Now, sir, I have said that this language is too plain for construction. When had the people of this Territory the right to elect representatives? Was it when there were five thousand free male citizens within its borders? By no means; but as soon as there were that number of free male inhabitants, whether citizens or not. Who were entitled to vote at these elections? They, referring directly and immediately to the five thousand free male inhabitants of full age.

The subsequent portion of the clause which I have just read, makes this question, if possible, still plainer. It divides those capable of being elected representatives, as well as the electors, into two distinct classes, conferring advantages, in both cases, upon those inhabitants who had been citizens of one of the States for a period of three years. If a candidate for the House of Representatives had been “a citizen of one of the United States three years,” he was eligible, although he might not have been a resident of the Territory for more than a single day. Nothing more, in this case, is required than that he should be a resident. No period of residence was necessary. If the candidate, on the other hand, belonged to the second class—if he had been a naturalized citizen of one of the States for less than three years, or if he still continued to be an alien, in order to render him eligible as a representative, he must “have resided in the district three years.” In short, if he had been a citizen for three years, it was no matter how brief his residence might have been; but if “a free male inhabitant” of any other description, a residence of three years was indispensable. A similar distinction prevails in regard to the electors. “A citizen“A citizen of any of the States, if a resident of the district but for a single day, had a right to exercise the elective franchise. If, on the other hand, he were not a citizen, “two years residence in the district” was required.

The property qualification was the same both for citizens and for other residents.

[Mr. Buchanan here read other portions of the ordinance to prove that its framers were careful in their use of terms, and always distinguished with great precision, between the use of the words “free male inhabitants,” and “citizens of one of the United States,” etc. He also referred, as a further proof of his position, to the language of that portion of the ordinance which provides for the election of the legislative council.]

Now, sir, said Mr. B., have I not clearly established the position, that, under this ordinance, aliens were entitled to elect and to be elected, provided they had resided a sufficient time in the territory, and were possessed of the necessary freehold qualification? If I can comprehend the meaning of the plainest English words, neither doubt nor difficulty can longer rest upon this question.

But it has been urged that in order to become a freeholder, a person must first have been a citizen of one of the States. In reply, I might content myself by saying that this is begging the question. It is assuming the very proposition to be proved. But I shall give this objection two answers. In the first place, although I have become somewhat rusty in my legal knowledge, yet I feel perfectly safe in asserting, that, under the strict principles of the common law of England, an alien may purchase real estate, may hold real estate, may transmit real estate to his heirs, or devise it by his will. His title is good against all mankind, except the crown; and can only be divested by what in technical language is termed “an office found” in favor of the king. Admitting that the Government in this country possessed the same right, they have, in the most solemn terms, abandoned it, by holding out inducements, under the ordinance, to foreigners, to become the proprietors of real estate within the Northwestern Territory.

An answer still more conclusive may be given to this objection. The old Congress which framed the ordinance had the unquestionable power to enable aliens to purchase and hold real estate. It was their policy to promote the settlement of this Territory; and for this purpose they have plainly declared, by the ordinance, that aliens, or in other words, that any free male inhabitant, might hold real estate. Even at this day aliens, without any restriction, purchase lands from the United States. To lure them to make purchases, as we have done, and then to attempt to forfeit their estates, would be a violation of every principle of justice and public faith.

The Congress of the United States have repeatedly, in relation to Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois, placed the same construction on this ordinance which I have done. I shall not exhaust either myself, or the Senate, by referring to more than one or two of these instances. In April, 1802, when Congress passed the act authorizing the people of Ohio to form a constitution and State government, it became necessary to prescribe the qualifications of the electors of delegates to the convention. They performed this duty in the fourth section of that act. It declares as follows: “That all male citizens of the United States who shall have arrived at full age, and resided within the said Territory at least one year previous to the day of election, and shall have paid a territorial or county tax, and all persons having, in other respects, the legal qualifications to vote for representatives in the general assembly of the territory, be, and they are hereby, authorized to choose representatives to form a convention.”

Who were these persons having, in other respects, the legal qualifications to vote for Territorial representatives? Let the ordinance itself answer this question. They were free male persons, not citizens of the United States, who held a freehold in fifty acres of land within the Territory, and had resided there for two years. Congress, actuated by the more liberal and enlightened spirit of the age, in the year 1802, dispensed with the freehold qualification in regard to citizens of the United States. They suffered it to remain, however, in relation to those persons within the Territory who were not citizens: but who possessed the legal qualifications, in other respects, to vote for Territorial representatives.

