British preparations for the prosecution of the war—Indications at the North—Doubtful position and conduct of General Howe—Embarrassing to the Americans—Intercepted correspondence—General Howe sails to the Chesapeake—Enters Philadelphia in triumph—Burgoyne approaches from the North—Indian policy—Sir Guy Carleton—False estimates of the strength of Ticonderoga—Burgoyne arrives at Crown Point—Feasts the Indians—Invests Ticonderoga—Carries the outworks—Fortifies Sugar Hill—The fortress evacuated by St. Clair—Retreat of the Americans—Battles near Skenesborough and at Fort Ann—Burgoyne enters the valley of the Hudson—Schuyler, without means, retreats from Fort Edward—Terror of the people—Cruelties of the Indians—Story of Miss McCrea—General flight of the population—Mrs. Ann Eliza Bleecker—Heroism of Mrs. Schuyler—Attempted assassination of General Schuyler.
Having failed in their efforts to extinguish the rebellion during the preceding year, the government of the parent country-resolved to put forth still greater energies during the present. For this purpose a powerful force was organized in Canada, the command of which was transferred from Sir Guy Carleton—the ablest British General, by the way, at that time or subsequently in America—and conferred upon General Burgoyne—an officer, also, of unquestioned merit—whose spirit of enterprise and thirst for military glory could not be exceeded. It was the aim of this Northern army to open a communication between Canada and New-York—thus cutting off New-England, which the ministry justly considered the hot-bed of the Revolution, from all communication with the Middle States; while Sir William Howe, with an army of 16,000 men, was to withdraw from New Jersey, and move round simultaneously to the Chesapeake, and take possession of the Middle States; and thus, as it was hoped, compel the whole to return to their allegiance.
Doubts, however, for several months hung over the intentions of the enemy, whose designs were so skilfully veiled as for a long time almost to paralyze the exertions of the Americans. The retreat of Carleton from Lake Champlain, the preceding Autumn, even after the lake was in his power and Crown Point in his possession, suggested a doubt whether a serious invasion was meditated from that quarter. On the contrary, the impression was general that the expedition of Burgoyne was destined against Boston; and that Sir William Howe, whose movements in New Jersey were enigmatical to perplexity, was to co-operate in an effort to re-subjugate New England. The British government itself, as it is believed, contributed to the distractions of Congress and the American commander, by causing reports to be circulated that Boston was to be the next point of attack. Arthur Lee, being then in Bordeaux, was thus confidentially advised, and he lost no time in communicating such supposed intention to the Secret Committee of Congress, who in turn gave the like information to the Commander-in-chief, and also to the Legislature of Massachusetts. The consequence of these distractions was unfortunate for the Americans. Less attention was paid to preparations for the defence of the North than otherwise would have been given; while Massachusetts, apprehending that all her strength would be required for her own defence, set about raising troops for her own protection, at the expense of the main army, from which its quota of recruits was withheld. [FN]
[FN] Letters of Washington, during the months of May, June, and July, 1777.
Before the close of June, however, the designs of the enemy in regard to the North became obvious. A person from Canada, arrested as a spy, and brought before General Schuyler, stated on his examination, "that the British forces were approaching St. Johns, and were to advance through Lake Champlain under General Burgoyne; and also that a detachment of British troops, Canadians and Indians, was to penetrate the country by the way of Oswego and the Valley of the Mohawk. He added many particulars, respecting the strength and arrangements of the British army, which turned out in the end to be nearly accurate, but of which no intelligence had before been obtained, or by many anticipated." [FN]
[FN] Sparks—Note in Life and Cor. of Washington, vol. iv.
The movements of General Howe were still equivocal, even after Burgoyne had commenced his descent upon the North—thus adding to the embarrassments of Washington. And in order the more certainly to mislead the American commander as to his real intentions. General Howe wrote a feigned despatch to Burgoyne, on the subject of ascending the Hudson to join him, the bearer of which fell purposely into the hands of the Americans, while pretending to be on his way to Canada. Unable, therefore, to determine whether such might not be his design, (although the intercepted despatch was regarded with strong suspicion,) or whether, on the other hand, it might not be the purpose of Howe to pass round to the Chesapeake and thence strike at Philadelphia, the American General was compelled to remain inactively watching his motions, strengthening, in the mean time, to the utmost of his power, his positions in the highlands—without being able to detach any large number of troops to the assistance of General Schuyler, then commanding the Northern Department. And even after General Howe had embarked his troops and dropped down to Sandy Hook—having evacuated New Jersey on the 30th of June [FN-1]—Washington was still in doubt whether it might not yet be his intention to return with the tide, and pass up the river in the night. [FN-2] Such, however, was no part of the plan of the British commander. His destination, on leaving the harbor of New-York, was the Chesapeake and Philadelphia; and the latter branch of the campaign indicated in the opening of the present chapter, was so far successful, that after a series of victories over the forces of General Washington, commencing at Brandywine and ending at Germantown, General Howe took possession of, and established himself in, the capital of Pennsylvania.
[FN-1] It is a pleasing evidence of the sound religious views of Washington, that he was a firm believer in the immediate interpositions of Providence in directing and controlling the affairs of men. His letters abound in passages that might be cited, showing his quickness to discern the finger of Providence, and his readiness to make the acknowledgment. Thus, in regard to the departure from New Jersey by General Howe, he says:—"The evacuation of Jersey at this time seems to be a peculiar mark of Providence, as the inhabitants have an opportunity of securing their harvests of hay and grain, the latter of which would in all probability have undergone the same fate with many farm-houses, had it been ripe enough to take fire."—Letter of Washington to Maj. Gen. Armstrong, July 4, 1777.
