I have not attempted to justify the policy of this monarch in all respects; but I have presented a few considerations which may serve to mitigate the violent attacks made upon him by his adversaries: it only remains for me to transcribe here the documents to which I alluded when I said that the Inquisition was not a mere instrument of the policy of Philip II., and that this prince did not intend to establish a system of obscurantisme in Spain.

Don Antonio Perez, in his Relations, gives a letter of the confessor of the king, Fray Diego de Chaves, in which letter the latter affirms that the secular prince has power over the lives of his subjects and vassals, and adds in a note: "I shall not undertake to relate all that I have heard said on the subject of the condemnation of some of these propositions; this is not within my province. Those who are concerned in this will at once understand the import of my words. I shall content myself with saying that, at the time when I was at Madrid, the Inquisition condemned the following proposition: a preacher—it matters not that I should mention his name—maintained in a sermon, at St. Jerome's, in Madrid, in presence of the Catholic king, that kings have an absolute power over the persons of their subjects, as well as over their properties. Besides some other separate matters, the preacher was condemned to retract this publicly, in the same place, with all the ceremonies of a juridical act, which he did in the same pulpit, saying that he had advanced such a proposition on such a day, and that he retracted it as erroneous. 'For, messieurs,' said he, reading literally from a paper, 'kings have no other power over their subjects than what is given them by the divine and human law; they have none proceeding from their own free and absolute will.' I even know who condemned the proposition, and appointed the words which the accused, to the great gratification of the former, was obliged to pronounce; indeed, he rejoiced to see torn up so poisonous a weed, which he felt was increasing, as the event proved. Master Fray Hernando del Castillo (I will mention his name) was the one who prescribed what the accused was to say; he was consultee of the holy office, and preacher to the king; he was a man of singular learning and eloquence, very well known and esteemed by his own nation, and especially by the Italians. Dr. Velasco, an important personage of that time, said of him, that the guitar in the hands of Fabricio Dentici was not so sweet as the tongue of Master Fray Hernandez del Castillo to the ears of those who heard him." And at page 47 in the text: "I know," says Don Antonio Perez, "that they were denominated very scandalous by persons very important by their rank, their learning, and their Christian purity of heart; there was one among them who had held supreme rank in the spiritual order in Spain, and had previously filled an office in the tribunal of the Inquisition." Perez afterwards says, that this person was the nuncio of his Holiness. (Relaciones de Anton. Perez. Paris, 1624.)

The letter of Philip II. to Doctor D. Benito Arias Montano contains the following, in addition to the remarkable passage which we have quoted.

"Concerning what you, Dr. &c., my chaplain, will have to do at Antwerp, whither we send you. Dated at Madrid, 25th March, 1568.

"Besides that you will render this good office and service to the said Plantinus, know that, from this time, in proportion as the six thousand crowns are recovered from his hands, I apply them to buy books for the monastery of St. Laurent-le-Royal, of the order of St. Jerome, which I am building near the Escurial, as you know. Thus you are admonished that such is my intention; you will comply with this, and will be diligent in collecting all the choice books, printed and MS., that your excellent discernment shall think proper, in order to bring them and place them in the library of the said monastery. Indeed, it is one of the chief possessions which I would wish to leave to the religious who are intended to dwell there, for it is the most useful and necessary. Wherefore I have also commanded my ambassador in France, D. Francis de Alaba, to collect the best books which he shall be able in that kingdom: you will communicate with him on that subject. I will direct him to communicate in writing also with you, to send you a list of the books which are to be had, as well as their price, before buying them; you will advise him as to which he had better take or leave, and what he may give for such. He will send to you at Antwerp those which he has thus bought; you will acknowledge them, and forward them here, all at once, at the proper time."

During the reign of Philip II.,—of that prince who is represented to us as one of the principal authors of obscurantisme,—choice works, both printed and MS., were sought in foreign countries, in order to enrich the Spanish libraries; in our age, which we call that of enlightenment, the libraries of Spain have been plundered, and their treasures have gone to add to those of foreigners. Who is ignorant of the collections which have been made of our books and MS., in England? Consult the catalogues of the British Museum and other private libraries. The author of these lines states only what he has seen with his own eyes—what he has heard lamented by persons worthy of respect. While we show so much negligence in preserving our treasures, let us not be so unjust and so puerile as to lose our time in vain declamation against those who have bequeathed them to us.

Appendix.

A few words on Puigblanch, Villeneuve, and Llorente.

Here, in the Spanish edition, the notes relating to the Inquisition terminate; but I think it may not be useless in the French edition to add a few words, to explain the matter to my foreign readers: little versed as they are in the knowledge of our affairs, they might often happen to drink at corrupted sources, which they imagine to be pure and salutary. Le Compte de Maistre, with respect to the Spanish Inquisition, cites L'Inquisition dévoilée de Natanaël Jomtob: I will say a few words, lest the authority of the author who quotes should give too much importance to him who is quoted. This Natanaël Jomtob is no other than Dr. D. Antonio Puigblanch, a Spaniard, who died not long ago in London. This author, in the prologue to his works published in London, himself explains the reason which made him adopt a strange name. "These Hebrew words," he says, "are two proper significative names, which, together, form the inscription, Dedit Deus diem bonum. I wished thus to express the happiness of being able to speak and write freely against the tribunal of the Inquisition, and the happiness of seeing it abolished." (Prolog. p. cxv.)

In order that the reader may judge of the value that belongs to this work, I will observe, that the first qualification in an historian, especially on a matter so delicate, is complete impartiality united to a great fund of moderation: these two qualifications were wanting in M. Puigblanch, who was lamentably infected with the contrary faults. It is impossible to be more violent than he is against all that he meets with; his ill-humor and anger blind him; he attacks institutions and men with perfect fury; he respects nothing: add to this a pitiable vanity. It would be easy for me to produce here various proofs of the impiety of Puigblanch; but I should fear to soil my paper by transcribing the impious satires of this man. This is enough to give an idea of the point of view in which he could regard things relating to religious affairs and to the clergy. He misses no opportunity of ridiculing the ministers of religion, of indulging in invectives against them, and of giving vent to the incomprehensible rage which he has against them. The unbecoming manner in which he treats his adversaries, real or imaginary, even when they have more or less sympathy with his opinions, is a good apology for the things which he combats on the other hand. I cannot repeat his words here, so coarse are they; besides, they attack persons who are still living; suffice it to say, that not content with insulting them in the most disgusting way, Puigblanch descends so low as to reproach them with their physical defects, after the manner of a market-woman. What was to be hoped from such a mind in a matter so important and delicate? Were such dispositions suitable for an historian of the Inquisition, who published his work precisely in the year 1811, that is to say, at a time of reaction and effervescence? With respect to talent and knowledge, I will not refuse to M. Puigblanch either reading or erudition, or a certain aptitude for criticism, yet it must not be forgotten that his mind was far from being so cultivated as it ought to have been, in order to keep pace with our age. A work like his required that he should have followed the march of the times, that he should not have been altogether devoid of the philosophy of history, that he should not have relied exclusively upon certain books, while accumulating crude erudition, and incessantly perusing etymologies and grammatical questions: this is what was wanting in M. Puigblanch. To sum up all in one sentence, I have found the following description, which I heard in London, from the mouth of a distinguished man who had intercourse with Puigblanch for a long time, to be perfectly correct: "Puigblanch," he told me, "knew what a learned man of the seventeenth century in Spain might have known." The Christian reader may imagine what was the result of the amalgamation of this kind of instruction with all the bile of Voltairian passion.