I shall merely refer to another instance in the case of Illinois. On the 20th May, 1812, Congress passed an act to extend the right of suffrage in that Territory. Under this act, no freehold was necessary, in any case, to the exercise of the elective franchise. The spirit of the age had corrected this error in politics. I am glad of it. Our own experience has taught us that the citizen, in humble circumstances, who pays his personal tax, feels as deep an interest in the welfare of the country, and would make as many sacrifices to promote its prosperity and glory, as the man who has an income of thousands from his real estate. Wealth has never been, and never can be, a true standard of patriotism. By the first section of this act, Congress declared that “each and every free white male person, who shall have attained the age of twenty-one years, and who shall have paid a county or Territorial tax, and who shall have resided one year in said Territory previous to any general election, and be, at the time of such election, a resident thereof, shall be entitled to vote for members of the legislative council and house of representatives for the said Territory.” You perceive, sir, that Congress, by this act, no longer retained the distinction which they had established in regard to Ohio, between citizens of the United States and persons in other respects entitled to vote for members of the Territorial legislature. They are all blended together into the same mass, and the elective franchise is conferred upon them all, under the denomination of free white male persons, who have paid taxes and resided one year in the Territory. The phrase citizens of the United States does not once occur in the act. In the second and third sections these free white male persons are denominated citizens of the Territory, not citizens of the United States. Under the ordinance of 1787, they were, in fact, constituted citizens of the Territory; and this phraseology is, therefore, perfectly correct.

The Senator from New Jersey (Mr. Southard) has undertaken the Herculean task of proving that neither the ordinance nor the act of 1802, in relation to Ohio, nor the act to which I have just referred, nor the other similar acts conferred upon any persons not citizens of the United States the right of voting. How far he has been successful, I shall leave for the Senate to judge.

These portions of the ordinance to which I have heretofore referred were subject to the control of Congress. They have been modified and changed in several instances, some of which have been referred to and commented upon in this debate. But I now come to speak of one of those articles of the ordinance, essential to the correct decision of this question, which is placed beyond the power of Congress. To use its own emphatic language, they “shall be considered as articles of compact between the original States and the people and States in the said Territory, and forever remain unalterable, unless by common consent.” This solemn agreement has been confirmed by the Constitution of the United States. No person either denies or doubts the sacred character and the binding force of this contract. The fifth of these articles of this ordinance declares as follows: “And whenever any of the said States shall have sixty thousand free inhabitants therein, such State shall be admitted by its delegates into the Congress of the United States, on an equal footing with the original States, in all respects whatever; and shall be at liberty to form a permanent constitution and State government; provided the constitution and government so to be formed shall be republican, and in conformity to the principles contained in these articles; and, so far as it can be consistent with the general interest of the confederacy, such admission shall be allowed at an earlier period, and when there may be a less number of free inhabitants in the State than sixty thousand.”

Now, sir, under this provision, these sixty thousand free inhabitants had a right to frame a constitution whenever they pleased. They had a right to determine which of them should be electors of delegates to their own convention for that purpose, and which of them should not. It rested solely within their own discretion, whether the elective franchise should be confined to the citizens of the United States, or be extended to other inhabitants of the Territory. It was the right and the duty of Congress first to determine the boundaries of the States to be formed within the limits of the Northwestern Territory. Had this duty been performed, the free inhabitants of Michigan, after they amounted to sixty thousand, would have become a distinct political community under the ordinance. They would have possessed the sovereign right to form a constitution; and if the constitution were republican, and in conformity to the ordinance, they might have demanded admission, by their delegates, into the Congress of the United States. They could not have been refused without a direct violation of the solemnly pledged faith of the nation. If Congress had objected that persons, not citizens of the United States, had been permitted to vote at the election for delegates, they might have triumphantly presented this ordinance, and declared that the question was settled by its terms and its spirit; that the time had arrived when they were entitled to shake off their Territorial dependence, and assume an equal rank with the other States of the Union. Throughout the ordinance there is a marked distinction between “free inhabitants” and “citizens of the United States.”

It is true that Congress have never yet determined the boundaries of the State of Michigan; but their omission to do so could not affect, in any degree, the right of the free male inhabitants to vote for delegates to the convention which framed their constitution. As soon as Michigan shall have been admitted into the Union, the boundaries of Wisconsin will then be irrevocably determined. It will be the last of the five States into which the Northwestern Territory can be divided under the terms of the ordinance. When that Territory shall contain sixty thousand free inhabitants, they will have an absolute right to demand admission, as a State, into the Union, and we cannot refuse to admit them without violating the public faith. Still, I should not advise them to frame a constitution without a previous act of Congress.

The precedent in the case of Tennessee, on which I commented when I addressed the Senate on Wednesday last, has completely silenced all opposition in regard to the necessity of a previous act of Congress to enable the people of Michigan to form a State constitution. It now seems to be conceded, that our subsequent approbation is equivalent to our previous action. This can no longer be doubted. We have the unquestionable power of waiving any irregularities in the method of framing the constitution, had any such existed. It is wiser, I admit, for Congress, in the first instance, to pass such an act; but, after they had refused to do so, from year to year, the people of Michigan had no other alternative but either to take the matter into their own hands, or abandon the hope of admission into the Union, within any reasonable time.

But I am not done with this Tennessee precedent.

It will be recollected that when North Carolina ceded to the United States the territory which now composes the State of Tennessee, it was specially stipulated that the inhabitants within the same should “enjoy all the privileges, benefits and advantages,” set forth in the ordinance for the government of the Northwestern Territory. This provision makes the case of Tennessee one precisely in point with the present. I would ask, then, who voted at the election for delegates to frame the constitution of Tennessee? Let the proclamation of Governor Blount, issued in obedience to an act of the Territorial legislature, answer this question. He declares “that all free males (not free male citizens,) twenty-one years of age and upwards,” shall be entitled to vote. Under this proclamation every free male inhabitant of the Territory had a right to vote, no matter how short a time his inhabitancy may have continued. In this respect it differs from the Territorial law of Michigan, which requires a previous residence of three months.