[FN-2] "If we were certain Gen. Burgoyne were approaching Ticonderoga with his whole army, I should not hesitate a moment in concluding that it is in consequence of a preconcerted plan with Gen. Howe, and that the latter is to co-operate with him by pushing his whole force up the North River, and aiming a stroke in the first instance and immediately at the Highlands."—Letter of Washington to the President of Congress, July 2. Again, in several successive letters, after the embarkation of General Howe's army from Staten Island, Washington spoke of the perplexity in which he was kept by the shifting manœuvres of the fleet. On the 22d of July he wrote—"I cannot give you any certain account of General Howe's operations. His conduct is puzzling and embarrassing beyond measure; so are the informations which I get. At one time the ships are standing up toward the North River; in a little while they are going up the Sound; and in one hour after, they are going out of the Hook."—Letter to General Schuyler. The fleet actually sailed for the Capes of Virginia on the 23d of July.
But a far different fortune attended the arms of Burgoyne. The regular troops of his command, English and German, amounted to above seven thousand men, added to which were large numbers of American and Canadian loyalists, together with many hundred Indians; a species of force, which, it has been held by British historians, Sir Guy Carleton was reluctant to employ, while General Burgoyne, it has been alleged, entertained no such scruples. It has ever been claimed as a virtue on the part of Carleton, and carried to the credit of his humanity, that, rather than employ the Indians, he submitted to the injustice of having the command of this expedition, properly belonging to him, conferred upon an officer who was not entitled to lead the enterprise. It is perhaps true, from his more intimate knowledge of the Indian character, that he had formed such an estimate of their services as to render him somewhat less sanguine than others as to their value. His experience could not but have taught him the extent of their inutility in war, the capriciousness of their character, their intractableness and inconstancy. He must have known that their ideas of war were totally different from those of civilized nations; by reason of which, notwithstanding their ferocity, and the incredible examples of passive valor which they sometimes afford in cases adapted to their own opinions, they were nevertheless utterly regardless of, and looked with contempt upon, those belligerent usages which are considered as honorable, generous, and fair in the modern service of civilized men. He could not have been ignorant of the fact, that the object and design of most of the wars in which the Indians engage, are not so much to conquer by manly and open battle, as to murder and destroy after their own peculiar fashion. In one word, that accomplished officer very well knew the services of the Indians to be uncertain; their rapacity to be insatiable; their faith at all times doubtful; and their action cruel to barbarity. Still, as we have already shown beyond contradiction, he was among the first to court the alliance and obtain the services of Brant and his Mohawks, on their descent to Montreal in 1775. The commendations, therefore, that have been bestowed upon Sir Guy Carleton upon this subject, at the expense of Burgoyne, were as undeserved by the one as unjust toward the other. True, the march of Burgoyne was tracked with blood, which a high-souled officer should scorn in such manner to shed; [FN] but the footsteps of Carleton might have been equally sanguine had the command been entrusted to him.
[FN] It is but just to this gallant but unfortunate officer, however, to state, that he did all in his power to restrain the excesses and barbarities of the Indians. At the council and war-feast, which he gave them near Crown Point, he endeavored to explain to them the laws of civilized war; and charged them that they must only kill those opposing them in arms; that old men, women, children, and prisoners, must be held sacred from the knife or hatchet, even in the heat of battle. But it did no good.
Never, probably, at the time, had there been an army of equal numbers better appointed than that of Burgoyne. The train of brass artillery, in particular, was perhaps the finest that had ever been allotted to an army not far exceeding the present in numerical strength, and for a time victory seemed to perch upon his ensigns.
General Carleton, it will be remembered, had made himself master of Lake Champlain, and the fortifications at Crown Point the Autumn before. The first object for attack presenting itself to General Burgoyne, therefore, was Ticonderoga—situated in the mountain gap through which the waters of Lake George fall into Lake Champlain. This fortress was then in command of General St. Clair, and was supposed by the Americans to be a post of great security. The principal fortress, the ruins of which are yet standing in frowning and rugged strength, was situated on an angle of land which is surrounded on three sides by water filled with rocks. A great part of the south side was covered by a deep morass; and where that failed, in the north-west quarter, the old French lines served as a defence. These lines had been strengthened by additional works and a block-house. The Americans had other defences and block-houses in the direction of Lake George, together with two new block-houses and some other works to the right of the French lines. Still greater pains had been taken in fortifying the high circular hill on the eastern shore of the inlet opposite, known as Mount Independence. On the summit of this mountain, which is table-land, the Americans had erected a star-fort, enclosing a large square of barracks, well fortified, and supplied with artillery. The foot of the mountain, on the west side projecting into the water, was strongly entrenched to its edge, and the entrenchment lined with heavy artillery. These lower works were sustained and covered by a battery, about half-way up the side of the mountain, and were connected by a bridge across the inlet, which had been constructed at great labor and expense. [FN-1] These, and other works of defence, had been judged sufficient to render the post secure. The Commander-in-chief himself, although indeed the works had not fallen under his own inspection, had formed a very erroneous opinion of their strength, or perhaps, to speak more correctly, of the natural advantages of the position, and of the defensibility of the works. [FN-2] Such, in fact, was his confidence in the post, that the idea of its loss seems from his correspondence scarce to have entered his mind.
[FN-1] London Universal Magazine, April, 1782.
[FN-2] "I am pleased to find, by your letter to Congress, that a strong supply of provisions has been thrown into Ticonderoga. Since that is the case, I see no reason for apprehending that it can possibly fall into the hands of the enemy in a short time, even were they to bring their whole force to a point; but if they have divided it to make the different attacks that you mention, General St. Clair will, in all probability, have an opportunity of acting on the defensive; and should he not be quite successful, he may damage them so considerably, that they will not be able to attack him in his works; to which, I dare say, he will always secure a retreat in case of accident."—Letter of Washington to General Schuyler, July 2, 1777.
But in all their labors, the American engineers had overlooked the high peak, or mountain, called Sugar Hill, situated south of the bridge, on the point of land at the confluence of the waters of Lakes George and Champlain. Originally it had been supposed, and taken for granted, that the crest of Sugar Hill was not only inaccessible, but too distant to be of any avail in covering the main fortress. This opinion was an error, to which the attention of the officers had been called the preceding year by Colonel John Trumbull, then Adjutant-General for the Northern Department. When Colonel Trumbull made the suggestion, he was laughed at by the mess; but he soon proved the greater accuracy of his own vision, by throwing a cannon shot to the summit; and subsequently clambered up to the top, accompanied by Colonels Wayne and Arnold. [FN] It was a criminal neglect, on the part of the Americans, that the oversight was not at once corrected, by the construction of a work upon that point, which would have commanded the whole post.
