that a coin loan to the amount of $500,000,000 may be obtained in Europe on Ten-Forties at par, provided the new bonds are of the same form and purport as the Ten-Forties which are already so popular, and provided further that the proceeds of the loan are applied to the payment in coin at par of the Five-Twenties of 1862. The reasons are obvious. The Ten-Forties have a good name, which is much to start with. It is like the credit or good-will of an established mercantile house, which stands often instead of capital; and then the fact that the proceeds are to be absorbed in the redemption of the first Five-Twenties, so often assailed, will most signally attest the determination of the country to maintain its credit. These advantages cost nothing, and it is difficult to see why they should be renounced.

We must not make an effort and fail. Our course must be guided by such prudence that success will be at least reasonably certain. For the nation to offer a loan and be refused in the market will not do. Here, as elsewhere, we must organize victory. Now it is to my mind doubtful, according to the information within my reach, if the loan proposed by the Committee can be negotiated successfully at par. Bankers there may be who would gladly see themselves announced as financial agents of the great Republic; but it remains to be seen if there are any competent to handle a loan of $500,000,000 who would undertake it on the terms of the Committee. I am clear that it is not prudent to make the experiment, when it is easy to offer another loan with positive advantages sufficient to turn the scale. Washington, in his Farewell Address, said, “Why forego the advantages of so peculiar a situation? Why quit our own to stand upon foreign ground?” In the same spirit I would say, Why forego the advantages of a well-known and peculiar security? Why quit our Ten-Forties to stand upon a security which is unknown, and practically foreign, whether at home or abroad?

In the loan proposed by the original bill we find assurance of success, with the promise of reduced taxation, Repudiation silenced, and the coin reserves in the banks strengthened by sales in Europe, it may be, $150,000,000. Should the amendment of the Committee prevail, I see small chance of any near accomplishment of these objects, and meanwhile our financial question is handed over to prolonged uncertainty.

I pass now to the substitute of the Committee for the second and third sections of the original bill. Here again the amount is changed from $500,000,000 to $400,000,000. I am not aware of any reason for this change; nor is there, indeed, any peculiar reason, as in the case of the Five-Twenties of 1862, for the amount of $500,000,000. The question between the two amounts may properly be determined by considerations of expediency, among which will be that of uniformity with outstanding loans. A more important change is in the time the bonds are to run, which is Fifteen-Thirty years for the bonds at four and a half per cent., and Twenty-Forty years for the bonds at four per cent. Here occurs again the argument with regard to the inferiority of Ten-Twenties, as compared with Ten-Forties. By the same reason the Fifteen-Thirties will be inferior to the Fifteen-Fifties, and the Twenty-Forties will be inferior to the Twenty-Sixties, of the original bill.

The prolongation of the bond is in the nature of compensation for the reduction of interest. Already we have established the ratio of compensation for such reduction,—already for a loan at six per cent. we have offered Five-Twenties, but for a loan at five per cent. we have offered Ten-Forties,—and I see no reason why by a tentative process we should so materially change this standard as is now proposed. The experiment can do no good, while it may do harm. It is in the nature of a restriction on our discretion, and a limitation of the duration of the bond, which, I apprehend, must interfere essentially with its marketable character. While the prolongation of time enlarges the option of the nation, it increases the value of the bond in the market. That which is most favorable to the nation is most favorable to the market value of the bond; and that which is unfavorable to the nation is unfavorable also to the market value of the bond, rendering its negotiation and sale more difficult and protracted. Thus at every turn are we brought back to the original proposition.

Against this conclusion is the argument founded on the idea of English consols. It is sometimes said, If the short term of Five-Twenty years is the standard for a six per cent. bond with a graduation to Twenty-Sixty for a four per cent. bond, why may we not go further, and establish consols at three per cent., running, if you please, to eternity?—The technical term “consols” is an abbreviation for the consolidated debt of Great Britain, and in the eyes of a British subject has its own signification. It means a debt never to be paid, or at least it is an inscribed debt carrying no promise of payment. I would not have any debt of the United States assume either the form or name of consols. I would rigidly adhere to definite periods of payment. This is the American system, in contradistinction to the British system. I would not only avoid the idea that our debt is permanent, but I would adhere to the form of positive payment at some fixed period, and keep this idea always present in the minds of the people. Without the requirement of law, I doubt if the debt would be paid. Political parties would court popularity by a reduction of taxation. The Treasury of the United States, like the British Treasury, would always be without a surplus, and the national debt would be recognized as a burden to be endured forever. Therefore do I say, No consols.

