The dispatch then proceeds to describe the attitude of the Spanish Government. And here it says of the events in Dominica:—

It will be observed with what energy of phrase the Spanish Minister excludes all suspicion of force on the part of Spain. Not only was there no Spanish ship on the coast, but not a single Spanish bottom. And then it is alleged that “the first condition” of reannexion must be “the unanimous, spontaneous, and explicit expression of the will of the Dominicans.” No foreign influence, no Spanish influence, was to interfere with the popular will. But this is nothing more than justice. Anything else is wrong.

The Spanish Government, not content with announcing this important rule in the dispatch which I have quoted, return to it in another similar dispatch, dated at Madrid, 26th May, 1861, as follows:—

Here again is the allegation that the movement was spontaneous and unanimous, and that the Spanish Government sought to acquire absolute assurance on this essential point. This was openly recognized as the condition-precedent; and I cite it as unanswerable testimony to what was deemed essential.

On this absolute assurance the Ministers laid before the Queen in Council a decree of reannexion, with an explanatory paper, under date of 19th May, 1861, where the unanimity of the Dominican people is again asserted, and also the absence of any influence on the part of Spain:—

Such is the official record on which the decree of reannexion was adopted. Mark well, Sir,—a unanimous people, and not a single Spanish bottom on the coast or Spanish soldier on the territory.

CONTRAST BETWEEN SPAIN AND THE UNITED STATES.

And now mark the contrast between the Old Monarchy and the Great Republic. The recent return of the Navy Department to the Senate, in reply to a resolution introduced by me, shows how the whole island has been beleaguered by our Navy, sailing from port to port, and hugging the land with its guns. Here is the return:—

Twelve mighty war-ships, including two, if not three, powerful monitors, maintained at the cost of millions of dollars, being part of the price of the pending negotiation. Besides what we pay to Baez, here are millions down. Rarely have we had such a fleet in any waters: not in the Mediterranean, not in the Pacific, not in the East Indies. It is in the waters of San Domingo that our Navy finds its chosen field. Here is its flag, and here also is its frown. And why this array? If our purpose is peace, why these engines of war? If we seek annexion by the declared will of the people, spontaneous, free, and unanimous, as was the boast of Spain, why these floating batteries to overawe them? If we would do good to the African race, why begin with violence to the Black Republic?

Before the Commissioners left our shores, there were already three war-ships with powerful armaments in those waters: the Congress, with fourteen 9-inch guns and two 60-pounder rifles; the Nantasket, with six 32-pounders of 4,500 pounds, and one 60-pounder rifle; and the Yantic, with one 11-inch gun and two 9-inch. And then came the Tennessee, with two 11-inch and two 9-inch guns, two 100-pounders and one 60-pounder, on its spar-deck, and sixteen 9-inch guns on its gun-deck, to augment these forces, already disproportioned to any proper object. The Commissioners are announced as ministers of peace; at all events, their declared duty is to ascertain the real sentiments of the people. Why send them in a war-ship? Why cram the dove into a cannon’s mouth? There are good steamers at New York, safe and sea-worthy, whose presence would not swell the array of war, nor subject the Great Republic to the grave imputation of seeking to accomplish its purpose by violence.

TRAGICAL END OF SPANISH OCCUPATION.

If while negotiating with the Dominicans for their territory, and what is more than territory, their national life, you will not follow Spanish example and withdraw your war-ships with their flashing arms and threatening thunder, at least be taught by the tragedy which attended even this most propitious attempt. The same volumes of authentic documents from which I have read show how, notwithstanding the apparent spontaneousness, freedom, and unanimity of the invitation, the forbearance of Spain was followed by resistance, where sun and climate united with the people. An official report laid before the Cortes describes nine thousand Spanish soldiers dead with disease, while the Spanish occupation was reduced to three towns on the seaboard, and it was perilous for small parties to go any distance outside the walls of the City of San Domingo. The same report declares that twenty thousand troops, provided for a campaign of six months, would be required to penetrate “the heart of Cibao,”—more accessible than the region occupied by General Cabral, who disputes the power of Baez. At last Spain submitted. The spirit of independence prevailed once more on the island; and the proud banner of Castile, which had come in peace, amid general congratulations, and with the boast of not a Spanish bottom or Spanish soldier near, was withdrawn.

AN ENGLISH PRECEDENT.