[FN] Conversations of the author with Colonel John Trumbull, and also his unpublished memoirs, to which the author has had access.
General Burgoyne arrived at Crown Point on the 21st of June; and after meeting and feasting the Indians, and attempting to instruct them in the rules and principles of civilized war, and making other necessary preparations—not forgetting to send forth a manifesto which he supposed would spread terror through the Northern Colonies—he advanced with great caution to the investment of Ticonderoga, where he arrived on the 2d of July. Most unaccountably, the Americans immediately abandoned all their works in the direction of Lake George—setting fire to the block-houses and saw-mills; and without sally or other interruption, permitted the enemy, under Major General Phillips, to take possession of the very advantageous post of Mount Hope, which, besides commanding their lines in a dangerous degree, totally cut off their communication with Lake George. The only excuse for such an early abandonment of this important point, was found in the fact that General St. Clair had not force enough to man all his defences.
One of the first objects that attracted the attention of the British commander, was the unoccupied point of Sugar Hill. It was forthwith examined, and its advantages were found to be so great, that immediate dispositions were made for its occupation. A winding road was cut to its summit, a battery commenced, and cannon to serve it transported thither. Under these circumstances, finding himself invested on all sides, and batteries ready to be opened upon him not only from around, but above, and having, moreover, not half troops enough to man his works—St. Clair hastily convened a council of war on the 5th of July, and an evacuation was unanimously decided upon as the only alternative for the emergency. [FN]
[FN] "The evacuation of Ticonderoga and Mount Independence is an event of chagrin and surprise, not apprehended nor within the compass of my reasoning. I know not upon what principle it was founded, and I should suppose it still more difficult to be accounted for, if the garrison amounted to five thousand men, in high spirits, healthy, well supplied with provisions and ammunition, and the Eastern militia marching to their succor, as you mentioned in your letter of the 9th to the Council of Safety of New-York."—Letter of Washington to General Schuyler, July 15, 1777. The truth, however, is, that the actual force and condition of St. Clair's army had been universally over-estimated—as well by the officers at a distance as by the public. The eyes of the nation were turned upon that post; and when the news of the retreat went abroad, the disappointment was extreme; and the loud voice of complaint and censure, against the unfortunate General, was reiterated from one end of the continent to the other. But, notwithstanding the "chagrin" and "surprise," so keenly felt by the Commander-in-chief at the loss of this important post, his strong sense of justice interposed to shield the unfortunate commander from condemnation unheard. He wrote to General Schuyler on the 13th of July, that General St. Clair owed it to himself to insist upon an opportunity of giving his reasons for evacuating Ticonderoga, but he at the same time said—"I will not condemn, or even pass censure upon, an officer unheard." Time, however, proved that he had acted the part of a judicious and skillful officer; but the excitement of the moment was so great, caused by chagrin on the one hand and alarm on the other, that all eyes were blind, and all ears deaf, to the true reasons of the case, and even to the palliating circumstances.—Sparks's Life of Gonverneur Morris.
Following up such a promising advantage, the British commander pushed forward upon the retiring army, with such a degree of vigor that the retreat became almost a rout. The Americans, however, made a stand between Skenesborough and Fort Anne in a well-contested battle; but after much hard fighting, were again compelled to retreat. Another engagement ensued at Fort Anne, with a like result; and the victorious Briton entered the valley of the Hudson, and took possession of Fort Edward, which, weak and unprovided, had likewise been evacuated on his approach by General Schuyler.
These movements by the British commander had been made with equal vigor and celerity; and such was the confusion of the Americans in their flight, that no advices of the disaster were forwarded by express to General Schuyler, to prepare him for the approach of the victors. Indeed, that officer was suffered to remain several days without intelligence from St. Clair of any description, excepting some vague flying rumors of the evacuation. [FN-1] During this suspense, General Schuyler wrote to the Commander-in-chief upon the subject, who, in turn, expressed his amazement at the mystery which seemed to hang over the affairs of the fortress. At one moment Washington was led to believe that St. Clair and the whole garrison had been made prisoners, and at another that the rumor of the evacuation was wholly untrue; and that the silence, for which it baffled conjecture to account, arose from the circumstance that the Americans were shut up in their works. [FN-2] But this doubt did not continue long. Notwithstanding that the advance of the enemy was repulsed at Fort Anne, Colonel Long, who was in command of that post, immediately evacuated it, contrary to the express orders of General Schuyler; and Schuyler himself, at the head of only fifteen hundred men at Fort Edward, "without provision, with little ammunition, not above five rounds to a man, having neither balls, nor lead to make any—and the country in the deepest consternation," [FN-3] was obliged also to fall back in the direction of Albany. The blow was a severe one; but the Commander-in-chief possessed a soul equal to every crisis. No undue elevation of spirit followed his successes; neither did the clouds of adverse fortune, so frequently darkening the prospect of the American arms, sink him into despondency. [FN-4] Indeed, each succeeding calamity was but another test of his moral greatness, for he rose above them all.
[FN-1] Letter from General Schuyler to General Washington, July 9, 1777.
[FN-2] Letter from General Washington in reply.
[FN-3] Letter of Schuyler to Washington.
[FN-4] "This stroke is severe indeed, and has distressed us much. But, notwithstanding things at present have a dark and gloomy aspect, I hope a spirited opposition will check the progress of General Burgoyne's army, and that the confidence derived from his success, will hurry him into measures that will, in their consequences, be favorable to us. We should never despair. Our situation has before been unpromising, and has changed for the better; so, I trust, it will again. If new difficulties arise, we must only put forth new exertions, and proportion our efforts to the exigency of the times."—Letterr of Washington to General Schuyler, July 15, 1777.
