The memorial of Caln Quarterly Meeting of the Religious Society of Friends, commonly called Quakers, respectfully represents: That, having long felt deep sympathy with that portion of the inhabitants of these United States which is held in bondage, and having no doubt that the happiness and interests, moral and pecuniary, of both master and slave, and our whole community, would be greatly promoted if the inestimable right to liberty was extended equally to all, we contemplate with extreme regret that the District of Columbia, over which you possess entire control, is acknowledged to be one of the greatest marts for the traffic in the persons of human beings in the known world, notwithstanding the principles of the Constitution declare that all men have an unalienable right to the blessing of liberty.

We therefore earnestly desire that you will enact such laws as will secure the right of freedom to every human being residing within the constitutional jurisdiction of Congress, and prohibit every species of traffic in the persons of men, which is as inconsistent in principle, and inhuman in practice, as the foreign slave trade.

Signed by direction, and on behalf of the aforesaid quarterly meeting, held in Lancaster county, Pennsylvania, the 19th of 11 mo., 1835.

The yeas and nays were ordered on the question of rejection.

Mr. McKean moved to amend the motion by striking out all after the word “that”—(namely, the words “the prayer of the petition to be rejected,”) and inserting “it is inexpedient at this time to legislate on the subject of slavery in the District of Columbia.”

On this question the yeas and nays were ordered, on his motion.

The question being taken, it was decided as follows:

Yeas—Messrs. Hendricks, McKean—2.

Nays—Messrs. Benton, Black, Brown, Buchanan, Clay, Crittenden, Cuthbert, Davis, Ewing of Illinois, Ewing of Ohio, Goldsborough, Grundy, Hill, Hubbard, King of Alabama, King of Georgia, Knight, Leigh, Linn, Nicholas, Niles, Porter, Prentiss, Preston, Robbins, Robinson, Ruggles, Shepley, Swift, Tallmadge, Tipton, Tomlinson, Walker, Wall, Webster, White, Wright—37.

Mr. McKean moved to amend the motion by inserting between the first word “that” and the words “the prayer of the petition be rejected,” the words “inexpedient to legislate on the subject of slavery in the District of Columbia, and that.”

On this question he called for the yeas and nays, which were ordered.

The question was then taken, and decided as follows:

Yeas—Messrs. Ewing of Ohio, Hendricks, McKean—3.

Nays—Messrs. Benton, Black, Brown, Buchanan, Clay, Crittenden, Cuthbert, Davis, Ewing of Illinois, Goldsborough, Grundy, Hill, Hubbard, King of Alabama, King of Georgia, Knight, Leigh, Linn, Moore, Niles, Nicholas, Preston, Porter, Robbins, Robinson, Ruggles, Shepley, Swift, Tallmadge, Tipton, Tomlinson, Walker, Wall, Webster, White, Wright—36.

The question being on the original motion of Mr. Buchanan, “that the prayer of the petition be rejected”—

Mr. McKean said that, in offering the amendments which he had proposed, he had discharged his conscience of an imperative duty. It had pleased the Senate to reject these amendments, and, as he was thus deprived of the power of making the motion more palatable, all that he could now do was to vote for the proposition of his colleague.

Same day, after debate.—The question was then taken on the motion to reject the prayer of the petition, and decided as follows:

Yeas—Messrs. Benton, Black, Brown, Buchanan, Clay, Crittenden, Cuthbert, Ewing of Illinois, Ewing of Ohio, Goldsborough, Grundy, Hill, Hubbard, King of Alabama, King of Georgia, Leigh, Linn, McKean, Moore, Nicholas, Niles, Porter, Preston, Robbins, Robinson, Ruggles, Shepley, Tallmadge, Tipton, Tomlinson, Walker, Wall, White, Wright—34.

Nays—Messrs. Davis, Hendricks, Knight, Prentiss, Swift, Webster—6.

So the prayer of the petition was rejected.

On the 25th of April, Mr. Buchanan presented a petition from the Society of Friends, in Philadelphia, on which he said:

He rose to present the memorial of the Yearly Meeting of the religious Society of Friends, which had been recently held in the city of Philadelphia, remonstrating against the admission of Arkansas into the Union, whilst a provision remained in her constitution which admits of and may perpetuate slavery. This Yearly Meeting embraced within its jurisdiction the greater part of Pennsylvania and New Jersey, the whole of the State of Delaware, and the Eastern Shore of Maryland. The language of this memorial was perfectly respectful. Indeed, it could not be otherwise, considering the source from which it emanated. It breathed throughout the pure and Christian spirit which had always animated the Society of Friends; and although he did not concur with them in opinion, their memorial was entitled to be received with great respect.

When the highly respectable committee,^[54] which had charge of this memorial, called upon him this morning, and requested him to present it to the Senate, he had felt it to be his duty to inform them in what relation he stood to the question. He stated to them that he had been requested by the delegate from Arkansas to take charge of the application of that Territory to be admitted into the Union, and that he had cheerfully taken upon himself the performance of this duty. He also read to them the 8th section of the act of Congress of 6th March, 1820, containing the famous Missouri compromise; and informed them that the whole Territory of Arkansas was south of the parallel of 36 degrees and a half of north latitude; and that he regarded this compromise, considering the exciting and alarming circumstances under which it was made, and the dangers to the existence of the Union which it had removed, to be almost as sacred as a constitutional provision. That there might be no mistake on the subject, he had also informed them that in presenting their memorial he should feel it to be his duty to state these facts to the Senate. With this course on his part they were satisfied, and still continued their request that he might present the memorial. He now did so with great pleasure. He hoped it might be received by the Senate with all the respect it so highly deserved. He asked that it might be read; and as the question of the admission of Arkansas was no longer before us, he moved that it might be laid upon the table. The memorial was accordingly read, and was ordered to be laid upon the table.

The next time that the subject of slavery came before the Senate was in June, 1836. It then arose upon a bill which had been proposed in conformity with a special recommendation by President Jackson, in his annual message of December, 1835, to restrain the use of the mails for the circulation of incendiary publications. The bill contained the following provisions:

Be it enacted, &c., That it shall not be lawful for any deputy postmaster, in any State, Territory, or District of the United States, knowingly to deliver to any person whatever, any pamphlet, newspaper, handbill, or other printed paper or pictorial representation touching the subject of slavery, where, by the laws of the said State, Territory, or District, their circulation is prohibited; and any deputy postmaster who shall be guilty thereof, shall be forthwith removed from office.

Sec. 2. And be it further enacted, That nothing in the acts of Congress to establish and regulate the Post Office Department, shall be construed to protect any deputy postmaster, mail carrier, or other officer or agent of said department, who shall knowingly circulate in any State, Territory, or District, as aforesaid, any such pamphlet, newspaper, handbill, or other printed paper or pictorial representation, forbidden by the laws of such State, Territory, or District.