With a full knowledge of these facts, General Washington, in his message to Congress of the 8th of April, 1796, on the subject of the admission of Tennessee into the Union, declares that “among the privileges, benefits and advantages thus secured to the inhabitants of the Territory south of the river Ohio, appear to be the right of forming a permanent constitution and state of government, and of admission as a State by its delegates into the Congress of the United States, on an equal footing with the original States in all respects whatever, when it should have therein sixty thousand free inhabitants; provided the constitution and government so to be formed should be republican, and in conformity to the principles contained in the articles of the said ordinance.”

The State of Tennessee was accordingly admitted. At this early day, when the ordinance was better understood than it can be at present, no objection was made from any quarter, so far as I can learn, that delegates to the convention which formed the constitution of that State, were voted for by inhabitants who were not citizens of the United States. Certain it is, that no such question was raised by General Washington. Even Mr. King, whose report was decidedly adverse to the admission of this State, never, in the most distant manner, adverts to this objection which has now been so strongly urged by Senators.

I stated when I last addressed the Senate, as a proposition clearly established, that under the ordinance, the States formed out of the Northwestern Territory had a right to confer the elective franchise upon the inhabitants resident within them at the time of the adoption of their constitutions, whether they were citizens or not. I then also asserted, that the States of Ohio and Illinois had not only exercised this power to the extent which Michigan had done, but had gone much further. They had not, like Michigan, confined the elective franchise to inhabitants actually resident within their respective States, at the time of the adoption of their constitutions; but had made a general provision by which all such inhabitants, though not citizens, would be entitled to vote in all future time. These positions, which I thought impregnable, have been violently assailed; and it has been contended that, under the provisions of these constitutions, no persons, except citizens of the United States, are entitled to vote. This renders it necessary that I should again turn to these constitutions. The first section of the fourth article of the constitution of Ohio declares, that “in all elections, all white male inhabitants, above the age of twenty-one years, having resided in the State one year next preceding the election, and who have paid, or are charged with, a State or county tax, shall enjoy the right of an elector; but no person shall be entitled to vote, except in the county or district in which he shall actually reside at the time of the election.” The fifth section of the same article varies the expression, and confers the right of voting “on white male persons,” who are compelled to labor on the roads. These “white male inhabitants,” or “white male persons,” are not required to be citizens of the United States. The terms are as general as they can be. They embrace all persons, whether citizens of the United States or not, who have resided within the State for one year, and are in other respects qualified. Besides, it would be easy to show, by adverting to other parts of this constitution, that the framers of it, in several cases, when they intended to confine its benefits to citizens of the United States, have so declared in express terms. We have heard it stated that by a judicial decision, the right to vote has been restricted to citizens of the United States. This decision has not been produced. I should be very much pleased to see it. I am aware that judicial construction can work wonders; but if any court has decided that “all white male inhabitants,” or “white male persons,” are restricted in their meaning to white male citizens of the United States, it is a stretch of judicial construction which surpasses anything of which I could have conceived.

The constitution of Illinois is still more general in its provisions. It declares that “in all elections, all white male inhabitants, above the age of twenty-one years, having resided in the State six months, next preceding the election, shall enjoy the right of an elector; but no person shall be entitled to vote except in the county or district in which he shall actually reside at the time of the election.” We have been informed by the Senators from Illinois, that the practice of that State has always conformed to the plain meaning of the constitution. At this day, any alien, who has resided within that State for six months, is in the full enjoyment of the elective franchise. Indeed, this privilege has induced aliens to settle in that State in preference to others where they cannot vote until after they have become citizens of the United States.

Now, sir, I wish to be fairly understood upon this question. As a general principle, I do not think that any State of this Union ought to permit any person to exercise the right of an elector who is not either a native or a naturalized citizen of the United States. There may have been, and I think there was, a propriety in conferring the elective franchise upon the inhabitants of the Territory, actually resident therein, although not citizens, who had a right under the ordinance to participate in the formation of the constitution. Beyond this, the power, even under the ordinance, is extremely doubtful. Michigan has wisely confined herself within these limits. She has not followed the example of Ohio and Illinois. These States have been admitted into the Union, notwithstanding the extravagant provisions in their constitutions in favor of foreigners. Would it not then be extremely ungracious to exclude Michigan, when no foreigner can ever hereafter enjoy the right of voting, except such as were resident within the limits of the State at the time of the formation of her constitution?

According to the census, it would appear that not more than from five to six hundred aliens could have been in that situation. At the present time it is probable that many of these have become naturalized citizens. The evil, if it be one, is very small. Within a short period it will entirely disappear. Would it be wise, would it be politic, would it be statesman-like, to annul all that has been done by the convention of Michigan, merely for this reason? Ought we, on this account, to defer the final settlement of the disputed boundary between Ohio and Michigan, and thus again give rise to anarchy and confusion, and perhaps to the shedding of blood? Do you feel confident, that the people of Michigan, after you have violated their rights, by refusing to admit them into the Union at this time, would ever act under your law authorizing them to form a new constitution? We must all desire to see this unfortunate boundary question settled; and the passage of this bill presents the best, if not the only means, of accomplishing a result so desirable.

