[337] Thucyd. i, 69. ἡσυχάζετε γὰρ μόνοι Ἑλλήνων, ὦ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, οὐ τῇ δυνάμει τινὰ ἀλλὰ τῇ μελλήσει ἀμυνόμενοι, καὶ μόνοι οὐκ ἀρχομένην τὴν αὔξησιν τῶν ἐχθρῶν, ἀλλὰ διπλασιουμένην, καταλύοντες.

[338] Αἰσχρὸν δὲ βιασθέντας ἀπελθεῖν, ἢ ὕστερον ἐπιμεταπέμπεσθαι, τὸ πρῶτον ἀσκέπτως βουλευσαμένους: “It is disgraceful to be driven out of Sicily by superior force, or to send back here afterwards for fresh reinforcements, through our own fault in making bad calculations at first.” (Thucyd. vi, 21.)

This was a part of the last speech by Nikias himself at Athens, prior to the expedition. The Athenian people in reply had passed a vote that he and his colleagues should fix their own amount of force, and should have everything which they asked for. Moreover, such was the feeling in the city, that every one individually was anxious to put down his name to serve (vi, 26-31). Thucydidês can hardly find words sufficient to depict the completeness, the grandeur, the wealth public and private, of the armament.

As this goes to establish what I have advanced in the text,—that the actions of Nikias in Sicily stand most of all condemned by his own previous speeches at Athens,—so it seems to have been forgotten by Dr. Arnold, when he wrote his note on the remarkable passage, ii, 65, of Thucydidês,—ἐξ ὧν ἄλλα τε πολλὰ, ὡς ἐν μεγάλῃ πόλει, καὶ ἀρχὴν ἐχούσῃ, ἡμαρτήθη, καὶ ὁ ἐς Σικελίαν πλοῦς· ὃς οὐ τοσοῦτον γνώμης ἁμάρτημα ἦν πρὸς οὓς ἐπῄεσαν, ὅσον οἱ ἐκπέμψαντες, οὐ τὰ πρόσφορα τοῖς οἰχομένοις ἐπιγιγνώσκοντες, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὰς ἰδίας διαβολὰς περὶ τῆς τοῦ δήμου προστασίας, τά τε ἐν τῷ στρατοπέδῳ ἀμβλύτερα ἐποίουν, καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν πόλιν πρῶτον ἐν ἀλλήλοις ἐταράχθησαν. Upon which Dr. Arnold remarks:—

“Thucydidês here expresses the same opinion which he repeats in two other places (vi, 31; vii, 42). namely, that the Athenian power was fully adequate to the conquest of Syracuse, had not the expedition been mismanaged by the general, and insufficiently supplied by the government at home. The words οὐ τὰ πρόσφορα τοῖς οἰχομένοις ἐπιγιγνώσκοντες signify “not voting afterwards the needful supplies to their absent armament:” for Nikias was prevented from improving his first victory over the Syracusans by the want of cavalry and money; and the whole winter was lost before he could get supplied from Athens. And subsequently the armament was allowed to be reduced to great distress and weakness, before the second expedition was sent to reinforce it.” Göller and Poppo concur in this explanation.

Let us in the first place discuss the explanation here given of the words τὰ πρόσφορα ἐπιγιγνώσκοντες. It appears to me that these words do not signify “voting the needful supplies.”

The word ἐπιγιγνώσκειν cannot be used in the same sense with ἐπιπέμπειν—παρασχεῖν (vii, 2-15), ἐκπορίζειν. As it would not be admissible to say ἐπιγιγνώσκειν ὅπλα, νῆας, ἵππους, χρήματα, etc., so neither can it be right to say ἐπιγιγνώσκειν τὰ πρόσφορα, if this latter word were used only as a comprehensive word for these particulars, meaning “supplies.” The words really mean: “taking farther resolutions (after the expedition was gone) unsuitable or mischievous to the absent armament.” Πρόσφορα is used here quite generally, agreeing with βουλεύματα, or some such word: indeed, we find the phrase τὰ πρόσφορα used in the most general sense, for “what is suitable;” “what is advantageous or convenient:” γυμνάσω τὰ πρόσφορα—πράσσεται τὰ πρόσφορα—τὰ πρόσφορ’ ηὔξατ’—τὰ πρόσφορα δρῳης ἂν—τὸ ταῖσδε πρόσφορον. Euripid. Hippol. 112; Alkestis, 148; Iphig. Aul. 160, B; Helen. 1299; Troades, 304.