Sec. 3. And be it further enacted by the authority aforesaid, That the deputy postmasters of the offices where the pamphlets, newspapers, handbills, or other printed papers or pictorial representations aforesaid, may arrive for delivery, shall, under the instructions of the Postmaster General, from time to time give notice of the same, so that they may be withdrawn, by the person who deposited them originally to be mailed, and if the same shall not be withdrawn in one month thereafter, shall be burnt or otherwise destroyed.

This bill, on the 2d of June, 1836, was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, by the casting vote of Mr. Van Buren, the Vice-President. On the 8th of June the following debate and proceedings took place:

Mr. Webster addressed the Senate at length in opposition to the bill, commencing his argument against what he contended was its vagueness and obscurity in not sufficiently defining what were the publications, the circulation of which it intended to prohibit. The bill provided that it should not be lawful for any deputy postmaster, in any State, Territory, or District of the United States, knowingly to deliver to any person whatever, any pamphlet, newspaper, handbill, or other printed matter or pictorial representation, touching the subject of slavery, where by the laws of said State, District, or Territory, their circulation was prohibited. Under this provision Mr. W. contended that it was impossible to say what publications might not be prohibited from circulation. No matter what was the publication, whether for or against slavery—if it touched the subject in any shape or form, it would fall under the prohibition. Even the Constitution of the United States might be prohibited; and the person who was clothed with the power to judge in this delicate matter was one of the deputy postmasters who, notwithstanding the difficulties with which he was encompassed in coming to a correct decision must decide correctly, under pain of being removed from office. It would be necessary, also, he said, for the deputy postmasters referred to in this bill to make themselves acquainted with all the various laws passed by the States, touching this subject of slavery, and to decide them, no matter how variant they might be with each other. Mr. W. also contended that the bill conflicted with that provision in the Constitution which prohibited Congress from passing any law to abridge the freedom of speech or of the press. What was the liberty of the press? he asked. It was the liberty of printing as well as the liberty of publishing, in all the ordinary modes of publication; and was not the circulation of the papers through the mails an ordinary mode of publication? He was afraid that they were in some danger of taking a step in this matter, that they might hereafter have cause to regret, by its being contended that whatever in this bill applies to publications touching slavery, applies to other publications that the States might think proper to prohibit; and Congress might, under this example, be called upon to pass laws to suppress the circulation of political, religious, or any other description of publications, which produced excitement in the States. Was this bill in accordance with the general force and temper of the Constitution and its amendments? It was not in accordance with that provision of the instrument, under which the freedom of speech and of the press was secured. Whatever laws the State Legislatures might pass on the subject, Congress was restrained from legislating in any manner whatever, with regard to the press. It would be admitted, that if a newspaper came directed to him, he had a property in it; and how could any man, then, take that property and burn it without due form of law? and he did not know how this newspaper could be pronounced an unlawful publication and having no property in it, without a legal trial.

Mr. W. argued against the right to examine into the nature of publications sent to the post-office, and said that the right of an individual in his papers, was secured to him in every free country in the world. In England, it was expressly provided that the papers of the subject shall be free from all unreasonable searches and seizures—language, he said, to be found in our Constitution. This principle established in England, so essential to liberty, had been followed out in France, where the right of printing and publishing was secured in the fullest extent; the individual publishing being amenable to the laws for what he published; and every man printed and published what he pleased, at his peril. Mr. W. went on at some length to show that the bill was contrary to that provision of the Constitution, which prohibits Congress to pass any law abridging the freedom of speech or of the press.

Mr. Buchanan said, that as he had voted for the engrossment of this bill, and should vote for its final passage, he felt himself bound to defend and justify his vote against the argument of the Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. Webster). In doing so, he would imitate that Senator, if in no other respect, at least in being brief.

It is indispensable to the clear and distinct understanding of any argument, to know precisely what is the question under discussion. Without this knowledge, we cannot tell whether in any or what degree the argument is applicable to the subject. What, then, is the naked question now under discussion, stripped of all the mist which has been cast around it? This bill embraced but a single principle, though this principle was carried out through three sections. It provides that deputy postmasters, within the limits of such slaveholding States as have found it necessary for their own safety to pass laws making it penal to circulate inflammatory publications and pictorial representations calculated to excite the slaves to insurrection, shall not be protected by the laws of the United States, in violating these State laws. Postmasters within these States who shall knowingly distribute such publications are liable to be removed from office. The bill also provides that the post-office laws of the United States shall not protect postmasters, mail carriers, or other officers or agents of the department who shall knowingly circulate such incendiary publications, from the penalties denounced against this offence under the laws of the States. This is the spirit and principle of the bill. It does no more than to withdraw the protection of the laws of the United States, establishing the Post Office Department, from postmasters and other agents of this Government who shall wilfully transgress State laws deemed absolutely necessary to secure the States, within which they exist, from servile insurrection.

This bill did not affect, in the slightest degree, any of the non-slaveholding States. Neither did it apply to any of the slaveholding States, except those within which the danger of insurrection had become so imminent as to compel them to pass laws of the character referred to in the bill.

Of the policy and justice of passing such a bill he could not doubt, provided we possess the power. No person would contend that this Government ought to become the instrument of exciting insurrection within any of the States, unless we were constrained to pursue this course by an overruling constitutional necessity. The question then is, does any such necessity exist? Are we bound by the Constitution of the United States, through our post-offices, to circulate publications among the slaves, the direct tendency of which is to excite their passions and rouse them to insurrection? Have we no power to stay our hand in any case? Even if a portion of this Union were in a state of open rebellion against the United States, must we aid and assist the rebels by communicating to them, through our Post Office Department, such publications and information as may encourage and promote their designs against the very existence of the confederacy itself? If the Constitution of the United States has placed us in this deplorable condition, we must yield to its mandates, no matter what may be the consequences.

Mr. B. did not believe that the Constitution placed us in any such position. Our power over the mails was as broad and general as any words in the English language could confer. The Constitution declares that “Congress shall have power to establish post-offices and post roads.” This is the only provision which it contains touching the subject. After the establishment of these post-offices and post roads, who shall decide upon the purposes for which they shall be used? He answered, Congress, and Congress alone. There was no limitation, no restriction, whatever, upon our discretion contained in the bond. We have the power to decide what shall and what shall not be carried in the mail, and what shall be the rate of postage. He freely admitted that, unless in extreme cases, where the safety of the Republic was involved, we should never exercise this power of discrimination between what papers should and should not be circulated through the mail. The Constitution, however, has conferred upon us this general power, probably for the very purpose of meeting these extreme cases; and it is one which, from its delicate nature, we shall not be likely to abuse.

