On the whole, a bird's-eye view of the United States showed a wilderness, 820,680 square miles in extent, that had a line of settlements along the coast. The political condition of the country was not unlike its physical—chaotic. The thirteen colonies, having thrown off allegiance to the mother-country, had essayed the formation of a ship of state, but had created only a raft of thirteen logs, if such a simile may be permitted, which chafed each other with growing friction. Congress was nominally the executive, the legislative, and the judicial head of a nation, but the money it issued ceased to circulate, and the bonds, representing borrowed coin and war material, were little better. As a body, the Congress consisted of a score or so of respectable gentlemen who met in a hall hired for the purpose, where they expressed their opinions on matters of international as well as local concern, and then begged the sovereign states to take action. They had no power to do anything—not even to raise the money with which to pay the rent of the hall in which they met.

An examination of the American merchant marine at this time shows that it had fallen far below that of the colonies. In a communication to Congress, 19 ship-builders of Philadelphia said (1789) that while they had launched 4500 tons of shipping per year before the war, "it appears from an average of three years past that we have built only to the amount of 1500 tons annually." Similar complaints were made by the shipwrights of Charleston, Baltimore, and Boston. The Charleston communication was especial interesting. It said:—

"From the diminished state of ship building in America, and the ruinous restrictions to which our vessels are subject in foreign ports; from the distressed condition of our commerce, languishing under the most disgraceful inequalities, its benefits transferred to strangers ... who neither have treaties with us ... nor are friendly to our commerce," it therefore seemed necessary to ask Congress to consider what ought to be done in the matter (Am. State Papers, VII, 9; X, 5-6).

It will help to a comprehension of the condition of our merchant marine if we recall once more the feeling of the English public towards the colonists before the war. While statesmen like Robert Peel fostered the growth of American shipping and commerce by encouraging them in evading the navigation laws, the growth thus fostered roused a strong feeling of ill-will on the part of many patriotic Englishmen. This feeling was entirely natural and unavoidable. It was not alone that the Americans were well able to compete with the mother-country for the carrying trade of the world. Under the influence of environment the Americans were developing into a distinct people. The successful colonial was often and perhaps usually self-assertive and boastful; he was necessarily aggressive. Then, too, he showed a lack of deference in the presence of rank that seemed shocking to the nobility. Men who were doing the world's work in the American wilderness made no efforts to conceal their contempt for royal governors, and the influential part of the people of England accepted the complaining letters of these baffled governors as accurate characterizations of the American people. Because of a sort of race prejudice thus produced, the measures of the king, when coercion was attempted, were heartily approved by the majority of the English people.

Then, during the war, the expelled American loyalists had ex parte stories to tell that added indignation to animosity. The successful American cruisers added to the ill feeling. At the same time the British authorities observed a tendency among the foremost hands in the British navy that was not a little alarming. While their navy lost, in the years from 1776 to 1780, 19,788 men through disease and battle, no less than 42,069 deserted. Some of these deserters were, of course, Americans who had been impressed, but many a good British tar learned about the opportunities in the new land and made haste to go to meet them.

In short, it was through natural and unavoidable causes that the influential Britons came to regard their "American cousins" with a feeling of, say, intense animosity not wholly unmingled with apprehension.

Keeping in mind this mental attitude, recall the fact that a command of the sea was then absolutely essential to the well-being of the British people, and further, that the supremacy which the British then boasted had been obtained, and maintained for a century, by good hard fighting; and further still, that many British thinkers had been alarmed at such American progress as had been manifested even a hundred years before the Declaration of Independence. Bluntly stated, while the British people had learned to hate the American, they suddenly saw that he alone had shown an ability to dispute that supremacy upon the sea which seemed absolutely necessary for the preservation of their national existence. And as an independent citizen of the world he was in a position to force the issue. It follows, therefore, that the British were naturally led to do all they could to oppose all progress in the United States. The "ruinous restrictions" of which the Charleston ship-builders made mention were a natural sequence of the success of the Revolution.

While the British were thus hostile upon the sea (they were also holding American territory in the West, and inciting the Indians to war), the French and the Spanish were united in an effort to cut off all that part of the United States west of the Appalachians. For civilization was then in the primitive state where men, though they talked about international law, were guided only by unenlightened selfishness, and acknowledged no other court of appeal than that afforded by the sword.

The story of foreign aggressions upon American shipping and commerce will be told in the next chapter, but by way of illustrating conditions in the years following the Revolution, consider one fact regarding the British work of opposition. All American trade with the British West Indies was forbidden, and so strictly was this regulation enforced that thousands of slaves starved to death in those islands for want of the "refuse fish" and other food which the planters had been accustomed to obtain from America; and even some of the poorer white people died for the same reason.

Because of ruined industries, and of a chaotic government at home, and of the ruthless opposition of the nations of Europe, the condition of the people of the United States seemed almost hopeless. So great was the depression of the seafaring part of the population, indeed, that even the optimistic whalers of Nantucket thought about removing their industry to France, and many of them did migrate.

And yet it was in this period of deepest gloom that the American merchant marine first reached out for the trade of the Far East. In the Journals of Congress for 1784 (p. 333) is a paragraph referring to "a letter of the 23d December, 1783, from Daniel Parker, stating, that a ship called the 'Empress of China' will shortly sail from New York for Canton in China, under the command of Captain John Green, and requesting sea-letters."^[5]

No commercial ventures to the East Indies were made in colonial days because, in part, of the monopoly of the East India Company, but chiefly because abundant profitable employment for all available capital was found in various trades nearer home. The fact that ships in the China trade very often made cent per cent was, of course, very well known in the colonies, and colonial merchants had a general knowledge of the cargoes suitable for that trade. They knew, for instance, that ginseng, a root growing wild in American forests, was highly valued in China for its supposed medicinal qualities. Accordingly, when the war ended, and American ships were excluded from such a large part of the trade which they had enjoyed in former days, the ship-owners naturally thought of the trade to the Far East. New York and Philadelphia merchants united in fitting out a vessel which they renamed the Empress of China. She measured 360 tons, and the chief part of her cargo was ginseng. Sailing from New York on February 22, 1784, with the sea letter noted above for a passport, she arrived at Canton Roads (Macao) on August 23, and she reached home on May 11, 1785. The profit on the venture was $30,000, which, being only a little more than 25 per cent on the investment, was considered small. Other voyages of the period are worth consideration, if only to illustrate the spirit of the ship-owners of the day.