The example of Spain is reinforced by an English precedent, where may be seen in the light of analogy the true rule of conduct. By a statute of the last century, all soldiers quartered at the place of an election for members of Parliament were removed, at least one day before the election, to the distance of two miles or more;[16] and though this statute has been modified latterly, the principle is preserved. No soldier within two miles of a place of election is allowed to go out of the barracks or quarters in which he is stationed, unless to mount or relieve guard or to vote.[17] This safeguard of elections is vindicated by the great commentator, Sir William Blackstone, when he says, “It is essential to the very being of Parliament that elections should be absolutely free; therefore all undue influences upon the electors are illegal and strongly prohibited.”[18] In accordance with this principle, as early as 1794, a committee of the other House of Congress reported against the seat of a Representative partly on the ground that United States troops were quartered near the place of election and were marched in a body several times round the court-house.[19] And now that an election is to occur in Dominica, where National Independence is the question, nothing is clearer than that it should be, in the language of Blackstone, “absolutely free,” and to this end all naval force should be withdrawn at least until the “election” is determined.

NICE AND SAVOY.

In harmony with this rule, when Nice and Savoy voted on the question of annexion to France, the French army was punctiliously withdrawn from the borders,—all of which was in simple obedience to International Ethics; but, instead of any such obedience, our war-ships have hovered with constant menace on the whole coast.

SEIZURE OF WAR POWERS BY OUR GOVERNMENT.

All this is preliminary, although pointing the way to a just conclusion. Only when we enter into details and consider what has been done by our Government, do we recognize the magnitude of the question. Unless the evidence supplied by the agents of our Government is at fault, unless the reports of the State Department and Navy Department are discredited, it is obvious beyond doubt, most painfully plain and indisputable, that the President has seized the war powers carefully guarded by the Constitution, and without the authority of Congress has employed them to trample on the independence and equal rights of two nations coëqual with ours,—unless, to carry out this project of territorial acquisition, you begin by setting at defiance a first principle of International Law. This is no hasty or idle allegation; nor is it made without immeasurable regret. And the regret is increased by the very strength of the evidence, which is strictly official and beyond all question.

BAEZ, THE USURPER.

In this melancholy business the central figure is Buenaventura Baez,—unless we except President Grant, to whom some would accord the place of honor. The two have acted together as copartners. To appreciate the case, and especially to comprehend the breach of Public Law, you must know something of the former, and how he has been enabled to play his part. Dominican by birth, with much of Spanish blood, and with a French education, he is a cross where these different elements are somewhat rudely intermixed. One in whom I have entire confidence describes him, in a letter to myself, as “the worst man living of whom he has any personal knowledge”; and he adds, that so must say “every honest and honorable man who knows his history and his character.” All his life he has been adventurer, conspirator, and trickster, uncertain in opinions, without character, without patriotism, without truth, looking out supremely for himself, and on any side according to imagined personal interest, being once violent against the United States as he now professes to be for them.

By the influence of General Santana, Baez obtained his first election as President in 1849; and in 1856, contrary to a positive provision of the Constitution against a second term except after the intervention of an entire term, he managed by fraud and intrigue to obtain another lease of power. Beginning thus early his violations of the Constitution, he became an expert. But the people rose against him, and he was driven to find shelter within the walls of the city. He had never been friendly to the United States, and at this time was especially abusive. His capitulation soon followed, and after a year of usurped power he left for France. Santana succeeded to the Presidency, and under him in 1861 the country was reincorporated with Spain, amidst the prevailing enthusiasm of the people. Anxious to propitiate the different political chiefs, the Spanish Government offered Baez a major-general’s commission in the Army, on condition that he should remain in Europe, which he accepted. For some time there was peace in Dominica, when the people, under the lead of the patriot Cabral, rose against the Spanish power. During this protracted period of revolution, while the patriotism of the country was stirred to its inmost depths, the Dominican adventurer clung to his Spanish commission with its honors and emoluments, not parting with them until after the Cortes at Madrid had renounced the country and ordered its evacuation; and then, in his letter of resignation addressed to the Queen, under date of June 15, 1865, he again outraged the feelings of his countrymen by declaring his regret at the failure of annexion to Spain, and his “regard for her august person and the noble Spanish nation,” against whose arms they had been fighting for Independence. Losing his Spanish honors and emoluments, the adventurer was at once changed into a conspirator, being always a trickster, and from his European retreat began his machinations for power. Are we not told by the proverb that the Devil has a long arm?