D. Joaquin Lorenzo Villanueva is another of those Spaniards who have distinguished themselves by declaiming against the Inquisition; in his Literary Life (Vida Literaria) he had asserted that the public information on this question, and the abolition of that famous tribunal, were in great part owing to him. Puigblanch strongly recriminates against Villanueva, who attempted to usurp his glory by availing himself of his work without acknowledging it, and other similar things, which do as little honor to the one as to the other. Villanueva has been already judged in Spain by all sensible men; foreigners who desire to understand this question will be under the unpleasant obligation of reading the two large volumes in 8vo, in which he has written his literary life. The bile of Villanueva against all the clergy who are not of his coterie, and, above all, his hatred against Rome, show themselves at every page of his book, and from time to time produce explosions which are much too violent to accord with the extreme mildness which he is pleased to affect. Moreover, let the reader prepare and arm himself with patience, if he undertake to get through these two large volumes, which contain, written by the man himself, who so well deserved it, the most complete panegyric of his profound knowledge, his vast erudition, his great humility, and his virtues of all kinds. It certainly would have been very well, if the author, with a slight recollection of modesty, had not candidly told us, that they went so far as to call him the father of the poor, that his poetic fire was not cooled by age, that his activity in labor did not allow him to remain idle, even in the midst of the greatest persecutions; in fine, if he had not undertaken to make us believe that all his life was a continual sacrifice on the altars of knowledge and virtue. To those who desire to derive their information from Villanueva, we have a right to say: Do not forget that you must beware of believing all—that the tree is known by its fruits—that the wolf often assumes sheep's clothing.

Among those who have made the most noise with respect to the Inquisition, is Llorente, the author of a history of that famous institution. The impartiality which may be expected from this writer shows itself every moment in his book, which has evidently been written for the purpose of blackening, as much as possible, the Catholic clergy and the Holy See. Happily the author has made himself too well known by his other works, for any Catholic to allow himself to be deceived by his insidious writings. No one, especially in Spain, is ignorant of the project of the religious constitution with which Llorente attempted to disturb consciences, and introduce schism and heresy into our country. Does he who attempts to destroy the universal discipline established from the earliest ages, who expresses doubts on the most sacred mysteries of our holy religion, who contests the infallible authority of the Church, and does not hold the first four Œcumenical Councils to be legitimate, deserve the least credit when writing the history of the Inquisition,—that history which affords so many opportunities of declaiming against the clergy and against Rome? Here is a proof of his impartiality. In his history of the Inquisition, he could not avoid relating the conduct of the Apostolic See in the early times of the Inquisition in Spain, and the efforts made by the Holy See for the purpose of softening the rigors of that tribunal, the appeals which were made, and the merciful judgments which were almost always obtained at Rome; all these facts clearly showed that Rome, far from being, as he pretended, a monster of cruelty, was rather a model of mildness and prudence. How do you think he gets out of this difficulty? By saying, that what the Court of Rome wanted was, to extort money from us. An explanation as unworthy as it is impudent—an odious means of depriving the most beneficent and generous actions of their lustre, and which shows a fixed design to find evil every where, even to the extent of assigning evil motives for benefits which are the most worthy of gratitude.

With respect to Llorente, I am unwilling to pass over in silence a remarkable fact which he has had the kindness to communicate to the public in the same work. King Joseph, the intruder, intrusted Llorente, by express orders, with the archives of the Supreme Council and the Tribunal of the Inquisition of the capital. This excellent man was so perfect an archivist, that he burnt all the reports of proceedings, with the approbation of his master (as he himself tells us), with the exception of those which could appertain to history, by the celebrity or the renown of the persons who figured in them, such as those of Caranza, of Macanaz, and a few others; although he preserved entire, he adds, the registers of the decisions of the Council, the royal ordinances, and the bulls and briefs from Rome. (Edition Française, 1818, t. 4, p. 145.) After having heard this remarkable confession, we will ask every impartial man, whether there is not room for greatly mistrusting an historian who claims to be sole and unique, because he has had the opportunity of consulting the original documents whereon he founds his history, and who, nevertheless, burns and destroys these same documents? Was there no place to be found in Madrid to place them, where they could be examined by those who, after Llorente, might wish to write the history of the Inquisition from the original documents? Llorente has preserved, he tells us, those which belonged to history; but the history of the Inquisition had equally need of others, even the most obscure—even the most apparently insignificant; for it not seldom happens that a fact, a circumstance, a word, shows us an institution, and paints for us an age. And observe, that this destruction took place at a critical moment of public disturbance, when the whole nation, devoted to an immortal struggle in defence of her independence, could not fix her attention on such matters. The most remarkable men, scattered on all sides, then led their fellow-citizens in arms, or were engaged in the most important interests of the country; consequently they could not watch over the conduct of an archivist, who, after having left his brethren, whose blood was flowing upon the battle-field, accepted employment under a foreign intruder, and burned the documents of an institution whereof he undertook to write the history.

Note 27, p. 281.

The plan of my work required that questions relating to the religious communities should be examined at some length but it did not allow me to give to this matter all the development of which it is susceptible. Indeed, it would be possible, in my opinion, in writing the history of religious communities, to give side by side that of the nations among whom these communities arose, so as to show in detail a truth we have now proved, viz. that the establishment of religious institutions, besides the superior and divine object which they have had in view, has been at all times the fulfilment of a social and religious necessity. Although my strength does not enable me to aspire to such an enterprise, by which the courage may well be daunted, even by contemplating the immense extent of such a work, I wish to suggest the idea of it here; perhaps a man may be found with sufficient capacity, learning, and leisure, to undertake it, and enrich our age with this new monument of history and philosophy. By conceiving the plan in this point of view, and making it subordinate to this unity of object, whereof the foundation, which shows itself in well-known facts, is discovered in obscure and conjectured in hidden ones, there would be no difficulty in giving all desirable variety to this work. The subject itself leads to variety; for it invites the writer to descend to extremely interesting particulars, which will be like the episodes of a grand and unique poem. The disposition of men's minds, now become favorable to religious institutions, thanks to the deceptions which are the consequence of vain theories, and to the lessons of experience, which destroy the calumnies invented by philosophy, render the road every day more easy. The path is already sufficiently beaten; it is only required to enlarge and extend it, in order to conduct a greater number of men towards the region of truth.

Having pointed out this, it only remains for me to state here, in conclusion, divers facts which could not be given in the text, and which I have preferred to collect in a note. As these facts belonged to the same subject, it appeared to me proper to collect them apart, while leaving the reader to pay full attention to the observations which form the body of my work.

There were known among the pagans, under the name of ascetics, persons who devoted themselves to abstinence and the practice of the austere virtues; so that, even before Christianity, there already existed the idea of those virtues which have been since exercised in Christianity. The lives of the philosophers are full of examples which prove the truth of my assertion. Yet it will be understood that, deprived of the light of faith and the aid of grace, the pagan philosophers afforded but a very faint shadow of what was afterwards realized in the lives of the Christian ascetics. We have stated that the monastic life is founded on the Gospel, inasmuch as the Gospel contains asceticism. From the foundation of the Church we see the monastic life established under one form or another. Origen tells us of certain men, who, in order to reduce their bodies into subjection, abstained from eating meat and from all that had life. (Origen, Contr. Celsum, lib. v.) Tertullian makes mention of some Christians who abstained from marriage, not because they condemned it, but in order to gain the kingdom of heaven. (Tertul. De Cult. Femin. lib. ii.)