The most interesting of the China voyages, in this point of view, was that of the sloop Experiment, a vessel with one mast and a capacity for eighty tons of cargo, that was built at Albany for the trade of the Hudson River. Captain Stewart Dean, her master, had served in two privateers during the Revolution. She carried six cannon, with a liberal supply of small arms, and her crew numbered fifteen (one account says twenty), men and boys. "Martial music and the boatswain's whistle were heard on board with all the pomp and circumstance of war." She carried out ginseng and brought back tea and silks, with profit; and what is of more importance, perhaps, in this story is the fact that she made the return voyage in four months and twelve days. The record shows what a fore-and-aft rig can do in a round-the-world voyage.

In the same year a Hingham sloop of only forty tons, commanded by a Captain Hallett, sailed from Boston, bound for Canton, but got as far only as the Cape of Good Hope. At that point English ship captains offered Captain Hallett two pounds of good tea for each pound of ginseng he carried, and he was willing to take the profit thus insured rather than risk a longer voyage in the hope of a larger one.

The story of the entrance of Elias Hasket Derby, of Salem, into the China trade is of interest because of the view it affords of a peculiarity of most of the successful ship-owners of the day. Derby considered the possibilities of the trade as early as any one, but while the Empress of China was on her way to Canton, Derby sent his Grand Turk as far as the Cape of Good Hope only. By trading ginseng and provisions to the English captains who were found at the Cape, Captain Ingersoll, commanding the Grand Turk, was able to make a fair profit on the voyage; but the main object in view was to learn all about the demands of the Canton trade; and in this he was entirely successful. It may be worth mentioning that Captain Ingersoll also went up the coast of Africa to complete his cargo with gold-dust, ivory, etc., and that he was under orders not to take on slaves, even though he should thereby be able to make a paying voyage out of a losing one. Elias Hasket Derby was one of the few individuals who were far enough ahead of their age to see the iniquity of the trade, but the important feature of the story of the voyage is this, that Derby would take the risks of the voyage to the Cape to obtain information. In the meantime, too, he sent one of his sons to Europe, where he spent several months in a study of the India trade of England and France.

The trade to China thus initiated was so profitable that in 1789 no less than fifteen American ships were in the Canton roads, of which four belonged to Captain Derby. One of the four is worth especial notice. She was the swift Astræ, Captain James Magee, Jr., commanding, and Thomas Handyside Perkins, supercargo. More than twenty individual ventures were made in this voyage of the Astræ, and a few notes from her outward manifest (list of cargo) will serve well to show the course of trade in those days. Thus Tenney and Brown, of Newbury, sent "9 kegs snuff," and a note in the margin of the manifest tells Captain Magee that "⅓ the net proceeds you are to credit E. H. D.'s account for freight—the other ⅔ to lay out on account of T. & B. in light goods." Opposite the item "1 phaeton and harness complete, with saddles and bridles &c., cased up" is a note saying: "This belongs to Folger Pope ... the net proceeds is to be credited to E. H. D.'s account, as friend Derby is to have the use of the money for freight." David Seas sent "Boxes containing $15,000, 16 casks ginseng, 5570 lbs. This at one-fifth for freight." William Cabot sent a box "containing 21 pieces plate, weight 255 oz. 16 dwts. 12 gr." Rum, wines, beer, fish, flour, "598 firkins butter 32,055 lbs," and spermaceti candles were conspicuous items in the manifest.

Some quotations from Derby's letter of instructions to the captain and supercargo are also interesting. "Make the best of your way for Batavia, and on your arrival there you will dispose of such a part of the cargo as you think may be most for my interest. I think you had best sell a few casks of the most ordinary ginseng if you can get one dollar a pound for it. If you find the price of sugar to be low you will then take into the ship as much of the best white kind as will floor her, and fifty thousand weight of coffee, if it is low as we have heard, ... and fifteen thousand of salt petre, if it is very low, some nutmegs, and fifty thousand weight of pepper; this you will store in the fore peak for fear of injuring the teas. The sugars will save the expense of any stone ballast, and it will make a floor for the teas &c. at Canton. At Batavia you must, if possible, get as much freight for Canton as will pay half or more of your charges.... You must endeavor to be the first ship with ginseng, for be assured you will do better alone than you will if there are three or four ships at Canton at the same time with you." As another of the Derby ships was to be at Batavia on the arrival of the Astræ, directions were given for the loading or the sale of that vessel, according as circumstances seemed to require, but special stress is laid upon the necessity of making careful calculations before selling the vessel, in order to be sure that that course would pay better than bringing her home full of cargo. It is manifest that Derby did not care to sell her. "Captain Magee and Mr. Perkins are to have 5 per cent commission for the sales of the present cargo, and 2½ per cent on the cargo home, and also 5 per cent on the profit made on goods that may be purchased at Batavia and sold at Canton, or in any other similar case that may arise on the voyage. They are to have one-half the passage money—the other half belongs to the ship. The privilege of Capt. Magee is 5 percent of what the ship carries on cargo exclusive of adventures. The property of Mr. Perkins, it is understood, is to be on freight, which is to be paid for like other freighters. It is orders that the ship's books shall be open to the inspection of the mates and doctor of the ship, so they may know the whole business" in case of the death of captain or supercargo. "The Philadelphia beer is put up so strong that it will not be approved until it is made weaker; you had best try some of it.... The iron is English weight; ... there is four percent you will gain if sold Dutch weight.... You are not to pay any moneys to the crew while absent from home, unless in case of real necessity, and then they must allow an advance for the money.... It is likewise my order that in case of your sickness that you write a clause at the foot of these orders putting the command of the ship into the person's hands that you think the most equal to it, not having any regard to the station he at present has in the ship.... Lay out for my account fifteen or twenty pounds sterling in curiosities."

The sale of the Astræ is forbidden for this voyage, but "if at Batavia or Canton you can agree to deliver her the next season for $20,000 or $25,000 you may do it." The final paragraph says that while the orders are "a little particular" "you have leave to break them in any part where you by calculation think it for my interest."

As there were fifteen American ships at Canton when the Astræ was there, the market was flooded with American goods. Her ginseng sold for $20,000 less than prime cost. Two of Derby's ships were sold; the other two brought home 728,871 pounds of tea. Although the consumption of the country at that time was only about a million pounds a year, the total imports of the year amounted to 2,601,852 pounds. In the meantime the government had been organized under the Constitution and a duty levied on imports which, in the case of the Astræ, amounted to about $27,000. On the face of the documents the voyage of the Astræ was disastrous. But Derby, by petition, obtained the privilege of putting his goods in the warehouse and paying the duty as they were sold and removed. The system of bonded warehouses became common later. And according to the biography of Captain Derby, published in Hunt's Merchants' Magazine, his capital was not impaired seriously, if at all, by the voyage.