He differed entirely from the opinion of the Senator from South Carolina (Mr. Calhoun), as to the source whence the power was derived to pass this bill. No action of the State Legislatures could either confer it or take it away. It was perfect and complete in itself under the Federal Constitution, or it had no existence. With that Senator he entirely concurred in opinion, that the sedition law was clearly unconstitutional. Congress have no power to abridge the freedom of the press, or to pass any law to prevent or to punish any publication whatever. He understood the freedom of the press to mean precisely what the Senator from Massachusetts had stated. But does it follow, as the gentleman contends, that because we have no power over the press, that therefore we are bound to carry and distribute anything and everything which may proceed from it, even if it should be calculated to stir up insurrection or to destroy the Government? So far as this Government is concerned, every person may print, and publish, and circulate whatever he pleases; but are we, therefore, compelled to become his agents, and to circulate for him everything he may choose to publish? This is the question. Any gentleman upon this floor may write what he thinks proper against my character; but because he can exercise this liberty, am I therefore bound to carry and to circulate what he has written? So any individual within the broad limits of this Union, without previous restraint and without danger of punishment from the Federal Government, may publish what is calculated to aid and assist the enemies of the country in open war; but does it follow, as a necessary consequence, that this very Government is bound to carry and circulate such publications through its mails? A more perfect non sequitur never had been presented to his mind. It was one thing not to restrain or punish publications; it was another and an entirely different thing to carry and circulate them after they have been published. The one is merely passive; the other is active. It was one thing to leave our citizens entirely free to print and publish and circulate what they pleased; and it was another thing to call upon us to aid in their circulation. From the prohibition to make any law “abridging the freedom of speech or of the press,” it could never be inferred that we must provide by law for the circulation through the post-office of everything which the press might publish. And yet this is the argument both of the Senator from Massachusetts and the Senator from South Carolina. If this argument were well founded, it was very clear to his mind, that no State law could confer upon Congress any power to pass this bill. We derived our powers from the Federal Constitution, and from that alone. If, under its provisions, we have had no authority to pass the bill, we could derive no such authority from the laws of the States.

Why, then, did Mr. B. vote for a bill to prevent the circulation of publications prohibited by State laws? Not because we derived any power from these laws; but, under the circumstances, they contained the best rule to guide us in deciding what publications were dangerous. The States were the best judges of what was necessary for their own safety and protection; and they would not call for the passage of this bill, unless they were firmly convinced that the situation in which they were placed imperiously demanded it. They were willing to submit to a great evil in depriving themselves of information which might be valuable to them, in order to avoid the still greater evil that would result from the circulation of these publications and pictorial representations among their slaves. Such a law would not be permitted to exist after the necessity for it had ended. He was therefore willing, upon this occasion, to refer to the laws of the States, not for the purpose of conferring any power on Congress, but merely for a description of the publications which it should be unlawful for our deputy-postmasters within these States to circulate.

This bill was in strict conformity with the recommendations contained in the President’s message on this subject, which had, he believed, found favor everywhere. The principles of this message, which had been pronounced unconstitutional by the Senator from South Carolina (Mr. Calhoun), had, he believed, been highly commended in a resolution passed by the legislature of that State. He would read an extract from the President’s message:

“In connection with these provisions in relation to the Post Office Department, I must also invite your attention to the painful excitement produced in the South, by attempts to circulate through the mails inflammatory appeals addressed to the passions of the slaves, in prints, and in various sorts of publications, calculated to stimulate them to insurrection, and to produce all the horrors of a servile war.

“There is, doubtless, no respectable portion of our countrymen who can be so far misled as to feel any other sentiment than that of indignant regret at conduct so destructive of the harmony and peace of the country, and so repugnant to the principles of our national compact, and to the dictates of humanity and religion. Our happiness and prosperity essentially depend upon peace within our borders—and peace depends upon the maintenance, in good faith, of those compromises of the Constitution upon which the Union is founded. It is fortunate for the country that the good sense, the generous feeling, and the deep-rooted attachment of the people of the non-slaveholding States to the Union, and to their fellow-citizens of the same blood in the South, have given so strong and impressive a tone to the sentiments entertained against the proceedings of the misguided persons who have engaged in these unconstitutional and wicked attempts, and especially against the emissaries from foreign parts who have dared to interfere in this matter, as to authorize the hope, that those attempts will no longer be persisted in. But if these expressions of the public will shall not be sufficient to effect so desirable a result, not a doubt can be entertained that the non-slaveholding States, so far from countenancing the slightest interference with the constitutional rights of the South, will be prompt to exercise their authority in suppressing, so far as in them lies, whatever is calculated to produce this evil.

“In leaving the care of other branches of this interesting subject to the State authorities, to whom they properly belong, it is nevertheless proper for Congress to take such measures as will prevent the Post Office Department, which was designed to foster an amicable intercourse and correspondence between all the members of the confederacy, from being used as an instrument of an opposite character. The General Government, to which the great trust is confided, of preserving inviolate the relations created among the States by the Constitution, is especially bound to avoid in its own action, anything that may disturb them. I would, therefore, call the special attention of Congress to the subject, and respectfully suggest the propriety of passing such a law as will prohibit, under severe penalties, the circulation in the Southern States, through the mail, of incendiary publications intended to instigate the slaves to insurrection.”

In reply to Mr. Webster, Mr. B. said, that he did not think there was any vagueness in that part of the bill on which the gentleman had commented, except what arose from the nature of the subject. It is vague, says the gentleman, because it contains no description of the publications, the circulation of which it intends to prohibit, except the words “touching the subject of slavery.” On this foundation he had erected a considerable portion of his argument. Mr. B. acknowledged that if the bill contained no other description than this, it would be impossible to carry it into execution. But this was not the fact. The subsequent language restricted this vague description; because it confined the operation of the bill to such publications only, “touching the subject of slavery,” as were prohibited from circulation by the laws of the respective States.

We have, said Mr. B., wisely and properly referred, for the description of the offence, to the laws of the different States which will be embraced by the bill. It was just—it was politic—it was treating those States with a proper degree of respect, to make our law conform with their laws, and thus to take care that no conflict should arise between our deputy postmasters and their State authorities. Could the gentleman from Massachusetts himself make the bill more explicit? He could not do it, consistently with the principles upon which it was founded, without incorporating into its provisions all the laws of all the States who had thought proper to pass laws upon this subject. Our deputy postmasters were resident citizens of those States. They were bound to know the State laws under which they lived, and all that this bill requires is, that they shall not violate them.

The Senator from Massachusetts has contended that any newspaper which had been sent to an individual by mail, and was deposited in a post-office, was his property; and we had, therefore, no right to say it should not be delivered. But this was begging the question. It was taking that for granted which remained to be proved. If Congress, as he (Mr. B.) had contended, possessed the incontestable power of declaring what should and what should not be circulated through the mails, no man could have the right to demand from any post-office that which the law had declared should not thus be circulated. If we can, without violating the Constitution, say that these inflammatory publications tending to excite servile war shall not be distributed by our postmasters among the individuals to whom they are directed, no question of property could then arise. No man can have a property in that which is a violation of the law. It then becomes a question, not of property, but of public safety. Admit the gentleman’s premises, that we have no right to pass any law upon this subject, and he can establish his position that a property exists in those publications whilst in the post-offices. Without this admission, his argument entirely fails.

