The departure of the English left Richelieu face to face with La Rochelle, “like a lion with his prey.” But the Cardinal was well aware that it was a prey which could not be secured without a long and terrible struggle. With its strong walls, covered on two sides by marshes and on a third by the harbour, and its brave and hardy population, largely composed of seafaring men inured to perils and hardships, La Rochelle was one of the most difficult places to subdue which it was possible to imagine. Old men remembered how the Duc d’Anjou (afterwards Henri III) had besieged the town for months after the St. Bartholomew, and had had nothing to show for his trouble but the graves of 20,000 of his soldiers, and predicted that Louis XIII and Richelieu would meet with no better fate. In fact, so long as La Rochelle retained command of the sea, it was deemed impregnable.

Richelieu, appreciating the immense difficulties of the enterprise, would fain have avoided it altogether; but the alliance of the Rochellois with the English had left him no alternative, and, once committed to it, he was resolved to carry it through, cost what it might. For this siege, in which, as he said, “he had to conquer three kings, those of France, England, and Spain,” he set aside all other work, and concentrated upon it all the resources of his genius. For this he closed his eyes momentarily to the death-struggles in Germany, to the Austrian menace on the eastern frontier, and to the intrigues of the Dukes of Savoy and Lorraine, and contented himself with merely holding Rohan’s rebellion in the South in check the while he was preparing to strike his decisive blows elsewhere.

The Cardinal had recognised, in arriving before La Rochelle, that it would be necessary for him to supervise everything himself, and that the obstacles which he would have to overcome were well-nigh as formidable in the Royal camp as in those of the enemy. The majority of the great nobles, by whom the Cardinal was feared and disliked, did not wish to see the Huguenot party completely crushed, foreseeing that, when this was accomplished, Richelieu would assuredly proceed to curtail their own power; and Bassompierre undoubtedly voiced their opinion when he exclaimed one day, laughing: “We shall be very foolish to take La Rochelle.” Bassompierre was too loyal a servant of the Crown not to do his duty as a soldier, whatever opinions he might hold; but there were others who were more logical, and already, during the siege of Saint-Martin-de-Ré, the conduct of more than one officer and more than one army-contractor had been distinctly suspicious. This ill-will would, unless effective means were taken to frustrate it, undoubtedly manifest itself on a much greater scale as time went on, and would not fail to take advantage of the least checks and the least sufferings to spread discouragement throughout the army.

Richelieu faced the situation boldly and resolved to attack the evil at its root. He secured the good-will and confidence of the people of the surrounding country, and assured the provisioning of the camp, by an ordinance which forbade the soldiers, under pain of death, to take away the cattle of the peasants or to interfere with the work in the fields, and instituted a special commission to receive the complaints of the peasants against the military. He gained, at the same time, the affection of the soldiers by the solicitude which he showed for their welfare, arranging with the neighbouring towns for the supply of winter clothing for the whole army and directing that the men should receive their pay each week from the commissaries of the Treasury, instead of allowing the money to pass, as had hitherto been the custom, through the hands of the captains of companies, in which a good proportion of it invariably remained. Thus, the company-officers were no longer able to defraud the soldier of his pay or to deceive the Ministers or the generals as to the number of effectives who were serving under them; and, thanks to this precaution and the rigorous surveillance exercised over the treasurers and contractors, the army employed at the siege of La Rochelle, though larger than that which had besieged Montauban five years before, did not cost the State even half as much. Never had a French army taken the field in which the soldiers were better cared for or better disciplined; never had the country surrounding a beleaguered town been less harried and annoyed. The camp, in fact, was a pattern of all the military virtues, which Richelieu afterwards himself compared to a “well-ordered convent.” The comparison seems to have been justified by the swarm of Capuchins who descended upon the Royal army in the train of Richelieu’s confidant, the celebrated Père Joseph—“Son Eminence grise”—to catechise the soldiers, and by the group of warlike prelates—the Bishops of Maillezais, Mende, Nîmes, and others—whom the Cardinal gathered round him to aid him in the surveillance of the officers and contractors.