Another merchant who reached out for trade in strange seas was Captain Ebenezer Parsons, who sent ships to the Red Sea, took on cargoes of coffee for Smyrna, and cleared, in some voyages, from 300 to 400 per cent. A still larger profit was made by Captain Jonathan Carnes, of Salem, in a number of ventures to Sumatra. While at Bencoolen, on that island, he learned by accident that pepper grew wild on its uncivilized northwest coast. Returning to Salem, Carnes imparted his information to Jonathan Peele, who at once furnished the money with which a schooner named the Rajah was built. Carnes armed the Rajah with four guns, shipped a crew of ten men, loaded her with brandy, gin, tobacco, bar iron, and dried fish, and then, in November, 1795, cleared out for the East Indies. These proceedings aroused the greatest curiosity in Boston as well as Salem; for neither owner nor captain would say a word about the destination of the schooner; and this curiosity grew, as the months passed and nothing was heard from the Rajah. Accordingly, when, after eighteen months, the schooner came sailing into port loaded to the hatch coamings with pepper, she created more excitement in Salem than any other vessel that entered the port that year. The profit on this voyage amounted to 700 per cent. When the Rajah was fitted for a second voyage in the same secret manner, a number of merchants sent other vessels in chase, hoping to find where she obtained her pepper; but Captain Carnes eluded them all, and once more brought home a cargo at an immense profit. In the third voyage, however, his secret buying place was discovered, and thereafter he had to be contented with the ordinary cent per cent.

One of the most celebrated voyages of the period was that of the ship Columbia, Captain John Kendrick, with the sloop Washington, Captain Robert Gray, as a tender, to the northwest coast of the continent to trade for furs.

The Columbia was a ship of 240 tons' burden. She could just carry the cargo of an Erie canal boat of the size in use in 1909. The expedition was fitted out by Joseph Barrell and four others. It sailed on October 1, 1787, and arrived at Nootka Sound in September, 1788. On July 3, 1789, Captain Gray sailed for home in the Columbia; and, returning by the way of China and the Cape of Good Hope, was the first to sail around the world under the American flag. The work done by these two captains is chiefly of interest here, however, because of the discoveries made on the coast and of the use the nation made of the discoveries later. For the Strait of Juan de Fuca and adjoining waters were thoroughly explored, the Columbia River was discovered, and its navigable waters were explored. Land was purchased of the Indians, forts were built, and a vessel called the Adventurer (of 40 tons' burden) was launched. The claim thus established by American citizens was used with effect, when it had been made good by subsequent occupation of the land, in settling the boundary between the United States and the British possessions to the north thereof.

The trade on the northwest coast was continued by Boston people with varying results until after the War of 1812, and many interesting stories have been related by those engaged in it. John Ledyard, the American traveller, was first to suggest engaging in it. He was with Captain Cook, when that celebrated explorer was on the northwest coast, and learned that the sea-otter skins, which the Indians had in abundance, could be sold for $120 each in China. On returning home, he almost succeeded in getting Robert Morris to enter the trade, but nothing was done in it until the Columbia sailed.

The voyage of the Columbia did not pay her owners, but those who followed her often made large profits. Perhaps the most interesting venture was one made by William Sturgis. While trading with the Indians (blankets, cutlery, firearms, molasses, and trinkets were then in demand), he learned that the Indians used the skin of the ermine in its winter coat as a currency, and that it was highly valued. Accordingly, Sturgis sent home a fine specimen of the ermine skin, and ordered as many as could be obtained. His correspondent secured 5000 at the Leipsic fair, and on the next voyage Sturgis carried them to the coast, where he traded five, which had been purchased for thirty cents each, for a sea-otter skin. He thus obtained a thousand sea-otter skins, which he sold in China for $50 each, or $50,000 for that part of the venture alone. Mr. Sturgis, in a lecture delivered in Boston, on January 21, 1846, said that he had known of a capital of $40,000 yielding a return of $150,000 in that trade, and in one voyage "an outfit not exceeding $50,000 gave a gross return of $284,000."

In the meantime Captain Derby's young supercargo on the Astræ, Thomas H. Perkins, had established a trading house in Canton. He entered the northwest coast trade with success, and in the course of twenty-two years his ships made thirty round-the-world voyages from Boston, by the way of the Horn, the northwest coast, Canton, and the Cape of Good Hope. It is an interesting fact that in the years immediately following the War of 1812 "all the supplies for the British [fur-buying] establishments, west of the Rocky Mountains, were brought from London to Boston, and carried thence to the mouth of the Columbia in American ships; and all their collections of furs were sent to Canton consigned to an American house, and the proceeds shipped to England or the United States in the same vessels." (Hunt's Magazine, XIV, 538.)

In connection with the stories that have been told of these voyages to the Far East, consider the following facts in the biography of Captain Nathaniel Silsbee:—

"Among the officers who rose most rapidly to distinction in the service of Mr. Derby, none is more prominent than the Hon. Nathaniel Silsbee, late Senator from Massachusetts. His father had enjoyed the entire confidence of Mr. Derby, and after his death Mr. Derby transferred that confidence to his son.

"In 1790 he appears as the mate and captain's clerk of a small vessel bound to Madeira. In 1792 [when but nineteen years old] he is master of a sloop in the trade to the West Indies, which Mr. Derby impowers him to sell for $350. In 1793, at the early age of twenty years, he is on a voyage to the Isle of France in command of the new ship Benjamin, of 142 tons. From the Isle of France he proceeds to the Cape of Good Hope, returns to the Isle of France, and brings his ship home with large profits.

"In 1796 Mr. Derby dispatches him in the ship Benjamin to Amsterdam and thence to the Isle of France, with a credit of $10,000 for his own private adventure. After selling his ship and cargo at a great profit he purchases a new ship of 450 tons for his owner and returns to Salem with a full cargo of East India goods for his owner, and such favorable results for himself as to enable him to commence business on his own account, in which he soon achieved fortune."

When Silsbee, at the age of twenty, was master of the Benjamin, on the way to the Isle of France, his first mate, Charles Derby, was nineteen years old, and his second mate, Richard J. Cleveland, was only eighteen. In 1799 this Cleveland made a voyage in a fifty-foot sloop from Canton to the northwest coast of America, and, though hampered by a mutinous crew, he secured there a cargo of furs which sold, on his return to Canton, for $60,000. The outfit had cost him $9000.

Although all ships of the day were, by modern standards, dangerous in size and rig; though scurvy was the plague of crews in long voyages; though vast breadths of the sea had never been explored, and the wild coasts visited had never been charted; although the first voyages were made when the American people were financially prostrate and the symbol of the American government was utterly powerless, not only in home affairs but in the face of the open and covert enmity of the leading commercial nations of the world,—in spite of all this, the American ship-owners reached out for the commerce of all the earth, and young men having ambition and ability worked their way to the command of ships before they were old enough to vote.