Thucydidês appears to have in view the violent party contests which broke out in reference to the Hermæ and the other irreligious acts at Athens, after the departure of the armament, especially to the mischief of recalling Alkibiadês, which grew out of those contests. He does not allude to the withholding of supplies from the armament; nor was it the purpose of any of the parties at Athens to withhold them. The party acrimony was directed against Alkibiadês exclusively, not against the expedition.

Next, as to the main allegation in Dr. Arnold’s note, that one of the causes of the failure of the Athenian expedition in Sicily, was, that it was “insufficiently supplied by Athens.” Of the two passages to which he refers in Thucydidês (vi, 31; vii, 42), the first distinctly contradicts this allegation, by setting forth the prodigious amount of force sent; the second says nothing about it, and indirectly discountenances it, by dwelling upon the glaring blunders of Nikias.

After the Athenians had allowed Nikias in the spring to name and collect the force which he thought requisite, how could they expect to receive a demand for farther reinforcements in the autumn, the army having really done nothing? Nevertheless, the supplies were sent, as soon as they could be, and as soon as Nikias expected them. If the whole winter was lost, that was not the fault of the Athenians.

Still harder is it in Dr. Arnold, to say, “that the armament was allowed to be reduced to great distress and weakness before the second expedition was sent to reinforce it.” The second expedition was sent the moment that Nikias made known his distress and asked for it; his intimation of distress coming quite suddenly, almost immediately after most successful appearances.

It appears to me that nothing can be more incorrect or inconsistent with the whole tenor of the narrative of Thucydidês, than to charge the Athenians with having starved their expedition. What they are really chargeable with, is, the having devoted to it a disproportionate fraction of their entire strength, perfectly enormous and ruinous. And so Thucydidês plainly conceives it, when he is describing both the armament of Nikias and that of Demosthenês.

Thucydidês is very reserved in saying anything against Nikias, whom he treats throughout with the greatest indulgence and tenderness. But he lets drop quite sufficient to prove that he conceived the mismanagement of the general as the cause of the failure of the armament, not as “one of two causes,” as Dr. Arnold here presents it. Of course, I recognize fully the consummate skill, and the aggressive vigor so unusual in a Spartan, of Gylippus, together with the effective influence which this exercised upon the result. But Gylippus would never have set foot in Syracuse, had he not been let in, first through the apathy, next through the contemptuous want of precaution, shown by Nikias (vii, 42).

[339] Thucyd. v, 7. See volume vi of this History, chap. liv, p. 464.

[340] Thucyd. vi, 72, 73.

[341] Thucyd. vi, 75. Ἐτείχιζον δὲ οἱ Συρακόσιοι ἐν τῷ χειμῶνι πρός τε τῇ πόλει, τὸν Τεμενίτην ἐντὸς ποιησάμενοι, τεῖχος παρὰ πᾶν τὸ πρὸς τὰς Ἐπιπολὰς ὁρῶν, ὅπως μὴ δι’ ἐλάσσονος εὐαποτείχιστοι ὦσιν, ἢν ἄρα σφάλλωνται, etc.

I reserve the general explanation of the topography of Syracuse for the next chapter, when the siege begins.

[342] Thucyd. vi, 75.

[343] Thucyd. vi, 77-80.

[344] Thucyd. vi, 83-87.

[345] Thucyd. vi, 86. ἡμεῖς μέν γε οὔτε ἐμμεῖναι δυνατοὶ μὴ μεθ’ ὑμῶν· εἴ τε καὶ γενόμενοι κακοὶ κατεργασαίμεθα, ἀδύνατοι κατασχεῖν, διὰ μῆκός τε πλοῦ καὶ ἀπορίᾳ φυλακῆς πόλεων μεγάλων καὶ παρασκευῇ ἠπειρωτίδων, etc.