While the welfare and efficiency of the army was thus being provided for, the siege was being busily pressed on. Lines of circumvallation three leagues in extent, flanked by eleven forts and eighteen redoubts, were undertaken, with the object of cutting off all approach to La Rochelle on the land side. One of the most important was the Fort of La Fons, to the north of the town, which was intended to intercept the supply of pure water. On November 18 Louis XIII sent for Bassompierre and informed him that he and the Cardinal were most anxious that a fort should be constructed at La Fons. So soon as possible Monsieur had charged himself with this task, but, as he had left the army and returned to Paris, the King had requested Angoulême to undertake it. That prince, however, was unwilling to do so, unless he could have a force of 500 horse and 5,000 foot at his disposal, as he felt certain that the besieged would make the most determined efforts to prevent the construction of the fort. It would be very difficult to spare so many troops, and the King had therefore sent for Bassompierre to ascertain whether he would undertake the work and what reinforcements he would require for the purpose. The marshal replied that he would not require any, and that he would engage that the approach to La Rochelle on that side should be effectually closed within a fortnight. The King appeared to think that Bassompierre was jesting, and asked if three more regiments and three companies of light cavalry would be enough. The marshal answered that, if his Majesty insisted on reinforcing him, he must decline to undertake the affair; that on the morrow he would survey the ground and trace out the fort, on the following day make his preparations, and on the next take up his quarters there and begin the work. Louis inquired what force he proposed to employ, and, on being told that 400 infantry and 40 horse were all that he should take, “told him that he was making game of him and that he would not suffer him to do it.” The marshal said that, in that case, the King had better entrust the work to someone else, as he declined to employ another man beyond the number he had mentioned. Finally, the King allowed him to have his way, recommending him, however, to take every precaution.

It is probable that Bassompierre would not have been nearly so ready to offer to undertake under the protection of a few hundred men a dangerous and important duty, for which ordinary prudence would have enjoined the employment of a very considerable force, had not Angoulême been present at the Council and the temptation to humiliate that prince proved too great to resist. He had reckoned, however, on his long experience of war to enable him to deceive an enemy who could possess little or no knowledge of the ruses of the battlefield, and he judged rightly. The spot where he proposed to construct his fort was flanked by two sunken roads, and at the head of each of these roads he erected a barricade, which he lined with troops, while the rest of his force he disposed in the space between them. The Rochellois sallied out to the number of 1,000 or 1,200 men, but, finding themselves confronted by several hundred soldiers, concluded that they formed but the advance-guard of a large force which lay concealed in the sunken roads behind the barricades, and did not venture to attack, contenting themselves with a cannonade, which did but little damage. Thus the resourceful Bassompierre was able to carry out the work entrusted to him with the loss of very few men, and was highly complimented by the King on his success.

The lines of circumvallation were, however, of but secondary importance, for there was no serious attack to be feared from the Huguenots of the South. It was not the land but the sea which it was necessary to close at any price, for it was impossible to believe that the English, more exasperated than dejected by the reverse they had sustained, would not sooner or later make a vigorous effort to succour the metropolis of French Protestantism. They were, indeed, in honour bound to come to the assistance of the Rochellois, since it was they who had drawn them into revolt.

In 1621 an Italian engineer had conceived a project of blocking the canal of La Rochelle; but the means which he proposed—an elaborated floating bar, an iron chain laid across vessels and rafts, and stretching from shore to shore—was found insufficient.

However, at the end of November, another scheme was mooted.

It was accordingly decided to undertake the gigantic task of blocking up the canal with solid masonry. From the point of Coreilles, which was beyond the range of the cannon of La Rochelle, a mole was to be thrown out some seven hundred paces towards the opposite shore, where Bassompierre commanded; whence, to meet it, another mole of four hundred paces was to be constructed. The whole breadth of the canal is here seventeen hundred paces, so that there would be, after all, a distance of some six hundred still open, for here the water was so deep as to render it impossible to carry the mole across it. It was therefore decided that in this opening a number of vessels should be sunk; while others, with their bows outward, were to be lashed together, and made fast to the ends of the mole, so as to close the passage with a kind of floating and armed bridge. A small squadron of the Royal fleet was to be stationed between the mole and the inner harbour, to prevent the vessels of the Rochellois from sallying out to burn the moored ships, while the main part of the fleet would cruise between the canal and the islands of Ré and Oléron to watch for the coming of the English.

