THE OREGON CONTROVERSY—DANGER OF A WAR WITH ENGLAND—NEGOTIATION FOR A SETTLEMENT OF THE BOUNDARY—PRIVATE CORRESPONDENCE.

Among the subjects involved in the foreign relations of the country, when Mr. Buchanan became Secretary of State, and which demanded his immediate attention, one of the most important and critical was the title to the territory of Oregon, that had long been in dispute between Great Britain and the United States. The northern boundary of this region of country, which should have separated British America west of the Rocky Mountains from the dominion of the United States, had not been settled by the treaty negotiated at Washington between the two powers in 1842, because Lord Ashburton had no instructions to deal with it. As far back as the administration of President Monroe, an extension of the 49th parallel of latitude to the Pacific, as the boundary, was offered by the United States to England, but it was declined. The British claim was founded on the assertion that the title of the United States, which was derived through the Louisiana and Florida treaties, was not exclusive as to any part of the territory; and since it was for the interest of the Hudson Bay Company to follow the Columbia River to the ocean, and since the English asserted an actual and previous occupation as well as the Americans, it became desirable for England to have a right of joint occupation established, until the boundary between the two national possessions should be finally settled. A convention was entered into in 1827, establishing such a joint occupation until notice of its termination should be given by either of the two powers. This concession on the part of the United States, made in the interest of peace, left an open question between the two governments, both claiming the whole territory. But what was “the whole” of Oregon? On the American side of the controversy, the region claimed extended to a line that would be marked by the parallel of 54° 40′ north latitude. This would have carried the American title on the Pacific coast far above the Strait of Fuca and Vancouver’s Island, and would have made an irregular boundary, not coinciding in latitude with the northern boundary of the United States east of the Rocky Mountains. On the other hand, the claim of England brought her down to the mouth of the Columbia River, which has its source nearly at the 50th parallel, and flows in a circuitous course of about eight hundred miles, first to the south, and then to the west, until it reaches the Pacific. The joint occupation agreed upon in 1827, had become inconvenient, and indeed dangerous for both nations. A very uneasy feeling sprang up in our Western States and among the settlers who were pushing into this territory, and who looked to the United States for titles to the land, and for the protection due from the sovereign power. Popular opinion about our right was not likely to be founded in intelligent investigation, but it was sure to find its way into the political action of the Democratic party. The political body which nominated Mr. Polk as its candidate for the Presidency, proclaimed our title to be “clear and unquestionable.” Mr. Polk considered himself as elected under an imperative popular instruction to assert this claim, and in his inaugural address he put it forth in very strong terms as extending to the parallel of 54° 40′. This was the attitude of the matter when Mr. Buchanan became Secretary of State.

Notwithstanding the strong personal convictions of the President and the Secretary of State of the validity of this claim as it was asserted in Mr. Polk’s inaugural address, deference for the action of former administrations and a desire to avoid a rupture with England, led the President to authorize Mr. Buchanan to offer the 49th parallel as the boundary. This offer was made to Mr. Pakenham, the British Minister at Washington, on the 10th of July, 1845. Without referring this offer to his own government and awaiting instructions, Mr. Pakenham replied on the 30th of July, that “after this exposition of the views entertained by the British government respecting the relative value and importance of the British and American claims, the American Plenipotentiary will not be surprised to hear that the undersigned does not feel at liberty to accept the proposal offered by the American Plenipotentiary for the settlement of the question.” He closed his note by expressing his “trust that the American Plenipotentiary will be prepared to offer some further proposal for the settlement of the Oregon question, more consistent with fairness and equity, and with the reasonable expectations of the British government.” These were very unfortunate expressions, since they implied, under the circumstances, that the American Government had begun the negotiation by asserting a claim that was untenable, and had followed its assertion with an unfair and inequitable offer. Had this language of the British plenipotentiary become public at that moment, the consequences would have been an uncontrollable excitement throughout this country. Careful, however, to keep open the door for mutual concessions, Mr. Buchanan, before he answered Mr. Pakenham’s note, wrote to Mr. McLane, who had succeeded Mr. Everett as United States Minister in London, an elaborate despatch, tracing the diplomatic history of the Oregon question, and suggesting, with much skill, the modes in which an unfortunate result might be avoided. Indefatigably industrious, and employing no pen but his own, he gave to his official papers a polish, the marks of which remain on the original drafts, attesting the extreme care that he bestowed upon them. Mr. McLane was instructed to make known the contents of this despatch to the British ministry, in case they made inquiries of him.