There is another consideration, having a wide influence, but especially important at the West and South, which should induce us to press for a reduction of the interest on our bonds; and here I present an argument which, if not advanced before, is none the less applicable.

Do Senators consider to what extent the Government determines the rates of interest in the money centres of the country? Not only for itself does it determine, but for others also. Government bonds enjoy preëminence as an investment,—and if the interest is high, they attract the disposable money of the country. Government sixes are worth more than a six per cent. bond of any private corporation or individual, no matter how well secured. Therefore, it is easy to see, so long as we retain our standard at six per cent., so long as we have sixes, will the capital of the country seek these bonds for investment, permanent or temporary, to the detriment of numerous enterprises important to the national development, which are driven to be the stipendiaries of foreign capital. Railroads, especially at the West and South, are sufferers, being sometimes delayed by the difficulty of borrowing money, and sometimes becoming bankrupt from ruinous rates of interest, always in competition with the Government. But what is true of railroads is also true of other enterprises, which are pinched, and even killed, by these exactions in which the Government plays such a part. All are familiar with the recurring appeals for money on bonds even at eight per cent., which is more than can be paid permanently without loss; and even at such a ruinous rate there is difficulty in obtaining the required amount.

Doubtless the excessive interest now demanded is partly due to our fictitious currency, where failed paper is forced upon the market; but beyond this influence is that of our sixes, absorbing disposable capital. I venture to assert, that, if we could at an early day reduce these sixes to fives, there are millions which would be released to seek investment in other securities at six per cent., especially to the relief of the West and South. The reduction of interest to four and a half per cent. and four per cent. would release further millions. A recent incident in the financial history of Massachusetts illustrates the disturbing influence of our sixes. An attempt to obtain a loan in Europe at five per cent. was unsuccessful, chiefly because the National Government offered six per cent.

Therefore, for the sake of public enterprise in its manifold forms, for the sake of that prosperity which depends on human industry, for the sake of manufactures, for the sake of commerce, and especially for the sake of railroads, by which all these are quickened, we must do what we can to reduce the general rate of interest, which is now such a curb on enterprise; and here we must begin with our own bonds. Without any adverse intention, the National Government is a victorious competitor, and the defeated parties are those very enterprises whose success is so important to the country. A competition so destructive should cease. Keeping this before us in the new loan, we shall adopt that form of bond by which the interest will most surely be reduced. Thus, while refunding the national debt, we shall open the way to improvements of all kinds.

This is what I have to say for the present on the refunding propositions of the Committee. Their object is the same as mine. If I differ from them in details, it is because after careful consideration it seems to me that in some particulars their system may be improved.

Proceeding from these pivotal propositions, I find other things where I must again differ. When I first addressed the Senate on this subject, I took occasion to declare my objection to the idea of agencies or offices in the commercial centres of Europe, where interest should be paid. I am not ready to withdraw that objection,—though, if I could be tempted, it would be by the Senator from Ohio [Mr. Sherman], when he held up the prospect of a common money among nations. This is one of the desires of my heart, as it is one of the necessities of civilization; but I fail to see how this aspiration will be promoted by the system proposed,—which must be judged on its own merits, without any such recommendation. It is easy to see that such a system, besides being the beginning of a new policy on the part of the Government, may entail serious embarrassments. Sub-treasuries must be created in foreign capitals, which must be continued so long as the bonds last. Remittances of coin must be semiannual; and should such remittances fail at any time, there must be advances at no little cost to the Government. I cannot imagine any advantage from this new system sufficient to induce us to encounter the possible embarrassments or entanglements which it may cause.