Nothing, however, could exceed the terror which these events diffused among the inhabitants, not only of Northern New-York, but of the New England States. The consternation was, moreover, increased by the reported murders and the cruelties of the savages—since all the efforts of General Burgoyne to dissuade them from the perpetration of their cruel enormities were ineffectual. Restrain them he could not; and it was admitted by the British writers of that day, that the friends of the Royal cause, as well as its enemies, were equally victims to their indiscriminate rage. It was even ascertained that the British officers were deceived by their treacherous allies, into the purchase of the scalps of their own comrades.
Among other instances of cruelty, the well-known murder of Miss Jane McCrea, which happened in the early part of the campaign, filled the public mind with horror. Every circumstance of this unnatural and bloody transaction—around which there lingers a melancholy interest to this day—served to heighten alike its interest and its enormity. Many have been the versions of this bloody tale. General Gates, who had at this juncture been most unjustly directed to supersede General Schuyler in the command of the Northern Department, assailed General Burgoyne in the newspapers with great virulence upon the subject of these outrages. After charging the British commander with encouraging the murder of prisoners, and the massacre of women and children, by paying the Indians a stipulated price for scalps, Gates, in a letter addressed to General Burgoyne, thus spoke of the case now specially under consideration:—"Miss McCrea, a young lady, lovely to the sight, of virtuous character and amiable disposition, engaged to an officer of your army, was, with other women and children, taken out of a house near Fort Edward, carried into the woods, and there scalped and mangled in the most horrid manner. Two parents, with their six children, were treated with the same inhumanity, while quietly resting in their own happy and peaceful dwelling. The miserable fate of Miss McCrea was particularly aggravated, by being dressed to receive her promised husband; but met her murderer, employed by you. Upward of one hundred men, women, and children, have perished by the hands of the ruffians to whom, it is asserted, you have paid the price of blood."
General Burgoyne replied, and repelled with indignation the charge of encouraging, in any respect, the outrages of the Indians. He asserted that from the first he had refused to pay for scalps, and had so informed the Indians at their council. The only rewards he gave them were for prisoners brought in, and by the adoption of this course he hoped to encourage a more humane mode of warfare on their part. In this letter Burgoyne said:—"I would not be conscious of the acts you presume to impute to me, for the whole continent of America, though the wealth of worlds was in its bowels and a paradise upon its surface." [FN-1] In regard to the hapless fate of Miss McCrea, General Burgoyne remarked:—"Her fall wanted not the tragic display you have labored to give it, to make it as sincerely abhorred and lamented by me as it can be by the tenderest of her friends. The act was no premeditated barbarity. On the contrary, two chiefs, who had brought her off for the purpose of security, not of violence to her person, disputed which should be her guard, and in a fit of savage passion in one, from whose hands she was snatched, the unhappy woman became the victim. Upon the first intelligence of this event, I obliged the Indians to deliver the murderer into my hands; and though to have punished him by our laws, or principles of justice, would have been perhaps unprecedented, he certainly should have suffered an ignominious death, had I not been convinced, from my circumstances and observations, beyond the possibility of a doubt, that a pardon under the terms which I presented and they accepted, would be more efficacious than an execution, to prevent similar mischiefs. The above instance excepted, your intelligence respecting the cruelty of the Indians, is false." [FN-2]
[FN-1] While these pages are passing through the press, the author has fallen upon a letter written from Montreal, and published in the Remembrancer for 1777, in which it was stated that a party of the Indians had returned to Montreal in a high state of dissatisfaction, because of the severity of Burgoyne's discipline toward them, and his refusal to tolerate their mode of warfare, or pay them their accustomed bounty for scalps. It was further stated that they waited upon Sir Guy Carleton with their complaints—liking their old "Father" much better than their new.
[FN-2] Vide Marshall's Life of Washington, Vol. I, Appendix.
The British commander doubtless labored to make the best of his case, and in respect to Miss McCrea, his statement was much nearer to the truth than that of General Gates. The actual circumstances of the case, stripped of its romance, were these:—Miss McCrea belonged to a family of loyalists, and had engaged her hand in marriage to a young refugee named Jones, a subordinate officer in the British service, who was advancing with Burgoyne. Anxious to possess himself of his bride, he despatched a small party of Indians to bring her to the British camp. Her family and friends were strongly opposed to her going with such an escort; but her affection overcame her prudence, and she determined upon the hazardous adventure. She set forward with her dusky attendants on horseback. The family resided at the village of Fort Edward, from whence they had not proceeded more than half a mile before her conductors stopped to drink at a spring. Meantime the impatient lover, who deserved not her embrace for confiding her protection to such hands, instead of going himself, had despatched a second party of Indians upon the same errand. The Indians met at the spring; and before the march was resumed, they were attacked by a party of the Provincials. At the close of the skirmish the body of Miss McCrea was found among the slain—tomahawked, scalped, and tied to a pine tree, yet standing by the side of the spring, as a monument of the bloody transaction. The name of the young lady is inscribed on the tree, the trunk of which is thickly scarred with the bullets it received in the skirmish. It also bears the date 1777. "Tradition reports that the Indians divided the scalp, and that each party carried half of it to the agonized lover." [FN] The ascertained cause of her murder was this. The promised reward for bringing her in safety to her betrothed, was a barrel of rum. The chiefs of the two parties sent for her by Mr. Jones, quarreled respecting the anticipated compensation. Each claimed it; and, in a moment of passion, to end the controversy, one of them struck her down with his hatchet.
[FN] Silliman's Tour from Hartford to Quebec. Vide, also, Marshall, Gordon, and others.
The tale was sufficiently painful according to the simple facts of the case, and its recital produced a thrill of horror wherever it came—enlarged and embellished, as it was sure to be in its progress, by every writer who could add to the eloquence of the narrative or the pathos of its catastrophe.