He felt as reluctant as any man could feel, to vote for any law interfering with the circulation through the mails of any publication whatever, no matter what might be its character. But if the slaves within any Southern State were in rebellion, or if a palpable or well-founded danger of such a rebellion existed, with his present convictions, should he refuse to prevent the circulation of publications tending to encourage or excite insurrection, he would consider himself an accomplice in their guilt. He entertained no doubt whatever of the power of Congress to pass this bill, or of the propriety of exercising that power. He would not have voted for the bill which had been reported by the Senator from South Carolina, (Mr. Calhoun) because he thought it a measure far beyond what was required by the necessity of the case. This bill, whilst it was sufficiently strong to correct the evil, would be confined in its operation to those States within which the danger existed.

Mr. Davis (of Massachusetts) stated at length his objections to the passage of the bill. Senators assumed that there were no difficulties in the way, because the post-office power gave to Congress the right to decide what should be carried in the mails. On a former occasion he had said all that was proper in regard to this matter. He then drew the attention of the Senate to the constitutional question involved, and demonstrated, as he thought, that there was no authority in the Constitution to pass this bill, or anything like it. The language of the Constitution was very simple: it only said that Congress should have the power to establish post-offices and post roads. Now what was a post-office, in the meaning of the Constitution? To understand this, it would be necessary to ascertain what was the meaning held at the time the Constitution was adopted. You had a post-office at the time the Constitution was made, and a press also; and the provision in the Constitution was made in reference to both these known things. The object in establishing the post-office, then, was to send abroad intelligence throughout the country; and it was intended for the transmission of newspapers, pamphlets, judicial and legislative proceedings, and all matters emanating from the press, relating to politics, literature, and science, and for the transmission of private letters. It would be, therefore, in his opinion, in conflict with the provision of the Constitution, giving Congress the power to establish the post-office, as well as an abridgment of the freedom of the press, to carry into effect the provisions of the bill.

The Senator from Pennsylvania reïterated the argument used the other day by his friend from Georgia, that you have no right to diffuse publications through the agency of the post-office, for the purpose of exciting a servile war. Now let me tell the gentleman, (said Mr. D.) that this is an old argument against the liberty of the press, and that it has been used whenever it was thought necessary to establish a censorship over it. The public morals were said to be in danger; it was necessary to prevent licentiousness, tumult, and sedition; and the public good required that the licentiousness of the press should be restrained. All these were the plausible pretences under which the freedom of the press had been violated in all ages. Now they knew that the press was at all times corrupt; but when they came to decide the question whether the tares should be rooted up, and the wheat along with it, those who had decided in favor of liberty, had always decided that it was better to put up with a lesser evil than to draw down upon themselves one of such fearful magnitude, as must result from the destruction of the press. Mr. D. contended that the power to be given to the deputy postmasters to decide what should, and what should not be distributed from the post-office, gave them a dangerous discretion over a very delicate matter, and that the power was one highly susceptible of abuse, and always liable to misconstruction.

Mr. Grundy (of Tennessee) observed that this bill was intended simply to prevent any officer of the Government, who should violate the laws of the States in which he resided, from sheltering himself under the post-office law. As the bill now stood, the objections with regard to abridging the freedom of the press had no application whatever. There was no provision in the bill interfering with the printing or publishing of any matter whatever, nor was it even pretended that Congress possessed the power of doing so. It was not even said that certain publications, no matter how incendiary in their character, should not be deposited in the post-office, and transmitted throughthrough the mails. Therefore all the objections that he had heard to the bill fell to the ground. In this bill, the Government simply said to the individuals in its employ, “We will not help you to do an act in violation of the laws of the State in which you live.” That was the ground on which the bill was framed, and it could not be pretended that this was an abridgment of the liberty of the press. It was only the Government declining to assist an individual in the violation of the law, and that was the whole bill. The Government, under the Constitution, had an entire control of the Post-Office Department. It had the power to regulate what matters should be carried throughthrough the mails, and what should not. We say to everybody that to these slaveholding States you may transmit through the mails what you please, but if you transmit to one of our officers what is prohibited by the laws of the State in which he resides, we shall say to that officer, you shall not put on the mantle of the Government to assist you in the violation of that law; you shall be subject to the penalties of the State laws, besides removal from office. In fact there was not the slightest pretext for saying that this bill violates in the remotest degree the freedom of the press. Nothing should be carried in the mails but what was proper for transmission through them; but if there was anything sent through them tending to excite insurrection and bloodshed, how could there be an objection to the passage of a law, saying that it should not be delivered out of the post-office?

The gentleman from Massachusetts objected to the vagueness of the bill in saying what shall not be distributed from the post-offices. How could the matter, he asked, be made more specific? When the publication arrived at the post-office where it was prohibited, and was about to be handed out, the State law would be consulted, and by it, it would be decided whether it was in violation of the State law or not, and it could thus be determined whether it was proper for delivery. He should not say anything as to the report—he did not concur in it farther than that this was a great evil, and should be corrected in the mildest way that it could be done. This bill did not affect any individual but those of the post-offices of the States where laws have been passed prohibiting publications and pictorial representations, calculated to excite insurrection among the slaves. He was opposed to the original bill, because it interfered with what publications should be deposited in, as well as delivered from, the post-offices. But it was only at the delivery office where this bill would operate, and the postmaster at such office would be operated on by the laws of the State in which it is situated. If this bill was not passed, nothing could be done, and the post-office would be made (for there were persons wicked enough to do it) the medium through which to send fire-brands throughout the country.

Mr. Clay said that he considered this bill totally unnecessary and uncalled for by public sentiment; and in this he differed with the Senator from Pennsylvania (Mr. Buchanan); for he believed that the President’s message on the subject had met with general disapprobation; that it was unconstitutional; and if not so, that it contained a principle of a most dangerous and alarming character. When he saw that the exercise of the most extraordinary and dangerous power had been assumed by the head of the post-office, and that it had been sustained by this message, he turned his attention to the subject and inquired whether it was necessary that the General Government should, under any circumstances, exercise such a power, and whether it possessed it; and after much reflection, he had come to the conclusion, that they could not pass any law interfering with the subject in any shape or form whatever.

The evil complained of was the circulation of papers having a certain tendency. The papers, unless circulated, did no harm, and while in the post-office or in the mail—it was a circulation solely which constituted the evil. It was the taking them out of the mail, and the use that was to be made of them, that constituted the mischief.—Then it was perfectly competent to the State authorities to apply the remedy. The instant that a prohibited paper was handed out, whether to a citizen or sojourner, he was subject to the laws which might compel him either to surrender them or burn them. He considered the bill not only unnecessary, but as a law of a dangerous, if not a doubtful authority.