The construction of the mole was begun forthwith, but it was a heartbreaking task, and it is probable that with anyone less inflexible than Richelieu to supervise it it would soon have been abandoned. For more than once the stormy sea destroyed in an hour the work of a week; and, on one occasion, the result of three months’ labour was entirely lost, through the fault of Louis de Marillac, who had caused the mole to be made upright, instead of slanting. But the patience of man eventually triumphed over the fury of the elements, and little by little the gigantic work advanced towards completion, despite the winds and the waves.

Bassompierre, although, for political reasons, he may, like most of the great nobles, have wished to spare the great stronghold of the Huguenot party, carried out the duties entrusted to him with his customary zeal and efficiency. Never probably had so much responsibility rested upon him. He had to see that the soldiers and labourers engaged upon the mole upon his side of the canal were promptly supplied with all they required, so that the work might not be interrupted even for an hour. He was responsible for the construction of all the forts and redoubts on the western and north-western side of La Rochelle, which appear to have been made from plans which he himself drew. He had constantly to be on the alert, by day and night, to repel the sallies which the garrison directed against the unfinished works, and to prevent the attempts which, until the lines of circumvallation had been completed, were constantly being made under cover of darkness to revictual the town.

One morning in January, 1628, the marshal received a visit from the Marquis de Grimault, who informed him that he had been sent by the King, who had gone to spend a few days at a château near Nantes, to express to him his Majesty’s displeasure to learn that he had been so negligent as to allow a large herd of cattle to be driven through his lines into the town. In great astonishment, Bassompierre inquired who had accused him of this, and was told that it was the Duc d’Angoulême, from whom the King had received a letter that morning. The marshal at once despatched one of his officers, named Lisle-Rouet, who was a noted huntsman and could be trusted to identify the track of any animal, to investigate the affair; but Lisle-Rouet could find no sign of a herd of cattle having passed through their lines. He then proceeded to examine the country on the other side of La Rochelle, where the main part of the Royal army under Angoulême and Schomberg lay, and, by good fortune, came upon the track of the cattle near the village of Périgny, to the south-east of the town. He returned and reported his discovery to Bassompierre, who at once despatched him to the King, to whom, says the marshal, “he expressed just resentment that I had been blamed for the faults of others, and that without having heard me or had the matter confirmed, the King should have not only judged but condemned me on the mere statement of my enemy”; and he offered to prove, if his Majesty would send someone who was a huntsman with him, that the cattle had entered the town through Angoulême’s and Schomberg’s lines.

Louis thereupon sent for the two commanders, before whom Lisle-Rouet repeated what he had told the King. They, of course, declared that the thing was impossible, upon which his Majesty suggested that they had better go and examine the ground over which the cattle were said to have passed themselves, and sent with them one of his gentlemen named Croysilles, who, like Lisle-Rouet, was an experienced huntsman. Croysilles confirmed the opinion of the other, and Angoulême and Schomberg were reluctantly obliged to acknowledge that it was with themselves, and not with Bassompierre, that the blame for a particularly gross piece of negligence lay.

It seems probable, however, that the admission of the cattle into La Rochelle was due to something worse than negligence, at least so far as Angoulême was concerned. Anyway, he was most severely reprimanded both by the King and the Cardinal, the latter being furiously indignant that the success of operations involving so much labour and such enormous expense should be compromised in this fashion. As for Bassompierre, the King, “satisfied him by many words of his esteem and affection for his person”; but it must, nevertheless, have been very galling to the marshal to find how ready his Majesty was to credit the most unfounded accusations against even his most intimate friends.

It was this very same unfortunate trait in Louis XIII’s character which was just then causing his great Minister the keenest anxiety. To assure his influence with the King it was necessary to be with him constantly, so as to be in a position to disabuse his gloomy and fickle mind of the suspicions which the enemies of the Cardinal were perpetually endeavouring to implant there. Well, Louis had grown weary of the monotony of the siege and had announced his intention of returning to Paris. The Cardinal was profoundly alarmed. To follow the King was to renounce La Rochelle, for no other than Richelieu was capable of finishing the work of Richelieu; to remain, to separate from the King, was to risk his political existence, for in Paris were his most dangerous enemies, who would not fail to take the fullest advantage of this opportunity his absence afforded them. How could he tell whether some malign influence might not succeed in undermining the inconstant monarch’s trust in him, and bringing the whole fabric of his ambition, upon which alone it was reared, crashing to the ground? For a moment he had almost determined to go with the King; but Père Joseph is said to have persuaded him to stay, pointing out that, if he went, the operations would almost certainly fail, and be followed by an outcry which would ruin him. Anyway, he decided to remain, and Louis, who appears to have recognised that his Minister’s resolution had something magnanimous about it, took his departure for Paris on February 10 with the promise that he would soon return, and left him with the title of “Lieutenant-General of the Army,” the marshals, Bassompierre and Schomberg, themselves being directed to take their orders from him.