On the disappearance of the Spanish flag, Cabral became Protector, and a National Convention was summoned to frame a Constitution and to organize a new Government. The people were largely in favor of Cabral, when armed men, in the name of Baez, and stimulated by his emissaries, overwhelmed the Assembly with violence, forcing the conspirator into power. Cabral, who seems to have been always prudent and humane, anxious to avoid bloodshed, and thinking that his considerable European residence might have improved the usurper, consented to accept a place in the Cabinet, which was inaugurated December 8, 1865. Ill-gotten power is short-lived; revolution soon began, and in the month of May, 1866, Baez, after first finding asylum in the French Consulate, fled to foreign parts.

The official journal of San Domingo, “El Monitor,” (June 2, 1866,) now before me, shows how the fugitive tyrant was regarded at this time. In the leading article it is said:—

Then follows in the same journal a manifesto signed by the principal inhabitants of Dominica, where are set forth with much particularity the grounds of his overthrow, alleging that he became President not by the free and spontaneous choice of the people, but was imposed upon the nation by an armed movement; that he treated the chief magistracy as if it were his own patrimony, and monopolized for himself and his brothers all the lucrative enterprises of the country without regard to the public advantage; that, instead of recognizing the merit of those who had by their sacrifices served their country, he degraded, imprisoned, and banished them; that, in violation of the immunity belonging to members of the Constituent Assembly, he sent them to a most horrible prison,—and here numerous persons are named; that, without any judicial proceedings, contrary to the Constitution, and in the spirit of vengeance, he shut up many deserving men in obscure dungeons,—and here also are many names; that, since his occupation of the Presidency, he has kept the capital in constant alarm, and has established a system of terrorism in the bosom of the national representation. All this and much more will be found in this manifesto. There is also a manifesto of Cabral, assigning at still greater length reasons for the overthrow of Baez, and holding him up as the enemy of peace and union; also a manifesto by the Triumvirate constituting the Provisional Government, declaring his infractions of the Constitution; also a manifesto from the general in command at the City of San Domingo, where, after denouncing the misdeeds of one man, it says, “This man, this monster, this speculator, this tyrant, is the General Buenaventura Baez.”

Soon after the disappearance of Baez, his rival became legitimate President by the direct vote of the people, according to the requirement of the Constitution. Different numbers of the official journal now before me contain the election returns in September, 1866, where the name of General José María Cabral appears at the head of the poll. This is memorable as the first time in the history of Dominica that a question was submitted to the direct vote of the people. By that direct vote Cabral became President, and peace ensued. Since then there has been no election; so that this was last as well as first, leaving Cabral the last legitimate President.

During his enforced exile, Baez found his way to Washington. Mr. Seward declined to see him, but referred him to me. I had several conversations with him at my house. His avowed object was to obtain money and arms to aid him in the overthrow of the existing Government. Be assured, Mr. President, he obtained no encouragement from me,—although I did not hesitate to say, as I always have said, that I hoped my country would never fail to do all possible good to Dominica, extending to it a helping hand. It was at a later day that belligerent intervention began.

Meanwhile Cabral, embarrassed by financial difficulties and a dead weight of paper money, the legacy of the fugitive conspirator, turned to the United States for assistance, offering a lease of the Bay of Samana. Then spoke Baez from his retreat, denouncing what he called “the sale of his country to the United States,” adopting the most inflammatory language. By his far-reaching and unscrupulous activity a hostile force was organized, which, with the help of Salnave, the late ruler of Hayti, compelled the capitulation of Cabral, February 8, 1868. A Convention was appointed, not elected, which proceeded to nominate Baez for the term of four years, not as President, but as Dictator. Declining the latter title, the triumphant conspirator accepted that of Gran Ciudadano, or Grand Citizen, with unlimited powers. At the same time his enemies were driven into exile. The prisons were gorged, and the most respectable citizens were his victims. Naturally such a man would sell his country. Wanting money, he cared little how it was got. Anything for money, even his country.

ORIGIN OF THE SCHEME.