I would not take too much of the time of the Senate, and therefore I pass at once to the proposition of the Committee, being section seven, providing for the very early payment of the national debt.

Mr. President, the payment of the national debt is an American idea, and I would say nothing to weaken it among the people. Whatever we owe must be paid; but it is the part of prudence to make the payment in such way as, while consistent with our obligations, shall promote the national prosperity. In this spirit I approach the proposition of the Committee, in which there is so much of good, only to examine and measure it, in order to ascertain its probable influence, especially on the question of Taxation.

Here it must be borne in mind, that the present measure in all its parts, so far as applicable, and especially with its guaranties and pledges, must be taken as the basis of our new engagements. The provision that so much of the debt shall be paid annually will become in a certain sense a part of the contract, although not so expressed in the bond. Not less than $150,000,000 are set apart annually to be applied “to the payment of the interest and to the reduction of the principal of the public debt.” This is a large sum, and we should consider carefully if such a guaranty or pledge has in it the promise of financial stability. Promising too much is sometimes as bad as promising too little. Our promise must be according to our means prudently employed.

If we assume obligations so large as to bear heavily upon the business of the country and to compel unreasonable taxation, there will be little chance of financial stability. They will become the object of attack, and will enter into the conflict of parties,—and if repealed, the national faith may be called in question. I need not say that business must suffer. A less ambitious effort on our part will be less obnoxious to attack,—thus leaving the bonds to their natural position in the money market, and strengthening all the movements of commerce.

In order to determine the operation of this provision we must look into details. I have the estimates before me, showing our present and prospective liabilities for interest; but I content myself with presenting compendiously the result, in order to determine the question of taxation. Suffice it to say, that under the operation of the present measure there will be in 1871, after the payment of all liabilities for interest, a surplus of $43,000,000 to be applied to the payment of the national debt. With each succeeding year the reduction of interest will rapidly increase this surplus; and when we bring into operation other provisions of the bill, and convert $500,000,000 of sixes into a like amount of four and a half per cents., effecting a further saving of interest, equal to $7,500,000 annually, the surplus revenue, as compared with necessary expenditures, will in a brief period approach $100,000,000 annually.

Here the question arises, Is not this unnecessarily large? Is it not beyond the bounds of prudence and wise economy? Shall we declare in this fundamental measure a determination to redeem the whole national debt within a period of twenty-five years? Can the industries of the country sustain such taxation? I put the question. You shall answer it. The future has its great claims upon us; so also has the present. I submit that the pending measure sacrifices the present. I conclude, therefore, as I began, with another appeal for reduced taxation. At the proper time I shall move an amendment, in order to aid this result.

Mr. President,—There is a word which has been introduced into this debate with which we were all very familiar in another relation some years ago. It is the word Coercion. A President of the United States announced in most formal phrase that we could not coerce a State; and now, borrowing a phrase from Mr. Buchanan, we are told we cannot coerce a national bank. Well, Sir, is the phrase applicable? If it be applicable, then I insist that we can coerce a national bank; but I do not admit its applicability. What I insist on has already been so ably and clearly stated by the Chairman of the Committee [Mr. Sherman] that perhaps I need not add another word. I do not like to occupy your time; yet I cannot forbear reminding you, Sir, of the plenary power which Congress has reserved over the banking system in that very Act by which it was established.[224]

The Senator from California [Mr. Casserly] has read to you the clause. We have been reminded to-day by a Senator on this floor that these are formal words, words that often appear in statutes. But are they not significant words? Have they not a meaning? Why are they there? Because they have a meaning; because they reserve to Congress what I call plenary power over the whole system. That system may be readjusted, modified, shaped anew, and the banks cannot complain. They began their existence under that law; they knew the conditions of their being; and they cannot now murmur, if Congress chooses to exercise the prerogative which it reserved at the very inception of the whole system.