The picture of one of those boyish sea-captains flinging the Stars and Stripes to the breeze on the far side of the earth portrays, better than anything ever said, written, or done, the spirit of America.

CHAPTER VII
FRENCH AND OTHER SPOLIATIONS

ON July 25, 1785, while the schooner Maria, Captain Isaac Stevens, of Boston, was sailing past Cape St. Vincent, on the southwest corner of Spain, she was captured by an armed ship from Algiers, and carried to that port. Five days later the ship Dauphin, Captain Richard O'Brien, of Philadelphia, when fifty leagues west of Lisbon, suffered a similar fate. These vessels with their cargoes were confiscated, and the crews, numbering twenty-one men all told, were sold into slavery.

In connection with these facts consider a quotation from Lord Sheffield's Observations on the Commerce of the United States, published in 1784;—

"It is not probable that the American States will have a very free trade in the Mediterranean; it will not be the interest of any of the great maritime powers to protect them from the Barbary states. They cannot protect themselves from the latter; they cannot pretend to a navy."

It will now be instructive to recall a letter written by Edward Church, American consul at Lisbon, on October 12, 1793, in regard to the Algerine pirates. Portugal had been protecting her trade from the Algerines by means of war-ships, and had incidentally afforded convoy to such American merchantmen as needed it in those waters. Having learned that a number of Algerine corsairs had gone cruising in the Atlantic, Consul Church went to the Portuguese Minister of Foreign Affairs to learn why the Portuguese war-ships had allowed them to leave the Mediterranean. The minister replied that Charles Logie, British consul at Algiers, acting under orders from the British government, had concluded a treaty of peace between Algiers and Portugal. Portugal, he said, had not authorized such a treaty, nor had she been consulted as to the terms. The British government had guaranteed the execution of the treaty, and the payment of the tribute that it called for, however, and with the British to aid them the pirates had gone forth to prey on commerce. Church, with more attention to accuracy than diplomatic language, termed the arrangement thus made a "hellish conspiracy" against American shipping.

A brief account of the Algerine pirates will now prove interesting. For time out of mind the people of the north coast of Africa lived by piracy, but it was not until the seafaring outlaws of Europe taught them to build and handle large ships that they became really menacing to commerce. While the English were fighting the Dutch in the middle of the seventeenth century, they were obliged to send Blake with twenty-five well-armed ships to overawe these pirates. In 1672 another squadron was sent for the same purpose. These two squadrons proved that it was easy and inexpensive to crush the power of the pirates; but instead of continuing to use their navy to protect their merchantmen, the British made no further attacks upon the pirates until 1816. Indeed, instead of crushing their power, the British government adopted the policy of adding to their means of destroying commerce. And in this policy several European powers soon joined.

Secretary of State Jefferson, in a report on "Mediterranean Trade," dated December 30, 1790, said that Spain paid "from three to five million dollars to Algiers" in one lump to induce the Dey to make "peace." France in 1788 had paid an unknown sum in hand, and had since paid an annual subsidy of $100,000 for immunity from attack. Great Britain paid an annual subsidy of 60,000 guineas to the four Barbary powers. Portugal alone of the European maritime powers used her fleet to protect her trade. In addition to the regular subsidies, the powers named made presents to the Barbary chiefs, and these presents included usually, if not always, armed ships and other war material.

The reason for paying subsidies instead of fighting is most interesting. It was done to encourage the pirates to ravage the shipping belonging to the rivals of the subsidy payers.

In 1793 England was at war with France. America was the leading neutral maritime nation. The British statesmen saw that the American shipping would secure much of the trade in the Mediterranean which English ships had been doing, unless checked promptly by some extraordinary means, and it was to administer this check that the pirates were loosed upon the Atlantic.

The injury done to our shipping in the raid mentioned above was insignificant, save only as the story gives emphasis to the other facts given—facts which show the state of civilization among the most enlightened nations of Europe. The state of American civilization, at the time, is shown by the treaty made with the pirates, under which we agreed to pay them tribute; for it was tribute and not subsidy as in our case. We paid it in war material, too, as shown by the following extract from the Life of General William Eaton, who, in 1798, was American consul at Tunis:—

"On the 22d of December Mr. Eaton ... went on board the U. S. brig Sophia, Capt. Henry Geddes, commander, bound to Algiers; in company with the Hero, a ship of 350 tons burden, loaded with naval stores for the Dey of Algiers; the Hassan Bashaw, an armed brig of 275 tons, mounting eight 6-pounders, destined to Algiers; the Skjoldabrand, a schooner of 250 tons, 16 double fortified 4-pounders, destined to Algiers; and the La Eisha, of 150 tons, 14 4-pounders, also destined to Algiers. All these vessels excepting the Sophia were to be delivered to the Dey of Algiers, for arrearages of stipulation and present dues."

With these facts in mind we shall be able to comprehend why American shipping was subjected to ruthless spoliations during the entire period between the end of the War of the Revolution and our second war for liberty, which we began in 1812. The sole criterion of right in international affairs was might.

"I avoid troubling you with the afflicting recital of the violences committed on those different occasions, and which were so much the less excusable inasmuch as they took place after the prizes were taken possession of, and when no resistence was met with."

On May 9, 1793, the French government authorized the seizure of "all neutral vessels which shall be laden wholly or in part" with food products and "destined for an enemy's port."

The decree was contrary to the treaties made between France and the United States in 1778, but it was confirmed on the 27th of July.

This decree was avowedly made because food was scarce in France and because England was trying to starve the French into submission by stopping all food-laden ships bound for France. In the French view it was justified as a measure of necessity.

On July 2, 1796, however, it was decreed that "the flag of the French Republic will treat neutral vessels either as to confiscation, as to searches or capture in the same manner as they shall suffer the English to treat them."

In the meantime the United States had made, under duress, a treaty with England (Jay's, 1794), which gave the English advantages of which the French, though by treaty our allies, were deprived; and this treaty was ratified in spite of the fact that the British aggressions had exceeded the French not only in extent, but in their aggravating character. Moreover, this treaty was not promulgated until May 9, 1796, and France justly complained of the concealment as disingenuous. It was partly because of the resentment thus created that the decree of July 2, 1796 was made, and it was wholly because of resentment that, on March 2, 1797, a decree was issued declaring that "every American vessel shall be a good prize which has not on board a list of the crew in proper form, such as is presented by the model annexed to the treaty of the 6th February, 1778."