“It was a singular spectacle,” says Henri Martin, “this general in the red hat, with his staff in mitre and cowl. But the Cardinal knew how to render terrible what so nearly touched the grotesque. He had acted up to then in the shadow of the King; he was henceforth general, admiral, engineer, munitioner, intendant, paymaster. He communicated the fire of his soul to all who surrounded him. The Bishop of Mende, who was directing under him the construction of the mole, died meanwhile, giving orders that his body was to be interred in La Rochelle. The spirit of the soldiery and of the lesser nobility, who did not share the mental reservations of the grandees, rose to the same pitch.”

Meantime, however, storms were gathering on various parts of the horizon, and all the enemies of France appeared to be striving to prevent her achieving her political unity. Threatening preparations for the relief of La Rochelle were going forward in the English ports; Wallenstein was carrying all before him in Germany, and the fainting princes of the North were sending despairing appeals for assistance; while, worst of all, the Spaniards from the Milanese and the Duke of Savoy had invaded the duchy of Mantua and the marquisate of Montferrato, to which Charles of Gonzaga, Duc de Nevers, had succeeded on the death of Vincenzo I, Duke of Mantua, in 1627, and were threatening Casale, on the Po, a fortress which it was of the most vital importance to France to save from falling into unfriendly hands.[112]

But, until La Rochelle was taken, France could do little or nothing to aid her hard-pressed ally, for all the troops which could be spared from the defence of the frontiers, save those engaged to hold Rohan and the Huguenots of the South in check, were concentrated before the Protestant stronghold; all the money which could be raised was being thrown into the mud of its canal. Recognising the impossibility of abandoning the siege, but sorely troubled by the news from Italy, Richelieu determined to make an attempt to take La Rochelle by surprise, although he was well aware that his chance of success was of the slightest. On March 11, accordingly, he sent for Bassompierre and informed him that that night he was sending Marillac to endeavour to blow up the Porte des Salines, and instructed the marshal to have 2,000 foot and 300 horse in readiness to support him. Bassompierre assembled his troops with all due secrecy at the place appointed, where he was joined by the Cardinal, with a force about equal to his own. They waited there all night, expecting every moment to hear the sound of the explosion; but nothing happened, and it subsequently transpired that Marillac and the men who were carrying the petard had lost their way in the darkness.

In the early morning of the 13th another attempt was made, this time on the south-eastern side of the town; but it failed completely, and more than forty men were killed and wounded.

After this second fiasco, Richelieu prudently abandoned the idea of taking La Rochelle by a coup de main, and, feeling very uneasy as to what was happening in Paris, wrote to the King pressing him to hasten his return to the army, in order to discuss with him the situation.

The Cardinal did well to be uneasy at Louis’s absence, for his enemies at the Court had been very busy indeed, more so, in fact, even than he appears to have imagined. This time the Queen-Mother was of the plot. Marie, as we have seen, had supported Richelieu warmly so long as she believed him to be her creature, prepared to place France at the mercy of her petty passions; but gradually the unpalatable truth had begun to dawn upon her sluggish mind that the Cardinal had been using her favour merely as a stepping-stone to that of the King, and that it was upon the son, and not upon the mother, that he intended to lean. The discovery exasperated the Queen-Mother, and there were not wanting persons about her to sympathise with her complaints against the neglect and ingratitude of the Cardinal. Chief among these was Bérulle, recently elevated to the cardinalate, Michel de Marillac, the Keeper of the Seals, and other members of the High Catholic party. Loudly as these pious souls had fulminated against the stubborn heretics of La Rochelle in the past, they were now as little anxious for the fall of the town as were the great nobles, though for a different reason. They knew that with Richelieu religious considerations counted for very little in comparison with political, and foresaw that, once the Huguenot party was overthrown, he would make no attempt to interfere with that liberty of conscience which the dévots regarded with such indignation, and would make use of his victory, not to revoke the Edict of Nantes, but to thwart the designs of the House of Austria to crush the Protestant princes of Northern Europe.