It is remarkable, that the weaker sex participated in a singular manner in that strength of mind which Christianity communicated for the exercise of the heroic virtues. In the early ages of the Church there were already reckoned, in great numbers, virgins and widows consecrated to the Lord, bound by a vow of perpetual chastity; and we see that special care was taken in the ancient Councils of the Church of that chosen portion of her flock. It is one of the objects of the solicitude of the Fathers to regulate discipline on this point in a proper manner. The virgins made their public profession in the church; they received the veil from the hands of the bishop, and, for greater solemnity, they were distinguished by a kind of consecration. This ceremony required a certain age in the person who was consecrated to God; we also observe that discipline has been very different on this point. In the East they received persons seventeen years old, and even sixteen, as we learn from St. Basil (Epist. can. 18); in Africa at twenty-five, as we see from the fourth canon of the third Council of Carthage; in France at forty, as appears from the nineteenth canon of the Council of Agde. Even when the virgins and widows dwelt in the houses of their fathers, they did not cease to be reckoned among ecclesiastical persons; they received the support of the Church by this title, in cases of necessity. If they violated their vow of chastity, they were excommunicated, and could not return to the communion of the faithful, except by submitting to public penance. (For these details, see the thirty-third canon of the third Council of Carthage, the nineteenth canon of the Council of Ancyra, and the sixteenth canon of that of Chalcedon.)

In the first three centuries, the state of the Church, subject to an almost continual persecution, must naturally have hindered persons who loved the ascetic life, men or women, from assembling in the towns to observe it in common. Some think that the propagation of the ascetic life in the desert is in great part due to the persecution of Decius, which was very cruel in Egypt, and made a great number of Christians retire into the deserts of the Thebais, or other solitudes in the neighbourhood. Thus commenced the establishment of that method of life which, in the end, was to gain so prodigious an extension. St. Paul, if we are to believe St. Jerome, was the founder of the solitary life.

It appears that some abuses were introduced into the monastic life from the earliest ages, as we see certain monks detested at Rome in the time of Jerome. Quousque genus detestabile monacorum urbe non pellitur, says the saint by the mouth of the Romans in a letter to Paula; but the reputation of the monks, which had perhaps been compromised by the Sarabaïtes and the Gyrovagues, a kind of vagabonds whose last care was the practice of the virtues of their state, and who indulged in gluttony and other pleasures with shameful licentiousness, was soon restored. St. Athanasius, St. Jerome himself, St. Martin, and other celebrated men, among whom St. Bennet distinguished himself in a particular manner, renewed the splendor of the monastic life by the most eloquent apology, that which consisted in giving, as they did, the most sublime example of the most austere virtues.

It is remarkable that, in spite of the multiplication of monks in the east and west, they were not divided into different orders, so that, during the first six centuries, all, as Mabillon observes, were considered as forming one institute. There was something noble in this unity, which, as it were, formed all the monasteries into one family; but it must be acknowledged that the diversity of orders afterwards introduced was essentially calculated to attain the various and numerous objects which successively attracted the attention of religious institutions.

The discipline, by virtue whereof no new order could be instituted without the previous approbation of the sovereign Pontiff, it may be said, was very necessary, considering the ardor which afterwards urged many persons to establish new institutions; so that, without this prudent check, disorder would have been introduced in consequence of the exaggerated transports which urged some imaginations to exceed all bounds.

Some people take delight in relating the excesses into which some individuals of the mendicant orders fell; and they borrow the narratives of Matthew Paris, without forgetting the lamentations of St. Bonaventura himself. I wish not to excuse evil, wherever it is found; but I will observe, that the circumstances of the times when the mendicant orders were established, and the kind of life they were obliged to embrace, in order to fulfill the purpose for which they were intended, as I have pointed out in the text, rendered almost inevitable those evils which pious men sincerely deplored, and which the enemies of the Church lament with no less affectation than exaggeration.

Note 28, p. 305.

"Sicut superius reprehendit illos, qui gloriabantur de meritis, ita nunc ingreditur illos redarguere, qui postquam erant ad fidem conversi nolebant subjici alicui potestati. Videbatur enim quod infideles, Dei fidelibus non deberent dominari, etsi fideles deberent esse pares. Quam superbiam removet, dicens: Omnis anima, id est, omnis homo, sit humiliter subdita potestatibus vel secularibus, vel ecclesiasticis, sublimioribus se: hoc est, omnis homo sit subjectus superpositis sibi potestatibus. A parte enim majore significat totum hominem, sicut rursum a parte inferiore totus homo significatur ubi Propheta dicit: Quia videbit omnis caro salutare Dei. Et recte admonet, ne quis ex eo quod in libertatem vocatus est, factusque Christianus, extollatur in superbiam, et non arbitretur in hujus vitæ itinere servandum esse ordinem suum, et potestatibus, quibus pro tempore rerum temporalium gubernatio tradita est, non se putet esse subdendum. Cum enim constemus ex anima et corpore, et quamdiu in hac vita temporali sumus, etiam rebus temporalibus ad subsidium ejusdem vitæ utamur, oportet nos ex ea parte, quæ ad hanc vitam pertinet, subditos esse potestatibus, id est, res humanas cum aliquo honore administrantibus: ex illa vero parte, qua Deo credimus, et in regnum ejus vocamur, non debemus subditi esse cuiquam homini, id ipsum in nobis evertere cupienti, quod Deus ad vitam æternam donare dignatus est. Si quis ergo putat quoniam Christianus est, non sibi esse vectigal reddendum, sive tributum, aut non esse honorem exhibendum debitum eis quæ hæc curant potestatibus, in magno errore versatur. Item si quis sic se putat esse subdendum, ut etiam in suam fidem habere potestatem arbitretur eum, qui temporalibus administrandis aliqua sublimitate præcellit, in majorem errorem labitur. Sed modus iste servandus est, quem Dominus ipse præcipit, ut reddamus Cæsari quæ sunt Cesaris, et Deo quæ sunt Dei. Quamvis enim ad illud regnum vocati simus, ubi nulla erit potestas hujusmodi, in hoc tamen itinere conditionem nostram pro ipso rerum humanarum ordine debemus tolerare, nihil simulate facientes, et in hoc non tam hominibus, quam Deo, qui hoc jubet, obtemperantes. Itaque omnis anima sit subdita sublimioribus potestatibus, id est, omnis homo sit subditus primum divinæ potestati, deinde mundanæ. Nam si mundana potestas jusserit quod non debes facere, contemne potestatem, timendo sublimiorem potestatem. Ipsos humanarum rerum gradus adverte. Si aliquid jusserit procurator, nonne faciendum est? Tamen si contra proconsulem jubeat, non utique contemnis potestatem, sed eligis majore servire. Non hinc debet minor irasci, si major prælata est. Rursus si aliquid proconsul jubeat, et aliud imperator, numquid dubitatur, illo contempto huic esse serviendum. Ergo si aliud imperator, et aliud Deus jubeat, quid faciemus? Numquid non Deus imperatori est præferendus? Ita ergo sublimioribus potestatibus anima subjiciatur, id est, homo. Sive idcirco ponitur anima pro homine, qui secundum hanc discernit, cui subdi debeat, et cui non. Vel homo, qui promotione virtutem sublimatus est, anima vocatur a digniore parte. Vel, non solum corpus sit subditum, sed anima, id est, voluntas: hoc est, non solum corpore, sed et voluntate serviatis. Ideo debetis subjici, quia non est potestas nisi a Deo. Numquam enim posset fieri nisi operatione solius Dei, ut tot homines uni servirent, quem considerant unius secum esse fragilitatis et naturæ. Sed quia Deus subditis inspirat timorem et obediendi voluntatem, contigit ita. Nec valet quisquam aliquid posse, nisi divinitus ei datum fuerit. Potestas omnis est a Deo. Sed ea quæ sunt, a Deo ordinatæ sunt. Ergo potestas est ordinata, id est, rationabiliter a Deo disposita. Itaque qui resistit potestati, nolens tributa dare, honorem deferre, et his similia, Dei ordinationi resistit, qui hoc ordinavit, ut talibus subjiciamur. Hoc enim contra illos dicitur, qui se putabant ita debere uti libertate Christiana, ut nulli vel honorem deferrent, vel tributa redderent. Unde magnum poterat adversus Christianam religionem scandalum nasci a principibus seculi. De bona potestate patet, quod eam perfecit Deus rationabiliter. De mala quoque videri potest, dum et boni per eam purgantur, et mali damnantur, et ipsa deterius præcipitatur. Qui potestati resistit, cum Deus eam ordinaverit, Dei ordinationi resistit. Sed hoc tam grave peccatum est, quod qui resistunt, ipsi pro contumacia et perversitate sibi damnationem æternæ mortis acquirunt. Et ideo non debet quis resistere, sed subjici."