No American vessel had carried this rôle d'equipage since the end of the War of the Revolution; the decree was passed with the intention of driving all American ships from the sea. Then, as a final thrust at America, it was decreed that, October 29, 1799, American sailors found serving on the ships of enemies should be treated as pirates, and that they should not be allowed to plead in extenuation that they had been impressed.

The following stories of French aggressions illustrate well the usual course of life at sea in American ships during the period under consideration:—

In 1796 the French privateer Flying Fish came to Philadelphia, purchased supplies, and made repairs. In the meantime her captain, aided by the French consul, obtained information about all the ships then loading with valuable cargoes for foreign ports. With these facts in hand the captain then went to the Capes of the Delaware, waited until one of the most valuable of the American ships passed out to sea, and then captured her and turned her crew adrift in a small boat.

In the same year, while the American ship Hare was lying in London, with a valuable cargo on board, her captain went to Paris and arranged with the French Minister of Marine to bring her into French waters and have her condemned as a prize to him as captor. And this bargain was carried out.

Some Philadelphia merchants fitted out a vessel named Les Jumeaux as a French privateer. When going to sea she drove off a revenue cutter that tried to stop her, and she finally made a prize of a vessel belonging to neighbors of her owner.

The brigantine Patty, Captain Josiah Hempsted, belonging to Justus Riley, of Wethersfield, Connecticut, was captured while on her way to St. Bartholomew, on July 31, 1796. When Captain Hempsted appeared before the "special agent" (a sort of governor and judge in admiralty) ruling at Guadaloupe, that official shook his fist under the captain's nose, and said:—

"I have confiscated your vessel and cargo, you damned rascal."

The French frigate Thetis, having captured the brigantine Eliza, of New York, a seaman named Henry Doughty, a native-born citizen of Boston, was placed with a number of English sailors who had been captured, and was then delivered to the British in exchange for French sailors. Using American sailors in effecting exchanges became a common practice with the French naval commanders.

The crews of American vessels taken to the West Indies were commonly turned ashore without clothing (except what they were wearing), or food, or means of procuring either. On November 10, 1797, seven captured American vessels were lying at Petit Guave, three-fourths of the crews of which had died because of the hardships they had suffered when thus turned ashore. In some cases the crews were imprisoned. Captain Breard, of the schooner Zephyr, of Portsmouth, who ventured to go on board the privateer that had captured him and there beg for a little of the food of which he had been robbed, was thrown over the rail. Captain Codwise, of the brig Glasgow, was thrown into prison at Leogane and kept for thirty-six hours without food.

A more cheerful picture of the life at sea in American ships at that time is found in a letter (written in 1799) from Captain Elias Hasket Derby, Jr., to his father. The young man was in command of the Salem ship Mount Vernon, and he had arrived at Gibraltar after a passage of seventeen and a half days.

"The first of our passage was quite agreeable; the latter, light winds, calm, and Frenchmen constantly in sight for the last four days. The first Frenchmen we saw was off Tercira—a lugger to the southward. Being uncertain of his force we stood by him to leeward on our course and soon left him. July 28th, in the afternoon, we found ourselves approaching a fleet of upwards of fifty sail, steering nearly N. E. We run directly for their center; at 4 o'clock found ourselves in their half-moon; concluding it impossible that it could be any other than the English fleet, continued our course for their center to avoid any apprehension of a want of confidence in them. They soon dispatched an 18-gun ship from their center, and two frigates, one from their van and another from their rear, to beat towards us—we being to windward. On approaching the center ship under easy sail I fortunately bethought myself that it would be but common prudence to steer so far to windward of him as to be a grapeshot's distance from him, to observe his force and maneuvering. When we were abreast of him he fired a gun to leeward and hoisted English colors. We immediately bore away and meant to pass under his quarter, between him and the fleet showing our American colors. This movement disconcerted him, and it appeared to me he either conceived we were either an American sloop of war, or an English one in disguise, attempting to cut him off from the fleet; for while we were in the act of wearing on his beam he hoisted French colors and gave us a broadside. We immediately brought our ship to the wind, and stood on about a mile—wore towards the center of the fleet—hove about and crossed him on the other tack, about half grapeshot distance, and received his broadside; several shot fell on board of us without much damage. All hands were active in clearing ship for action, for our surprise had been complete. In about ten minutes we began firing our stern chasers and in a quarter of an hour gave him our broadside in such style as evidently sickened him, for he immediately luffed in the wind, gave us his broadside, went in stays in great confusion, wore ship afterwards in a large circle, and renewed the chase at a mile and a half distance—a maneuver calculated to keep up appearances with the fleet and escape our shot.

"At midnight we had distanced them; the chasing rocket signals being almost out of sight. We have been in constant brushes ever since. The day after we left the fleet we were chased till night by two frigates, whom we lost sight of when it was dark. The next morning off Cape St. Vincent, were chased by a French lateen-rigged vessel, apparently 10 or 12 guns, one of them an 18-pounder. We brought to for him, [but] his metal was too heavy for ours, and his position to windward.... [As] it was not in my power to cut him off we of course bore away and saluted him with our long nines. He continued his chase till dark, and when we were nearly by Cadiz, at sunset, he made a signal to a consort whom we had just discovered ahead. Having a strong breeze I was determined to pass my stern over him if he did not make way for me. He thought prudent to do so. At midnight we made the lights in Cadiz city, but found no English fleet. After lying to till daylight concluded that the French must have gained the ascendancy in Cadiz and thought prudent to proceed to this place, where we arrived at 12 o'clock, popping at Frenchmen all the forenoon. At 10 a.m., off Algesiras Point, were seriously attacked by a large lateener who had on board more than 100 men. He came so near our broadside as to allow our 6-pound grape to do execution handsomely. We then bore away and gave him our stern guns in a cool and deliberate manner, doing apparently great execution. Our bars having cut his sails considerably, he was thrown into confusion, struck both his ensign and his pennant. I was then puzzled to know what to do with so many men. Our ship was running large, with all her steering sails out, so that we could not immediately bring her to the wind; and we were immediately off Algesiras Point, from which I had reason to fear she might receive assistance, and my port, (Gibraltar) in full view. These circumstances induced me to give up the gratification of bringing him in. It was, however, a satisfaction to flog the rascal in full view of the English fleet who were to leeward. The risk of sending here is great indeed for any ship short of our force in men and guns—but particularly [when short of] heavy guns. Two nines are better than six or eight sixes, and two long twelves do better than twenty sixes.... I have now, while writing to you, two of our countrymen in full view who are prizes to these villains. Lord St. Vincent, in a 50-gun ship, is in the act of retaking one of them. The other goes into Algesiras without molestation."