Have the people of Michigan, or any portion of them, ever complained of this part of their constitution? I would ask, by what authority have the Senators from Ohio and New Jersey (Messrs. Ewing and Southard) raised this objection, whilst the people themselves are content? Even if they did commit an error in this respect, we ought to treat them as children, and not as enemies. It is the part of greatness and magnanimity to pass over unimportant errors of judgment committed by those who are, in some degree, dependent upon us. It would, indeed, be a severe measure of justice, for the Congress of the United States, after having admitted Ohio and Illinois into the Union, to close the door of admission against Michigan. This, in truth, would be straining at a gnat, and swallowing a camel.

Suppose you deprive the people of Michigan of a territory to which they all believe, however erroneously, they have a right, and transfer it to Ohio, and then drive them from your door and refuse to admit them into the Union; can any Senator here view the probable consequences with composure? They are a high-spirited and manly people. You cannot blame them for that. They are bone of your bone, and flesh of your flesh. They have been taught, by your example, to resist what they believe to be oppression. Will they patiently submit to your decree? Will they tamely surrender up to Ohio that territory of which they have been in possession for thirty years? Their past history proves conclusively that they will maintain what they believe to be their rights, to the death. You may have civil war as the direct consequence of your vote this day. Should the amendment of the Senator from Ohio (Mr. Ewing) prevail, whilst it will leave unsettled the question of boundary so important to his own State, it may, and probably will produce, scenes of bloodshed and civil war along the boundary line. I have expressed the opinion, that Congress possess the power of annexing the territory in dispute to the State of Ohio, and that it is expedient to exercise it. The only mode of extorting a reluctant consent from the people of Michigan to this disposition, is to make it a condition of their admission, under their present constitution, into the Union. The bill proposes to do so, and, in my humble judgment, Ohio is deeply interested in its passage.

I shall now, following the example of my friend from New York (Mr. Wright), proceed to make some suggestions upon another point. They are intended merely as suggestions, for I can say with truth I have formed no decided opinion upon the subject. A friend called to see me last evening, and attempted to maintain the proposition that the several States, under the Constitution of the United States, and independent of the ordinance applicable to the Northwestern Territory, had the power of conferring the right to vote upon foreigners resident within their territories. This opinion was at war with all my former impressions. He requested me to do as he had done, and to read over the Constitution of the United States carefully, with a view to this question. I have complied with his request, and shall now throw out a few suggestions upon this subject, merely to elicit the opinion of others.

The older I grow, the more I am inclined to be what is called “a State rights man.” The peace and security of this Union depend upon giving to the Constitution a literal and fair construction, such as would be placed upon it by a plain, intelligent man, and not by ingenious constructions, to increase the powers of this Government, and thereby diminish those of the States. The rights of the States, reserved to them by that instrument, ought ever to be held sacred. If then the Constitution leaves to them to decide according to their own discretion, unrestricted and unlimited, who shall be electors, it follows as a necessary consequence that they may, if they think proper, confer upon resident aliens the right of voting.

It has been supposed, and is perhaps generally believed, that this power has been abridged by that clause in the Constitution which declares, that “the citizens of each State shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens of the several States.” Does then a State, by conferring upon a person, not a citizen of the United States, the privilege of voting, necessarily constitute him a citizen of such State? Is the elective franchise so essentially connected with the citizenship, that the one cannot exist without the other? This is the question. If it be so, no State can exercise this power; because, no State, by bestowing upon an alien the privilege of voting, can make him a citizen of that State, and thereby confer upon him “the privileges and immunities of citizens of the several States.” Citizens are either natives of the country, or they are naturalized. To Congress exclusively belongs the power of naturalization; and I freely admit, that no foreigner can become a citizen of the United States, but by complying with the provisions of the acts of Congress upon this subject. But still we are brought back to the question, may not a State bestow upon a resident alien the right to vote, within its limits, as a personal privilege, without conferring upon him the other privileges of citizenship, or ever intending to render it obligatory upon the other States to receive him as a citizen? Might not Virginia refuse to a foreigner who had voted in Illinois, without having been naturalized, “the privileges and immunities” of one of her citizens, without any violation of the Constitution of the United States? Would such an alien have any pretext for claiming, under the Constitution of the United States, the right to vote within a State where citizens of the United States alone are voters?

It is certain that the Constitution of the United States, in the broadest terms, leaves to the States the qualifications of their own electors, or rather it does not restrict them in any manner upon this question. The second section of the first article provides “that the House of Representatives shall be composed of members chosen every second year by the people of the several States, and the electors in each State shall have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the State Legislature.” By the first section of the second article, “each State shall appoint, in such manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a number of electors equal to the whole number of Senators and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress.” Both these provisions seem to recognize in the States the most absolute discretion in deciding who shall be qualified electors. There is no declaration or intimation throughout the whole instrument that these electors shall be citizens of the United States. Are the States not left to exercise this discretion in the same sovereign manner they did before they became parties to the Federal Constitution? There is at least strong plausibility in the argument, especially when we consider that the framers of the Constitution in order more effectually to guard the reserved rights of the States, inserted a provision, “that the powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”

Without any stretch of imagination, we might conceive a case in which this question would shake our Union to the very centre. Suppose that the decision of the next Presidential election should depend upon the vote of Illinois; and it could be made to appear, that the aliens who voted under the Constitution in that State, had turned the scale in favor of the successful candidate. What would then be the consequence? Have we a right to rejudge her justice? to interfere with her sovereign rights? to declare that her Legislature could not appoint electors of President and Vice President in such manner as they thought proper, and to annul the election?