As the invader advanced, the inhabitants fled in the wildest consternation. The horrors of war, however mitigated by the laws and usages of civilization, are at all times sufficiently terrific; but when to these the fierce cruelties of a cloud of savages are superadded, those only who have been familiar with an American border warfare can form an adequate opinion of its atrocities. Among the fugitives driven from their peaceful abodes on the present occasion, was Mrs. Ann Eliza Bleecker, a lady who has been somewhat celebrated as one of the early poets of our country. She was the daughter of Mr. Brandt Schuyler of the city of New-York, and the wife of John J. Bleecker, Esq., of New Rochelle, whose enterprise, together with his lady's love for the wild scenery of the forest, had induced him to exchange a residence among the busy haunts of men for a solitary plantation in the vale of the Tomhanic—a mountain stream flowing into the Hoosic river, about twenty miles from Albany. Mr. Bleecker's residence lay directly in the march of Burgoyne, on whose approach he hastened to Albany to provide accommodations for his family. But a few hours after his departure, Mrs. Bleecker, as she sat at table received intelligence that the enemy, with tomahawk and brand, was within two miles of her residence. Instant flight was the only alternative. Taking one of her children in her arms and seizing the other by the hand, she started off on foot attended only by a young mulatto girl, and leaving her house and all its contents a prey to the Indians. The roads were encumbered by carriages, loaded with women and children, each intent upon his or her own safety; so that no assistance could be obtained, and her only recourse was to mingle in the fugitive throng, and participate in the common panic and common distress. Having traveled about five miles on foot, however, she succeeded in obtaining a seat for the children in a wagon which served to facilitate her march. On the following morning she was met by her husband, who conducted her to Albany, and from thence down the Hudson as far as Red Hook one of her children dying by the way. [FN]
[FN] The facts of this incident in the life of Mrs. Bleeker are taken from Kettel's biographical sketches of American poets. The memoirs of Mrs. B. together with her poems, were published many years ago, but I sought in vain among the libraries and the Bleekers to obtain a copy.—Author.
Amid this scene of desolation and affright, there was yet one woman whose proud spirit was undaunted. It was the lady of General Schuyler. The General's country-seat was upon his estate in Saratoga, standing upon the margin of the river. On the approach of Burgoyne, Mrs. Schuyler went up to Saratoga, in order to remove their furniture. Her carriage was attended by only a single armed man on horseback. When within two miles of her house, she encountered a crowd of panic-stricken people, who recited to her the tragic fate of Miss McCrea, and representing to her the danger of proceeding farther in the face of the enemy, urged her to return. She had yet to pass through a dense forest, within which even then some of the savage troops might be lurking for prey. But to these prudential councils she would not listen. "The General's wife," she exclaimed, "must not be afraid!" And pushing forward, she accomplished her purpose. [FN]
[FN] I have derived this incident, and also that respecting the General, which follows in the text, from Mrs. James Cochran of Oswego, who was the youngest daughter of General Schuyler.—Author.
Before the mansion was evacuated, however, the General himself had a narrow escape from assassination by the hand of a savage, who had insinuated himself into the house for that purpose. It was at the hour of bed-time, in the evening, and while the General was preparing to retire for the night, that a female servant, in coming in from the hall, saw a gleam of light reflected from the blade of a knife, in the hand of some person whose dark outline she discerned behind the door. The servant was a black slave, who had sufficient presence of mind not to appear to have made the discovery. Passing directly through the door into the apartment where the General was yet standing near the fire-place, with an air of unconcern she pretended to arrange such articles as were disposed upon the mantel-piece, while in an undertone she informed her master of her discovery, and said, aloud, "I will call the guard." The General instantly seized his arms, while the faithful servant hurried out by another door into a long hall, upon the floor of which lay a loose board which creaked beneath the tread. By the noise she made in trampling rapidly upon the board, the Indian—for such he proved—was led to suppose that the Philistines were upon him in numbers, sprang from his concealment and fled. He was pursued, however, by the guard and a few friendly Indians attached to the person of General Schuyler, overtaken, and made prisoner. Exasperated at his treachery, the friendly Indians were resolved to put him to death, and it was with much difficulty that they were diverted from their purpose by the General.
The effect of the incidents we have been detailing, and other recitals of savage cruelties, not all, as General Burgoyne represented, without foundation, was extensive and powerful. The cry of vengeance was universal; and a spirit was aroused which proved of speedy and great advantage to the American arms.
Expedition against the Mohawk Valley from Oswego—Despondency of the people in Tryon County—Letter of John Jay—Arrest of several of the disaffected—Flight of others to Canada—Schuyler's complaints of the cowardice of the people—Great discouragements—Proclamation of General Herkimer—Letter from Thomas Spencer—St. Leger's approach—Caution and plan of his march—Diary of Lieut. Bird—Fort Stanwix invested—Colonel Gansevoort takes command—Its deplorable condition—Gansevoort joined by Willett—Story of Captain Gregg—Situation of the garrison—Arrival of St. Leger—His proclamation—Burgoyne's affairs becoming critical—Affair of Bennington—General Herkimer, with the Tryon County militia, advances to the relief of Gansevoort—Battle of Oriskany—Bloody upon both sides—Unexampled bravery of Captain Gardenier—Major Watts—Dissatisfaction of the Indians—Sortie and success of Colonel Willett—Death and character of General Herkimer.