Marie and her friends had recourse to all kinds of means to detain the King in Paris, but they did not succeed; and on April 25 he rejoined the army, which he found larger by several thousand men than when he had quitted it at the beginning of February, while all the works were approaching completion.

On the following day a herald was sent to summon La Rochelle to surrender in the name of the King; but the inhabitants refused to receive him.

The most violent party had gained the day in this unhappy town, and the mayoralty had become a dictatorship. On March 3 the famous admiral of the Rochellois, Jean Guiton, had been elected mayor, against his will. “You know not what you are doing in nominating me,” said he. “Remember that with me there must be no talk of surrender. If anyone says a word about that, I will kill him.” And, drawing his poniard, he threw it on to the table of the Hôtel de Ville and gave orders that it should be left there.

The King and the Cardinal thought for a moment of converting the blockade into a regular siege with approaches in form, and endeavouring to take La Rochelle by assault. But the council of war which they called to discuss the matter objected that the only part of the fortifications which was approachable was of immense strength, and that to attempt to storm it would only entail a useless sacrifice of life. If Richelieu had been as sure of the officers as he was of the soldiers, he would perhaps have disregarded this advice, but he could not expose himself to the chance of a serious reverse. He therefore decided that there was nothing to be done but to continue the blockade and starve the place out. As for the Italian situation, it was recognised that it was impossible for France to intervene directly so long as La Rochelle remained untaken, but authority was given to raise a force of volunteers, who were to enter Italy by way of the Valtellina and throw themselves into Casale.

CHAPTER XXXVII

To the profound mortification of Charles I, who considered the deliverance of La Rochelle a matter of personal honour, the difficulty of obtaining both money and men had delayed the fitting out of the expedition until the spring was well advanced; but at the end of April it sailed from Portsmouth, under the command of the Earl of Denbigh, Buckingham’s brother-in-law, and on May 11 appeared off the Île de Ré.

The English appear to have imagined that they had only to show themselves to enter the harbour, as they had been informed that the French had only a few ships and that the mole was but little advanced. They were astonished to behold the approach barred by twenty-nine vessels and a swarm of boats and armed shallops. The flanks of this fleet were protected by the batteries which bristled on the two promontories of Chef de Baie and Coreilles and on both sides of the canal. Even supposing that they were able to force this formidable barrier, they would find themselves confronted by the mole, now almost completed, which was fortified by four batteries, one at each extremity, and one on either side of a narrow opening left for the passage of the tides. A little fort, built in the canal, covered this opening on the side of the sea, and this fort was covered, in its turn, by twenty-four vessels lashed together in the shape of a half-moon. On the other side of the mole, a second floating stockade of armed boats prevented the Rochellois from communicating with their allies.

It may be questioned, as Gardiner very justly observes, whether Drake or Nelson, followed by crews as high-spirited and as energetic as themselves, would have made an attack successfully. But Denbigh’s fleet was for the most part manned by pressed men, carried off against their will from their ordinary occupations to a service of danger, in which the reward was but scanty pay, or, most probably, no pay at all. Many of them were soldiers converted into sailors from sheer necessity. Such men could have had but little stomach for the business in hand, nor was Denbigh the kind of commander to inspire those under him with a more daring spirit.

Denbigh would appear to have founded some hope on the superiority of his ships-of-war over any which the French could oppose to them; but he was assured by the Rochellois émigrés who were with him that these great vessels would undoubtedly run aground in the shallow waters of the canal. He therefore decided to wait until the next spring tide made the attack easier for his fire-ships; but, in any case, it would have been impossible for him to have attempted anything of importance for nearly a week, as during that time, Bassompierre tells us, the wind was blowing hard off the coast.

More than one attempt, however, was made by small vessels to run the blockade under cover of darkness; and during the night of the 14th-15th, Bassompierre learned that an English pinnace had passed through the opening in the mole. He sent at once to warn the vessels which lay between the mole and the inner harbour; but the pinnace succeeded in evading them and reached the town in safety. It was a most daring feat and worthy of the best traditions of the Navy.

On the 15th there was an alarm that the English fleet was getting under way, and Richelieu sent the Swiss Guards and Vaubecourt’s regiment to reinforce Bassompierre at Chef de Baie. However, nothing happened.

