[260] "Port Mahon is a very narrow harbor, from which you cannot get out without great difficulty." (Collingwood's letters, August 18, 1799.) "Ships had better be under sail off Port Mahon than in the harbor." (Nelson's Dispatches, May 12, 1799.)
[261] Brenton's St. Vincent, vol. i. p. 493.
[262] "I had the happiness to command a band of brothers." (Nelson's Dispatches, vol. iii. p. 230) The best of his Nile captains were, for the most part, still with him.
[263] Nelson's Dispatches, vol. iii. pp. 366, 374.
[265] Jurien de la Gravière, Guerres Maritimes, vol. i. p. 288 (4th edition); also James, Naval History, vol. ii. p. 264 (edition 1847). Other authorities say the 8th. The reconcilement seems to be that Bruix did not take his fleet to Genoa, but only a detachment; the main body anchoring in Vado Bay. He would thus leave Genoa the 6th, Vado the 8th.
[266] "We avoided the enemy by skirting very close, and under cover of foggy weather, the coasts of Piedmont and Provence." (Journal of Captain Moras, special aid to Bruix. La Gravière, Guerres Maritimes, vol. i. p. 376. Appendix, 4th edition.)
[267] "In our passage before Toulon we learned the vexatious accidents which had happened to the Spanish fleet, and went to rejoin them at Cartagena." (Ibid. Also James, Nav. Hist., vol. ii. p. 264.)
[268] The British fleet was sighted off St. Tropez (Troude, vol. iii. p. 158); and fired upon by coast batteries near Antibes on June 6th. (James, Nav. Hist. vol. ii. p. 262).
[269] Nelson's Dispatches, vol. iii. p. 379, note. This east wind seems to have been overlooked in the criticisms of Keith's conduct.
[270] Cape delle Melle bore, on the 8th, N. N. E., distant ninety miles. James, Nav. Hist., vol. ii. p. 262.
[271] Lord Keith's biographer (Allardyce) says he determined "to take Minorca on his way to Rosas" (p. 165); which was certainly a liberal construction, though not beyond the discretion of an officer in Keith's position. To take Minorca on his way to Rosas, from his position on the 8th, was to go two hundred miles to the former and one hundred and fifty more to Rosas, when the latter at the moment was not two hundred distant. He was a few miles nearer Rosas than Minorca, when he took the decision which finally wrecked the cruise.
[272] Brenton's Life of St. Vincent, vol. ii. p. 24.
[274] Mutineers belonging to the "Impétueux," one of the division, were tried by court martial in Port Mahon, June 19 and 20. (Osler's Life of Lord Exmouth, p. 192. Nels. Disp., vol. iii. p. 415, note.)
[275] James, Nav. Hist., vol. ii. p. 265 (edition 1847). Nels. Disp., vol. iii p. 415 note.
[276] Brenton's Life of St. Vincent, vol. ii. p. 25.
[277] Histoire de la Révolution, vol. x. p. 392, note.
[278] Nels. Disp., July 4, 1803, vol. v. p. 116.
[279] Mar. Fran, sous la Rép. p. 415.
[280] Ten or twelve British, four or five Portuguese; the former exceptionally well-ordered ships. (Nels. Disp., vol. iii. p. 365.)
[281] Nels. Disp., vol. vii. p. 16.
[282] To this must be added that, from conditions of wind and weather, Malta was very far from Toulon, much farther than Toulon from Malta. Of this Nelson complained often and bitterly in the later war, when commander-in-chief off Toulon. Malta was valuable, he said (Disp., vol. v. p. 107), as a most important outwork to India and for influence in the Levant; valueless against Toulon.
[283] This is plain from his letter of June 6 to Nelson. (Ante, p. 313.) Keith's failure is usually attributed to St. Vincent's dispatches, received June 8; whereas the letter shows that he had decided to return to Minorca two days before receiving them.
[284] Nels. Disp., vol. iii. pp. 408 and 414, with notes.
[285] Nels. Disp., vol. iii. p. 380.
[286] Keith to Nelson, July 12, 1799; Nels. Disp., vol. iii. p. 419, note.
[287] The larger number is the estimate in Napoleon's Commentaries, which ordinarily exaggerate the enemy's forces. (Vol. iii. p. 107.)