It is curious to remark, that except in a few instances, the Constitution of the United States has not prescribed that the officers elected or appointed under its authority, shall be citizens; and we all know in practice, that the Senate have been constantly in the habit of confirming the nominations of foreigners as consuls of the United States. They have repeatedly done so, I believe, in regard to other officers.

I repeat that, on this question, I have formed no fixed opinion one way or the other. On the other points of the case, I entertain the clearest conviction, that Michigan is entitled to admission into the Union.

I have thus completed all I intend to say upon this subject. I have been most reluctantly drawn a second time into this debate. I had the admission of Arkansas specially entrusted to my care. Few, if any, of the objections urged against Michigan, are applicable to Arkansas; but I could not conceal from myself the fact, that the admission of the one depended upon that of the other; and I am equally anxious to receive both the sisters.

The people of Texas were at this time engaged in their revolutionary effort to make themselves independent of Mexico. It was deemed necessary to authorize the President of the United States to accept the services of volunteers for the defence of the frontiers. On a bill introduced for this purpose, and which had passed the House of Representatives, Mr. Buchanan, on the 4th of May, said:

He had no doubt but that the Government of the United States, in regard to Mexico, had pursued, and would pursue, the course which had been sanctioned by all its experience in relation to questions of this kind. One principle had been established in the political history of the country; had grown with its growth, and strengthened with its strength; and without knowing what the President had done or would do in this matter, he had no doubt but he would strictly adhere to that established principle in our institutions, never to interfere with the internal policy or domestic concerns of foreign nations. The famous proclamation of neutrality of General Washington first asserted that principle, and to it our Government had always adhered. We consider, said Mr. B., all nations “enemies in war, and in peace, friends.”

In regard to Mexico, he considered Santa Anna as an usurper. The federal constitution, established for the Republic of Mexico, and which Texas, as a part of that Republic, had sworn to support, had been trampled on by him, and Texas, in his eyes, and in the eyes of all mankind, was justified in rebelling against him. Whether the Texans acted consistently with a true policy at the time, in declaring their independence, he should not discuss, nor should he decide; but as a man and an American, he should be rejoiced to see them successful in maintaining their liberties, and he trusted in God they would be so. He would, however, leave them to rely on their own bravery, with every hope and prayer that the God of battles would shield them with his protection.

If Santa Anna excited the Indians within our territory to deeds of massacre and blood; if he should excite a spirit among them which he cannot restrain; and if, in consequence, the blood of our women and children on the frontier shall flow, he undoubtedly ought to be held responsible. Mr. B. saw a strong necessity for sending a force to the frontiers, not only to restrain the natural disposition of the Indians to deeds of violence, but because they could place no confidence in a man who had so little command of his temper, who had shown so cruel and sanguinary a disposition as Santa Anna had. He was for having a force speedily sent to that frontier, and a force of mounted men or dragoons, as suggested by the Senator from Missouri (Mr. Linn), but he was against interfering in the war now raging in Texas, unless an attack should be made on us.

If it were left for him to decide to which bill a preference should be given by the Senate, he would first take up the bill providing for this additional force for the protection of the frontiers; but he had been instructed by an authority which he was bound to respect and obey, and he must, therefore, vote to take up the land bill. He should vote with the warmest friends of that bill in its favor till it was either carried through or defeated. To-day or to-morrow, the land bill would be finally disposed of; it now stood in the way of everything else; and he would then be for proceeding with the appropriation bills as rapidly as possible. He should have said nothing about instructions, had not this question of preference been brought up. After the decision of the land bill, he should give his hearty support to carry through the bills necessary for the defence of the country, with as much expedition as possible.

Mr. Preston presented the petition of a number of the citizens of Philadelphia, on the subject of the affairs of Texas; and praying Congress to acknowledge the independence of that country.

Mr. Buchanan said he had received several memorials from the city of Philadelphia, of the same character as those which had been presented by the Senator from South Carolina (Mr. Preston). He had intended to present them this morning to the Senate, but was prevented from doing so at the proper time by an accidental circumstance. It was also his intention to have accompanied their presentation by some remarks. These he thought best to offer now, rather than to wait until to-morrow morning, and then become instrumental in getting up another debate.

These memorials asked Congress “to recognize the independence of Texas, and at such time, and in such manner, as may be deemed proper, interpose to terminate the conflict which now rages in that country.”