The offer of the 49th parallel having been withdrawn, Mr. Buchanan, on the 30th of August, addressed a note to Mr. Pakenham, in which he reasserted the American claim to what he regarded as “the whole of Oregon,” and made an elaborate and exhaustive exposition of its grounds. There are few papers on the diplomatic records of our Government more able and searching than this exposition of the American claim to the territory of Oregon. Thoroughly master of his subject, and fully convinced of the validity of the claim which he was asserting, Mr. Buchanan wrote this paper with a dignified force that was not unlikely to command the assent of impartial persons, when the document should become public. Writing to Mr. McLane afterwards, he said: “this note of Mr. Pakenham (July 30th) became the subject of grave deliberation by the President. Upon a full consideration of the whole question, and after waiting a month, he deemed it to be a duty which he owed to his country to withdraw his proposition (of the 49th parallel), which he had submitted, and to maintain the right of the United States to the whole of Oregon. This was done by my note to Mr. Pakenham of the 30th of August last.”

But the note of August 30th could not become public while the negotiation was pending, or before the meeting of Congress in December. In the mean time, Mr. Pakenham endeavored to have the American offer of the 49th parallel restored. “Judging from late conversations with Mr. Pakenham,” Mr. Buchanan again writes to Mr. McLane, “he is now anxious that this withdrawal should be withdrawn, and that the negotiation might proceed as if our offer were still in force. But the President will not consent to change his position and to recall what has already been done. He will not renew his former offer, nor submit any new proposition; and it must remain for the British government to decide what other or further steps, if any, they may think proper to take in the negotiation. The President has adopted this determination after two cabinet councils, and he deems it necessary that this should be communicated to you, in order that you may clearly understand his purpose.”

The correspondence was submitted by the President to Congress, in December (1845), and its publication was immediately followed in this country by a considerable change of feeling in those quarters where the course of the administration was watched with most jealousy, and where war was most dreaded. In the House of Representatives, where the war feeling of the Northwest found expression, some violent speeches were made. In the Senate there was a moderate tone, but steps were taken looking to the termination of the joint occupation, and to an inquiry into the state of the national defences. These movements had an ominous appearance. In the diplomatic department, however, the negotiation went on quietly.

On the 23d of December, Mr. Buchanan made the following brief minute of a cabinet consultation held on that day, at which the President said:

If Mr. Pakenham inquires if a new proposition made by them would be respectfully considered, I would refer him to the correspondence—your last note of the 30th August, and say it has been at your option, with a perfect liberty to propose any proposition you thought proper, and you had no reason to conclude from what had occurred here that the Government would not have treated such a proposition with respectful consideration when made. You have made no new proposition, and the question, therefore, stands on its present attitude.

December 23, 1845.—I took down the foregoing from the lips of the President, in the presence of the cabinet.

Four days afterward an interview took place at the State Department, of which I find the following account in Mr. Buchanan’s hand-writing:

On Saturday afternoon, 27th of December, 1845, Mr. Pakenham called at the Department of State. After some brief preliminary conversation on other topics, he informed me that he had received instructions from his government relative to the Oregon question; without at the time informing me what they were. He then proceeded to express his desire that I should recall the withdrawal of our offer to settle the Oregon question by the 49th parallel of latitude, and suffer the negotiation to proceed on that basis, expressing the belief that it might then result in a satisfactory manner. I informed him that he had made one proposition to Mr. Calhoun, which had been rejected; that I had made a proposition which had been rejected by him and then withdrawn; that the whole negotiation had been submitted to Congress with the President’s message; and after all this, it was too late to expect that the President would now retrace his steps. That what had been done must be considered as done.