Contemporaneously with the descent of Burgoyne upon Northern New-York, Colonel Barry St. Leger had been despatched from Montreal, by the way of the St. Lawrence and Lake Ontario, to Oswego, there to form a junction with the Indians and loyalists under Sir John Johnson and Captain Brant. From Oswego, St. Leger was to penetrate by the way of Oneida Lake and Wood Creek to the Mohawk river, with a view of forming a junction from that direction with Burgoyne, on his arrival in Albany. The alarm everywhere felt on the approach of Burgoyne from the North, was greatly increased in Tryon County, on receiving intelligence of the contemplated invasion by the Indians and loyalists from the West, The news of this movement was first brought to the inhabitants by an Oneida half-breed sachem named Thomas Spencer, who came therewith direct from Canada, whither he had gone as a secret emissary to obtain information. Spencer stated that he had been present at a council held at the Indian castle of Cassassenny, at which Colonel Claus presided. [FN-1] According to Thomas's relation. Colonel Claus strongly urged the Indians to join in the expedition into the Mohawk Valley by the Western approach; boasting of the strength of the army under Burgoyne, which had gone against Ticonderoga, and the number of Indians with them, and before whom he assured them Ticonderoga would fall. "Yes," said Colonel Claus, "Ticonderoga is mine. This is true: you may depend on it, and not one gun shall be fired." Singularly enough, though improbable at the time, the prediction, as we have seen, was literally fulfilled. "The same," added the superintendent, "is true of Fort Schuyler. I am sure that when I come before that fort, and the commanding officer shall see me, he also will not fire a shot, but will surrender the fort to me." The Oneida sachem farther informed the people that Sir John Johnson and Colonel Claus were then at Oswego with their families, with seven hundred Indians and four hundred regular troops. There were also six hundred Tories on one of the islands above Oswegatchie preparing to join them; and Colonel Butler was to arrive at Oswego on the 14th of July from Niagara, to hold a council with the Six Nations, to all of whom he would offer the hatchet to join them and strike the Americans. [FN-2] Thomas thereupon concluded his communication in the following speech:—
[FN-1] Colonel Daniel Claus, a brother-in-law of Sir John Johnson, had either superseded Guy Johnson as Indian Superintendent in Canada, or been appointed a Deputy.
[FN-2] Referring, doubtless, to the Grand Council, of which an account is given in chapter VIII.
"Brothers: Now is your time to awake, and not to sleep longer; or, on the contrary, it shall go with Fort Schuyler as it went already with Ticonderoga.
"Brothers: I therefore desire you to be spirited, and to encourage one another to march on to the assistance of Fort Schuyler. Come up, and show yourselves as men, to defend and save your country before it is too late. Despatch yourselves to clear the brush about the fort, and send a party to cut trees in the Wood Creek to stop up the same.
"Brothers: If you don't come soon, without delay, to assist this place, we cannot stay much longer on your side; for if you leave this fort without succor, and the enemy shall get possession thereof, we shall suffer like you in your settlements, and shall be destroyed with you. We are suspicious that your enemies have engaged the Indians, and endeavor daily yet to strike and fight against you; and General Schuyler refuses always that we shall take up arms in the country's behalf.
"Brothers: I can assure you, that as soon as Butler's speech at Oswego shall be over, they intend to march down the country immediately to Albany. You may judge yourselves that if you don't try to resist, we shall be obliged to join them or fly from our Castles, as we cannot hinder them alone. We, the good friends of the country, are of opinion, that if more force appears at Fort Schuyler, the enemy will not move from Oswego to invade these frontiers. You may depend on it we are willing to help you if you will do some efforts too."
The counsel of the faithful Oneida was neither early enough, nor was it seconded with sufficient promptitude on the part of the inhabitants. Indeed, it must be confessed, that, as the storm of war rolled onward, gathering at once from different directions, and threatening daily to break upon them with increasing fury, many of the yeomen who had hitherto borne themselves nobly, began to falter. A spirit of disaffection had also been more widely diffused among the settlements than could have been supposed from the previous patriotic conduct of the people, while treason lurked in many places where least suspected. Upon this subject, and with special reference to the popular feeling and conduct in Tryon County, John Jay, then sitting in the State Convention at Kingston, addressed the following letter to Gouverneur Morris, a member of the Council of Safety, who was at that time with General Schuyler in the North:—
"John Jay to Gouverneur Morris.
"Kingston, July 21st, 1777.
"Dear Morris,
"The situation of Tryon County is both shameful and alarming. Such abject dejection and despondency, as mark the letters we have received from thence, disgrace human nature. God knows what to do with, or for them. Were they alone interested in their fate, I should be for leaving their cart in the slough till they would put their shoulders to the wheel.
"Schuyler has his enemies here, and they use these things to his disadvantage. Suspicions of his having been privy to the evacuation of Ticonderoga spread wide; and twenty little circumstances, which perhaps are false, are trumped up to give color to the conjecture. [FN] We could wish that your letters might contain paragraphs for the public. We are silent because we have nothing to say; and the people suspect the worst because we say nothing. Their curiosity must be constantly gratified, or they will be uneasy. Indeed, I do not wonder at their impatience, the late Northern events having been such as to have occasioned alarm and suspicion. I have not leisure to add any thing more, than that I am, very sincerely, yours, &c.
"John Jay."
[FN] Reference has already been made, in the text, to the injustice done toward General Schuyler during this memorable year. There was probably no officer in the service, the Commander-in-chief alone excepted, who was considered by the enemy so great an obstacle to the success of their arms. A narrow sectional prejudice existed against him in New England. The failure of the Canadian campaign had been most wrongfully attributed to him in 1776, and with equal injustice the fall of Ticonderoga was now charged to his remissness by his own countrymen. The enemy were not slow to avail themselves of these prejudices and groundless imputations, and through the agency of the Tories, the most artful and insidious means were employed to destroy the public confidence in his integrity and capacity. The flame of suspicion was fanned by them until it became general, and was openly avowed. Committees, towns, and districts, assembled, and passed resolves expressing their distrust in him, and both Congress and the Provincial Legislature of New-York were addressed upon the subject. General Schuyler, than whom there was not a truer patriot, nor a more earnest or active in the public service, was well aware of these movements. To a Committee of the Provincial Congress, who had formally communicated the charges to him, he returned an answer worthy of a brave and magnanimous soldier. The character of this answer will be understood from this single sentence:—"We must bear with the caprice, jealousy, and envy of our misguided friends, and pity them."