In some remarks, which he had submitted to the Senate a few days since, and which, like all other proceedings in this body, had been much misrepresented abroad, he had indulged the feelings of a man and an American citizen. What he then uttered were the sentiments of his own heart, in relation to the existing trouble in Texas. But when he was called on as a Senator to recognize the independence of that country, he thought it prudent to refer back to the conduct of our ancestors, when placed in similar circumstances, and to derive lessons of wisdom from their example. If there was any one principle of our public policy which had been well settled—one which had been acted upon by every administration, and which had met the approbation not only of this country, but of every civilized government with which we have intercourse, it was that we should never interfere in the domestic concerns of other nations. Recognizing in the people of every nation the absolute right to adopt such forms of government as they thought proper, we had always preserved the strictest neutrality between the parties, in every country, whilst engaged in civil war. We had left all nations perfectly free, so far as we were concerned, to establish, to maintain, or to change their forms of government, according to their own sovereign will and pleasure. It would indeed be surprising, and more than that, it would be unnatural, if the sympathies of the American people should not be deeply, earnestly enlisted in favor of those who drew the sword for liberty throughout the world, no matter where it was raised to strike. Beyond this we had never proceeded.

The peaceful influence of our example upon other nations was much greater—the cause of free government was thus more efficiently promoted than if we should waste the blood and treasure of the people of the United States in foreign wars, waged even to maintain the sacred cause of liberty. The world must be persuaded, it could not be conquered. Besides, said Mr. B., we can never, with any proper regard for the welfare of our constituents, devote their energies and their resources to the cause of planting and sustaining free institutions among the people of other nations.

Acting upon these principles, we had always recognized existing governments de facto, whether they were constitutional or despotic. We had the same amicable relations with despotisms as with free governments; because we had no right to quarrel with people of any nation on account of the form of government which they might think proper to adopt or to sanction. It was their affair, not ours. We would not tolerate such interference from abroad; and we ought to demean ourselves towards foreign nations as we should require them to act towards ourselves.

A very striking illustration of this principle had been presented, during the present administration, in the case of Portugal. We recognized Don Miguel’s government, because he was de facto in possession of the throne, apparently with the consent of the Portuguese people. In this respect, Mr. B. believed, we stood alone, or nearly alone, among the nations of the earth. When he was expelled from that country, and the present queen seemed to be firmly seated upon the throne, we had no difficulty, pursuing our established policy, in recognizing her government.

A still more striking case, and one to the very point in question, had occurred during Mr. Monroe’s administration. The Spanish provinces, throughout the whole continent of America, had raised the standard of rebellion against the king of Spain. They were struggling for liberty against oppression. The feelings of the American people were devotedly enlisted in their favor. Our ardent wishes and our prayers for their success, continued throughout the whole long and bloody conflict. But we took no other part in their cause; and we rendered them no assistance, except the strong moral influence exerted over the world by our well-known feelings and opinions in their favor. When, said Mr. B., did we recognize their independence? Not till after they had achieved it by their arms; not until the contest was over, and victory had perched upon their banners; not until the good fight had been fought and won. We then led the van in acknowledging their independence. But until they were independent in fact, we resisted every effort and every eloquent appeal which was made in their behalf, to induce us to depart from the settled policy of the country. When the fact of their actual independence was established; then, and not till then, did we acknowledge it.

He would rejoice should similar success attend the arms of the Texans. He trusted they would yet conquer their independence against the myrmidons of Santa Anna. In that event, there was no man in the country who would vote more cheerfully to recognize it than himself. Until that time should arrive, he must continue to act upon the firmly established principle which had been our guide for nearly half a century.

Mr. B. believed that no President of the United States had ever been more strongly convinced of the necessity of maintaining this principle inviolate than General Jackson. His whole conduct towards foreign governments had made this manifest. Whilst, said Mr. B., he requires justice from all, he treats all with justice. In his annual message, at the commencement of the present session, he informed Congress that instructions had been given to the district attorneys of the United States, to prosecute all persons who might attempt to violate our neutrality in the civil war between Mexico and Texas. He also stated that he had apprised the government of Mexico that we should require the integrity of our territory to be scrupulously respected by both parties. He thus declared to the world, not only that we had determined to be neutral between the parties, but that our neutrality must be respected by both. This afforded abundant evidence of his disposition neither to interfere with the internal concerns of other nations, nor to submit to any violation of the law of nations by them. Mr. B. entertained not a doubt that the line of conduct which he had marked out for himself, in the beginning, he would pursue until the end, so far as the executive Government was concerned.

It was obviously necessary to concentrate a strong military force on the confines of Texas, not only to enforce our neutrality, but to protect the lives and property of our fellow-citizens. This had been done; but the commanding general had been strictly prohibited from acting, except on the defensive.

Such a force was absolutely necessary to preserve inviolate our treaty with Mexico. Under it, we were bound to maintain peace among the Indian nations along the frontier of the two countries, and to restrain the Indians within our territory by force, if that should become necessary, from making war upon Mexico. This obligation was reciprocal and bound both parties. If the Indians from Texas should be let slip upon our frontier; if they, or Santa Anna, or any other power should attempt to invade our territory, then every American would say, repel force by force, and return blow for blow. Our cause and our quarrel would be just.

But, said Mr. B., let us not, by departing from our settled policy, give rise to the suspicion that we have got up this war for the purpose of wresting Texas from those to whom, under the faith of treaties, it justly belongs. Since the treaty with Spain of 1819, there could no longer be any doubt, but that this province was a part of Mexico. He was sorry for it; but such was the undeniable fact. Let us then follow the course which we had pursued, under similar circumstances, in all other cases.