This remarkable passage contains all—the origin of power, its object, its duties, and its limits. We must observe, that St. Anselm expressly confirms what I have hinted in the text on the subject of the wrong meaning sometimes given in the first centuries to Christian liberty; many imagining that this liberty carried with it the abolition of the civil powers, and particularly of those which were infidel. He also shows the scandal which this doctrine might cause; thus explaining how the Apostles, without attempting to attribute to the civil power any extraordinary and supernatural origin, like that of the ecclesiastical power, had nevertheless powerful reasons for inculcating that this power emanates from God, and that whoever resists it, resists the ordinance of God.

Passing on to centuries nearer our own time, we find the same doctrines in the most eminent commentators. Cornelius a Lapide interprets the passage of St. Paul in the same way as St. Anselm, and explains, by the same reasons, the solicitude with which the Apostles recommended obedience to the civil powers. These are his words:

"Omnis anima (omnis homo) potestatibus sublimioribus, id est principibus et magistratibus, qui potestate regendi et imperandi sunt præditi; ponitur enim abstractum pro concreto; potestatibus, hoc est potestate præditis, subdita sit, scilicet iis in rebus, in quibus potestas illa sublimior et superior est, habetque jus et jurisdictionem, puta in temporalibus, subdita sit regi et potestati civili, quod propie hic intendit Apostolus: per potestatem enim, civilem intelligit; in spiritualibus vero subdita sit Prælatis, Episcopis et Pontifici.

"Nota.—Pro potestatibus sublimioribus, potestatibus supereminentibus vel præcellentibus, ut, Noster vertit, 1 Pet. ii., sive regi quasi præcellenti, Syrus vertit, potestatibus dignitate præditis: id est magistratibus secularibus, qui potestate regendi præditi sunt, sive duces, sive gubernatores, sive consules, prætores, &c.

"Seculares enim magistratus hic intelligere Apostolum patet, quia his solvuntur tributa et vectigalia quæ hisce potestatibus solvi jubet ipse v. 7, ita Sanctus Basilius de Constit. Monast. c. 23.

"Nota.—Ex Clemente Alexand. lib. iv. Stromatum, et S. Aug. in Psal. cxviii. cont. 31, Initio Ecclesiæ, puta tempore Christi et Pauli, rumor erat, per Evangelium politias humanas, regna et respublicas seculares everti; uti jam fit ab hæreticis prætendentibus libertatem Evangelii: unde contrarium docent, et studiose inculcant Christus, cum solvit didrachma, et cum jussit Cæsari reddi ea quæ Cæsaris sunt; et Apostoli: idque ne in odium traheretur Christiana religio, et ne Christiani abuterentur libertate fidei ad omnem malitiam.

"Ortus est his rumor ex secta Judæ et Galilæorum de qua Actor. 5, in fine, qui pro libertate sua tuenda omne dominium Cæsaris et vectigal, etiam morte proposita abnuebant, de quo Josephus, libr. xviii. Antiqu. 1. Quæ secta diu inter Judæos viguit; adeoque Christus et Apostoli in ejus suspicionem vocati sunt, quia origine erant Galilæi, et rerum novarum præcones. Hos Galilæos secuti sunt Judæi omnes, et de facto Romanis rebellarunt: quod dicerent populum Dei liberum non debere subjici et servire infidelibus Romanis; ideoque a Tito excisi sunt. Hinc etiam eadem calumnia in Christianos, qui origine erant et habebantur Judæi, derivata est: unde Apostoli, ut eam amoliantur, sæpe docent principibus dandum esse honorem et tributum.

"Quare octo argumentis probat his Apostolus principibus et magistratibus deberi obedientiam....

"His rationibus probat Apostolus Evangelium, et Christianismum, regna et magistratus non evertere, sed firmare et stabilire: quia nil regna et principes ita confirmat, ac subditorum bona, Christiana et sancta vita. Adeo, ut etiam nunc principes Japones et Indi Gentiles ament Christianos, et suis copiam faciant baptismi et Christianismi suscipiendi, quia subditos Christianos, magis quam Ethnicos, faciles et obsequentes, regnaque sua per eos magis firmari, pacari et florere experiuntur."

With regard to the mode in which civil power proceeds from God, the celebrated commentator agrees with the other theologians. Like them, he distinguishes between direct and indirect communication, and takes care to define the particular meaning of the term, divine origin of power, when applied to ecclesiastical authority.

In his explanation of these words, all power is from God, he thus expresses himself:

"Non est enim potestas, nisi a Deo; quasi diceret principatus et magistratus non a diabolo, nec a solo homine, sed a Deo ejusque divina ordinatione et dispositione conditi et instituti sunt: eis ergo obediendum est.

"Nota primo.—Potestas sæcularis est a Deo mediate; quia natura et recta ratio, quæ a Deo est, dicat, et hominibus persuasit præficere reipublicæ magistratus, a quibus regantur. Potestas vero ecclesiastica immediate est a Deo instituta; quia Christus ipse Petrum et Apostolos Ecclesiæ præfecit."

The celebrated Dom Calmet explains the same passage with no less learning; he quotes numerous passages from the holy Fathers, showing what ideas the first Christians held on the subject of civil power, and how calumniously they have been accused of being the disturbers of public order.

"Omnis anima potestatibus, &c. Pergit hic Apostolus docere Fideles vitæ ac morum officia. Quæ superiori capite vidimus, eo desinunt, ut bonus ordo et pax in Ecclesia interque Fideles servetur. Hæc potissimum spectant ad obedientiam, quam unusquisque superioribus potestatibus debet. Christianorum libertatem atque a Mosaicis legibus immunitatem commendaverat Apostolus; at ne quis monitis abutatur, docet hic, quæ debeat esse subditorum subjectio erga Reges et Magistratus.

"Hoc ipsum gravissime monuerant primos Ecclesiæ discipulos Petrus et Jacobus; repetitque Paulus ad Titum scribens, sive ut Christianos, insectantium injuriis undique obnoxios, in patientia contineret, sive ut vulgi opinionem deleret, qua discipuli Jesu Christi, omnes ferme Galilæi, sententiam Judæ Gaulonitæ sequi, et principum authoritati repugnare censebantur.