It was objected that it was vague and indefinite in its character; and how is that objection got over? The bill provided that it shall not be lawful for any deputy postmaster, in any State, Territory, or District of the United States, knowingly to deliver to any person whatever, any pamphlet, newspaper, handbill, or other printed paper or pictorial representation, touching the subject of slavery, where, by the laws of said State, Territory, or District, their circulation is prohibited. Now, what could be more vague and indefinite than this description? Now, could it be decided by this description, what publications should be withheld from distribution? The gentleman from Pennsylvania said that the laws of the States would supply the omission. He thought the Senator was premature in saying that there would be a precision in State laws, before he showed it by producing the law. He had seen no such law, and he did not know whether the description in the bill was applicable or not. There was another objection to this part of the bill: it applied not only to the present laws of the States, but to any future laws they might pass.

Mr. C. denied that the bill applied to the slaveholding States only, and went on to argue that it could be applied to all the States, and to any publication touching the subject of slavery whatever, whether for or against it, if such publication was only prohibited by the laws of such State. Thus, for instance, a non-slaveholding State might prohibit publications in defence of the institution of slavery, and this bill would apply to it as well as to the laws of the slaveholding States; but the law would be inoperative: it declared that the deputy postmaster should not be amenable, unless he knowingly shall deliver, etc. Why, the postmaster might plead ignorance, and of course the law would be inoperative.

But he wanted to know whence Congress derived the power to pass this law. It was said that it was to carry into effect the laws of the States. Where did they get such authority? He thought that their only authority to pass laws was in pursuance of the Constitution; but to pass laws to carry into effect the laws of the States, was a most prolific authority, and there was no knowing where it was to stop: it would make the legislation of Congress dependent upon the legislation of twenty-four different sovereignties. He thought the bill was of a most dangerous tendency. The Senator from Pennsylvania asked if the post-office power did not give them the right to regulate what should be carried in the mails. Why, there was no such power as that claimed in the bill; and if they passed such a law, it would be exercising a most dangerous power. Why, if such doctrine prevailed, the Government might designate the persons, or parties, or classes who should have the benefit of the mails, excluding all others.

It was too often in the condemnation of a particular evil that they were urged on to measures of a dangerous tendency. All must agree as to the dangerous consequences of persons residing out of certain States transmitting to them incendiary publications, calculating to promote civil war and bloodshed. All must see the evil, and a great evil it was, and he hoped that a stop would be put to it; but Congress had no power to pass beyond the Constitution for the purpose of correcting it. The States alone had the power, and their power was ample for the purpose. He hoped never to see the time when the General Government should undertake to correct the evil by such measures as the one before them. If (said Mr. C.) you can pass this law to prohibit the delivery through the post-office of publications touching the subject of slavery, might they not also pass laws to prohibit any citizen of New York or Massachusetts from publishing and transmitting through the mails touching that subject? If you may touch the subject of slavery at all, why not go to the root of the evil? Suppose one of the Southern States were to pass a law of this kind, would you not be called upon by all the arguments now used in favor of this bill, to carry such laws into effect? Mr. C. concluded by saying that the bill was calculated to destroy all the landmarks of the Constitution, establish a precedent for dangerous legislation, and to lead to incalculable mischief. There was no necessity for so dangerous an assumption of authority, the State laws being perfectly competent to correct the evil complained of. He must say, that from the first to the last he was opposed to the measure.

Mr. Calhoun could not concur with the views taken by the Senators from Massachusetts and Kentucky, that this bill would comprehend in its provisions all publications touching the subject of slavery. In order to bring any publications within the provision of the bill, two qualifications were necessary. The first was, that it must relate to the subject of slavery; and the next was, that it must be prohibited by the laws of the States to which it is transmitted. He thought that this was the view that would be taken of it by the courts. The object of this bill was to make it the duty of the postmasters in the States to conform to the laws of such States, and not to deliver out papers in violation of their laws. The simple question was, had this Government the power to say to its officers, you shall not violate the laws of the States in which you reside? Could it go further, and make it their duty to co-operate with the States in carrying their laws into effect? This was the simple question. Now could any man doubt that Congress possessed the power to pass both measures, so that their officers might not come in conflict with the State laws? Indeed, he looked upon measures of this kind to prevent conflicts between the General and State Governments, which were likely to ensue, as essentially necessary, for it was evident that when such conflicts took place, the State must have the ascendancy. Mr. C. then briefly recapitulated the principles on which this bill was founded, and contended that it was in aid of laws passed by the States, as far as Congress had the power constitutionally to go, and assumed no power to prohibit or interfere with the publication or circulation of any paper whatever; it only declared, that the officers of the Government should not make their official stations a shield for violating the State laws. Was there any one there who would say, that the States had not the power to pass laws prohibiting, and making penal, the circulation of papers calculated to excite insurrection among their slaves? It being admitted that they could, could not Congress order its officers to abstain from the violation of these laws? We do not (said Mr. C.) pass a law to abridge the freedom of the press, or to prohibit the publication and circulation of any paper whatever—this has been done by the States already. The inhibition of the Constitution was on Congress, and not on the States, who possessed full power to pass any laws they thought proper. They knew that there were several precedents to sanction this bill. Congress had passed laws to abstain from the violation of the health laws of the States. Could any one say that the Constitution gave to Congress the power to pass quarantine laws? He had not adverted to the message of the President on this subject, because he believed that the President acted from the best motives, and that that part of the message was drawn up without sufficient reflection. He denied, however, that this message was in conformity with the Constitution. It would be directly abridging the liberty of the press for Congress to pass such laws as the President recommended. One part of the message he would refer to, which was in these words:

“I would, therefore, call the special attention of Congress to the subject, and respectfully suggest the propriety of passing such a law as will prohibit, under severe penalties, the circulation in the Southern States, through the mail, of incendiary publications, intended to instigate the slaves to insurrection.” This was clearly unconstitutional, for it not only recommended the prohibition of publications and circulation of incendiary papers (abridging the freedom of the press), but it recommended also the infliction of severe penalties, which powers were expressly prohibited by the Constitution. On no other principle could this ever be defended, than that it was simply abstaining from a violation of the laws of the States.

The Senator from Kentucky contended that this bill was useless, and he (Mr. C.) agreed that it was so in one sense, and that was, with or without this bill, the Southern States would execute their own laws against the circulation of such papers. It was a case of life and death with them; and did anybody suppose that they would permit so many magazines in their bosoms, to blow them to destruction, as these post-offices must be, if these incendiary publications continued to be circulated through them? While the Southern States contained so many postmasters opposed to their institutions, as it was in his own State, where almost every postmaster was opposed to it, it was absolutely necessary for them to take effectual measures for their own security. It was the assertion of the principle, that the States had a right to protect themselves, which made the bill valuable in his eye; it prevented the conflict which would be likely to take place between the General and State Governments, unless some measure of the kind should be adopted. The States had a right to go to the extent of this bill, and they would be wanting to themselves and to posterity, if they omitted to do it. It was on the doctrine of State rights and State intervention, that he supported this bill, and on no other grounds.