On the following day the English sent a fire-ship against the French fleet, but the boats succeeded in towing it to the shore of the canal. It was thought probable that the enemy might attempt an attack that night, and the King came to spend it in Bassompierre’s quarters, the marshal sleeping in his coach.

On the 18th Louis XIII dined and held his Council at Bassompierre’s quarters, and then went with him to Chef de Baie to watch the enemy’s fleet in the Straits of Antioche. He then started to return to Aytré, accompanied by the marshal; but, after they had proceeded some little distance, happening to glance back, they observed great activity aboard the English ships: anchors were being weighed, sailors were going aloft hoisting sails, and it was evident that a general movement was about to take place.

Bassompierre returned in all haste to Chef de Baie, and the French on land and sea began hurriedly preparing to meet the expected attack.

Presently, the great ships-of-war stood in towards the canal, until they had got within range, when they tacked, discharged their broadsides into the French vessels, and then stood out to sea, as did the whole fleet. The French watched them with astonishment, scarcely daring to believe that they really intended to leave the beleaguered city to its fate without any serious attempt to force their way into the harbour; but they held on their course, running rapidly before the wind, and ere long the last of their sails disappeared below the horizon. “Then,” says Bassompierre, “we returned to our quarters to make good cheer without fear of the enemy and with good hope of the speedy reduction of La Rochelle.”

It is very difficult to decide who was to blame for this fiasco, for the evidence is exceedingly conflicting. The English officers, when they came home, threw all the blame on the Rochellois refugees who accompanied them, while the Rochellois bitterly retorted the accusation. The explanation given by Gardiner, who is always scrupulously fair in his criticism of naval and military operations, is as follows:—

When the news that the expedition which he had only succeeded in sending out after so many difficulties and delays was on its way home, Charles I, who, only a day or two before, had sent orders to Denbigh to hold on at La Rochelle so long as possible and to send for reinforcements if he required them, was furiously indignant. He at once despatched Lord Fielding, Denbigh’s son, to Portsmouth to press into the King’s service every vessel he found there, and to direct his father to return at all hazards to La Rochelle and to await the reinforcements and supplies which would be sent him. But it was impossible for Denbigh to carry out these orders. His ships were full of sick men and very short of provisions, while some of them were urgently in need of repairs, and to send them to sea again before these were effected would, if bad weather came on, entail the loss of them and their crews. Besides this, three of his merchant-vessels laden with corn for La Rochelle had been snapped up by Dunkirk privateers within sight of the English coast, and they and their freights would have to be replaced. The King reluctantly acknowledged the force of Denbigh’s representations and sent orders to him to refit, while all the available maritime force of the country was being got ready to accompany him.

The retreat of the English produced a profound impression both in France and abroad. The clergy, assembled at Fontenai, in Poitou, voted a subsidy of three millions to aid the King to finish his work. The Comte de Soissons, who had contemplated raising the standard of revolt in Dauphiné and joining Rohan, sued for pardon and came to the Royal camp to make his peace with the King; while the Duc de la Trémoille, the greatest noble of Poitou, hastened to abjure the Protestant faith, and was received into the Catholic Church by Richelieu, who promptly rewarded his “conversion” by the command of the light cavalry. It appears to have been the almost general belief that the surrender of La Rochelle was near at hand, a belief which was strengthened when, a week after the departure of the English fleet, the Rochellois made an unsuccessful attempt to send their “bouches inutiles” through the lines of the besiegers, thus admitting that the town was already beginning to feel the pinch of hunger.

But those who counted on the early surrender of La Rochelle understood but little the grim tenacity of that people, so well personified by the inflexible seaman whom it had chosen as its chief. The mayor Guiton, ably seconded by the old Duchesse de Rohan and the eloquent minister Salbert, exhorted their fellow-citizens to endure all things for the sake of their faith and to choose death rather than dishonour. Nevertheless, so great was the despondency which followed the departure of the English that these zealots were unable to prevent negotiations being opened with the Royal army, though it is probable that they had no intention of allowing them to be carried through. Anyway, on May 31, a drummer from the town came to Bassompierre’s quarters; informed him that the citizens were debating the question of surrender, and requested that he would send someone to arrange for a conference. Bassompierre despatched the Comte, afterwards the Maréchal, de Grancey to La Rochelle, and sent to inform the King and the Cardinal, who expressed their approval; and on the following day commissioners were appointed on both sides. On the morrow, however, the negotiations were abruptly broken off by the Rochellois:

Alas for the unhappy Rochellois! Distracted by troubles at home and at his wits’ end for money, many weeks were to pass before Charles was to be in a position to redeem his promise, and long before that time the last extremities had come upon the people whom he and his favourite had so wantonly incited to revolt.