"Omnis anima, quilibet, quavis conditione aut dignitate, potestatibus sublimioribus subdita sit; Regibus, Principibus, Magistratibus, iis denique quibus legitima est authoritas, sive absoluta, sive alteri obnoxia. Neminem excipit Apostolus, non Presbyteros, non Præsules, non Monachos, ait Theodoretus; illæsa tamen Ecclesiasticorum immunitate. Tunc solum modo parere non debes, cum aliquid Divinæ Legi contrarium imperatur: tunc enim præferenda est debita Deo obedientia; quin tamen vel arma capere adversus Principes, vel in seditionem abire liceat. Repugnandum est in iis tantum, quæ justitiam, ac Dei legem violant; in cæteris parendum. Si imperaverint aut idolorum cultum aut justitiæ violationem cum necis vel bonorum jacturæ interminatione, vitam et fortunas discrimini objicito, ac repugnato; in reliquis autem obtempera.

"Non est enim potestas nisi a Deo. Absolutissima in libertate conditus est homo, nulli creatæ rei, at uni Deo subditus. Nisi mundum invasisset una cum Adami transgressione peccatum, mutuam æqualitatem libertatemque homines servassent. At libertate abusos damnavit Deus, ut parerent iis, quos ipse principes illis daret, ob pœnam arrogantiæ, qua pares Conditori effici voluerunt. At, inquies, quis nesciat, quorumdam veterum Imperiorum initia et incrementa ex injuria atque ambitione profecta. Nemrod, exempli causa, Ninus, Nabuchodonosor, aliique quamplures, an Principes erant a Deo constituti? Nonne similius vero est, violenta Imperia primum exorta esse ab imperandi libidine? liberorum vero Imperiorum originem fuisse hominum metum, qui sese impares propulsandæ externorum injuriæ sentientes, aliquem sibi Principem creavere, datamque sibi a Deo naturalem ulciscendi injurias potestatem, volentes libentesque alteri tradiderunt? Quam vere igitur docet Apostolus, quamlibet potestatem a Deo esse, eumque esse positæ inter homines authoritatis institutorem?"

He points out four ways in which power may be said to emanate from God, and it is remarkable that none of them are extraordinary or supernatural; all of them serve to confirm more and more what reason and the very nature of things teach us.

"Omnino Deus potestatis autor et causa est. I. Quod, hominibus tacite inspiraverit consilium subjiciendi se uni, a quo defenderentur. II. Quod imperia inter homines utilissima sint servandæ concordiæ, disciplinæ, ac religioni. Porro quicquid boni est, a Deo ceu fonte proficisciter. III. Cum potestas tuendi ab aggressore vitam vel opes, hominibus a Deo tradita, atque ab ipsis in Principem conversa, a Deo primum proveniat, Principes ea potestate ab hominibus donati, hanc ab ipso Deo accepisse jure dicuntur; quamobrem Petrus humanam creaturam nuncupat, quam Paulus potestatem a Deo institutam: humana igitur et divina est, varia ratione spectata, uti diximus. IV. Denique suprema authoritas a Deo est, utpote quam Deus, a sapientibus institutam, probavit.

"Nulla unquam gens sæcularibus potestatibus magis paruit, quam primæ ætatis Christiani, qui a Christo Jesu et ab Apostolis edocti, nunquam ausi sunt Principibus a Providentia sibi datis repugnare. Discipulos fugere tantum jubet Christus. Ait Petrus, Christum nobis exemplum reliquisse, cum sese Judicum iniquitate pessime agi passus est. Monet hic Paulus, resistere te Dei voluntati, atque æternæ damnationis reum effici, si potestati repugnas. 'Quamvis nimius et copiosus noster populus, non tamen adversus violentiam se ulciscitur: patitur,' ait sanctus Cyprianus. 'Satis virium est ad pugnam; at omnia perpeti ex Christo didicimus. Cui bello non idonei, non prompti fuissemus, etiam copiis impares, qui tam libenter trucidamur? si non apud istam disciplinam magis occidi liceret, quam occidere,' inquit Tertullianus. 'Cum nefanda patimur, ne verbo quidem reluctamur, sed Deo remittimus ultionem,' scribebat Lactantius. Sanctus Ambrosius: 'coactus, repugnare non novi. Dolere potero, potero flere, potero gemere: abversus arma, milites, Gothos quoque; lacrymæ meæ arma sunt. Talia enim sunt munimenta Sacerdotis. Aliter ne debeo nec possum resistere.'"

I have said in the text, that there was to be remarked a singular coincidence of opinions on the origin of society between the philosophers of antiquity, deprived of the light of faith, and those of our days who have abandoned this light; both wanting the only guide, which is the Mosaic history, have found in their researches after the origin of things, nothing more than chaos, in the physical as well as in the moral order. In support of my assertion, I will insert passages from two celebrated men, in which the reader will find, with very little difference, the same language as in Hobbes, Rousseau, and other writers of the same school.

"There was a time," says Cicero, "when men wandered in the fields like the brutes, feeding on prey like wild beasts, deciding nothing by reason, but every thing by force. No religion was then professed, no morality observed; there were no laws of marriage; the father could not distinguish his own children, and the possession of property by virtue of principles of equity was unknown. Hence the blind, unrestrained passions ruled tyrannically in the midst of error and ignorance, and used the powers of the body for their gratification as their most injurious satellites."

"Nam fuit quoddam tempus cum in agris homines passim bestiarum more vagabantur, et sibi victu ferino vitam propagabant; nec ratione animi quidquam, sed pleraque viribus corporis administrabant. Nondum divinæ religionis, non humani officii ratio colebatur; nemo nuptias viderat legitimas, non certos quisquam inspexerat liberos; non jus æquabile quid utilitatis haberet, acceperat. Ita propter errorem atque inscitiam, cæca ac temeraria dominatrix animi cupiditas ad se explendam viribus corporis abutebatur, perniciosissimis satellitibus." (De Inv. 1.)

The same doctrine is to be found in Horace:

"When men first began to crawl upon the earth, they were only like a herd of brute and speechless animals, contending with their nails or their fists for a few acorns or for a den. They afterwards contended with sticks and such arms as experience taught them to invent. At length they discovered the use of words to express their thoughts; gradually they became weary of fighting, and built cities, and made laws to prevent theft, robbery, and adultery; for, before Helen, women had been the cause of terrible wars. He who was the strongest, abusing his power, after the manner of brutes, attacked the weak, like a bull among a subject herd; they thus contended for the favors of inconstant Venus; but their end was inglorious. If you consult the origin of things, you will acknowledge that laws have been made in apprehension of injustice. Nature enables us to discern good from evil, what is to be sought after from what is to be avoided, but she is incapable of distinguishing justice from injustice."

Note 29, p. 311.

Concerning this question, as to the direct or indirect origin of civil power, it is remarkable, that, in the time of Louis of Bavaria, the imperial princes solemnly sanctioned the opinion that power emanates directly from God. In an imperial Constitution, published against the Roman Pontiff, they established the following proposition: "In order to avoid so great an evil, we declare that imperial dignity and power proceed directly from God.—Ad tantum malum evitandum, declaramus, quod imperialis dignitas et potestas est immediate a Deo solo." That we may form an idea of the spirit and tendency of this doctrine, let us see what kind of man this Louis of Bavaria was. Excommunicated by John XXII., and at a later period by Clement VI., he went so far as to depose this latter Pontiff, in order to exalt to the Pontifical Chair the antipope Peter, for which reason the Pope, after repeated admonitions, divested him of his imperial dignity, substituting Charles IV. in his stead.