[288] Corr. de Nap., vol. v. p. 710.
[289] Commentaires de Napoléon, vol. iii. p. 89.
[290] Corr. de Nap., vol. v. p. 56.
[291] Ibid., p. 403 (Feb. 10, 1799).
[293] Mém. de Bourrienne, vol. ii. p. 238.
[294] Ibid., p. 305.
[295] Chevalier, Mar. Fran. sous le Consulat, etc., p. 16.
[296] Nels. Disp. vol iv. p. 219, note.
[297] Naval Chronicle, vol. iii. p. 149.
[298] Napoleon's Commentaries give Sept. 26, 1799, as the date of this letter,—only a month after Bonaparte sailed. (Vol. iii. p. 183.)
[299] Nels. Disp. vol. iii. p. 296.
[300] June 28, 1799. Corr. de Nap. vol. v. p. 622.
[301] At the same time he made requisitions for clothing for double the number of men actually in Egypt, notifying the officers concerned that he did so to deceive Europe as to the strength of the army. Corr. de Nap. vol. v. p. 721. This has a significant bearing on the charges, made by him against Kleber, of exaggerating his weakness.
[302] Annual Register, 1800; State Papers, p. 225. It may be added the commissioners first met on board Smith's ship.
[303] For the convention of El Arish, see Annual Register, 1800, State Papers, p. 217.
[304] Allardyce's Life of Lord Keith, pp. 226, 227.
[305] "At the theatre last night I had a conversation with General Kilmaine [commanding the division intended to send into Ireland]. He told me ... the arsenals at Brest are empty; and what stores they have in other ports they cannot convey thither, from the superiority of the naval force of the enemy, which kept everything blocked up." (Wolf Tone's Journal, June 16, 1798.) In 1801 "the port of Brest lacked provisions. The difficulty of getting the convoys into it decided the First Consul to break up the fleet there and send part to Rochefort.... The Spanish admiral (who had come there with Bruix in 1799) was invited to escort the division. To equip the necessary ships, this officer had to give them equipments taken from the others of his squadron, and could obtain provisions only for seventeen days. Baffled by the winds and by the constant presence of the enemy, the ships did not sail." A combined expedition against the Cape of Good Hope failed for the same reason. "The blockade of the Dutch ports was no less rigorous than that of the coast of France." "At Brest, they lived from day to day. Villaret Joyeuse was ordered to go out with ten French and ten Spanish ships to support the entry of convoys. He did not go, and received another mission." (Troude, Batailles Navales, vol. iii. p. 222.)
[306] Nelson's Disp., vol. v. pp 300, 306, 411, 498.
[308] There is between Ushant and the reefs a narrow passage, practicable for ships-of-the-line, which was surveyed under Lord St. Vincent; but it could only be used with pilots, and was rather a convenience than an important feature.
[309] In the English Channel and the neighboring western coasts of Europe, winds from S.W. to N.W. prevail during three fourths of the days of the year, and are often exceedingly violent.
[310] See "Twelve letters to the Rt. Hon. Spencer Perceval," by Capt. James Manderson, 1812; in which it is also said that Mr. Pitt was towards the end of his life much impressed with the advantages of Falmouth's position. To this opinion is probably due the following statement in a magazine of the day, during Pitt's short second administration: "It is now (Feb. 1805) determined that the Channel fleet shall in future rendezvous at Falmouth, and moorings are immediately to be laid down for fifteen sail-of-the-line." (Nav. Chron., vol. xiii. p. 328.) Lord Exmouth seems to have shared this opinion. (Life, p. 140.) While Falmouth was by position admirably suited for a rendezvous, ships running for refuge to Torbay would have the wind three points more free, an advantage seamen will appreciate.
[311] With the wind to the southward of south-east we know full well that no ship-of-the-line can get out of Brest.—Letter of St. Vincent; Tucker's Life, vol. ii. p. 119.
[312] Tucker's Life of Earl St. Vincent, vol. ii. p. 14.
[315] Chevalier, Mar. Fran. sous la Rép., p. 265.
[316] Rousselin's "Vie de Hoche," quoted by Troude, Bat. Nav., vol. iii. p. 6.
[317] Before Rochefort.
[318] See map of Brest, p. 343.