This is exactly the language of Nikias in his speech to the Athenians. vi, 11.

[346] Thucyd. vi, 88.

[347] Compare the remarks of Alkibiadês, Thucyd. vi, 91.

[348] Thucyd. vi, 88.

[349] Thucyd. vi, 88; vii, 42.

[350] Plutarch (Alkib. c. 23) says that he went to reside at Argos; but this seems difficult to reconcile with the assertion of Thucydidês (vi, 61) that his friends at Argos had incurred grave suspicions of treason.

Cornelius Nepos (Alkib. c. 4) says, with greater probability of truth, that Alkibiadês went from Thurii, first to Elis, next to Thebes.

Isokratês (De Bigis, Orat. xvi, s. 10) says that the Athenians banished him out of all Greece, inscribed his name on a column, and sent envoys to demand his person from the Argeians; so that Alkibiadês was compelled to take refuge with the Lacedæmonians. This whole statement of Isokratês is exceedingly loose and untrustworthy, carrying back the commencement of the conspiracy of the Four Hundred to a time anterior to the banishment of Alkibiadês. But among all the vague sentences, this allegation that the Athenians banished him out of all Greece stands prominent. They could only banish him from the territory of Athens and her allies. Whether he went to Argos, as I have already said, seems to me very doubtful: perhaps Plutarch copied the statement from this passage of Isokratês.

But under all circumstances, we are not to believe that Alkibiadês turned against his country, or went to Sparta, upon compulsion. The first act of his hostility to Athens, the disappointing her of the acquisition of Messênê, was committed before he left Sicily. Moreover, Thucydidês represents him as unwilling indeed to go to Sparta, but only unwilling because he was afraid of the Spartans; in fact, waiting for a safe-conduct and invitation from them. Thucydidês mentions nothing about his going to Argos (vi, 88).

[351] Thucyd. vi, 88.

[352] Thucyd. vi, 89. Τοῖς γὰρ τυράννοις ἀεί ποτε διάφοροί ἐσμεν, πᾶν δὲ τὸ ἐναντιούμενον τῷ δυναστεύοντι δῆμος ὠνόμασται· καὶ ἀπ’ ἐκείνου ξυμπαρέμεινεν ἡ προστασία ἡμῖν τοῦ πλήθους.

It is to be recollected that the Lacedæmonians had been always opposed to τύραννοι, or despots, and had been particularly opposed to the Peisistratid τύραννοι, whom they in fact put down. In tracing his democratical tendencies, therefore, to this source, Alkibiadês took the best means of excusing them before a Lacedæmonian audience.

[353] Thucyd. vi, 89. ἡμεῖς δὲ τοῦ ξύμπαντος προέστημεν, δικαιοῦντες ἐν ᾧ σχήματι μεγίστη ἡ πόλις ἔτυχε καὶ ἐλευθερωτάτη οὖσα, καὶ ὅπερ ἐδέξατό τις, τοῦτο ξυνδιασῴζειν· ἐπεὶ δημοκρατίαν γε καὶ ἐγιγνώσκομεν οἱ φρονοῦντές τι, καὶ αὐτὸς οὐδενὸς ἂν χεῖρον, ὅσῳ καὶ λοιδορήσαιμι· ἀλλὰ περὶ ὁμολογουμένης ἀνοίας οὐδὲν ἂν καινὸν λέγοιτο· καὶ τὸ μεθιστάναι αὐτὴν οὐκ ἐδόκει ἡμῖν ἀσφαλὲς εἶναι, ὑμῶν πολεμίων προσκαθημένων.

[354] The establishment and permanent occupation of a fortified post in Attica, had been contemplated by the Corinthians even before the beginning of the war (Thucyd. i, 122).

[355] Thucyd. vi, 92. Καὶ χείρων οὐδενὶ ἀξιῶ δοκεῖν ὑμῶν εἶναι, εἰ τῇ ἐμαυτοῦ μετὰ τῶν πολεμιωτάτων, φιλόπολίς ποτε δοκῶν εἶναι, νῦν ἐγκρατῶς ἐπέρχομαι.