The Senator from Massachusetts objected to the returning of these papers, whose delivery was prohibited. He regretted this as much as the Senator did, but his objection was, that it did not go far enough; he thought that these papers should be delivered to the prosecuting officers of the States, to enable them to ferret out the designs of the incendiaries.

Mr. Webster remarked, that in general, it might be safely said, that when different gentlemen supported a measure admitted to be of a novel character, and placed their defence of it on different and inconsistent grounds, a very simple person might believe, in such case, that there were no very strong grounds for adopting the measure. The Senator from Pennsylvania and the Senator from South Carolina not only placed their defence of their bill on opposite grounds, but each opposed the principles on which the other founded his support of it. Where the object to be gained was apparently good, and the case urgent, as it was represented to be, how could limitations of power stand against powerful opponents, which have always been urging to despotism? Now, against the objects of this bill, he had not a word to say; but with constitutional lawyers, there was a great difference between the object and the means to carry it into effect. It was not the object to be gained, but the means to attain it, which they should look to, for though the object might be good, the means might not be so. His objections went to the means and not to the object; and he did not yield the argument because the object was a good one, and the case was urgent. It was better to limit the power, and run the risk of injury from the want of it, than to give a power which might be exercised in a dangerous manner.

The Senator from Pennsylvania said that this bill was calling on Congress to do nothing but to abstain from violating the laws of the States. It was one thing, said the Senator, for Congress to abstain from giving these incendiary papers circulation, and another to pass laws saying that they shall not be published. But if Congress had no mail through which these papers could be transmitted, what did the gentleman mean by Congress abstaining from giving them circulation? It meant that Congress should interfere and should create an especial exception as to what should be transmitted by their ordinary channel of intelligence, and that that exception should be caused by the character of the writing or publication. He contended that Congress had not the power, drawn from the character of the paper, to decide whether it should be carried in the mail or not, for such decision would be a direct abridgment of the freedom of the press. He confessed that he was shocked at the doctrine. He looked back to the alien and sedition laws which were so universally condemned throughout the country, and what was their object? Certainly to prohibit publications of a dangerous tendency. Mr. W. here quoted the sedition law, to show the objects it intended to effect. But the deputy postmasters (Mr. W. said) must look into the newspaper mail to see if there were any publications in it touching the subject of slavery calculated to excite insurrections among the slaves.

Now, said Mr. W., the country would have been rent into atoms if the sedition law, instead of saying that papers should not be published in such and such a way, had declared that the deputy postmasters should have the power to search the mails to see if they contained any publications calculated to “bring the Government into disrepute, promote insurrection, and lead to foreign war,” the evils the sedition law intended to guard against. All the papers described in the law of ’99 were unlawful by the laws of any of the States, and yet that law which had created so much excitement and met with such general reprobation, contained nothing like the power claimed by this bill. Any law distinguishing what shall or shall not go into the mails, founded on the sentiments of the paper, and making the deputy postmaster the judge, he should say, was expressly unconstitutional, if not recommended by gentlemen of such high authority. This bill (said Mr. W.) went beyond the recommendation of the President, for his recommendation was, that the person who circulated the papers described by him should be punished by severe penalties. Now, this was the old law of liberty—there was not a word of previous restraint in it as imposed by this bill. Mr. W. then went into an argument to show the vagueness of the bill in describing the paper, the delivery of which was prohibited. Under it, it was impossible to determine what publications should be prohibited; abolition pamphlets were to be stopped at the South, and anti-abolition papers were to be stopped at the North. In reply to Mr. Buchanan, he said that he did not assume that these prohibited publications either were or were not property. All he said was, that they ought not to make the deputy postmasters the judge, and take away the property without the authority of law. What he had to say was, that it was a question of property or no property, and that they could not make the deputy postmaster the judge of the fact, as he could not be a judge of property known to the Constitution and the law.

Mr. Buchanan said he had not anticipated, when he first addressed the Senate upon this subject, that he should have occasion to make any further remarks, but the Senator from Massachusetts had replied to his argument, in such a special manner, that he felt himself constrained to reply to some of his remarks. Now, permit me to say (continued Mr. B.) that he has not at all met the point of my argument. He has invested this subject with an air of greater importance and responsibility than it deserves: he has played around it with all his powers, but without touching the real question involved in the discussion.

Congress has no power (says the gentleman) to pass any law abridging the freedom of speech or of the press. Granted. He most freely admitted that Congress had no power to touch the press at all. We can pass no law whatever either to prevent or to punish any publication, under any circumstances whatever. The sedition law violated this principle. It punished libels against the Federal Government and its officers; and having met with general reprobation, it was repealed, or permitted to expire by its own limitation, he did not recollect which.

Mr. B. said he admitted these premises of the gentleman in their broadest extent; but did they justify his conclusions? In order to maintain his argument, he must prove that the Constitution, in declaring that Congress shall not pass any law abridging the freedom of the press, has thereby, and from the force of these terms alone, commanded us to circulate and distribute, through our post-offices, everything which the press may publish, no matter whether it shall promote insurrection and civil war or not. This is the proposition which he must establish. All the gentleman’s remarks in favor of the liberty of the press met his cordial approbation; but they did not apply to the constitutional question then under discussion. He had argued this question precisely as if, in addition to the words already in the Constitution, that “Congress shall make no law abridging the freedom of speech or of the press,” there had been inserted, “or to prevent the circulation of any production of the press through the post-offices.” But these words were not in the instrument; and the only question was, whether the one prohibition could be inferred from the other. Mr. B. said he was in favor of a plain and literal construction of the Constitution. He took it for his guide; and he could never consent to interpolate what its framers never intended should be there. They have conferred upon Congress, in express terms, a general discretion in regard to the Post Office Department; and the question then was, shall we exercise it in the manner proposed by this bill, for the purpose of preventing servile war, bloodshed and disunion?

How had the gentleman from Massachusetts met his argument? He says that the principles upon which the Senator from South Carolina (Mr. Calhoun) and himself had sustained this bill, were at variance with each other; and that this of itself was sufficient to cast doubt over the measure. But was it the first time the gentleman had known correct conclusions to be drawn from varying or even unfounded premises? The bill itself ought not to be condemned for the arguments of its friends. He would remind the gentleman of the advice given by a distinguished English judge, to a young friend about to occupy a judicial station in the West Indies, which was, never to give reasons for his judgments, where it could be avoided; because his natural sense and perception of justice would almost always enable him to decide correctly, though he might, and probably often would, assign insufficient reasons for his decisions. This bill ought to be judged by its own provisions, and ought not to be condemned for the reasons in support of it which had been advanced either by the Senator from South Carolina or himself.

The Senator from Massachusetts had argued as though he (Mr. B.) had said, that as the end proposed by this measure was good, he should vote for it, notwithstanding the means might be unconstitutional.

[Here Mr. Webster explained, and said he had not imputed to Mr. B. such an argument.]