Mr. B. said his blood boiled whilst contemplating the cruelties and the barbarities which were said to have been committed by the Mexicans in this contest. The heart sickened and revolted at such a spectacle. But, as an American Senator, he could give the Texans nothing except his prayers and his good wishes.

Mr. Calhoun, from the Committee of Conference appointed on the part of the Senate, to confer with a committee of the House on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses as to the Senate’s amendment to the bill authorizing the President to accept the services of ten thousand volunteers for the defence of the western frontiers, reported that the committees of the two Houses had had a meeting, but that they had not been able to effect the objects for which they were appointed, having sat the whole day without coming to any agreement whatever.

Mr. King of Alabama (from the same committee) observed that it was true that they had come to no agreement on the point at issue between the two Houses, inasmuch as some gentlemen seemed to think that they had the whole bill under consideration, and that they had the power to modify it at pleasure. He hoped that when the Senate again appointed a committee of conference, they would appoint gentlemen who would be willing to confine their deliberations to the subject of disagreement, and not think themselves authorized to take the range of the whole bill.

Mr. Calhoun replied that the committee did confine themselves to the subject of disagreement, until finding that there was no possibility of coming to an agreement on that point, they entered into a more enlarged discussion, for the purpose of ascertaining whether the bill could not be so framed as to meet the concurrence of both Houses. His understanding was, that when a committee of conference came to a proposition that could not be agreed on, the whole subject was open to them.

Mr. King recollected exactly the state of the case. The proposition last made was, that they should extend the term of service of the militia force of the United States for a year, instead of its being a volunteer militia force. This was the last subject of conference; and after talking until half-past five o’clock, the committee found that they could come to no agreement whatever.

Mr. Buchanan said that he had been a member of the Committee of Conference; and if a second committee should now be appointed, he hoped he would be excused from serving upon it. He did not believe that the appointment of the same committee by the Senate and the House could result in any practical good. They had been busily engaged in the Conference Chamber until a late hour yesterday, and when they had separated, they were further, if possible, from agreeing, than when they had first met.

For his own part, he could not feel the force of the constitutional objections which had been made by the Senator from South Carolina (Mr. Calhoun). It was true that the amendment which had been proposed by the Senate to the bill of the House was somewhat vague and ambiguous in its terms. He had thought, at one time, during the conference, that we should have agreed upon an amendment to the Senate’s amendment, which would have made the bill much more explicit, and would have removed all the constitutional objections of the gentlemen. When it came to the final vote, he found that he had been mistaken.

The amendment proposed in the Committee of Conference provided that none of the officers should be appointed by the President, until the volunteers were actually mustered into the service of the United States. Until that moment, the companies which might be formed would thus be considered as mere voluntary associations, under no pledge whatever, except that of honor, to enter the service of their country. When once, however, this pledge was redeemed—when they were mustered into the service—they became a portion of the army of the United States for the period of six or twelve months; and then there could not possibly be a constitutional objection to the appointment of their officers by the President. Congress possessed the power to raise armies in any manner they thought proper. Whether they obtained soldiers by individual enlistments, or whether the patriotic young men of the country chose to associate together as volunteers, and come in masses, we had an equal right to receive them. The one mode of obtaining soldiers was just as constitutional as the other.

The amendment which had been proposed, whilst it practically insured to the companies the selection of their own company officers, did not interfere with the constitutional powers of the President. The volunteers themselves were to designate such officers, and if the President approved of such designations, these officers would be appointed. This would be the best and strongest recommendation which could be presented to him; and, no doubt, he would always obey the wishes of the companies, unless in cases where powerful and satisfactory reasons existed to render it improper.

Until these volunteers should actually enter the service, they would continue to be militia men of the States, and liable to perform militia duty in the States. Their character would not be changed. They would not constitute a dormant standing army in the States, with officers appointed by the President, as had been urged, but would be mere associations, bound together by no law but that of honor. Such men would always be ready to obey the call of their country in case of necessity.

The Senator from South Carolina (Mr. Calhoun) did argue that it would be a violation of the Constitution for the President to appoint these officers without the previous advice and consent of the Senate. Whatever doubt might have rested upon this point at the organization of our Government, this power had been exercised, over and over again, ever since the adoption of the Constitution, under all administrations. The precedents were numerous. One act had been read which passed during the late war, conferring upon the President, in express terms, the power of appointing all the officers of the military force to be raised under its provisions, but requiring him to submit these appointments to the Senate for their approbation at the next session. The very same thing was proposed to be done by this act, in regard to all the officers above the rank of captain.

He was afraid to trust his memory in attempting to state the proceedings of the Committee of Conference. So much had been said, that he could not, if he would, undertake to report it all. We did not confine ourselves to the point of disagreement between the two Houses; but almost every question relating to the military defence of the country had been ably and eloquently discussed. He had derived much information on this subject from the members of that committee.

There was one fact which he would mention, and which demanded the serious consideration of the country at the present crisis. A gallant and distinguished officer, who was a member of the committee, (Gen. Ripley) had stated, that, according to his recollection, the history of our Indian wars did not present a single case in which a volunteer force had been beaten by the Indians. Our disasters in this kind of warfare had always been suffered by the regular troops. Our recent experience was certainly in accordance with this statement. This important fact, however, established the necessity of raising volunteer corps, in some form or other, composed of the brave and hardy youth, accustomed to the modes of Indian warfare, and who were able and willing to fight the Indians, man to man, according to their own custom. Such men would best protect our citizens from the ravages of the Indians, and would soon put an end to the Creek war.