Sir, I approach this question, therefore, with the conviction that the whole matter is open to our discretion. Nobody can say safely that what is now proposed is not within the power of Congress. Congress may do it, if the occasion justifies, if in its discretion it thinks best to do it. It may do it, if it thinks that the financial policy of this country will be thereby promoted. The banks are all parties to that policy. May not the country turn around and ask the banks to do their part in this great work of renovation? To a certain extent the banks are in partnership with the Government. May not the Government insist that they shall do their part on this great occasion? Shall this effort of ours to readjust our finances and to save this large interest to our country be thwarted by a pretension on the part of the banks that we have not the power to interfere?

But we are reminded that there is a difference between power and right. How often, Sir, on other occasions, have I so insisted in this Chamber! A great, broad, vital distinction there always is between power and right. A nation or an individual may have a power without right. Now is there not here a right as well as a power? I cannot doubt it. I cannot doubt that Congress may rightfully exercise what I cannot doubt is an existing power. Why should it not? It could exercise it—who can doubt?—with reference to the public interests, to promote the national credit. It will not exercise it in any spirit of wantonness, in any spirit of injustice,—but to promote the national credit. Is not that a rightful object? No one will say the contrary. Why, then, shall we hesitate?

We are reminded that these banks have secured certain privileges, and it is said often that those are vested, and the old phrase “vested rights” has been repeated. But how can they have vested rights under a statute which contains the provision just read to us, securing to Congress full power to change it in every respect? What, then, is the simple aspect of this question? It is that certain securities have been lodged with the Government by these banks on which they transact their business, and now in readjusting the national debt it is deemed advisable and for the public interests that the securities should be at a lower rate of interest than when they were originally deposited. Is it not right for Congress to require that? I cannot see the wrong in it. I cannot see any doubt on the question. To my mind it is clear; it is absolutely within the province of Congress, in the exercise of the discretion which it originally retained over this whole subject.

I hope, therefore, that in this debate we shall not be pressed too much with the suggestion that we cannot coerce these banks. If the occasion requires, and if the term be applicable, then do I say we may coerce these banks to the extent of obliging them to take these securities at a reduced rate of interest. I find no Repudiation in that. I find nothing wrong in that. I find nothing in it but a simple measure in harmony with this great process of Financial Reconstruction in which we are now engaged. I call it Financial Reconstruction; and in this work ought not the banks to take their place and perform their part?

Now, Sir, I have a criticism on this section. It does not go far enough. The Committee propose that the banks shall take one third of the three different kinds of bonds, the five, the four and a half, and the four per cents. I think they ought to be required to take all in fours, and I propose to give the Senate an opportunity of expressing its judgment on that proposition. I may be voted down; perhaps I shall be; but I shall make a motion, in the honest endeavor to render this bill a practical measure, which can best succeed. I wish to mature it; I wish to put it in the best shape possible; and for the sake of the banks, and in the interest of the banks, I wish such a measure as shall have a reasonable chance of stability in the future. If you allow the banks gains that are too large, there will necessarily be a constant opposition, growing and developing as their gains become more conspicuous. Why expose the system to any such criticism? Let us now revise it carefully, place it on sure, but moderate foundations, so that it will have in itself the elements of future stability.

To my mind that is the more politic course, and I am sure it is not unjust. You and I, Mr. President, remember very well what was done on another occasion. The State banks were taxed out of existence. It was the cry, “Tax them out of existence! do not let them live! drive them from competition with these new children of ours, the national banks!” It was done. Was not that coercion? If the phrase is to be employed, there was an occasion for it. But I am not aware that it was argued, certainly it was with no great confidence argued, that to do that was unjust. It was a measure of policy wisely adopted at the time, and which we all now see has answered well. But if we could tax the State banks out of existence, can we not, under the very specific terms of the Act of Congress to which these national banks owe their existence, apply a rule not unlike to them? We do not propose to tax them out of existence, but we propose to require that they shall lodge with the Government securities at a lower rate of interest.

Something has been said, perhaps much, in this debate, with regard to the burden that this will impose upon the banks. The Senator from Ohio [Mr. Sherman] has already answered that objection, and I do not know that I can add to his answer; and yet I am not aware that he reminded the Senate that in this very bill there is a new and important provision in favor of the banks, or in favor of all bondholders,—being an exemption from all taxation, not only State and municipal, but national.