Mr. B. proceeded. The Senator did not mean this imputation; but his argument seemed to imply as much. However necessary he might believe this bill to be, if he did not find a clear warrant for its passage in the Constitution, it should never have his support. He never could believe that this Government, having exclusive control over the Post-Office Department in all its various relations, was yet so impotent to prevent evil, that it must, under the fundamental law which called it into existence, whether it would or not, distribute publications tending directly to promote servile insurrection, and to produce its own destruction.

The Senator from South Carolina (Mr. Calhoun) had misapprehended him in one particular. He (Mr. B.) had disclaimed all authority to pass this bill derived from State laws, or from any other source than the Constitution of the United States. He had not said he would vote for a similar bill in all cases where the State Legislatures might think proper to pass laws to prohibit the circulation of any publication whatever. He considered the passage of such laws merely as evidence of the necessity for legislation by Congress; but he was very far from adopting the principle that it should be conclusive evidence in all cases. Congress must judge for itself under all the circumstances of each particular case.

In reply to the Senator from Massachusetts, Mr. B. said that this bill would not be a penal law. Everything like a penalty had been stricken from its provisions, unless the removal of a deputy postmaster from office by the Postmaster General might be viewed in that light. By it we merely directed our agent not to violate State laws by distributing publications calculated to excite insurrection. He would not have occasion to study all the laws of all the States on the subject of slavery, as the Senator from Massachusetts had alleged. All that would be required of him was to know the laws of the State of which he was a citizen, and to take care not to violate them.

The gentleman had said that he (Mr. B.) had mistaken the recommendation contained in the President’s message. Now he undertook to assert that this bill was in conformity with the recommendation of the President, and carried it out in all essential particulars.

[Here Mr. B. again read the last paragraph of the message which he had read before.]

Now, sir, (said Mr. B.) does not the President expressly assert that Congress has authority to regulate what shall be distributed through the post-offices, and does he not “suggest the propriety of passing such a law as will prohibit, under severe penalties, the circulation in the Southern States, through the mail, of incendiary publications, intended to instigate the slaves to insurrection?” Except that this bill contained no severe penalties, it was framed both in its spirit and in its letter according to the suggestion of the President. What other bill could we pass of a milder character than the one now before us, to prevent the circulation of these incendiary publications? Let the President’s recommendation be entitled to what weight it might, this bill was in exact accordance with it.

The Senator from Massachusetts had contended that this bill conferred upon deputy postmasters the power of depriving individuals of their property in newspapers and other publications, in violation of that clause in the Constitution, which declares that no person shall be deprived of his property without due process of law. By this bill we had not attempted to shield any postmaster from legal responsibilityresponsibility for his conduct. We could not do so, if we would. We had merely prescribed for him, as we had done for our other agents, the line of his duty. We did not attempt to protect him from the suit of any person who might consider himself aggrieved. If any individual to whom a publication was directed, and who had demanded it from the postmaster and had been refused, should believe our law to be unconstitutional, he might bring this question before the judiciary, and try it, like any other question. All our officers and agents are liable to be sued, and if the law under which they acted should prove to be unconstitutional, it would afford them no protection. On the present occasion we proposed to proceed in the spirit of the common law principle, that any individual may abate a nuisance; though he thereby rendered himself responsible, in case it should appear afterwards that the thing abated was not a nuisance. So here, the postmaster refusing to deliver a newspaper under our law, would be responsible in damages to the party aggrieved, in case it should appear that the law under which he had acted was unconstitutional.

As to the necessity for passing this bill, he should say but a few words. It was very easy for gentlemen to say that necessity was the plea of tyrants. He admitted it had been so, and would be so in all time to come. But after all, if we possessed the power to legislate in this case, from our situation we were compelled to judge whether it was necessary to call it into efficient action or not. This duty devolved upon us. We could not avoid deciding this question. Was it not, then, within our knowledge that the slaveholding States had been attempted to be flooded with pamphlets and pictorial representations calculated to excite servile insurrection? Had we not seen upon this floor many of these pictorial representations, whose direct effect would be to excite the wild and brutal passions of the slaves to cut the throats of their masters? Within the last few months, had there not been blood shed? and had there not been several attempted insurrections in some of the Southern States? These facts were incontestable. Believing and knowing all this to be true, he said the case of necessity, in his judgment, was fully established, and he should vote for the passage of the bill.

Mr. Cuthbert (of Georgia) was not desirous to throw himself into the current of this debate at this time. The position which he held—the infrequency of his occupying that floor, and the indisposition under which he labored, authorized him to expect the attention of the Senate for a short time, when he should be better able to address them than he then was. He therefore hoped the Senate would indulge him in an opportunity of being heard on the subject, by postponing it, to be taken up within a very short period. It appeared to him that the Senator from Pennsylvania had said precisely what should have been said in support of this bill. It appeared to him that that Senator had given an unanswerable reply to the Senator from Massachusetts on points on which he principally relied for his opposition to the measure before them. What is the state of the case (said Mr. C.)? The deputy postmaster in one of the States holds in his hand an incendiary publication, intended to carry blood and desolation through the land. Is he bound in duty to hold it from circulation? If he gives it to another, the evil intended by that publication will ensue; but then your officer, contends the Senator from Massachusetts, is bound to deliver it, because you have no power to pass a law abridging the freedom of the press. According to this doctrine, that which an individual cannot do, your officer is bound to do. It appeared to him that the obvious necessity of this law was to prevent the post-office agents from committing a criminal offence against the laws of the States, and then shielding themselves under the post-office law. But the Senator from Massachusetts had not met this point, but had rather evaded and played around it. This was a question which should not be discussed with the chicanery of a pettifogging lawyer, but should be considered with those enlarged ideas and noble sentiments which belong to the statesman. They should argue it as became enlightened patriots, anxious to promote harmony and good feeling through our common country, and to preserve all its parts from the dangers of insurrection.

He denied that property could be affected by this law, as contended by the Senator from Massachusetts. There could be no property in these incendiary publications. The postmaster holds in his hand that which, by the laws of the States, is in the condition of stolen property, and he is bound to give it back. He holds in his hand what, by his own judgment, he considers not to be property—which his own judgment condemns, and he is therefore bound to resign it. The Senator from Massachusetts said, rightly, that the person to whom this publication is directed may come forward and demand it, under the provision of this law. Now, if the Senator thought there was anything wanting in this provision of the bill, why did he not propose an amendment? If he did propose any, he (Mr. C.) had not heard it. The property is not to be destroyed; it must be returned to him who sent it.