He then said that if he were now to make a new proposition, he had no means of knowing whether it would be accepted: if he made a proposition it might be rejected.

I replied that the whole field was open to him, as it had been in the beginning; that it was as free to him as it had been to him at first, or was to me afterwards, to make any proposition he thought proper; that all I could say was that any proposition he might make would be respectfully considered by the President; but I said no more.

He then observed that as I was not willing to go further (as I understood him), he would, under his instructions, present me the offer of the British government to arbitrate the question. He said it was drawn up chiefly in the very language of Lord Aberdeen.

I then received the communication from him, and read it over carefully. As soon as I had completed its perusal, he urged its acceptance strongly; expressed his great desire for the preservation of peace between the two countries, and said that it was impossible that war should grow out of such a question between two great nations. He said he was not worth much in the world; but would give half what he was worth to see the question honorably and amicably adjusted between the two nations.

I stated the strong desire, both on the part of the President and myself, that the question might be amicably and honorably adjusted. That we had every disposition that this result might be attained. I observed, however, that if ever this was accomplished, I thought it must be by negotiation, and not by arbitration; and especially such an arbitration as he proposed. That both the President and myself were firmly convinced of the validity of our title up to 54° 40´; and yet his proposition to arbitrate assumed the right to a portion of the territory on the part of Great Britain, and left it to the arbitrator alone to decide in what manner the territory should be divided between the parties. That this alone, I thought, would be a sufficient reason for the rejection of his proposition, even if others did not exist, of which he must be aware from our previous conversations on the subject; but I would consult the President, and give him an answer with as little delay as possible. He intimated rather than expressed a wish that his answer might be communicated to him in time for the packet (Monday). I told him that a proper respect for the British government required that the answer should be well considered; that the cabinet would not meet again before Tuesday, and I could not encourage him to expect the answer before Saturday next. He said he had no doubt my answer would be well considered. He hoped that in it I would not assert a claim to the whole territory, and Saturday next would be in time.

He then branched off, and said that the proposition was to refer the question to a state as well as a sovereign; he said that this had been done on purpose to get clear of the objection to crowned heads. I asked him to whom he thought it might be referred if not to a sovereign. He suggested the Republic of Switzerland, or the government of Hamburg or Bremen. I told him that whilst my own inclinations were strongly against arbitration; if I were compelled to select an arbitrator, it would be the Pope. That both nations were heretics, and the Pope would be impartial. This he appeared at first to take seriously,—he said the Pope was a temporal sovereign; but I thought he was disinclined to select him as an arbitrator. He perceived, however, that I was not in earnest, and suggested that the reference might be made to commissioners from both countries. I told him I thought it was vain to think of arbitration; because, even if the President were agreed to it, which I felt pretty certain he was not, no such treaty could pass the Senate. That the pursuit of arbitration would only involve the question in new difficulties. He then suggested the mediation of a third power in the adjustment of the question. I told him that was an idea which he had never suggested before, and on which I could say nothing. He observed that this, together with his suggestion of commissioners, came from himself and had not been embraced in his instructions. He said that a mediator who would interfere might share the fate of the man who interfered between two other men who were fighting, when both fell upon him and gave him a sound drubbing.

He remarked that the affair might remain just where it was, and the British government would not disturb it. He did not entertain serious apprehensions of war.

He then told me that he had met Judge Douglas at Mr. Cox’s party the other evening, and had a good deal of conversation with him about his bill.