As early as the 10th of April, Colonel Robert Van Rensselaer wrote to a friend, that the Chairman of the County Committee had applied to him for the assistance of his militia, to quell an insurrection of the loyalists in Ballston; but such was the condition of his own regiment, that he was obliged to decline the request. The spirit of disaffection had become so prevalent among his men, that numbers of them had taken the oath of secrecy and allegiance to Great Britain. However, he added that seventeen of the villains had been arrested by the vigilance of the officers, and were then in confinement; and a hope was indulged of being able to detect the whole. [FN-1] Early in the following month the residue of the Roman Catholic Scotch settlers in the neighborhood of Johnstown ran off to Canada, together with some of the loyalist Germans—all headed by two men named McDonald, who had been permitted by General Schuyler to visit their families. The fact that the wives and families of the absconding loyalists were holding communication with them, and administering to their subsistence on the outskirts of the settlements, had suggested their arrest, and removal to a place of safety, to the number of four hundred—a measure that was approved by General Herkimer and his officers. [FN-2] Alarming reports of various descriptions were continually in circulation, and the inhabitants were harassed beyond measure by the necessity of performing frequent tours of military duty—acting as scouts and reconnoitering parties; and standing, some of them, as sentinels around their fields, while others did the labor. No neighborhood felt secure, and all were apprehensive that the whole country would be ravaged by the Indians; while parties of the disaffected were continually stealing away to augment the ranks of the enemy. Thus circumstanced, and at the very moment when they were called upon to reinforce Fort Schuyler, the Committees both of Palatine and Schoharie, feeling that they were not strong enough even for self-defence, were calling upon the Council of Safety at Albany to send additional forces for their protection. Mr. Paris wrote repeatedly upon the subject. The Schoharie Committee, on the 17th of July, wrote very frankly, that "the late advantages gained by the enemy had such an effect, that many who had been counted as friends of the State were drawing back. Our situation," he added, "is deplorable—excepting those who have sought protection from the enemy. We are entirely open to the Indians and Tories, whom we expect every hour to come upon us. Part of our militia are at Fort Edward; and of the few that are here, many are unwilling to take up arms to defend themselves, as they are unable to stand against so many enemies. Therefore if your honors do not grant us immediate relief to the amount of about five hundred men, we must either fall a prey to the enemy, or take protection also." [FN-3] On the 18th of July, General Schuyler wrote to the Hon. Pierre Van Courtlandt, from Saratoga, and again on the 21st from Fort Edward, to the same effect. "I am exceedingly chagrined," he says, "at the pusillanimous spirit which prevails in the County of Tryon. I apprehend much of it is to be attributed to the infidelity of the leading persons of that quarter. If I had one thousand regular troops, in addition to those now above and on the march, I should venture to keep only every third man of the militia, and would send them down. The substance of Colonel Harper's information had been transmitted about a month ago. In consequence whereof, I sent Colonel Van Schaick into Tryon County with as many troops as I could collect. After the improper agreement made by General Herkimer, [FN-4] these troops were marched back; but as soon as I was informed of the march, I ordered them to remain in Tryon County, where they are still, and I have sent up Colonel Wesson's regiment to reinforce them. But if I may be allowed to judge of the temper of General Herkimer and the Committee of Tryon County, from their letters to me, nothing will satisfy them unless I march the whole army into that quarter. With deference to the better judgment of the Council of Safety, I cannot by any means think it prudent to bring on an open rupture with the savages at the present time. The inhabitants of Tryon County are already too much inclined to lay down their arms, and take whatever terms the enemy may please to afford them. Half the militia from this (Tryon) County, and the neighboring State of Massachusetts, we have been under the necessity of dismissing; but the whole should go. I enclose you the proceedings of a council of General officers, held at this place on the 20th instant. You will perceive that we have been driven to the necessity of allowing some of the militia to return to their plantations. The remainder have promised to remain three weeks longer—that is to say, unless they choose to return sooner, which will doubtless be the case, and for which they have many reasons." [FN-5]
[FN-1] MS. documents in the Department of State, Albany.
[FN-2] MS. documents in the Department of State, Albany—Letter of Isaac Paris.
[FN-3] MS. correspondence of the Provincial Congress—Secretary's office, Albany.
[FN-4] Probably referring to the interview between Herkimer and Brant at Unadilla.
[FN-5] MS. Cor. Council of Safety—Secretary's office, Albany.
The complaints of General Schuyler were not without just foundation, as the reader has already seen. Indeed, both regulars and militia in Tryon County, seemed for the moment to have lost all the high qualities of soldiers or citizens. Of two hundred militiamen ordered to muster and join the garrison of Fort Schuyler, only a part obeyed; while two companies of regular troops, receiving the like orders, entered upon the service with great reluctance, and not without urging various excuses—complaining that service in scouting parties had unfitted them for garrison duty. [FN] Under circumstances of such discouragement, it was a time of peculiar trial to the officers and Committees of Safety. Tryon County had early espoused the cause of freedom, and apparently with greater unanimity than any other county in the State; and the extensive defection, or criminal apathy, which we have just been contemplating, was altogether unexpected. But a crisis was approaching, which necessity soon obliged them to meet. Accordingly, on the 17th of July, General Herkimer issued a patriotic proclamation to the inhabitants of the county, announcing the gathering of the enemy at Oswego, "Christians and Savages," to the number of two thousand strong, with the intention of invading the frontier, and calling upon the people en masse, to be ready at a moment's warning to repair to the field, with arms and accoutrements, on the approach of the enemy. Those in health, from 16 to 60 years of age, were designated for actual service; while those above 60 years of age, or invalids, were directed to arm for the defence of the women and children at whatever place they might be gathered in for safety. Concerning the disaffected, and those who might refuse to obey the orders, it was directed in the proclamation that they should be arrested, their arms secured, and themselves placed under guard to join the main body. All the members of the Committee, and all those who, by reason of having formerly held commissions, had become exempts from service, were invited to repair to the rendezvous, and aid in repulsing the foe; "not doubting that the Almighty Power, upon our humble prayers, and sincere trust in Him, will then graciously succour our arms in battle for our just cause, and victory cannot fail on our side."
[FN] Annals of Tryon County.