Cabral withdrew to the interior, keeping up a menace of war, while the country was indignant with the unscrupulous usurper, who for the second time obtained power by violence. Power thus obtained was naturally uncertain, and Baez soon found himself obliged to invoke foreign assistance. “Help me, Cassius, or I sink!” cried the Grand Citizen. European powers would not listen. None of them wanted his half-island,—not Spain, not France, not England. None would take it. But still the Grand Citizen cried, when at last he was relieved by an answering voice from our Republic. A young officer, inexperienced in life, ignorant of the world, untaught in the Spanish language, unversed in International Law, knowing absolutely nothing of the intercourse between nations, and unconscious of the Constitution of his country, was selected by the President to answer the cry of the Grand Citizen. I wish that I could say something better of General Babcock; but if I spoke according to the evidence, much from his own lips, the portraiture would be more painful, and his unfitness more manifest. In closest association with Baez, and with profitable concessions not easy to measure, was the American Cazneau, known as disloyal to our country, and so thoroughly suspected that the military missionary, before leaving Washington, was expressly warned against him; but like seeks like, and he at once rushed into the embrace of the selfish speculator, who boasted that “no one American had been more intimately connected with the Samana and annexation negotiations, from their inception to their close, than himself,”—and who did not hesitate to instruct Baez that it was not only his right, but duty, to keep an American citizen in prison “to serve and protect negotiations in which our President was so deeply interested,” which he denominates “the great business in hand.”[20]

By the side of Cazneau was Fabens, also a speculator and life-long intriguer, afterwards Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of Baez in “the great business.” Sparing details, which would make the picture more sombre, I come at once to the conclusion. A treaty was signed by which the usurper pretended to sell his country to the United States in consideration of $1,500,000; also another treaty leasing the Bay of Samana for an annual rent of $150,000. The latter sum was paid down by the young plenipotentiary, or $100,000 in cash and $50,000 in muskets and a battery. No longer able to pocket the doubloons of Spain, the usurper sought to pocket our eagles, and not content with muskets and a battery to be used against his indignant fellow-countrymen, obtained the Navy of the United States to maintain him in his treason. It was a plot worthy of the hardened conspirator and his well-tried confederates.

OPEN INFRACTION OF THE DOMINICAN CONSTITUTION.

The case was aggravated by the open infraction of the Constitution of Dominica with which it proceeded. By that Constitution, adopted 27th September, 1866, a copy of which is now before me, it is solemnly declared that “neither the whole nor part of the territory of the Republic can ever be alienated,” while the President takes the following oath of office: “I swear by God and the Holy Gospels to observe and cause to be observed the Constitution and the Laws of the Dominican People, to respect their rights, and to maintain the National Independence.” The Constitution of 1865 had said simply, “No part of the territory of the Republic can ever be alienated”; but now, as if anticipating recent events, it was declared, “Neither the whole nor part,”—thus explicitly excluding the power exercised. All this was set aside while the plot went on. Even if Baez defied the Constitution of his country, our Government, in dealing with him, could not do so. In negotiation with another power, the Great Republic, which is an example to nations, cannot be insensible to the restrictions imposed by the Constitution of the contracting party; and this duty becomes stronger from the very weakness of the other side. Defied by the Dominican usurper, all these restrictions must be sacredly regarded by us. Than this nothing can be clearer in International Ethics; but the rule of Law is like that of Ethics. Ancient Rome, speaking in the text of Ulpian, says: “He who contracts with another either knows or ought to know his condition,”—Qui cum alio contrahit vel est vel DEBET esse non ignarus conditionis ejus;[21] and this rule has the authority of Wheaton as part of International Law.[22] Another writer gives to it this practical statement, precisely applicable to the present case: “Nevertheless, in order to make such transfer valid, the authority, whether de facto or de jure, must be competent to bind the State. Hence the necessity of examining into and ascertaining the powers of the rulers, as the municipal constitutions of different states throw many difficulties in the way of alienations of their public property, and particularly of their territory.”[23] Thus, according to International Law, as expounded by American authority, was this treaty forbidden.

Treaties negotiated in violation of the Dominican Constitution and of International Law were to be maintained at all hazards, even that last terrible hazard of war; nor was Public Law in any of its forms, Constitutional or International, allowed to stand in the way. The War Powers, so carefully guarded in every Republican Government, and so jealously defended against the One-Man Power, were instantly seized, in open violation of the Constitution of the United States, which was as little regarded as that of Dominica, while the Law of Nations in its most commanding principles was set at defiance: all of which appears too plainly on the facts.

ALLEGATIONS IN FORMER SPEECH NOW REPEATED.