During the ensuing weeks an occasional attempt was made to revictual La Rochelle on the land side, but without success, and by the end of June the town was in the grip of famine. Half the population was already subsisting on vegetables, roots, and shell-fish, but soon these resources failed, and they were obliged to have recourse to all the deplorable expedients which hunger can impose on the revolted senses. Soon there was not a cat or dog in the town, and when these had disappeared, parchments, skins and leather were cut into shreds, soaked in water, boiled, and eaten, with a little syrup to season the dish. Some endeavoured to support life on bran and chopped straw; others declared war on rats and mice.

Several attempts were made to send the old men, women, and children out of the town; but Louis XIII, who had none of his father’s kindly heart, which had led him to have compassion on the fugitives at the time of the siege of Paris, gave orders for them to be driven back. Those who persisted in trying to pass through the Royal lines were taken and hanged. Guiton, more inflexible even than the King, ended by refusing to open the gates to the poor creatures whom he had expelled, and numbers of them perished miserably between the besieging army and the walls of the town.

About the middle of July, a rising in favour of peace broke out amongst the least zealous inhabitants. It was, however, speedily put down by the fanatical party, and Guiton caused several of the leaders to be executed. Early in August, however, a more regular attempt was made in the council of the town itself. Several of the magistrates of the Présidial inclined to submission, and one of them declared that they ought to surrender, provided that the King would leave them their walls and their religious liberty, pointing out that if the English fleet had been unable to effect anything when the canal was only partially closed, it could not reasonably be expected to be more successful now that the mole was completed. Guiton did not make use of the poniard which still lay on the council-table against the speaker, but he struck him with his fist. Another councillor then struck the mayor, and this unseemly brawl terminated by the Council ordering the arrest of Guiton. The latter however, raised the people against the moderate party, and the two councillors who had offended him had to go into hiding to escape being torn to pieces by the mob, who had been persuaded that there was no mercy to hope for from the King, and that, if they opened their gates, the men would be massacred and the women abandoned to the soldiers.

Day after day, from the top of the ramparts, the famished citizens scanned the sea in the hope of catching sight of the approaching sails of the English fleet; day after day their hopes mocked them. The deputies of La Rochelle in England addressed to Charles I the most touching remonstrances in the name of their perishing city, but the King could do nothing until the necessary subsidies for the equipment of another expedition had been voted by Parliament, and even when these had been obtained, as the price of his surrender on the question of the Petition of Right, fresh obstacles arose to delay the departure of the fleet. And, meanwhile, the condition of La Rochelle was growing daily more terrible.

The markets were deserted, the shops closed, numbers of houses were unoccupied, every member of the families who had once occupied them having perished. Dead bodies were constantly found in the streets—the bodies of those who had wandered hither and thither in a vain search for food, and at last had lain down and died, too weak to crawl back to their homes. And there they often remained for days, since it was difficult for the authorities to procure men with enough strength left to carry them away and bury them.

Amid all the horrors of the famine there were numerous instances of heroic self-devotion. For a week a father kept his child alive by nourishing it with his own blood, and many preferred death to sharing what little food they could get with those whom they loved. The preachers went about amongst the people, exhorting them to faith in Heaven, and the old Duchesse de Rohan ably seconded their efforts. As for Guiton, he was as inflexible as ever; nothing could bend that iron will. “One of his friends,” writes Pontis, “pointed out to him a person of their acquaintance who was dying of hunger. ‘Are you astonished at that?’ he answered coldly. ‘It is what you and I will assuredly have to come to!’ And when another observed to him that the whole town was famishing to death, he replied with the same coldness: ‘If one man remains to close the gates, it is enough!’”

The garrison, for whom the scanty supplies of the town had been husbanded to the utmost, fared better than the citizens; but by the middle of August it was found necessary to reduce their rations to what barely sufficed to enable even the strongest to carry out their duties. Many of the soldiers, who were not sustained by the same religious zeal as the Rochellois, attempted to surrender to the enemy; but, for the reasons which had caused the refugees to be driven back, orders were issued that their surrender was not to be accepted.