Ziegler the Lutheran, a zealous supporter of direct communication, in order to explain his doctrine, compares the election of a prince to that of a minister of the Church. The latter, says he, does not receive his spiritual authority from the people, but immediately from God. From this explanation it is evident with how much reason I have said, that such a doctrine tended to place the temporal and spiritual powers on a level, by making it appear that the latter could not claim, by reason of its origin, any superiority over the former. I do not mean, however, to assert, that this declaration, made in the time of Louis of Bavaria, had directly this aim, since it may rather be regarded as a sort of weapon employed against the pontifical authority, the ascendency of which was dreaded. But it is well known that doctrines, besides the influence resulting immediately from them, possess a peculiar force, which continues to develop itself as opportunities occur. Some time after, we see the kings of England defenders of the religious supremacy which they had just usurped, supporting the proposition advanced in the imperial Constitution.

I know not with what foundation it can be said that Ziegler's opinion was general before the time of Puffendorf; in consulting ecclesiastical and secular writers, we do not find the least support for such an assertion. Let us be just even to our adversaries. Ziegler's opinion, defended by Boecler and others, was attacked by certain Lutherans, amongst others by Boehmer, who observes, that this opinion is not favorable, as its partisans pretend, to the security of states and princes. To repeat what I have already explained in the text, I do not consider that the opinion of direct communication, rightly understood, is so inadmissible and dangerous as some have imagined; but as it lay open to an evil interpretation, Catholic theologians have done well to combat its tendency to encroach upon the divine origin of ecclesiastical power.

Note 30, p. 317.

This book, printed at Madrid in 1615, furnished with all the privileges, approbations, and other formalities in use, must have been well received at that epoch, since it was reprinted at Barcelona in 1616, by Sebastian de Cormellas. Who shall say whether this work did not inspire Bossuet with the idea of that intituled Politics derived from the very words of Scripture? The title is certainly analogous, and the idea is in fact the same, although differently carried out. "I think," says Brother John de Ste.-Marie, "I shall escape all difficulty, by laying before kings in this work, not my own reasonings, nor those afforded by eminent philosophers and the records of profane history, but the words of God and His saints, and the divine and canonical histories, whose teaching commands respect, and whose authority cannot be prejudicial to any one, however powerful a sovereign he may be; in fact, to these a Christian cannot but submit, since every thing in them is dictated by the Holy Ghost, the author of these divine maxims. If I cite examples of Gentile kings, if I appeal to antiquity, and adduce passages from philosophers unconnected with the people of God, I shall do so incidentally only, and as we resume possession of what of right belongs to us, and has been unjustly usurped by others." (Chap. 2.)

The work is dedicated to the king. Addressing him, and praying him to read it, and not to allow himself to be imposed upon by those who would dissuade him from its perusal, the good religious says, with a pleasing candor, "Let no one tell you that these things are metaphysical, impracticable, and all but impossible."

The following inscription is placed at the head of the 1st chapter: "Ad vos (O Reges) sunt hi sermones mei, ut discatis sapientiam et non excidatis: qui enim custodierint justa juste, justificabuntur: et qui didiscerint ista, invenient quid respondeant." (Sap. 6, v. 10.)

In the first chapter, the title of which is, "A treatise in which the import and definition of this word commonwealth are briefly discussed," we read these remarkable words: "So that monarchy must degenerate if it be absolute and without restraint (for power and authority thus become unreasonable); in all things falling under the cognizance of law, it should be bound by the law; and in special and incidental matters it should be subject to advice, from the connection which it ought to have with the aristocracy, which is its assistant, and forms a council of learned and powerful men. Without this wise modification, monarchy will create great errors of government, will give but little satisfaction, but, on the contrary, will cause great discontent among the governed. The wisest and most enlightened men of every age have invariably considered this form of government the best; and without such a modification no city or kingdom has ever been considered well governed. Good kings and the wisest statesmen have always been in favor of this system; bad kings, on the contrary, elated by their power, have pursued the opposite course. Hence, if a monarch, whoever he be, decides by himself, without taking advice, or against the advice of his councillors, he passes the legitimate bounds of monarchy, and even when his decisions are fortunate, he is a tyrant. History is full of these examples and of their disastrous consequences; it will be enough to adduce one only, that of Tarquin the Proud, as related in the 1st book of Livy, a king whose pride was unbounded, and who, to render himself absolute, and to put every thing under his feet, strove to weaken the authority of the Roman Senate by diminishing the number of Senators, thus arrogating to himself an absolute right of decision in all the affairs of the empire."

In chapter 2, in which the author treats of "the meaning of the word king," we read as follows: "We meet here very opportunely with the third meaning of the word king, which is the same as that of father; as we find in Genesis, when the Sichemites gave to their king the name of Abimelech, which means 'Father and Lord.' Kings were formerly styled the fathers of their states. Whence King Theodoric, defining royal majesty (as Cassiodorus relates), makes use of these words: 'Princeps et Pastor publicus et communis.—The king is the public and common father of the state.' From the extreme resemblance between the office of a king and that of a father, Plato was induced to call the king the father of a family; and the philosopher Xenophon says: Bonus Princeps nihil differt a bono Patre. The difference solely consists in one having few and the other a great number of persons under his dominion. And it is certainly very reasonable to give kings this title of father; for they ought to be the fathers of their subjects and of their kingdoms, watching over their welfare and preservation with the love and solicitude of a Father. Royalty, says Homer, is nothing else than a paternal government, like that of a father over his children: 'Ipsum namque regnum imperium est suapte natura paternum.' The best manner of governing well is, for the king to be possessed with the love of a father, and to regard his subjects at his own children. The love of a father for his children, his solicitude that they should want for nothing, his devotedness to each of them, all this bears the greatest resemblance to the love of a king for his subjects. He is called father, and this name lays him under the obligation of acting in accordance with the meaning it conveys. This name, so well adapted to kings, and which, when well considered, is the greatest of all titles and epithets of majesty and power, since it embraces all, the genus and the species, the father being alone the lord, the master, or the chief; this name, I say, is above all human names for expressing authority and solicitude. Antiquity, with a view to confer upon an emperor an extraordinary degree of honor, called him the Father of the State, which was greater than Cæsar, Augustus, or any other glorious name; it decreed him this title, either to flatter him, or to lay him under the weighty obligations required by the name of father. In fine, to give kings this name is to remind them of their duty, viz. to direct, govern, and maintain their states and kingdoms in justice; like good pastors, to feed their rational sheep; like physicians, to care for them and heal them; to take care of their subjects, as a father does of his children, with prudence, love, and solicitude; for the king is for them, rather than for himself. 'Kings are under greater obligations to their kingdoms and states than to themselves;' in fact, if we consider the institution of kings and monarchs, we shall find that the king was appointed for the good of the kingdom, and not the kingdom for the good of the king."