When last I had the honor of addressing the Senate on this grave question, you will remember, Sir, my twofold allegation: first, that the usurper Baez was maintained in power by our Navy to enable him to carry out the sale of his country; and, secondly, that further to assure this sale the neighbor Republic of Hayti was violently menaced by an admiral of our fleet,—both acts being unquestionable breaches of Public Law, Constitutional and International. That these allegations were beyond question, at least by our Government, I knew well at the time, for I had the official evidence on my table; but I was unable to use it. Since then it has been communicated to the Senate. What I then asserted on my own authority I now present on documentary evidence. My witnesses are the officers of the Government and their official declarations. Let the country judge if I was not right in every word that I then employed. And still further, let the country judge if the time has not come to cry “Halt!” in this business, which already has the front of war.

WAR.

War, Sir, is the saddest chapter of history. It is known as “the last reason of kings.” Alas, that it should ever be the reason of a Republic! “There can be no such thing, my Lords, as a little war for a great nation,” was the exclamation of the Duke of Wellington,[24] which I heard from his own lips, as he protested against what to some seemed petty. Gathering all the vigor of his venerable form, the warrior seasoned in a hundred fights cried out, and all within the sound of his voice felt the testimony. The reason is obvious. War, whether great or little, whether on the fields of France or the island of San Domingo, is war, over which hovers not only Death, but every demon of wrath. Nor is war merely conflict on a chosen field; it is force employed by one nation against another, or in the affairs of another,—as in the direct menace to Hayti, and the intermeddling between Baez and Cabral. There may be war without battle. Hercules conquered by manifest strength the moment he appeared on the ground, so that his club rested unused. And so our Navy has thus far conquered without a shot; but its presence in the waters of Hayti and Dominica was war.

TWO SOURCES OF TESTIMONY.

All this will be found under two different heads, or in two different sources: first, what is furnished by the State Department, and, secondly, what is furnished by the Navy Department. These two Departments are witnesses, with their agents, confessing and acting. From the former we have confession; from the latter we have acts: confessions and acts all in harmony and supporting each other. I begin with the confession.

CONFESSION OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT.

In the strange report of the Secretary of State, responsive to a resolution moved by me in the Senate, the dependence of Baez upon our Navy is confessed in various forms. Nobody can read this document without noting the confession, first from the reluctant Secretary, and then from his agent.

Referring to the correspondence of Raymond H. Perry, our Commercial Agent at San Domingo, who signed the treaties, the Secretary presents a summary, which, though obnoxious to just criticism, is a confession. According to him, the correspondence “tends to show that the presence of a United States man-of-war in the port was supposed to have a peaceful influence.”[25] The term “peaceful influence” is the pleonasm of the Secretary, confessing the maintenance of Baez in his usurpation. There is no such thing as stealing; “convey the wise it call”; and so with the Secretary the maintenance of a usurper by our war-ships is only “a peaceful influence.” A discovery of the Secretary. But in the levity of his statement the Secretary forgets that a United States man-of-war has nothing to do within a foreign jurisdiction, and cannot exert influence there without unlawful intervention.

The Secretary alludes also to the probability of “another revolution,” of course against Baez, in the event of the failure of the annexion plot; and here is another confession of the dependence of the usurper upon our Navy.

But the correspondence of Mr. Perry, as communicated to the Senate, shows more plainly than the confession of the Secretary how completely the usurper was maintained in power by the strong arm of the United States.

The anxiety of the usurper was betrayed at an early day, even while vaunting the popular enthusiasm for annexion. In a dispatch dated at San Domingo, January 20, 1870, Mr. Perry thus reports:—

Why the man-of-war was needed is easily inferred from what is said in the same dispatch:—

If the truth were told, the usurper felt that it was almost impossible to prevent the people from pronouncing for his overthrow, and therefore he wanted war-ships.

Then under date of February 8, 1870, Mr. Perry reports again:—

The truth becomes still more apparent in the dispatch of February 20, 1870,—nearly three months after the signature of the treaties, and while they were still pending before the Senate,—where it is openly reported:—

Nothing can be plainer. In other words, the usurper was maintained in power by our guns. Such was the official communication of the very agent who had signed the treaties, and who was himself an ardent annexionist. Desiring annexion, he confesses the means employed to accomplish it. How the President did not at once abandon, unfinished, treaties maintained by violence, how the Secretary of State did not at once resign rather than be a party to this transaction, is beyond comprehension.