[356] Thucyd. vi, 92. Τό τε φιλόπολι οὐκ ἐν ᾧ ἀδικοῦμαι ἔχω, ἀλλ’ ἐν ᾧ ἀσφαλῶς ἐπολιτεύθην. Οὐδ’ ἐπὶ πατρίδα οὖσαν ἔτι ἡγοῦμαι νῦν ἰέναι, πολὺ δὲ μᾶλλον τὴν οὐκ οὖσαν ἀνακτᾶσθαι. Καὶ φιλόπολις οὗτος ὀρθῶς, οὐχ ὃς ἂν τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἀδίκως ἀπολέσας μὴ ἐπίῃ, ἀλλ’ ὃς ἂν ἐκ παντὸς τρόπου διὰ τὸ ἐπιθυμεῖν πειραθῇ αὐτὴν ἀναλαβεῖν.

[357] Thucyd. vi, 89-92.

[358] Thucyd. vi, 28.

[359] See a remarkable passage of Thucyd. viii, 89, ῥᾷον τὰ ἀποβαίνοντα, ὡς οὐκ ἀπὸ τῶν ὁμοίων, ἐλασσούμενός τις φέρει, and the note in explanation of it, in a later chapter of this History, chap. lxii.

[360] Thucyd. vi, 12-17.

[361] Plutarch, Alkib. c. 17.

[362] Lucan, Pharsal. iv, 819.

[363] Thucyd. vi, 93; Plutarch, Alkib. c. 23; Diodor. xiii, 7.

[364] Thucyd. vi, 104.

[365] Horses were so largely bred in Sicily, that they even found their way into Attica and Central Greece, Sophoklês, Œd. Kolon. 312:—

If the Scholiast is to be trusted, the Sicilian horses were of unusually great size.

[366] Thucyd. vi, 95-98.

[367] At the neighboring city of Gela, also, a little without the walls, there stood a large brazen statue of Apollo; of so much sanctity, beauty, or notoriety, that the Carthaginians in their invasion of the island, seven years after the siege of Syracuse by Nikias, carried it away with them and transported it to Tyre (Diodor. xiii, 108).

[368] Thucyd. vi, 75. Ἐτείχιζον δὲ καὶ οἱ Συρακόσιοι ἐν τῷ χειμῶνι τούτῳ πρός τε τῇ πόλει, τὸν Τεμενίτην ἐντὸς ποιησάμενοι, τεῖχος παρὰ πᾶν τὸ πρὸς τὰς Ἐπιπολὰς ὁρῶν, ὅπως μὴ δι’ ἐλάσσονος εὐαποτείχιστοι ὦσιν, ἢν ἄρα σφάλλωνται, etc.

[369] Thucyd. vi, 96.

[370] Thucyd. vi, 97.

[371] Thucyd. vi, 98. ἐχώρουν πρὸς τὴν Συκῆν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, ἵναπερ καθεζόμενοι ἐτείχισαν τὸν κύκλον διὰ τάχους.

[372] The Athenians seem to have surpassed all other Greeks in the diligence and skill with which they executed fortifications: see some examples, Thucyd. v, 75-82; Xenoph. Hellen. iv, 4, 18.

[373] Dr. Arnold, in his note on Thucyd. vi, 98, says that the Circle is spoken of, in one passage of Thucydidês, as if it had never been completed. I construe this one passage differently from him (vii, 2, 4)—τῷ ἄλλῳ τοῦ κύκλου πρὸς τὸν Τρώγιλον ἐπὶ τὴν ἑτέραν θάλασσαν: where I think τῷ ἄλλῳ τοῦ κύκλου is equivalent to ἑτέρωθι τοῦ κύκλου, as plainly appears from the accompanying mention of Trogilus and the northern sea. I am persuaded that the Circle was finished; and Dr. Arnold himself indicates two passages in which it is distinctly spoken of as having been completed.