He had said more than he intended, as his chief object in rising had been to request that he might not be appointed a member of the new Committee of Conference.

Mr. Buchanan could not now but hope, after having heard the observations of the Senator from South Carolina (Mr. Calhoun), that a Committee of Conference might yet agree upon some compromise which would be acceptable to both Houses. He now believed, from what he had just heard from several members of the other House, that another committee ought to be appointed.

The Senator from South Carolina had not, he believed, denied any of the positions which he had stated. They did not materially differ as to their constitutional views on this subject. His (Mr. B.’s) positions were these: that any number of individuals within the States might associate together, either in companies, battalions, or divisions, for the purpose of entering the army of the United States, for six or for twelve months, upon any contingency which might render their services necessary; that these associations would be voluntary and not compulsory; and would be held together by no tie but that sense of honor which binds a man to enter the service of his country, after he has declared, in the presence of the world, that such was his determination; and that these volunteers, after having arrived at the place of rendezvous, and after having been mustered into service, but not before, became a part of the regular army of the United States; and the President could then, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, appoint their officers. At one period of the conference, he had believed that the committee would arrive at these conclusions.

One of the objections of the Senator from South Carolina was, that the appointment of the captains of companies and other inferior officers ought, like that of the superior officers, to be submitted to the Senate. Mr. B. had been perfectly willing and was still willing to adopt this modification. He could not, however, agree, nor did he understand the gentleman now to insist upon it, that these offices could not be filled without the previous advice of the Senate. Such a provision would render the law perfectly nugatory. We might not, and probably would not, be in session when these appointments must be made. The same necessity which the gentleman alleges to have existed during the late war, for authorizing the President to make appointments, during the recess of the Senate, will exist in regard to the appointments to be made under this act.—Besides, whatever might be our opinion in regard to the power of the President, if the question were now, for the first time, submitted to us, Congress have so often authorized him to make appointments, during the recess, to be submitted to the Senate at its next session, that this constitutional question must be considered as settled.

As to the act of 1812, which had just been cited by the other Senator from South Carolina (Mr. Preston), he thought it went too far. He would not say that it was unconstitutional, because he had not examined the subject sufficiently to express a positive opinion. This he would say, however, that it did authorize the existence of a dormant military force within the several States, commanded by officers appointed by the President of the United States, and liable to be called into service at any moment he might think proper. The individuals composing this force were exempted from militia duty within the States. Upon the principles contained in this act, the militia of the several States might be subverted, and a national militia, under the command of national officers, might be substituted in its stead. This would certainly be at war with the spirit of the Constitution, which reserves to the States respectively the appointment of the officers of the militia, and the authority of training them according to the discipline prescribed by Congress. The militia emphatically belongs to the States, and not to the General Government; and it might be very dangerous for the States to surrender their control over this force into the hands of Congress.

Under the act cited by the gentleman, a portion of the militia was taken from the control of the States, and relieved from the performance of militia duty, whilst they remained in the heart of the country, mixed up with the other citizens. This did seem to him to interfere with the power of the States over their militia, contrary to the provisions of the Constitution. But these objections did not apply to the bill before them, nor to the amendment he had suggested. They had drawn a broad line of separation between the force to be raised and the militia of the States. What they proposed was, that these volunteers should associate themselves together for the purpose of offering their services to their country, and that when they arrived at their places of rendezvous, they should enrol themselves, and be mustered into service as a part of the regular army; but until then, that they should remain as they were, citizens of the several States, liable to the performance of the militia duty of the States. With these views, he was confident that a new Committee of Conference might come to such an agreement as would be acceptable to both Houses, and he therefore hoped that one would be appointed. He was almost ashamed to say that he had never acquainted himself sufficiently with the rules which governed the proceedings of a Committee of Conference. His common sense, however, had taught him that it was the duty of such a committee to confine itself to the point of disagreement between the two Houses; but he had been informed by gentlemen of great experience that the whole subject of the bill was open to them. Acting upon this principle, they had got into a general discussion as to the relative value of volunteer and regular as well as common militia forces. He believed now that a Committee of Conference might do some good, and that by steering clear of the constitutional scruples of gentlemen, they might agree on some amendments that would render the bill acceptable to both Houses, and thus enable them speedily to adopt a measure so urgently demanded for the protection of the suffering inhabitants of the frontiers.

Mr. B. said, as he should not be a member of the new Committee of Conference, he would read the amendment which had been so much discussed in the old committee:

“Be it enacted, That the said volunteers shall form themselves into companies, and designate their company officers, who, if he approve of such designations, shall be commissioned by the President, after they shall have been mustered into service; and that the President be, and hereby is, authorized to organize the volunteers so mustered into service, as aforesaid, into battalions, squadrons, regiments, brigades and divisions, as soon as the number of volunteers shall render such organization, in his judgment, expedient, and shall then appoint the necessary officers, which appointment shall be submitted to the Senate at its next session.”