Nor was the State Department left uninformed with regard to the distribution of this naval force. Here is the report, under date of San Domingo, March 12, 1870, while the vote was proceeding:—

Thus under the guns of our Navy was quiet maintained, while Baez, like another usurper, exclaimed, “Now, by St. Paul, the work goes bravely on!”

What this same official reported to the State Department he afterward reaffirmed under oath, in his testimony before the committee of the Senate on the case of Mr. Hatch. The words were few, but decisive, touching the acts of our Navy,—“committed since we had been there, protecting Baez from the citizens of San Domingo.”[31]

Then, again, in a private letter to myself, under date of Bristol, Rhode Island, February 10, 1871, after stating that he had reported what the record shows to be true, “that Baez was sustained and held in power by the United States Navy,” he adds, “This fact Baez acknowledged to me.”

So that we have the confession of the Secretary of State, also the confession of his agent at San Domingo, and the confession of Baez himself, that the usurper depended for support on our Navy.

AN AMERICAN CITIZEN SACRIFICED TO HELP THE TREATY.

This drama of a usurper sustained by foreign power is illustrated by an episode, where the liberty of an American citizen was sacrificed to the consummation of the plot. It appears that Davis Hatch, of Norwalk, Connecticut, intimately known to one of the Senators of that State [Mr. Ferry] and respected by the other [Mr. Buckingham], lived in Dominica, engaged in business there, while Cabral was the legitimate President. During this time he wrote letters to a New York paper, in which he exposed the character of the conspirator Baez, then an exile. When the latter succeeded by violence in overthrowing the regular Government, one of his first acts was to arrest Mr. Hatch, on the ground that he had coöperated with Cabral. How utterly groundless was this charge appears by a letter to Baez from his own brother, governor of the province where the former resided,[32] and also by the testimony of Mr. Somers Smith, our Commercial Agent in San Domingo, who spoke and acted as became a representative of our country.[33] Read the correspondence and testimony candidly, and you will confess that the whole charge was trumped up to serve the purpose of the usurper.

Sparing all details of trial and pardon, where everything testifies against Baez, I come to the single decisive point, on which there can be no question, that, even after his formal pardon, Mr. Hatch was detained in prison by the authority of the usurper, at the special instance of Cazneau and with the connivance of Babcock, in order to prevent his influence against the treaty of annexion. The evidence is explicit and unanswerable. Gautier, the Minister of Baez, who had signed the treaty, in an official note to our representative, Mr. Raymond H. Perry, dated at San Domingo, February 19, 1870, and communicated to the State Department, says: “I desire that you will be good enough to assure his Excellency, the Secretary of State in Washington, that the prolonged sojourn of Mr. Hatch here has been only to prevent his hostile action in New York.”[34] Nor is this all. Under the same date, Cazneau had the equal hardihood to write to Babcock, then at Washington, a similar version of the conspiracy, where, after denunciation of Perry as “embarrassing affairs here,” in San Domingo, by his persistency in urging the release of Mr. Hatch, he relates, that, on occasion of a recent peremptory demand of this sort in his presence, Baez replied, that Hatch “would certainly make use of his liberty to join the enemies of annexation,” and “that a few weeks’ restraint would not be so inconvenient to him as his slanderous statements might become to the success of General Grant’s policy in the Antilles,”—and he adds, that he himself, in response to the simultaneous charge of “opposing the liberation of an innocent man,” declared, that, in his opinion, “President Baez had the right, and ought, to do everything in his power to serve and protect negotiations in which our President was so deeply interested.”[35] All this is clear, plain, and documentary. Nor is there any drawback or deduction on account of the character of Mr. Hatch, who, according to the best testimony, is an excellent citizen, enjoying the good-will and esteem of his neighbors at home, being respected there “as much as Governor Buckingham is in Norwich,”[36]—and we all know that no higher standard can be reached.

In other days it was said that the best government is where an injury to a single citizen is resented as an injury to the whole State. Here was an American citizen, declared by our representative to be “an innocent man,” and already pardoned for the crimes falsely alleged against him, incarcerated, or, according to the polite term of the Minister of Baez, compelled to a “prolonged sojourn,” in order to assure the consummation of the plot for the acceptance of the treaty, or, in the words of Cazneau, “to serve and protect negotiations in which our President [Grant] was so deeply interested.” The cry, “I am an American citizen,” was nothing to Baez, nothing to Cazneau, nothing to Babcock. The young missionary heard the cry and answered not. Annexion was in peril. Annexion could not stand the testimony of Mr. Hatch, who would write in New York papers. Therefore was he doomed to a prison. Here again I forbear details, though at each point they testify. And yet the Great Republic, instead of spurning at once the heartless usurper who trampled on the liberty of an American citizen, and spurning the ill-omened treaty which required this sacrifice, continued to lend its strong arm in the maintenance of the trampler, while with unexampled assiduity it pressed the treaty upon a reluctant Senate.