[374] Thucyd. vi, 99. Ὑποτειχίζειν δὲ ἄμεινον ἐδόκει εἶναι (τοῖς Συρακουσίοις) ᾗ ἐκεῖνοι (the Athenians) ἔμελλον ἄξειν τὸ τεῖχος· καὶ εἰ φθάσειαν, ἀποκλῄσεις γίγνεσθαι, καὶ ἅμα καὶ ἐν τούτῳ εἰ ἐπιβοηθοῖεν, μέρος ἀντιπέμπειν αὐτοὶ τῆς στρατιᾶς, καὶ φθάνειν ἂν αὐτοὶ τοῖς σταυροῖς προκαταλαμβάνοντες τὰς ἐφόδους· ἐκείνους δὲ ἂν παυομένους τοῦ ἔργου πάντας ἂν πρὸς σφᾶς τρέπεσθαι.

The Scholiast here explains τὰς ἐφόδους to mean τὰ βάσιμα; adding ὀλίγα δὲ τὰ ἐπιβαθῆναι δυνάμενα, διὰ τὸ τελματῶδες εἶναι τὸ χωρίον. Though he is here followed by the best commentators, I cannot think that his explanation is correct. He evidently supposes that this first counter-wall of the Syracusans was built—as we shall see presently that the second counter-work was—across the marsh, or low ground between the southern cliff of Epipolæ and the Great Harbor. “The ground being generally marshy (τελματῶδες) there were only a few places where it could be crossed.” But I conceive this supposition to be erroneous. The first counter-wall of the Syracusans was carried, as it seems to me, up the slope of Epipolæ, between the Athenian circle and the southern cliff: it commenced at the Syracusan newly-erected advanced wall, inclosing the Temenitês. This was all hard, firm ground, such as the Athenians could march across at any point: there might perhaps be some roughness here and there, but they would be mere exceptions to the general character of the ground.

It appears to me that τὰς ἐφόδους means simply, “the attacks of the Athenians,” without intending to denote any special assailable points; προκαταλαμβάνειν τὰς ἐφόδους, means “to get beforehand with the attacks,” (see Thucyd. i, 57, v, 30.) This is in fact the more usual meaning of ἔφοδος (compare vii, 5; vii, 43; i, 6; v, 35; vi, 63), “attack, approach, visit,” etc. There are doubtless other passages in which it means, “the way or road through which the attack was made:” in one of these, however (vii, 51), all the best editors now read ἐσόδου instead of ἐφόδου.

It will be seen that arguments have been founded upon the inadmissible sense which the Scholiast here gives to the word ἔφοδοι: see Dr. Arnold, Memoir on the Map of Syracuse, Appendix to his ed. of Thucyd. vol. iii, p. 271.

[375] Thucyd. vi, 100.

[376] Thucyd. vi, 101. Τῇ δ’ ὑστεραίᾳ ἀπὸ τοῦ κύκλου ἐτείχιζον οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τὸν κρημνὸν τὸν ὑπὲρ τοῦ ἕλους, ὃς τῶν Ἐπιπολῶν ταύτῃ πρὸς τὸν μέγαν λιμένα ὁρᾷ, καὶ ᾗπερ αὐτοῖς βραχύτατον ἐγίγνετο καταβᾶσι διὰ τοῦ ὁμάλου καὶ τοῦ ἕλους ἐς τὸν λιμένα τὸ περιτείχισμα.

I give in the text what I believe to be the meaning of this sentence, though the words ἀπὸ τοῦ κύκλου are not clear, and have been differently construed. Göller, in his first edition, had construed them as if it stood ἀρξάμενοι ἀπὸ τοῦ κύκλου: as if the fortification now begun on the cliff was continuous and in actual junction with the Circle. In his second edition, he seems to relinquish this opinion, and to translate them in a manner similar to Dr. Arnold, who considers them as equivalent to ἀπὸ τοῦ κύκλου ὁρμώμενοι, but not at all implying that the fresh work performed was continuous with the Circle, which he believes not to have been the fact. If thus construed, the words would imply, “starting from the Circle as a base of operations.” Agreeing with Dr. Arnold in his conception of the event signified, I incline, in construing the words, to proceed upon the analogy of two or three passages in Thucyd. i, 7; i, 46; i, 99; vi, 64—Αἱ δὲ παλαιαὶ πόλεις διὰ τὴν λῃστείαν ἐπιπολὺ ἀντισχοῦσαν ἀπὸ θαλάσσης μᾶλλον ᾠκίσθησαν ... Ἐστὶ δὲ λιμὴν, καὶ πόλις ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ κεῖται ἀπὸ θαλάσσης ἐν τῇ Ἐλαιάτιδι τῆς Θεσπρώτιδος, Ἐφύρη. In these passages ἀπὸ is used in the same sense as we find ἄποθεν, iv, 125, signifying “apart from, at some distance from;” but not implying any accompanying idea of motion, or proceeding from, either literal or metaphorical.