He objected to a promise of a grant of lands to actual settlers in Oregon, and to the erection of forts by the Government within it, as violations of the treaty. I told him I had formed no decided opinion as to the promise of grants of land; but as to the forts, it was very clear, in my opinion, that we had a right to erect them. We did not purpose to erect fortifications capable of enduring a siege in civilized warfare; but merely stockade forts to protect our emigrants from the savages. That the Hudson’s Bay Company had erected many such forts, and we surely had the right under the treaty to do what they had done. He observed that the settlers might do this themselves as the Company had done. I replied that they were too poor; that this Company had the entire government in its hands; and surely we might do what they had done. I observed that this was ever the way with Great Britain, she was always fettered by monopolies; and if it were not for the Company they would at once give us our rights to the whole country up to 54° 40′. He said that the Hudson’s Bay Company had rights in Oregon which must be protected; but I understood him to admit that they did interpose an obstacle in the way of the settlement of the question. He said the British government would be glad to get clear of the question on almost any terms; that they did not care if the arbitrator should award the whole territory to us. They would yield it without a murmur. I said I had no doubt of this. They never played the part of the fox: but always of the lion. They would preserve their faith inviolate. He said they wished for peace; but intimated that this was not our wish. I asked him why we should desire war. Would not their superiority at sea give them command of the coasts of Oregon. Yes, he said, that was true, but the war would not be confined to that region. That he would willingly make a bargain to fight it out with us there, if we would agree to that.

On the 26th of February (1846), Mr. Buchanan addressed an elaborate official despatch to Mr. McLane, explaining fully the reasons which had led the President to decline to make the boundary of Oregon a subject of arbitration, and suggesting what it would be practicable for the President to agree upon, if proposed by the British government. Mr. McLane was authorized to make known to Lord Aberdeen the contents of this despatch; and between its date and the 1st of June, Sir Robert Peel’s government determined to send to Washington the project of a convention which is described in a despatch addressed to Mr. J. Randolph Clay on the 13th of June, and which is given below. The despatch of February 26th, to Mr. McLane, was accompanied by a private letter of the same date. On the 6th of June, another private letter to Mr. McLane informed him of the President’s purpose to submit Lord Aberdeen’s project to the Senate, and the despatch of June 13th to Mr. Clay gives the result.

My Dear Sir:—

The brief space left to me before the departure of our messenger to Boston shall be devoted to writing you a private letter...... By my despatch you will be made distinctly acquainted with the ground which the President has determined to maintain on the Oregon question; and I do not perceive, after what has passed, how he could do more than submit a British proposition, based on the parallel of 49°, to the Senate. From all I can learn, there is not the least doubt but that either of the two propositions specified in my despatch would receive the previous sanction of a constitutional majority of that body. I say the previous sanction, for reasons which I have not the time to give you. All that I apprehend is, that the British government, in their offer, may insist on the perpetual free navigation of the Columbia. This would indeed be truly embarrassing; and all your diplomacy should be exerted to prevent it. The President would not present such a proposition to the Senate, unless he should greatly change his mind; and if he should, I do not believe that two-thirds of that body would give it their sanction.

I am convinced that the Oregon question is rapidly reaching that point when it must, if ever, be peaceably settled. Although what I have said to you of the present disposition of the Senate is strictly true, it is uncertain how long this may continue. Public opinion on this subject is far in advance of Congress. I am convinced that if the question should remain open until the Congressional elections next fall, this would be clearly evinced...... In Great Britain they form their judgment of popular opinion from what they read in the newspapers, chiefly Whig, of our large commercial cities. This you know to be a mistake. The commercial interest which, in a great degree controls these papers, has a direct interest in the preservation of peace, and especially with Great Britain. The strong and irresistible public opinion throughout the vast interior of our country, which controls the action of the Government, is but little, if at all, affected by the considerations which influence the mercantile community. General Cass and Mr. Allen, who are both candidates for popular favor, the one immediately and the other prospectively, will not consent to accept the parallel of 49°. The two Senators from Indiana, the two from Illinois, and one from Missouri (not Colonel Benton), occupy the same ground.