Spain took scores of American ships, and when the French privateers carried an American ship into a Spanish port, the Spanish officials invariably assisted in the robbery. The other nations robbed in proportion to their power and opportunity. The third volume of our Foreign Relations contains a list of fifty-one American ships that were carried into the ports of Denmark and Sweden. The French aggressors were inspired primarily, as said, by indignation; the English were acting in defence of their maritime supremacy, as shall appear further on, but these smaller powers of Europe were animated by no other motive than that of the Algerine pirates.

As to the total of the damages suffered from the French republicans, it must be said that no complete calculation was ever made. But documents written under oath show that more than 600 ships were despoiled before the year 1800, and that losses amounting to more than $20,000,000 were sustained. These losses included ships and cargoes only; incidental losses due to the conditions at sea could not be measured.

Though really a part of our naval history, perhaps it may be worth adding that when, at last, our naval ships, though few in numbers and small in size, were ordered to sea to protect our trade, no more than three or four well-fought actions were needed to bring the French Republic spoliations to an end. It was, and, unhappily, it is yet, in human nature to despise any appeal to altruistic notions of right in an effort to secure justice, but all accord hearty respect to him who is able and willing to fight for his rights. We were amused by the antics of the Japanese as a nation of artists; we took off our hats and stood erect with our heels together in the presence of the heroes of the Battle of the Yellow Sea.

CHAPTER VIII
THE BRITISH AGGRESSIONS

BEFORE considering the aggressions of the British government upon our shipping during the period between the Revolution and the War of 1812, it seems still more necessary than it was in the case of the French to try to get the point of view of the aggressor. The men who governed England were placed in power not only to guard but to promote English interests against those of all other nations. Patriotism and natural ambition inspired them to do this as fully as possible. The welfare of the nation being in their charge, it was their duty to consider first of all entire safety from invasion, as everybody believed then, and believes now, that safety depended upon the supremacy of the nation upon the high seas. To maintain that supremacy every Briton felt obliged to make every needed sacrifice. Small wonder, then, that in maintaining that supremacy the rulers of England should have felt obliged to hamper all possible rivals for that supremacy. The state of public mind at the end of a century wherein England had been at war four years for every three of peace demanded that the British supremacy at sea be maintained at any cost; and the morality of the world has not even yet reached a condition where an English patriot can feel sentiments differing greatly from those of the end of the eighteenth century.

At the beginning of the twentieth century, civilized nations acknowledge certain rules of national conduct called international law, but at the end of the eighteenth nothing of the kind had any real weight in regulating international affairs. Men quoted Vattel in their correspondence, but the one recognized rule contained three words only, "Might makes right." Practical, not altruistic, considerations controlled all negotiations, and no nation had, or could expect to maintain, any "right" which it was unwilling to support by force. It was the duty of neutral powers to build ships of the line, or meekly suffer the consequences. The facts of history support no statement more fully than this, that American shipping suffered from spoliations, between 1783 and 1812, solely because they begged, instead of fighting, for that freedom of the sea which they claimed as a natural right.

As an introduction to the story of the British aggressions, here are a few extracts from letters written by one Phineas Bond, a native-born American who served England as consul at Philadelphia, beginning in 1787. The letters were written either to the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, or to one of the under secretaries. (See An. Rep. Am. Hist. Asso., 1894.)

On February 21, 1787, in referring to an act of Parliament relating to the registry of English ships, Bond said that "if properly pointed it must inevitably cramp the remnant of commerce now enjoyed by this country." He is confident that the "alarm and perplexity" which the act occasioned in America, prove that it will be beneficial to British shipping.

On May 17 Bond said that the American ships from China were bringing home more goods than the country could use, and that the surplus was shipped to Europe, where it would undersell the goods of the British East India Company. By the use of bribes (he speaks plainly of bribing officials), he obtained copies of the manifests of all American ships from China, and forwarded them to England. Then on July 2 he wrote:—

"This country is so restricted by the regulations of trade of other nations ... and so weak are the resources of the merchants here, that if an early check or restraint can be thrown in their way, either by thwarting their credit or by withholding the articles suitable to their commerce, they would never rally; and then, my Lord, they would be confined to their coasting trade and to illicit communication with the Spaniards: These come in a secret manner into the ports of America and bring specie to a large amount ... the amount of specie is enormous ... at least 500,000 dollars were brought into this port last year." To take away this trade with the Spaniards Bond advised the "establishing of a free port in the Bahamas ... from which the Spaniards could draw the supplies they want."

In a letter dated September 29 Bond took a look ahead: "The rumor of war has inspired the Americans with new spirits: they anticipate the benefits of a free trade, and already calculate upon the profits of being the carriers to all the belligerent powers."

In a letter dated November 20 Bond tells "of two persons, natives of England who with great resolution and no small personal risque purchased here and reshipped to Liverpool three machines for spinning cotton and a machine for carding cotton for spinning." The machines had been brought from Liverpool "clandestinely ... packed in queensware crates." They were bought by the "natives of England" and reshipped to Liverpool in order to hinder the establishment of a cotton-spinning industry in the United States.

Bond said he did not "apprehend" that any such factories would be "speedily brought to a state of Rivalship with those of Gt. Britain," but it was "fit to guard against an evil which tho' at present in its infancy," might grow in time.

In several letters Bond urged that restrictions be placed upon passenger-carrying ships leaving England for the United States, "Under color of a humane provision for the comfort of" emigrants, in order to stop or at least "discourage" all emigrants, and especially mechanics, likely to be of value in developing the industries of the United States.

Of especial interest is the warning which Bond sent when he learned that the British government considered the propriety of admitting American vessels of limited size, (seventy tons was offered later), into the trade of the British West Indies. He said:—

"Any indulgence of this sort would certainly divert the trade out of its present channel—the people of New England are an enterprising people, the number of their ports and the locality of their situation favor the increase of seamen. They navigate their vessels frugally and their outfits are infinitely less expensive than the outfits of Brit. vessels. When once admitted to trade with the W. India Islands, ship building which has lain dormant, almost, and which was formerly a source of great profit to this country, would instantly be revived—America would soon monopolize the advantages of carrying; limited as to size the numbers of her vessels would be increased, and by increasing the numbers would supply the means of conveying all the produce of America which is consumed in our islands, and that, too, at a much cheaper rate than any other nation could afford. But the enterprising spirit of the people of New England would, as soon as they found the channels of profit open, be exerted to the raising a maritime force which in case of future war might operate very detrimentally to the interests of England."