In his 3d chapter, of which the following is the title, "Whether the name of king necessarily implies an office," he thus expresses himself:—"Besides what we have advanced, it may be proved that the name of a king is the name of an office, by the common maxim, 'the benefice is the reward of the office.' Since, therefore, kings receive such great benefices, not only from the considerable tributes they receive from the State, but also from the advantage they derive from benefices and ecclesiastical rents, they certainly do hold an office, and that the greatest of all, for which reason the entire kingdom so bountifully assists them. This is what St. Paul says in his Epistle to the Romans: Ideo et tributa præstatis, &c. Kingdoms do not contribute for nothing; all those states, taxes, and great revenues, that name, that high authority and eminent dignity, are not given gratuitously. They would have their title of king for nothing if they had no subjects to rule and govern, and if they were freed from this obligation: In multitudine populi dignitas regis. This great dignity, wealth, rank, majesty, and honor, are possessed by them with the perpetual obligation of ruling and governing their states, so as to preserve them in peace and justice. Let kings bear in mind, therefore, that they are only invested with this title to serve their kingdoms; and the latter, that kings ought to be paid. They hold an office requiring them to labor: Qui præest in sollicitudine, says St. Paul. Such is the title and the name of king, and of him who rules: one who is the first not only as regards honors and enjoyments, but also as regards cares and solicitude. Let them not imagine that they are kings merely in name and representation, and appointed only to make themselves honored; merely to exhibit their royal person and sovereign dignity in a pompous manner, like some of the kings of the Persians and Medes, who were mere shadows of kings, forgetful of their office, as though they had never received it. Nothing is more destitute of life and substance than the shadowy image which stirs its arm or its head only when some one acts upon it. God forbade the Israelites to have statues or painted images, representing a hand where there was none, and a face that did not exist, exhibiting to the eye an imaginary body, and feigning by apparently living actions to see and to speak; for God loves not feigned images, painted men, or sculptured kings, like those spoken of by David: Os habent et non loquentur, oculos habent et non videbunt. What does it avail to have a tongue that speaks not, eyes that see not, ears that hear not, or hands which do not work? Is it any thing more than an idol of stone, bearing only the external representation of a king? To bear the supreme name and all authority, and not to be capable of any thing, sounds badly. The names which God has given to things are like the title of a book, which, in a few words, contains every thing that is included in the book. This name of king was given to kings by God himself, and contains every thing to which they are obliged by virtue of their office. If their actions are not in accordance with the name, it is as if the mouth should affirm what the head denies, like a buffoon, whom no one believes in earnest. Every one would regard as a mockery and a delusion a signboard bearing the inscription, 'Pure gold sold here,' if, in reality, nothing but tinsel was sold. The name of king should not be an empty thing, a mere superfluity in the royal person—it should be what it implies and gives itself out for. Your name indicates that you rule and govern; rule and govern, therefore, in reality. Do not be mere pasteboard kings, to use a common expression, that is, kings in name only. In France, there was a time when kings had nothing but the name, and the government was entirely in the hands of their generals, whilst they, like animals, were occupied only with gluttony and luxurious living. That it might be known they were living, for they never went out, they used to appear in public once a year, on the 1st of May, in the squares of Paris, seated on a throne, as kings in a dramatic representation, and there they were saluted, gifts were presented to them, and they, on their part, granted certain favors to whomsoever they thought proper. In order to show to what a degree of degradation they had fallen, Eginard tells us, in the beginning of his Life of Charlemagne, that they were devoid of courage and incapable of great actions; they merely held the empty name of king; for, in reality they were not kings, neither had they any participation in the government or riches of the kingdom; every thing was entrusted to the mayors of the palace, styled majors-domo of the royal household; and the latter usurped every thing to such a degree, that they left the wretched king nothing but his title. Seated on his throne, with his long hair and beard, the monarch played his part, pretending to give audiences to ambassadors arriving from all parts, and to furnish them with answers to convey to their masters; whilst in reality they merely answered according to the instructions they had received, either by word or writing, although they appeared to answer on their own responsibility. So that royal power for such a king was reduced to the mere name, to this throne and this ridiculous majesty; the real kings and masters were those favorites by whom the monarch was oppressed. God said of one of the kings of Samaria, that he was merely to be compared to a little vapor, which, seen from afar, appeared something, but when touched was no longer any thing. Simia in tecto rex fatuus in solio suo. (St. Bernard, de Consider ad Eug. cap. 7.) A monkey on a housetop, which, presenting the appearance of a man, is taken for such by those who know not what it is; such is a useless king upon a throne. Monkeys also serve to amuse children, and the king is a laughing-stock to him who looks upon him apart from any royal act, invested with authority, and making no use of it. A king dressed in purple, seated on a throne with great majesty, suited to his grandeur, grave, severe, and terrible in appearance, but in reality an absolute nonentity. Like a painting de la main du Greco, which, placed in an elevated position, and seen from a distance, looks very beautiful, and produces a great effect, but when nearly approached is but a rough sketch. All pomp and majesty, properly considered, are a mere sketch and shadow of a king. Simulacra gentium, says David, speaking of kings who have nothing but the name; and according to the Hebrew text: Imago fictilis et contrita. A figure of pounded earth, crumbling on all sides; an empty phantom, great in appearance, but a mere piece of deception. The name which Elifaz unjustly applied to Job is perfectly applicable here, when he designated this good and just king, a man void of foundation and substance, bearing only external appearances; he styled him Myrmicoleon, that is, the name of the animal which, in Latin, is called Formica-leo, because it is a monstrous conformation, one half of its body, in fact, representing a fearful lion, an animal always used as an emblem of a king, and the other half an ant, that is, a most feeble and insignificant thing. Such are the authority, the name, throne, and majesty of a fierce lion and of a powerful monarch; but as regards the essence, you will find only that of an ant. There have been kings whose very name filled the world with terror; but these kings were void of substance in themselves, in their kingdoms they were as mere ants; their names and offices were very great, but without effect. Let the king, therefore, bear in mind that he has an office to fulfill, and not only an office, but that he is obliged to speak and labor on all offices, of which he is the general superintendent. St. Augustine and St. Thomas, explaining that passage of St. Paul which treats of episcopal dignity, say, that the word bishop, in Greek, is composed of two roots signifying the same thing as superintendent. The name of bishop, king, and every other superior, are names signifying superintendence over, and co-operation with, every office. This is what is expressed by the sceptre used by kings in public acts, a ceremony used by the Egyptians, who borrowed it from the Israelites. The latter, in order to point out the duty of a good king, painted an open eye placed in an elevated position on the point of a rod in the form of a sceptre, representing, on the one hand, the great power of the king, the solicitude and vigilance which he ought to exercise; on the other, that he ought not to be satisfied with holding the supreme power, with occupying the most exalted and most eminent position, and, in possession of these, passing his life in sleep and repose; on the contrary, he should be the first in commanding and counselling, he should appear in every office, incessantly watching and inspecting, like a man doing the business in which he is engaged. Jeremiah also understands it in this sense, for when God asked him what he saw, he answered: Virgam vigilantem ego video. Thou hast seen well; and verily I tell thee, that I who am supreme, will watch over my flock; I who am a shepherd, will watch over my sheep; I who am a king and a monarch, will watch without ceasing over all my inferiors. Regem festinantem, says the Chaldean, a king who is in haste; for, although he has eyes and sees, if he remains in repose, in his pleasures and amusements, if he does not go about from place to place, if he does not act so as to become acquainted with all the good and evil that is going on in his kingdom, he is as though he did not exist. Let him consider that he is the head, and even the head of the lion, which even in its sleep keeps its eyes open; that he is the rod with eyes, that he is the torch; let him open his eyes, therefore, and sleep no longer, trusting to those who are blinded, and see no better than moles; who, if they have eyes, only employ them to see their own interest, and to distinguish at a greater distance what may conduce to their own profit and aggrandizement. Such persons have eyes for themselves, and it would be better if they had them not, for their eyes are those of birds of prey—of vultures."