Mr. Calhoun, from a variety of circumstances, came to the Senate with a flush of popularity, which might have rendered him highly useful, both to himself and to his country; but, already, it is nearly all gone. He at once took open and bold ground against the notice, and propagated his opinions with that degree of zeal which belongs to his character. He succeeded in inducing a small number of Democrats in the House, chiefly Virginians, to vote against the notice; and such is now the weight of public opinion in its favor, that it is said he would vote for it himself, but for the awkward dilemma in which this would place his friends in the House. The truth is, that the discreet friends of peace clearly perceive that the question must be settled peaceably within the year, or war may be the consequence. In some form or other it will pass the Senate by a large majority; and many anticipate an almost unanimous vote. I do not believe this. I have always liked Mr. Calhoun very much, and am truly sorry that he did not adopt a wiser course. He must have been the great man of our party in the Senate. Colonel Benton’s conduct and speech on the Oregon question are entitled to warm commendation. Your son Robert is winning laurels for himself in the Maryland legislature. He is indeed a fine fellow, and a worthy chip of the old block.

I have for years been anxious to obtain a seat on the bench of the Supreme Court. This has been several times within my power; but circumstances have always prevented me from accepting the offered boon. I cannot desert the President, at the present moment, against his protestations. If the Oregon question should not be speedily settled, the vacancy must be filled; and then farewell to my wishes.

...... Please to remember me in the kindest terms to Mrs. McLane, and believe me, as ever, to be, sincerely and respectfully,

My Dear Sir:—

I have but little time to scribble you a private letter before the closing of the mail to go by the Great Britain.

The President has determined to submit Lord Aberdeen’s project to the Senate. He had no alternative, as you know, between this and its absolute rejection.

The proviso to the first article would seem to render it questionable whether both parties would have the right to navigate the Strait of Fuca, as an arm of the sea, north of the parallel of 49°; neither does it provide that the line shall pass through the Canal de Arro, as stated in your despatch. This would probably be the fair construction.

The article relating to the possessions of British occupants south of 49° is vague and indefinite; and in order to prevent disputes between the two governments hereafter, as to the extent of these possessions, it would seem to be a prudent precaution to provide some means of ascertaining the rights of these occupants respectively. There is no reciprocal provision in the treaty for American settlers north of 49°. There may be none there; but yet such a provision would give the convention a fairer appearance.

The right of the Hudson’s Bay Company to the navigation of the Columbia presents the important difficulty. It is considered doubtful by the President and several members of the cabinet whether under the terms of the projet this right would not expire upon the termination of the existing charter of that company in 1859.

The President’s message will reiterate the opinions expressed in his annual message in favor of our title to 54° 40´; but in consideration of and in deference to the contrary opinions expressed by the Senate, his constitutional advisers, he submits the projet to them for their previous advice. He may probably suggest some modifications.

What the Senate may do in the premises is uncertain. There undoubtedly is in that body a constitutional majority in favor of settling the question on the parallel of 49° to the Straits of Fuca. The question of the perpetual navigation of the Columbia is and ought to be the point of difficulty. Should the Senate modify this article so as to limit the right to the termination of the existing charter of the Hudson’s Bay Company, I can scarcely suppose that the modification would be rejected by the British government.

I sincerely hope that you may not think of leaving London until the question shall be finally settled; and I am happy to learn from Robert that your continuance in London will not be prejudicial to your private interest at home.

With my kindest respects to Mrs. McLane, I remain sincerely and respectfully your friend,

Sir:—

The Oregon question may now be considered as settled. On the 6th instant Mr. Pakenham presented to me the project of a convention for its adjustment: and the President, after mature deliberation, determined, in pursuance of several precedents adopted in the early history of our Government, to submit it to the Senate for their previous advice. This was done by a confidential message on the 10th instant, of which I transmit you a copy.

On the 12th instant the Senate adopted a resolution by a vote of 37 to 12, of which the following is a copy:

“Resolved (two-thirds of the Senators present concurring) that the President of the United States be, and he is hereby, advised to accept the proposal of the British government accompanying his message to the Senate, dated 10th June, 1846, for a convention to settle boundaries, etc., between the United States and Great Britain, west of the Rocky or Stony Mountains.”