“The Athenians began to fortify, at some distance from their Circle, the cliff above the marsh,” etc.

[377] Thucyd. vi, 102; Plutarch, Nikias, c. 18. Diodorus erroneously places the battle, in which Lamachus was slain, after the arrival of Gylippus (xiii, 8).

[378] Thucyd. vi, 102.

[379] Thucyd. vi, 102.

[380] Thucyd. vi, 103. οἷα δὲ εἰκὸς ἀνθρώπων ἀπορούντων καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ πρὶν πολιορκουμένων, etc.

[381] Diodorus, however, is wrong in stating (xiii, 7) that the Athenians occupied the temple of Zeus Olympius and the polichnê, or hamlet, surrounding it, on the right bank of the Anapus. These posts remained always occupied by the Syracusans, throughout the whole war (Thucyd. vii, 4, 37).

[382] Thucyd. vi, 103. πολλὰ ἐλέγετο πρός τε ἐκεῖνον καὶ πλείω ἔτι κατὰ τὴν πόλιν.

[383] Thucyd. vii, 55.

[384] Thucyd. vii, 49-86.

[385] Plutarch, Nikias, c. 18.

[386] Thucyd. vi, 104. ὡς αὐτοῖς αἱ ἀγγελίαι ἐφοίτων δειναὶ καὶ πᾶσαι ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἐψευσμέναι, ὡς ἤδη παντελῶς ἀποτετειχισμέναι αἱ Συράκουσαί εἰσι, τῆς μὲν Σικελίας οὐκέτι ἐλπίδα οὐδεμίαν εἶχεν ὁ Γύλιππος, τὴν δὲ Ἰταλίαν βουλόμενος περιποιῆσαι, etc. Compare Plutarch, Nikias. c. 18.

It will be seen from Thucydidês, that Gylippus heard this news while he was yet at Leukas.

[387] Thucyd. vi, 104. Ἄρας (Γύλιππος) παρέπλει τὴν Ἰταλίαν καὶ ἁρπασθεὶς ὑπ’ ἀνέμου κατὰ τὸν Τεριναῖον κόλπον, ὃς ἐκπνεῖ ταύτῃ μέγας, κατὰ Βορέαν ἑστηκὼς ἀποφέρεται ἐς τὸ πέλαγος, καὶ πάλιν χειμασθεὶς ἐς τὰ μάλιστα Τάραντι προσμίσγει.

Though all the commentators here construe the words κατὰ Βορέαν ἑστηκὼς as if they agreed with ὃς or ἄνεμος, I cannot but think that these words really agree with Γύλιππος. Gylippus is overtaken by this violent off-shore wind while he is sailing southward along the eastern shore of what is now called Calabria Ultra: “setting his ship towards the north or standing to the north (to use the English nautical phrase), he is carried out to sea, from whence, after great difficulties, he again gets into Tarentum.” If Gylippus was carried out to sea when in this position, and trying to get to Tarentum, he would naturally lay his course northward. What is meant by the words κατὰ Βορέαν ἑστηκὼς, as applied to the wind, I confess I do not understand; nor do the critics throw much light upon it. Whenever a point of the compass is mentioned in conjunction with any wind, it always seems to mean the point from whence the wind blows. Now, that κατὰ Βορέαν ἑστηκὼς means “a wind which blows steadily from the north,” as the commentators affirm, I cannot believe without better authority than they produce. Moreover, Gylippus could never have laid his course for Tarentum, if there had been a strong wind in this direction; while such a wind would have forwarded him to Lokri, the very place whither he wanted to go. The mention of the Terinæan gulf is certainly embarrassing. If the words are right (which perhaps may be doubted), the explanation of Dr. Arnold in his note seems the best which can be offered. Perhaps, indeed,—for though improbable, this is not wholly impossible,—Thucydidês may himself have committed a geographical inadvertence, in supposing the Terinæan gulf to be on the east side of Calabria.