That Bond was encouraged in this kind of work appears from the fact that he was promoted later. There was no detail of American business too small to escape the careful attention of the British government in its efforts to throw what Bond called an "early check or restraint" upon all American progress, and especially upon the prosperity of American shipping.

A comparison, briefly made, of the laws and regulations of England and the United States follows:—

The British prohibited American vessels from entering the ports of their West India Islands, Canada, and other American possessions, and their East India spice market. We admitted British vessels into all our ports on payment of a tonnage tax of fifty cents per ton (our ships paid six cents per ton), and goods brought in British ships paid a revenue duty of 10 per cent more than goods in ours.

In the treaty made in 1794 the British offered to let our vessels of no more than seventy tons enter their West Indies on condition that we would admit British ships of any size on payment of the same tax and duty as our own.

The British imposed double lighthouse taxes on American vessels bound to any port in England except London. We imposed no extra lighthouse dues.

British merchants were prohibited from using American-built vessels in a number of trades. We allowed our merchants to use British-built vessels in any trade on payment of the extra dues mentioned above.

The British prohibited the importation of goods by American vessels from every country except the United States. We permitted the British vessels to bring us goods from all countries.

The British prohibited the importation of some of our agricultural products during specified periods of time, and of some at all times. We admitted the importation of all British agricultural products at all times.

An American citizen was not allowed to import some goods into some ports of the British domain, even in British ships. In other ports an extra tax was laid on the American. We permitted the British citizen to import all goods into all our ports, and we laid no extra tax upon him.

The British prohibited the consumption of certain American articles the importation of which they permitted. We did not prohibit the consumption of any British article.

The British prohibited the importation of American goods from all countries except the United States. We permitted the importation of British goods from all countries.

Consul Bond, in a letter (April 19, 1789), to Lord Carmarthen, berated Mr. Madison because "he by no means adverts to that important consideration, that so great indulgence has been granted by Gt. Britain to the United States."

Omitting for want of space any account of many previous attacks upon American shipping, it may be said that the first made in connection with the war upon the French Republic was the order to British warships on June 8, 1793, to "detain all vessels laden wholly or in part with corn, flour or meal" bound to any French port. It was provided that each ship so captured should be restored, but the cargo was to be confiscated for the account of the British government, which was to pay for it the invoice cost with 10 per cent added. This order was issued ostensibly to starve the French republicans into submission to the old monarchy, but it was well known that no such result could follow because France had never depended upon the United States for any part of its bread worth mention. Thus, in 1792, when we exported 546,913 bushels of wheat to Great Britain and her possessions, France took only 54 bushels. The order, therefore, had some other object in view, and the brief story of the ship Neptune, Captain Jeffries, is instructive at this point. When the Neptune was captured under this order, she was restored as soon as convenient to do so, and an order was issued for the payment of the invoice price of her cargo with 10 per cent added. The addition of 10 per cent for profit seemed at first glance to be an effort to act with some degree of fairness, but as a matter of fact the owners were deliberately robbed; the market price of wheat in England, at that time, was very much higher than the invoice price with 10 per cent added, and Captain Jeffries pleaded for permission, not to go on to the port for which he had been sailing (where the price was still higher), but for permission to sell the grain to merchants there in London, who were anxious to give the market price; but the government insisted on taking it at the mere advance of 10 per cent.

We may suppose that Captain Jeffries's failure to be satisfied with a profit of 10 per cent was considered a plain illustration of American avarice.

On November 6, 1793, British cruisers were ordered to capture all neutral ships laden with the produce of the French West Indies. American ships were carrying immense quantities of those goods, and all the larger because they were excluded from the British West Indies. To make certain of a clean sweep of these American ships, the order in council was kept secret for several weeks in order to give the British cruisers time enough to get on the ground and take everything unawares. (H. Adams, II, 322.)

On January 8, 1794, this order was changed so as to permit American ships to carry the French colonial produce to American ports, but the direct trade to Europe was still forbidden. In the meantime more than 200 American vessels had been captured and confiscated under the original order.

While American ships were forbidden to carry French colonial goods from the colonies direct to France, they were, as said, yet allowed to carry the produce to the United States and then reëxport it to Europe, provided it was entered in the American port, landed, and all duties, etc., paid before the voyage was continued. In the case of the Polly, decided April 29, 1800, Sir William Scott (Lord Stowell), confirmed this right of American ships, and the American minister "succeeded in obtaining from Pitt an express acceptance of this rule." One may note that this concession was obtained immediately after our warships had been sent to protect our merchantmen from the aggressions of the French; the guns of the Constellation had been heard in London, so to speak.

When, on April 29, 1803, England declared war upon Napoleon, however, a new administration had been inaugurated in the United States, and all Europe knew that no use would be made of such American war-ships as remained in commission. Accordingly, as a first measure to hamper the American ships in their effort to become carriers for the beleaguered French, two British frigates were sent to Sandy Hook to detain and search all ships for property belonging to the French. American waters were occupied for the purpose of hampering American trade. In the course of the blockade thus established, a British gunner, just for a joke, fired a shot at a coaster, aiming so as to frighten the crew. The man at the coaster's helm was killed.

This invasion of American waters was a fair notice of the British determination to compel the United States to abide by all English laws and orders in council made for the protection of British shipping. By refusing to declare war, the American administration justified the aggressors.

Then the British government, still further to promote British trade and shipping, adopted Phineas Bond's advice, and established free ports in the West Indies, to which small unarmed traders from the colonies of the enemy were invited to come and buy British goods. These free ports were supplied by British ships under convoy.

In the meantime preparations were made to deprive the Americans of the indirect trade from the French colonies by way of the United States to Europe. On July 23, 1805, Sir William Scott, reversing his decision in the case of the Polly, decided that a ship called the Essex was a good prize, although in a voyage from Bordeaux she had called at Salem, discharged cargo, made repairs, and reloaded before heading away for a West India port.

The all-influential British navy had joined in with the British ship-owner to demand that the American ships should be excluded from all trade between the colonies of the enemy and Europe. The ship-owners demanded it because the American ship, in spite of the great expense of the indirect voyage, was yet able to take the trade from the British, even though they were supported by free ports and other aids. The demand made by or for the British naval officers was unique. When voiced by one James Stephens (War in Disguise; or the Frauds of the Neutral Flags), he pictured a British admiral grown old and full of honors in the service, who, in spite of his honors, had been unable "to wrest [from the enemy] the means of comfortably sustaining those honors." As long as American ships were allowed to engage in the indirect trade, the naval officer would have to "look in vain for any subject of safe and uncontested capture." If American ships were excluded, they would still take chances, and they would then be captured without danger and condemned without contest.