The convention will be signed by the plenipotentiaries on Monday next: and in the course of the next week will doubtless be ratified by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.

The terms are, an extension of the 49th parallel of latitude to the middle of the channel which separates the continent from Vancouver’s Island, thence along the middle of this channel and the Strait of Fuca, so as to surrender the whole of that island to Great Britain.

The navigation of the Columbia is conceded, not to British subjects generally, but to the Hudson’s Bay Company and those trading with it. To this concession there is no express limitation of time; but it was believed by the Senate, that under the true construction of the projet this grant will expire on the 30th May, 1859, the date of the termination of the existing license to that Company, to trade with the Indians, etc., on the North-west Coast of America.

I need not enumerate the other less important particulars.

While in December 1845 many political friends and opponents in all parts of the country were reading with approbation the correspondence on the Oregon question, so far as it had been published, an approbation which appears from a great multitude of private letters addressed to Mr. Buchanan, he thus wrote confidentially to Mr. McLane:

“I should this day [December 13th] have been on the bench of the Supreme Court, had it not been for the critical state of our foreign relations. I very much desired the position, because it would have enabled me to spend the remainder of my days in peace. I have now been on the stormy deep nearly a quarter of a century. Besides, I sincerely wished, if possible, to prevent my name being even mentioned in connection with the next Presidency.”

The vacancy on the bench of the Supreme Court of the United States was occasioned by the death of Mr. Justice Baldwin. According to an invariable custom the appointment should be made from the Pennsylvania circuit. There were persons who desired, not without a mixture of motives, that Mr. Buchanan might receive it; for his transfer to the bench would, it was assumed, bring into the Department of State a gentleman whose friends were exceedingly anxious to have him in that position. Others wished Buchanan to be out of the cabinet, without much reference to the question of who was to be his successor. There came about a kind of intrigue, to produce a public belief that he was to be appointed a judge, in order that it might be considered as a foregone conclusion and appear to be called for by the general voice. Some of Mr. Buchanan’s friends, of both political parties, believing that he had eminent qualifications for the judicial office, urged him to accept the offer, if it should be made to him; others, who had just as strong convictions that he would be a great acquisition to the bench, were not willing to have him retire from political life, and were earnestly opposed to his leaving the Department of State at that time. The great body of the discreet friends of the administration took the same view. The matter was kept open for a long time, and meanwhile Mr. Buchanan, uncertain of his own future, had to go on and manage the foreign relations of the country, in which, besides the Oregon question, the state of things consequent upon the proposed annexation of Texas and the other difficulties with Mexico, of which I shall treat hereafter, became extremely perplexing. That he would have preferred the safe retirement of the bench to anything that political office could give him, and that he would have renounced all further connection with politics if he had received this appointment, cannot be doubted. Having had occasion thus far to estimate the qualities of his mind and character, I may here express the opinion, that he would have been a highly useful and distinguished judge. If this change in the course of his life had taken place, he would never have become President of the United States, and his biography, if written, would have been only that of a man who had been very eminent in political life to the age of forty-six, and had then passed the remainder of his days in the tranquillity of a judicial career, giving more or less proof of the versatility of his powers. He believed that it would be a gain of happiness to escape from the stormy conflicts of the political sphere. But public men can rarely do more than “rough-hew their ends;” to entirely “shape” them is not given to mortals. The following interesting letters from his friend King give, by reflex, all that can now be known concerning his feelings in regard to this disappointment:^[91]