[388] Thucyd. vi, 104.

[389] Thucyd. vii, 1.

[390] Thucyd. vii, 2-7.

[391] Thucyd. vi, 103; vii, 2; Plutarch, Nikias, c. 19.

[392] Thucyd. vii, 2.

[393] Thucyd. vii, 3. Οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι, αἰφνιδίως τοῦ τε Γυλίππου καὶ τῶν Συρακοσίων σφίσιν ἐπιόντων, etc.

[394] Compare an incident in the ensuing year, Thucyd. vii, 32. The Athenians, at a moment when they had become much weaker than they were now, had influence enough among the Sikel tribes to raise opposition to the march of a corps coming from the interior to the help of Syracuse. This auxiliary corps was defeated and nearly destroyed in its march.

[395] Thucyd. vii, 3.

[396] Thucyd. vii, 4.

[397] Thucyd. vii, 4.

[398] Thucyd. vii, 5; Plutarch, Nikias, c. 19.

[399] Thucyd. vii, 5, 6.

[400] Thucyd. vii, 7. Μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο, αἵ τε τῶν Κορινθίων νῆες καὶ Ἀμπρακιωτῶν καὶ Λευκαδίων ἐσέπλευσαν αἱ ὑπόλοιποι δώδεκα (ἦρχε δὲ αὐτῶν Ἐρασινίδης Κορίνθιος), καὶ ξυνετείχισαν τὸ λοιπὸν τοῖς Συρακοσίοις μέχρι τοῦ ἐγκαρσίου τείχους.

These words of Thucydidês are very obscure, and have been explained by different commentators in different ways. The explanation which I here give does not, so far as I know, coincide with any of them; yet I venture to think that it is the most plausible, and the only one satisfactory. Compare the Memoir of Dr. Arnold on his Map of Syracuse (Arn. Thucyd. vol. iii, p. 273), and the notes of Poppo and Göller. Dr. Arnold is indeed so little satisfied with any explanation which had suggested itself to him that he thinks some words must have dropped out.

[401] Thucyd. vii, 7.

[402] Thucyd. vii, 8.

[403] Thucyd. vii, 9. ἐν ἄλλαις πολλαῖς ἐπιστολαῖς. The word despatches, which I use to translate ἐπιστολαῖς, is not inapplicable to oral, as well as to written messages, and thus retains the ambiguity involved in the original; for ἐπιστολαῖς, though usually implying, does not necessarily imply, written communications.

The words of Thucydidês (vii, 8) may certainly be construed to imply that Nikias had never on any previous occasion sent a written communication to Athens; and so Dr. Thirlwall understands them, though not without hesitation (Hist. Gr. ch. xxvi, vol. iii, p. 418). At the same time, I think them reconcilable with the supposition that Nikias may previously have sent written despatches, though much shorter than the present, leaving details and particulars to be supplied by the officer who carried them.

Mr. Mitford states the direct reverse of that which Dr. Thirlwall understands: “Nicias had used the precaution of frequently sending despatches in writing, with an exact account of every transaction.” (Ch. xviii, sect v, vol. iv, p. 100.)

Certainly, the statement of Thucydidês does not imply this.

[404] It seems, that in Greek ship-building, moist and unseasoned wood was preferred, from the facility of bending it into the proper shape (Theophrastus, Hist. Plant. v, 7, 4).