There is but one other remark I will make, and that is, we all know, unless I am much deceived, that the banks have during these last years made great profits. I am told that the profits of the national banks are two or three times greater than those of the old State banks, which we did not hesitate to tax out of existence. Now is not that a fact in this case? Is it not an essential element? Should it not be taken into consideration on this occasion? If these national banks are the recipients of such large profits, should we not exercise all the power that belongs to us to compel them to their full contribution to this great measure of Financial Reconstruction? I cannot hesitate in my conclusion.

Mr. President,—Interested as I am in this bill, desirous of its passage hardly less than the Senator from Ohio, I am bound to say, that, in my judgment, the passage of this single section would be worth more than the whole bill. It would do more for the credit of the country; it would do more for its business. It would help us all to the completion of Financial Reconstruction. How often have I insisted that all our efforts to fund and refund are to a certain extent vain and impotent, unless we begin by specie payments! That, Sir, is the Alpha of this whole subject; and until Congress is ready to begin with that, I fear that all the rest will be of little avail. It is in the light of expedient rather than of remedy. There is the remedy.

MAJOR-GENERAL NATHANAEL GREENE, OF THE REVOLUTION.

Beyond his own deserts, Greene was fortunate during life in the praise of Washington, who wrote of “the singular abilities which that officer possesses,”[225]—and then again fortunate after death in the praise of Hamilton, whose remarkable tribute is no ordinary record.[226] He has been fortunate since in his biographer, whose work promises to be classical in our literature.[227] And now he is fortunate again in a statue, which, while taking an honorable place in American art, is the first to be received in our Pantheon. Such are the honors of patriot service.

Among the generals of the Revolution Greene was next after Washington. His campaign at the South showed military genius of no common order. He saved the South. Had he lived to take part in the National Government, his character and judgment must have secured for him an eminent post of service. Unlike his two great associates, Washington and Hamilton, his life was confined to war; but the capacities he manifested in command gave assurance that he would have excelled in civil life. His resources in the field would have been the same in the council chamber.

Of Quaker extraction, Greene was originally a Quaker. The Quaker became a soldier and commander of armies. Such was the requirement of the epoch. Should a soldier and commander of armies in our day accept ideas which enter into the life of the Quaker, the change would only be in harmony with those principles which must soon prevail, ordaining peace and good-will among men. Looking at his statue, with military coat and with sword in hand, I seem to see his early garb beneath. The Quaker general could never have been other than the friend of peace.

Standing always in that beautiful Hall, the statue will be a perpetual, though silent orator. The marble will speak; nor is it difficult to divine the lesson it must teach. He lived for his country, and his whole country,—nothing less. Born in the North, he died in the South, which he had made his home. The grateful South honored him as the North had already done. His life exhibits the beauty and the reward of patriotism. How can his marble speak except for country in all its parts and at all points of the compass? It was for the whole country that he drew his sword of “ice-brook temper.” So also for the whole country was the sword drawn in these latter days. And yet there was a difference between the two occasions easy to state.

Our country’s cause for which Greene contended was National Independence. Our country’s cause recently triumphant in bloodiest war was Liberty and Equality, the declared heritage of all mankind. The first war was for separation from the mother country, according to the terms of the Declaration, “That these United Colonies are and of right ought to be Free and Independent States,”—the object being elevated by the great principles announced. The second war was for the establishment of these great principles, without which republican government is a name and nothing more. But both were for country. The larger masses, with the larger scale of military operations, in the latter may eclipse the earlier; and it is impossible not to see that a war for Liberty and Equality, making the promises of the Declaration a reality, and giving to mankind an irresistible example, is loftier in character than a war for separation. If hereafter Greene finds rivals near his statue, they will be those who represented our country’s cause in its later peril and its larger triumph. Just in proportion as ideas are involved is conflict elevated, especially if those ideas concern the Equal Rights of All.