[319] In performing this audacious service Pellew was somewhat favored by the fact that his ship was a French prize, easily mistaken for one of the expedition. He kept close, often within half gun-shot of the leading ship.
[320] The greater part of the "Séduisant's" crew was saved.
[321] "Fog so thick we cannot see a ship's length. Has been foggy all day." (Wolfe Tone's Journal, Dec. 18.) "The state of the weather was such that it was impossible for Admiral Colpoys to keep his own fleet under observation, and the air so hazy that fog guns had continually to be fired." (Parliamentary Hist. xxxiii, p. 12. March 3, 1797.)
[322] Wolfe Tone's Journal, Dec. 21, 1796.
[323] James Nav. Hist. vol. ii. p. 7. Chevalier, Mar. Fran. sous la Rép. p. 281.
[324] Bouvet was broken without trial by the Directory on the 15th of February, 1797, and was not restored to the navy until 1801, under the Consulate. Captain Chevalier's judgment is that "he despaired too soon of the success of the expedition, ... and forgot that he should have been inspired only by the great interests entrusted by accident to his hands." (Mar. Fran. sous la Rép., pp. 309, 311.)
[325] Chevalier. James makes the number captured to be seven.
[327] See post, Chap. XVI.
[328] Parliamentary History, vol. xxxiii. pp. 113, 116. Wolfe Tone states that there were on board the ships of the expedition 41,160 muskets. (Journal, Dec. 22, 1796.)
[329] Dundas's Speech, Mar. 3, 1797, Parl. Hist. vol. xxxiii. p. 12.
[330] Ibid., vol. xxxiii. 13.
[331] Ibid., vol. xxxiii. pp. 109, 111.
[332] Speech of Lord Albemarle, ibid., p. 109.
[333] Speech of Earl Spencer, First Lord of Admiralty, ibid., p. 111.
[334] Dundas, Parl. Hist. vol. xxxiii. p. 13.
[335] James's Nav. Hist., vol. ii. p. 21.
[336] Of fifteen ships four were of ninety-eight guns or over. (Schomberg's Nav. Chronology, vol. iv. p. 525.)
[337] James, vol. ii. p. 20.
[338] James's Nav. Hist., vol. ii. pp. 20, 22.
[339] Earl Spencer's Speech, Parl. Hist., vol. xxxiii. p. 115.
[340] Tucker's Life of Earl St. Vincent, vol. ii. pp. 10 and 70; the latter reference being to a letter from St. Vincent to the First Lord of the Admiralty. The incident occurred on board Bridport's flag ship, the "Royal George."
[341] Tucker's Life of Earl St. Vincent, vol. ii. p. 58.
[342] Ibid., vol. ii. p. 13.
[343] Ibid., p. 114.
[344] Ibid., p. 24.
[345] Tucker's St. Vincent, vol. ii. p. 114.
[346] Ibid., p. 80.
[347] Ibid., p. 78.
[348] See Nelson's letter to Earl St. Vincent, Feb. 1, 1800. (Nelson's Dispatches.)
[349] Tucker, vol. ii. p. 121. Modern ships, so much more complex, are much more liable to derangement than those of St. Vincent; and, unless such pains as his are taken to make them self-sufficing, their officers and the dockyards will make a heavier drain on the force of the fleet than in his day. Perhaps in no point will provident administration more affect the efficiency of the fleet than in this.
[350] Tucker's St. Vincent, vol. ii. pp. 13, 88.
[351] Tucker's St. Vincent, vol. ii. p. 14.
[352] Ibid., p. 14.
[353] Ibid., p. 115.
[354] See Troude, Batailles Navales, 1800, 1801, vol. iii. pp. 190, 222, 223. "We had at Brest (in 1800) neither provisions nor material. The Franco-Spanish fleet there was of consideration only from its numbers." (Chevalier, Mar. Fran. sous le Consulat, p. 10.)
[355] Tucker's St. Vincent, vol. ii. p. 136.
[356] Naval Chronicle, vol. iv. p. 520.
[357] See post, Chap. XIII.
[358] Tucker's St. Vincent, vol. ii. p. 105.
[359] Parliamentary History, vol. xxxiii. pp. 111-116.
[360] Batailles Navales, vol. iii. pp. 187-190, 222, 223.