[405] Thucyd. vii, 13. Καὶ οἱ ξένοι οἱ μὲν ἀναγκαστοὶ ἐσβάντες, εὐθὺς κατὰ τὰς πόλεις ἀποχωροῦσιν, οἱ δὲ ὑπὸ μεγάλου μισθοῦ τὸ πρῶτον ἐπαρθέντες, καὶ οἰόμενοι χρηματιεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ μαχεῖσθαι, ἐπειδὴ παρὰ γνώμην ναύτικόν τε δὴ καὶ τἄλλα ἀπὸ τῶν πολεμίων ἀνθεστῶτα ὁρῶσιν, οἱ μὲν ἐπ’ αὐτομολίας προφάσει ἀπέρχονται, οἱ δὲ ὡς ἕκαστοι δύνανται· πολλὴ δ’ ἡ Σικελία.

All the commentators bestow long notes in explanation of this phrase ἐπ’ αὐτομολίας προφάσει ἀπέρχονται: but I cannot think that any of them are successful. There are even some who despair of success so much, as to wish to change αὐτομολίας by conjecture; see the citations in Poppo’s long note.

But surely the literal sense of the words is here both defensible and instructive: “Some of them depart under pretence (or profession) of being deserters to the enemy.” All the commentators reject this meaning, because they say, it is absurd to talk of a man’s announcing beforehand that he intends to desert to the enemy, and giving that as an excuse for quitting the camp. Such is not, in my judgment, the meaning of the word προφάσει here. It does not denote what a man said before he quitted the Athenian camp, he would of course say nothing of his intention to any one, but the color which he would put upon his conduct after he got within the Syracusan lines. He would present himself to them as a deserter to their cause; he would profess anxiety to take part in the defence; he would pretend to be tired of the oppressive Athenian dominion; for it is to be recollected, that all or most of these deserters were men belonging to the subject-allies of Athens. Those who passed over to the Syracusan lines would naturally recommend themselves by making profession of such dispositions, even though they did not really feel any such; for their real reason was, that the Athenian service had now become irksome, unprofitable, and dangerous; and the easiest manner of getting away from it was, to pass over as a deserter to Syracuse.

Nikias distinguishes these men from others, “who got away, as they could find opportunity, to some part or other of Sicily.” These latter also would of course keep their intention of departing secret, until they got safe away into some Sicilian town; but when once there, they would make no profession of any feeling which they did not entertain. If they said anything, they would tell the plain truth, that they were making their escape from a position which now gave them more trouble than profit.

It appears to me that the words ἐπ’ αὐτομολίας προφάσει will bear this sense perfectly well, and that it is the real meaning of Nikias.

Even before the Peloponnesian war was begun, the Corinthian envoy at Sparta affirms that the Athenians cannot depend upon their seamen standing true to them, since their navy was manned with hired foreign seamen rather than with natives—ὠνητὴ γὰρ ἡ Ἀθηναίων δύναμις μᾶλλον ἢ οἰκεία (Thucyd. i, 121). The statement of Nikias proves that this remark was to a great extent well founded.

[406] Thucyd. vii, 11-15.

[407] Thucyd. vii, 10.

[408] Thucyd. vii, 16. There is here a doubt as to the reading, between one hundred and twenty talents, or twenty talents.

I agree with Dr. Arnold and other commentators in thinking that the money taken out by Eurymedon was far more probably the larger sum of the two, than the smaller. The former reading seems to deserve the preference. Besides, Diodorus states that Eurymedon took out with him one hundred and forty talents: his authority, indeed, does not count for much, but it counts for something, in coincidence with a certain force of intrinsic probability (Diodor. xiii, 8).

On an occasion such as this, to send a very small sum, such as twenty talents, would produce a discouraging effect upon the armament.

[409] Thucyd. vii, 42.

[410] Plutarch (Nikias, c. 20) tells us that the Athenians had been disposed to send a second armament to Sicily, even before the despatch of Nikias reached them: but that they had been prevented by certain men who were envious (φθόνῳ) of the glory and good fortune of Nikias.

No judgment can be more inconsistent with the facts of the case than this, facts recounted in general terms even by Plutarch himself.

[411] Thucyd. vi, 93.

[412] Thucyd. vii, 18.