In another point of view (Mr. C. said), the postmaster must judge whether these papers are legal or not. He holds in his hand papers which the laws of his State have said shall not be circulated, under a penalty. Is he not to decide whether he shall incur that penalty or not? How stood the argument of the Senator from Massachusetts? He requires that the officer shall violate the laws of his State, or that the General Government shall protect him in it. With regard to the members that compose the Senate, every gentleman was conscious in his own breast of a strong desire to prevent the evils of a servile war in the Southern States. Of this he was confident. But with regard to the Senator from Massachusetts, he should be guilty of a want of candor if he allowed him that clearness of judgment which belonged to the statesman; he should be wanting in that sincerity of heart on which he had ever prided himself, if he declared his conviction that the honorable Senator had treated this subject with the liberal and impartial spirit it deserved. The gentleman’s course had uniformly been opposed to all those measures which tended to quiet the country, and heal those sectional dissensions which disturb the Union.

When a large and overwhelming vote was taken in the Senate, on the motion of the Senator from Pennsylvania, believed by all to be so necessary to settle a question, threatening the most fearful consequences, it was held to be highly desirable that there should be an unanimous vote. Yet, on an occasion when the Senator could well have shown a desire to harmonize and conciliate, his vote was found in the negative. Again, the Senator from Massachusetts had put forth a paper calculated to excite great distrust in the body of the people affected by it. He alluded to the resolutions adopted at a meeting held in Boston on the subject of slavery, of which the gentleman was said to be the author, in which it was declared that Congress had the power to regulate the transfer of slaves from one State to another. Mr. C. said that he had addressed the Senate but seldom, and as he wished to be heard on this subject more at large, when his health was better and under more favorable circumstances, he hoped the Senate would indulge him by a postponement.

Mr. Webster said that he had heard the remarks of the Senator from Georgia (Mr. Cuthbert) with attention and with respect; and considering his speech of a personal character, it became him to notice it; but as the gentleman proposed to discuss this subject more at large when his health was better, and, as he said, under circumstances less tending to irritation, he should postpone his reply till then. He should hear the gentleman with pleasure, and he looked forward to it with much solicitude, and should endeavor to reply to him according to his best abilities. Mr. W. then entered into a lengthy reply to the remarks of Mr. Buchanan, in the course of which he contended that the law was unnecessary, because the States had at present the power to punish the deputy postmasters who should circulate incendiary publications in violation of their laws.

Mr. Buchanan did not rise again to argue the question. He did not feel any petty desire to have the last word. He should now merely remark that the Senator from Massachusetts, in his last observations, had done nothing more than again to restate his proposition, without offering any new argument in its support. He reminded him of another powerful man, in the ancient time, who was condemned to roll a large stone to the top of a mountain, which was always falling back upon him, and which he never could accomplish. The gentleman’s position was one which even his great powers did not enable him to maintain.

Mr. B. should not again have risen but for the purpose of making a single remark. The Senator from Massachusetts had just expressed the opinion that deputy postmasters could be punished, under State authority, for circulating inflammatory pamphlets and papers in violation of State laws. If this be true, then all the power over the post-office which we confer by this bill already exists in the States. The effect of it, then, will be nothing more than to express our assent to the exercise of a power over deputy postmasters by the States, which the gentleman admits to exist already. Upon this principle there can be no objection to the adoption of the present measure.

Mr. Cuthbert only rose to repeat the request that the Senate would, by the postponement of the subject to a short day, allow him an opportunity of being heard on it when his health was better.

Mr. C. then moved to lay the bill on the table; which motion was lost.

The bill was then rejected by the following vote:

Yeas—Messrs. Black, Brown, Buchanan, Calhoun, Cuthbert, Grundy, King of Alabama, King of Georgia, Mangum, Moore, Nicholas, Porter, Preston, Rives, Robinson, Tallmadge, Walker, White and Wright—19.

Nays—Messrs. Benton, Clay, Crittenden, Davis, Ewing of Illinois, Ewing of Ohio, Goldsborough, Hendricks, Hubbard, Kent, Knight, Leigh, McKean, Morris, Naudain, Niles, Prentiss, Ruggles, Shepley, Southard, Swift, Tipton, Tomlinson, Wall, and Webster—25.

During this session of Congress (1836), Michigan sought admission into the Union. The following speech was made by Mr. Buchanan on the first of April, in reply to some of the arguments against the admission of that State:

Mr. President: Nothing was more remote from my intention, when I closed my remarks on Wednesday last, than again to address you on the subject of the admission of Michigan into the Union; but my argument on that occasion has been so strongly assailed by the Senator from New Jersey (Mr. Southard), and other gentlemen, that I feel myself almost constrained to reply. Even under this strong necessity, I would not now trespass upon your time, if I believed I should thus provoke a protracted debate, and thereby prevent the decision of the question before we adjourn this afternoon.

I shall undertake to demonstrate, notwithstanding all that has been said, that under the ordinance of 1787, aliens who were residents of the Northwestern Territory, had a clear right to exercise the elective franchise.

The territory ceded by Virginia to the United States was sufficiently extensive for an immense empire. The parties to this compact of cession contemplated that it would form five sovereign States of this Union. At that early period we had just emerged from our revolutionary struggle, and none of the jealousy was then felt against foreigners, and particularly against Irish foreigners, which now appears to haunt some gentlemen. There had then been no attempts made to get up a native American party in this country. The blood of the gallant Irish had flowed freely upon every battle-field in defence of the liberties which we now enjoy. Besides, the Senate will well recollect that the ordinance was passed before the adoption of our present Constitution, and whilst the power of naturalization remained with the several States. In some, and perhaps in all of them, it required so short a residence, and so little trouble, to be changed from an alien to a citizen, that the process could be performed without the least difficulty. I repeat that no jealousy whatever then existed against foreigners.

What, at that early period, was the condition of the vast Territory, part of which has been formed into the State of Michigan? It was a wilderness and a frontier. The wise men of the old Congress who framed this ordinance desired to promote its population, and to render it a barrier against foreign invasion. They were willing that all persons, whether citizens of any of the States, or foreigners, who should establish a fixed residence in the Territory, and become the owners of a freehold, might not only enjoy the privilege of voting, but that of holding offices. In regard to the construction of the ordinance itself, I shall not follow in detail the argument of the Senator from New Jersey. Indeed, I do not consider it a question for construction. The language is so plain, that he who runs may read. No ingenuity can cast the slightest shade of doubt over it.

The ordinance declares that “so soon as there shall be five thousand free male inhabitants of full age, in the district, upon giving proof thereof to the governor, they shall receive authority, with time and place, to elect representatives from their counties or townships, to represent them in the general assembly; provided that, for every five hundred free male inhabitants, there shall be one representative, and so on, progressively, with the number of free male inhabitants, shall the right of representation increase, until the number of representatives shall amount to twenty-five; after which the number and proportion of representatives shall be regulated by the legislature; provided, that no person be eligible or qualified to act as a representative, unless he shall have been a citizen of one of the United States three years, and be a resident in the district, or unless he shall have resided in the district three years; and in either case, shall likewise hold in his own right, in fee simple, two hundred acres of land within the same; provided also, that a freehold of fifty acres of land in the district, having been a citizen of one of the States, and being resident in the district, or the like freehold and two years residence in the district, shall be necessary to qualify a man as an elector of a representative.”