In his fourth chapter, the title of which is, "On the office of kings," the author thus explains the origin of royal power and its obligations:—"From this it follows," says he, "that the institution of the state of royalty, or king, represented by the head, was not merely for the use and profit of the king himself, but for that of his whole kingdom. Hence he ought to see, hear, feel, and understand, not only by himself and for himself, but by all and for all. He ought not merely to fix his regards upon his own greatness, but on the good of his subjects, since it is for them, and not for himself, that he was born a king. Adverte, said Seneca to the Emperor Nero, rempublicam non esse tuam, sed te reipublicæ.—When men first issued from solitude, and united to live in common, they knew that every one would naturally labor for himself or his own family, and that no one would take an interest in all; they agreed to select a man of great merit, that all might have recourse to him; a man who, distinguished above all the rest by his virtue, his prudence, and courage, should be the chief over all, should govern all, watch over all, and should exert himself for the advantage of all—for the common weal—like a father for his children, or a shepherd for his sheep. Now, considering that this man, abandoning his own affairs to look after those of others, could not maintain himself and his family (every one was then maintained by the labor of his hands), it was agreed that all should contribute to his support, in order that he might not be distracted by any other occupations than those of the common weal and the public government. Such was the end for which kings were instituted—such was their beginning. The good king ought to be more solicitous for the public than for his own private interest. He possesses his grandeur at the expense of great solicitude; the anxiety, the disquietude of mind and body, which is fatigue for him, is repose, support, and protection for others. Thus smiling flowers and fruits, whilst they adorn the tree, exist not so much for the tree, nor on account of the tree, as for the sake of others. Do not imagine that all happiness is in the beauty and grace of the flower, and in those who are the flowers of the world: powerful kings and princes may be termed the flowers of the world, but flowers who consume their lives, who are full of solicitude, and whose fruit will rather contribute to the enjoyment of others than to their own. 'For,' says the Jew Philo, 'the king is to the kingdom what the wise is to the ignorant man, what the shepherd is to his sheep, the father to his children, light to darkness, and what God is upon earth to all his creatures.' The investiture he gave to Moses, when he appointed him the chief and king over his people, was to tell him that he ought to be as God, the common father of all; for the office and dignity of a king require all this. Omnium domos illius vigila defendit, omnium otium illius industria, omnium vacationem illius occupatio. (Seneca, Lib. de Consol.) This is what the prophet Samuel says to Saul, recently elected king, when he expounds to him the obligations of his office: 'Consider, Saul, that God has this day constituted thee king over all this kingdom; thou art bound by the office to govern the whole of it. Thou hast not been made a king to enjoy repose, to become proud, and to glory in the dignity of a king; but to govern thy kingdom, to maintain it in peace and justice, to defend and protect it against its enemies.' Rex eligitur, non, ut sui ipsius curam habeat, says Socrates, et sese molliter curet, sed ut per ipsum ii, qui elegerunt, bene beateque vivant. They were not created and introduced into the world for their own convenience and pleasure or to be fed upon every dainty morsel of food (if such were the case, no one would willingly submit to them); but they were appointed for the advantage and common good of all their subjects, to govern them, protect them, enrich them, preserve and serve them. All this is perfectly admissible; for although the sceptre and crown appear to be the emblems of domination, the office of a king is, strictly speaking, that of a slave. Servus communis, sive servus honoratus, are words which have sometimes been applied to a king, quia a tota republica stipendia accipit ut serviat omnibus. And the Supreme Pontiff glories in this title, Servus servorum Dei. In ancient times this name of slave was one of infamy; but since Christ bore it it has become a name full of honor. Now, since it is neither repugnant nor derogatory to the essence nor nature of the Son of God, neither can it be derogatory to the nature and grandeur of the king.

"Antigonus, king of Macedon, was perfectly aware of this, and said candidly to his son, when he rebuked him for the severity with which he governed his subjects: An ignoras, fili mi, regnum nostrum nobilem esse servitutem? Before his time Agamemnon expressed himself in the same manner: 'We live apparently in the midst of grandeur and exaltation; but in reality we are the servants and slaves of our subjects.' Such is the office of good kings—an honorable servitude. From the moment of their being created kings, their actions no longer depend upon their own will, but on the laws and rules which have been given them, and on the conditions upon which they have undertaken their office. And although they may fail to comply with these conditions (which are the effects of a human convention), they may not fail to comply with that dictated by natural and divine law, the mistress of kings as well as of subjects. Now, these rules are almost all included in the words of Jeremiah, which God, according to St. Jerome, addresses to kings on giving them the command:—Facite judicium et justitiam, liberate vi oppressum de manu calumniatoris, et advenam, et pupillum, et viduam nolite contristare, neque opprimatis inique, et sanguinem innocentum non effundatis. Such is the summary of the obligations of a king; such the laws of his institution, which lay him under the obligation of maintaining in peace and justice the orphan, the widow, the poor, the rich and the powerful man, and him who can do nothing for himself. Upon him rest the wrongs of his ministers towards some, the injustice suffered by others, the sorrows of the afflicted, the tears of those who weep, not to mention many other burdens—a flood of cares and obligations—imposed upon every prince or chief of a state. For if he is the head to command and govern, and to bear the burdens of others, he should also be the feet upon which the whole weight of the state is sustained. Kings and monarchs, says the holy man Job, as we have seen, bear and carry the world upon their shoulders, on account of their office. Hence the figure we meet with in the Book of Wisdom: In veste poderis, quam habebat summus sacerdos, totus erat orbis terrarum. From the moment a man is created king, let him consider himself loaded with a burden so heavy that a strong carriage would not support it. Moses felt this strongly; for God having made him His viceroy, His captain-general, His lieutenant in the government, instead of returning thanks for so distinguished a favor, he complains that so heavy a burden should be placed upon him. Cur afflixisti servum tuum? Cur imposuisti pondus universi populi hujus super me? Again, continuing his complaint, he says, Numquid ego concepi omnem hanc multitudinem? Aut genui eam, ut dicas mihi: Porta eos?—'Lord, have I conceived all this multitude, or begotten them, and thou shouldst say to me, Carry them on thy shoulders?' Now, it is remarkable that God said nothing of that to Moses; he merely tells him to rule and govern them, to fulfill towards them the office of captain and chief. Nevertheless, what says Moses? That God commanded him to bear them on his shoulders—Porta eos. It appears, then, that he has no reason to complain, since he is merely told to be the captain, to direct, rule, and govern. It is a common expression, 'A word to the wise is sufficient.' He who knows and understands what it is to govern and to be the chief, knows also that government and obligation are the same thing. The very words regere and portare are synonymous, and have the same meaning: there is no government nor employment without obligation and labor. In the distribution of the offices which Jacob made among his children, he appointed Reuben to be the first in his inheritance and the highest in command—prior in donis, major in imperio. And St. Jerome translates major ad portandum, for command and obligation are the same thing; and the obligation and the labor are so much more considerable as the command is more exalted. St. Gregory, in his Morales, says, that the power, domination, and rule of kings over the whole world should not be looked upon as an honor but as a labor. Potestas accepta non honor, sed onus æstimatur. And this truth was ever received by the blindest among the Gentiles. One of them, taking the same view of the subject, says, speaking of another Pagan, that his god Apollo had made him all glorious and happy by the gift of a certain office: Lætus erat, mixtoque oneri gaudebat honore. So that power and command composed of a little honor and weighty obligations. The Latin word for honor only differs from that for burden by one letter—onos and onus. Besides, there always were and always will be persons willing to undertake the responsibility for the sake of the honor, although every one avoids as much as possible any thing that lays him under an obligation, and seeks after what is glorious; a dangerous choice, for the latter is not always the most secure."