Greene died at the South, and nobody knows the place of his burial. He lies without epitaph or tombstone. To-day a grateful country writes his epitaph and gives him a monument in the Capitol.

PERSONAL RECORD ON RECONSTRUCTION WITH COLORED SUFFRAGE.

This assault to-day compels me to make a statement now which I never supposed I should be called to make. I make it now with hesitation, but rather to show the Senator’s course than my own. Sir, I am the author of the provision in that Act conferring suffrage; and when I brought it forward, the Senator from Illinois was one of my opponents,—then as now. Senators who were here at that time remember well that this whole subject was practically taken for the time from the jurisdiction of the Senate into a caucus of the Republican party, where a committee was created to whom all pending measures of Reconstruction were referred. I had the honor of being a member of that committee. So was the Senator from Illinois. So was my friend from Michigan [Mr. Howard]. The Senator from Ohio [Mr. Sherman] was our chairman. In that committee this Reconstruction Bill was debated and matured sentence by sentence, word for word; and then and there, in that committee, I moved that we should require the suffrage of all persons, without distinction of color, in the organization of new governments, and in all the constitutions to be made.

In making this proposition at that time I only followed the proposition I had made in the Senate two years before,[230] which I had urged upon the people in an elaborate address at a political convention in Massachusetts,[231] which I had again upheld in an elaborate effort for two days in this Chamber,[232] and which from the beginning I had never lost from my mind or heart. It was natural that I should press it in committee; but I was overruled,—the Senator opposing me with his accustomed determination. I was voted down. The chairman observed my discontent and said, “You can renew your motion in caucus.” I did so, stating that I had been voted down in committee, but that I appealed from the committee to the caucus. My colleague [Mr. Wilson], who sits before me, called out, “Do so”; and then rising, said, in language which he will pardon me for quoting, but which will do him honor always, “The report of the committee will leave a great question open to debate on every square mile of the South. We must close that question up.” Another Senator, who is not now here,—I can therefore name him,—Mr. Gratz Brown [of Missouri], cried out most earnestly, “Push it to a vote; we will stand by you.” I needed no such encouragement, for my determination was fixed. There sat the Senator from Illinois, sullen in his accustomed opposition. I pushed it to a vote, and it was carried by only two majority, Senators rising to be counted. My colleague, in his joy on the occasion, exclaimed, “This is the greatest vote that has been taken on this continent!” He felt, I felt, we all felt, that the question of the suffrage was then and there secured. By that vote the committee was directed to make it a part of Reconstruction. This was done, and the measure thus amended was reported by the Senator from Ohio as chairman of the committee.

I am compelled to this statement by the assault of the Senator. I had no disposition to make it. I do not claim anything for myself. I did nothing but my duty. Had I done less, I should have been faithless,—I should have been where the Senator from Illinois placed himself.

The Senator read from the “Globe” the vote on the passage of the bill, and exulted because my name was not there. Sir, is there any Senator in this Chamber whose name will be found oftener on the yeas and nays than my own? Is there any Senator in this Chamber who is away from his seat less than I am? There was a reason for my absence on that occasion. I left this Chamber at midnight, fatigued, not well, knowing that the great cause was assured, notwithstanding the opposition of the Senator from Illinois,—knowing that at last the right of the colored people to suffrage was recognized. I had seen it placed in the bill reported from the committee. There it was on my motion, safe against the assaults of the Senator from Illinois. Why should I, fatigued, and not well, remain till morning to swell the large and ascertained majority which it was destined to receive?[233] I have no occasion to make up any such record. You know my fidelity to this cause. You know if I am in the habit of avoiding the responsibilities of my position. I cannot disguise, also, that there was another influence on my mind. Reconstruction, even with the suffrage, was defective. More was needed. There should have been a system of public schools, greater protection to the freedmen, and more security against the Rebels, all of which I sought in vain to obtain in committee, and I found all effort in the Senate foreclosed by our action in caucus. Pained by this failure, and feeling that there was nothing more for me to do, after midnight I withdrew. On the return of the Act to the Senate on the veto of the President, I recorded my vote in its favor.