Mere mention need be made of the British practice of taking American sailors from American ships and compelling them to serve in British war-ships. Many American merchantmen were left short-handed upon the high seas, and there is no doubt that some of them were, for this reason, lost with all hands. The practice was maintained as one method of depressing our navigation, but the subject seems to belong to our naval histories.

Brief space will serve for a consideration of the various orders in council and paper blockades issued and laid in 1806 and 1807. In May, 1806, the British declared that the European coast "from the river Elbe to the port of Brest inclusive ... must be considered as blockaded." No blockading fleet was maintained. In reply to this Napoleon issued his Berlin decree declaring the British islands "in a state of blockade," and that "all commerce and correspondence with the British Islands is prohibited."

The French navy was unable to go to sea; Napoleon had only a few privateers with which to enforce his decree, but the British used it as an excuse for the order in council of January 7, 1807, by which no vessel was "permitted to trade from one port to another both which ports shall" be so far under the control of the enemy "that British vessels may not trade freely thereat."

"If we may not no one else shall." The chief influence of this order upon American vessels was to interdict their trade as coasters in Europe, and to prevent their seeking a cargo in another port when they failed to find one in the first port entered.

The order in council of November 11, 1807, was issued partly because, as it stated, that the one of January 7 had failed to induce Napoleon to withdraw his Berlin decree, and because no neutral power had declared war upon him because of that failure. The chief reason for issuing it however (and this was also plainly declared), was "for supporting that maritime power which the exertions and valor of his [the British king's] people have, under the blessing of Providence enabled him to establish and maintain." To this end all the ports from which "the British flag is excluded" were declared in a state of blockade. "Maritime power" meant "merchant marine."

The principal ports of the world to which American vessels had been accustomed to trade, having thus been closed with a paper blockade, they were all reopened again on condition that the trade to them be carried on by way of England. On the 25th of the month it was further provided that the ships thus trading by way of England were to land their cargoes in the English port visited.

This placed the ships of the United States in the condition endured by American vessels in colonial days when goods purchased in Europe had to be carried to an English port and "laid on shore" before they were taken to America. Some writers have supposed that this was done as a step toward returning the United States once more to the position of colonies. The fact is that the rulers of England had found that they could not exclude American ships altogether from the sea, and they had determined, therefore, to make them serve British interests as far as possible—first by carrying British goods to the ports from which British ships were excluded, and second, by making them pay a tribute by landing their cargoes in English ports. Practically the United States was thus made a vassal of England.

In reply to this order Napoleon decreed that any ship that should in any way submit to or take advantage of it should be good prize.

The dates of the several orders in council and decrees are of some interest because these show that the British began the series by the paper blockade from the Elbe to Brest. But the chief interest is in the fact that the orders were all issued for the benefit of British trade. The talk found in various histories about "retaliation" and England's "death struggle with tyranny" was all sham. Said Spencer Percival, in a frank speech in Parliament, (March 3, 1812):—

"The object of the orders in council was not to destroy the trade of the continent but to force the continent to trade with us."

"I am of the opinion," said Lord Hawkesbury, "that some decisive measure in support of our own commerce ... is become indispensable, not merely as a measure of commercial policy, but in order to put the contest in which we are engaged upon its true grounds." (Quoted by H. Adams, IV, 90.)

But while England strove by every means to preserve her trade and shipping at the expense of her American rival, and Napoleon, with motives no higher than those of a highwayman, confiscated American ships and cargoes to the value of $10,000,000, the American merchant marine prospered.

On December 31, 1789, ships of an aggregate capacity of 123,893 tons were registered under the American flag for foreign trade. In 1792 the tonnage registered was 411,438. In 1793, the first year of extensive spoliations, the tonnage was reduced to 367,734, but thereafter, in spite of the fact that Americans were obliged to fight their way through swarming enemies, our shipping grew until in 1800 we made boast of the possession of 667,107 tons in the foreign trade. Further than that, British shipping aggregating 115,000 tons entered and cleared out of American ports in 1790, but in 1800, only 40,000 tons. From 1790 to 1792 the American tonnage that entered and cleared averaged 54,000 tons a year; in 1800 the tonnage that entered and cleared was 236,000.

Even when the stupidity of the administration added the embargo to all other ills afflicting our shipping, its vigor was not destroyed. The registered tonnage fell from 840,163 in 1807 to 765,252 in 1808 under the embargo, but after the embargo was removed (March 1, 1809), the figures grew within the year to 906,855, and in 1810 we had 981,019 tons registered for foreign trade. Moreover, 127,000 tons of new ships were built during that year, and in that year, too, our ships carried 91.5 per cent of all American imports and exports.

The reasons for this prosperity are readily found. American enterprise was, in those days, irrepressible. When Salem merchants heard that dried sea slugs (bêche de mer) were highly prized as food in China, and that the waters of the Fiji Islands swarmed with the worms, they despatched the bark Active (July 26, 1811), under Captain William P. Richardson, to collect and dry enough of the slugs to freight the ship for the Canton market. A more remarkable illustration of the enterprise of the day is found, perhaps, in the fact that when a colony of New Englanders settled at Marietta, Ohio (Captain Abraham Whipple was of the number), they began to build ships there for the deep-water trade. The brig St. Clair, of 110 tons, was launched in 1800. In 1801 a ship of 230 tons and a brig of 126 were built. Three ships of 300 or more tons were completed in 1806 besides a number of smaller ones. A similar record was made the next year. The largest ship built there was the Francis, of 350 tons, built by Whitney for B. J. Gilman. She was of the largest size of her day. In all, seven ships, eleven brigs, six schooners, and two gunboats (for the navy), were built at Marietta before the War of 1812. Imagine a full-rigged ship, with all sails set, plunging down over the Falls of the Ohio!

To enterprise was added unequalled opportunity. The wars of Europe drove the ships of European nations from the sea, save only as voyages were made under convoy. The Americans took the risks because the pay was adequate. Captain George Coggeshall, in American Privateers (p. 200), says he received $45 per ton freight from Bordeaux to Boston. In the voyage of Captain Elias Hasket Derby, described in the last chapter, his cargo carried to Gibraltar cost him $43,275. The net profit made upon it was more than $100,000.

How the perils of trade affected the quality of American ships, especially their speed, must have mention. Hundreds of our vessels were captured by the enemy, but many more were chased in vain. It was at this time that the Baltimore clippers gained world-wide fame. The narrow and shoal waters of the Chesapeake had compelled Baltimore designers to make shallow models that could beat to windward swiftly in all winds. The peculiarity of these vessels was the great breadth of beam and a consequent ability to carry large areas of sail. No models equalled those of Baltimore, and when speed was the price of safety at sea, the Baltimore model was copied everywhere in America.