CONFESSION OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT WITH REGARD TO HAYTI.

But intervention in Dominica is only one part of the story, even according to the confession of the State Department. Side by side with Dominica on the same tempting island is the Black Republic of Hayti, with a numerous population, which more than two generations ago achieved national independence, and at a later day, by the recognition of our Government, took its place under the Law of Nations as equal and peer of the Great Republic. To all its paramount titles of Independence and Equality, sacred and unimpeachable, must be added its special character as an example of self-government, being the first in the history of the African race, and a promise of the future. Who can doubt that as such this Black Republic has a value beyond all the products of its teeming tropical soil? Like other Governments, not excepting our own, it has complications, domestic and foreign. Among the latter is chronic hostility with Dominica, arising from claims territorial and pecuniary. To these claims I refer without undertaking to consider their justice. It is enough that they exist. And here comes the wrong perpetuated by the Great Republic. In the effort to secure the much-coveted territory, our Government, not content with maintaining the usurper Baez in power, occupying the harbors of Dominica with the war-ships of the United States, sent other war-ships, being none other than our most powerful monitor, the Dictator, with the frigate Severn as consort, and with yet other monitors in their train, to menace the Black Republic by an act of war. An American admiral was found to do this thing, and an American minister, himself of African blood, was found to aid the admiral.

The dispatch of the Secretary of State instituting this act of war does not appear in his Report; but we are sufficiently enlightened by that of Mr. Bassett, our Minister Resident at Port-au-Prince, who, under date of February 17, 1870, informs the State Department in Washington that he had “transmitted to the Haytian Government notification that the United States asked and expected it to observe a strict neutrality in reference to the internal affairs of San Domingo”; and then, with superserviceable alacrity, he lets the Department know that he communicated to Commander Owen, of the Seminole, reports that “persons in authority under the Haytian Government were planning clandestinely schemes for interference in San Domingo affairs.”[37] But a moment of contrition seems to have overtaken the Minister; for he adds, that he did not regard these reports “as sufficiently reliable to make them the basis for a recommendation of severe or extreme measures.”[38] Pray, by what title, Mr. Minister, could you recommend any such measures, being nothing less than war against the Black Republic? By what title could you launch these great thunders? The menacing note of the Minister was acknowledged by the Black Republic without one word of submission,—as also without one word of proper resentment.[39]

The officious Minister of the Great Republic reports to the State Department that he had addressed a diplomatic note to the Black Republic, under date of February 9, 1870, where, referring to the answer of the latter, he says, “It would nevertheless have been more satisfactory and agreeable to my Government and myself, if you, in speaking for your Government, had felt authorized to give assurance of the neutrality asked and expected by the United States.”[40] This letter was written with the guns of the Dictator and Severn behind. It appears from the Minister’s report, that these two war-ships arrived at the capital of the Black Republic on the morning of February 9th, when the Minister, as he says, “arranged for a formal call on the Haytian Government the same day.” The Minister then records, and no blush appears on his paper, that “the Admiral availed himself of this visit to communicate, quite pointedly, to the President and his advisers the tenor of his instructions.”[41] This assault upon the Independence and Equality of the Black Republic will appear more fully in the Report transmitted to the Senate by the Navy Department. For the present I present the case on the confession of the State Department.

RECORD OF THE NAVY DEPARTMENT.

If the Report of the State Department is a confession, that of the Navy Department is an authentic record of acts flagrant and indefensible,—unless we are ready to set aside the Law of Nations and the Constitution of the United States, two paramount safeguards. Both of these are degraded in order to advance the scheme. If I called it plot, I should not err; for this term is suggested by the machination. The record is complete.

The scheme first shows itself in a letter from the Secretary of State to the Secretary of the Navy, under date of May 17, 1869, informing the latter that the President deems it “desirable that a man-of-war, commanded by a discreet and intelligent officer, should be ordered to visit the several ports of the Dominican Republic, and to report upon the condition of affairs in that quarter.” The Secretary adds:—