The Oneida Indians, who were sincerely disposed to favor the cause of the United States, but who, pursuant to the humane policy of Congress and the advice of General Schuyler, had determined to preserve their neutrality, beheld the approaching invasion from Oswego with no small degree of apprehension. The course they had marked out for themselves, as they were well aware, was viewed with displeasure by their Mohawk brethren, while the other members of their confederacy were obviously inclined to side with their "Uncle." [FN] Living, moreover, in the immediate neighborhood of Fort Schuyler, where St. Leger's first blow must be struck, they were not a little troubled in the prospect of what might happen to themselves. The watchful Thomas Spencer, therefore, despatched the following letter to the Committee on the 29th of July, which was received on the 30th:—
[FN] In the Six Nations, the Mohawks—the head tribe—were called "Uncle." The Oneidas were "the elder brother," &c.
"At a meeting of the chiefs, they tell me that there is but four days remaining of the time set for the king's troops to come to Fort Schuyler, and they think it likely they will be here sooner.
"The chiefs desire the commanding officers at Fort Schuyler not to make a Ticonderoga of it; but they hope you will be courageous.
"They desire General Schuyler may have this with speed, and send a good army here; there is nothing to do at New-York; we think there is men to be spared—we expect the road is stopped to the inhabitants by a party through the woods; we shall be surrounded as soon as they come. This may be our last advice, as these soldiers are part of those that are to hold a treaty. Send this to the Committee—as soon as they receive it, let the militia rise up and come to Fort Schuyler.
"To-morrow we are a-going to the Three Rivers [FN] to the treaty. We expect to meet the warriors, and when we come there and declare we are for peace, we expect to be used with indifference and sent away."
[FN] The junction of the Oneida, Seneca, and Oswego rivers—not "Three Rivers" in Canada.
"Let all the troops that come to Fort Schuyler take care on their march, as there is a party of Indians to stop the road below the fort, about 80 or 100. We hear they are to bring their cannon up Fish Creek. We hear there is 1000 going to meet the enemy. We advise not—the army is too large for so few men to defend the Fort—we send a belt of 8 rows to confirm the truth of what we say.
"It looks likely to me the troops are near—hope all friends to liberty, and that love their families, will not be backward, but exert themselves; as one resolute blow would secure the friendship of the Six Nations, and almost free this part of the country from the incursions of the enemy." [FN]
[FN] MS. letter among the papers of General Gansevoort. Thomas Spencer was a blacksmith, who had resided among the Cayugas, and was greatly beloved by the Indians.—Letter from General Schuyler to Colonel Dayton—Gansevoort papers.
The certainty that the invaders were thus approaching, the earnestness of the appeals of the Committee to the patriotism of the people, the influence of the proclamation of the German General, who was a much better man than officer, save only in the single attribute of courage; and, above all, the positive existence of a common danger from which there was no escape; were circumstances, together, not without their effect. And although the eleventh hour had arrived, yet the militia, and all upon whom the call to arms had been made, now began to move with a degree of alacrity and an exhibition of spirit that went far to atone for the unpatriotic, if not craven, symptoms already noticed.
Meantime, having completed his organization at Oswego, General St. Leger commenced his march upon Fort Schuyler, moving by the route already indicated, though with great circumspection. The name of this place of rendezvous has already recurred more than once, or twice, in the preceding pages. Its position was important, and it had been a place of renown in the earlier wars of the Colony. The river bearing the same name, which here pours Northwardly into Lake Ontario, is the outlet both of the Oneida and Seneca rivers, through which, and their tributary streams, it is connected with the chain of small lakes bearing the names of Oneida, Cazenovia, Skaneateles, Owasco, Cayuga, Seneca, and Canandaigua. Its estuary, of course, forms the natural opening into the rich district of country surrounding those lakes, which, down to the period of the present history, contained the principal towns of four of the Five Nations of Indians. During the wars between the French and Five Nations, Oswego was repeatedly occupied by the armies of the former. It was here that Count Frontenac landed, on his invasion of the Onondaga country in 1692, at which time, or subsequently, a considerable military work was erected on the western side of the river. During the war with France, which was closed in America by the conquest of Canada, it was in the occupancy of the Provincials and English. The expedition destined to descend the St. Lawrence upon Montreal, was assembled at this point in 1759, after the fall of Niagara, under General Shirley and Sir William Johnson, The army was encamped here several weeks, and finally broke up without attempting its main object—owing, as Sir William Johnson intimates in his private diary, to a want of energy on the part of Shirley. After the fall of Quebec and Montreal into the hands of the English, a battalion of the 55th regiment was stationed at Oswego, under Major Duncan, a brother of the naval hero of Camperdown. A new and far more formidable work was constructed upon the Eastern or North-eastern promontory, formed by the embouchure of the river into the lake. The new position was far better chosen for a fortress than the old; and, ultimately, before the Britons were dispossessed of it by the Americans, it became a work of somewhat formidable strength and dimensions. The situation is one of the most beautiful that can be imagined; and during the two or three years in which Major Duncan was in command, by the cultivation of a large garden, the laying out and improving of a bowling-green, and other pleasure-grounds, it was rendered a little paradise in the wilderness. [FN]
[FN] See Mrs. Grant's delightful book—"Memoirs of an American Lady," chapters xliv. to xlvii. inclusive.
All told, the army of St. Leger consisted of seventeen hundred men—Indians included. These latter were led by Thayendanegea. The order of their march, as beautifully drawn and colored, was subsequently taken, with the escritoire of the commanding General, and will be found on the subsequent page, accurately copied and engraved. The advance of the main body, it will be seen, was formed of Indians, marching in five Indian columns; that is, in single files, at large distances from each other, and four hundred and sixty paces in front of the line. From these columns of Indians, files were stretched at a distance often paces from each other, forming a line of communication with the advanced guard of the line, which was one hundred paces in front of the column. The right and left flanks were covered by Indians at one hundred paces, forming likewise lines of communication with the main body. The King's regiment moved from the left by Indian file, while the 34th moved in the same order from the right. The rear-guard was formed of regular troops; while the advance guard, composed of sixty marksmen, detached from Sir John Johnson's regiment of Royal Greens, was led by Sir John's brother-in-law, Captain Watts. Each corps was likewise directed to have ten chosen marksmen in different parts of its line, in case of attack, to be pushed forward to any given point as circumstances might require. [FN]
[FN] MS. directions found among the captured papers of St. Leger.