Dear Buchanan:—

Your friendly letter gave me both pleasure and pain. Pleasure, in the renewed assurance of your friendship; and pain, to perceive that the course of the President towards you has not been entirely characterized by that delicacy and confidence which is certainly due to your position, and to the important services you have rendered to him and the country. Let me entreat you, however, to act with great deliberation and prudence. Do not suffer yourself to be operated upon by professing, or even by real friends, to act hastily. I am not of the opinion that any slight was intended by the President. He no doubt gave the true reason for having nominated Judge —— without consulting you, as he knew you were opposed to his selection.^[92] It is not, I think, of sufficient importance to produce a quarrel; and the President must be too well aware of the strength you give to his administration to desire your withdrawal. Your doing so at this most important juncture would be to give the staff into the hands of your enemies; who would desire nothing better to prostrate you with. Your able correspondence with Pakenham has justly turned the eyes of the country towards you as a talented and safe helmsman to guide the ship of State. This your enemies know and feel. Do not, I again entreat you, by your own act, aid them to defeat your future prospects. Probably I have dwelt more on this matter than it merits; if so, I feel assured you will attribute it to the true motive, my anxiety to see you elevated to a station you are so well qualified to fill, with honor to yourself and advantage to the country....

My Dear Friend:—

I read your kind letter attentively, and then committed it to the flames, as you requested. The refusal of the President to place you on the Bench of the Supreme Court, after you had manifested a willingness to accept of the situation, surprises me greatly. I had supposed, independent of a desire to gratify you, to whom he owes so much, he would have seized with avidity on the opportunity thus afforded him to get freed from the importunities of persons of doubtful qualification, none of whom could venture to complain of your being preferred to him. I have turned it over and over in my mind, to see if I could discover any motive for his refusal other than that assigned by himself, viz., that you were too important to his administration in the post you now occupy to enable him to dispense with your services. If this was in truth his sole reason, he should have frankly and unreservedly placed before you the difficulties and embarrassments your abandonment of the State Department would involve him in; how necessary you were to enable him to carry on the Government successfully, and at the same time have expressed his willingness to meet your wishes if persisted in. If such had been his course, I know you too well to doubt for a moment but that you would have relinquished the judgeship, and continued your invaluable services as a member of the administration. This, however, you must still do; you owe it to the country; you owe it to yourself. You can form no idea of the reputation you have acquired, even in Europe, by the able and masterly manner in which you have presented our claim to Oregon, never before perfectly understood, either in Europe or America. You certainly occupy at this moment, in public estimation, a more enviable position than any other distinguished man of our country, and your prospects for the future are brighter than those of any one I know. Do not, I beg you, mar those prospects by abandoning your place at this critical period of our foreign relations. Finish the work you have so ably begun. Settle the Oregon question by an equitable compromise, and whatever a few hot heads or selfish aspirants may say, your reputation will rest upon a foundation broad and strong, the approval of a virtuous and intelligent people at home, and the wise and good of every land. You know I am no flatterer. I speak in all sincerity, and say nothing but what is strictly true.

Dear Buchanan:—

The last steamer brought me your very acceptable letter of the 26th February. The publication of my correspondence with M. Guizot has been well received by all parties in Paris, and has put at rest forever all speculation as to the correctness of my despatch. Even M. Guizot himself manifests a greater degree of cordiality than formerly, and made it a point to attend a ball I gave on the 22d February, although he is not in the habit of going to parties. I knew the course I pursued would, so far from committing me with any one here, produce a salutary result; and it was not taken in passion, or because I am “thin skinned.” My position was never better than at this time with all in power here, from the king down to the lowest official. Present me kindly to my friend, Mr. Trist, and tender him my thanks for the interest he has manifested for me. The postponement of the election of Senator for Alabama will, as you say, enable me to enter the field with a fair prospect of success, and I am free to declare that I should be truly gratified to be reinstated in the Senate. It is possible, however, that the Governor may be operated upon by those on the spot, who aspire to the situation, and dread my return, to call the legislature together this spring, and before I can possibly be present. This my friends Bagby and others should prevent. A called session would involve unnecessary expense, without an adequate advantage, or, in fact, any advantage whatever, so far as the public is concerned. My arrangements are such that I cannot, with convenience, return to the United States before the last of July. I am anxious, however, to conform to the wishes of the President in the appointment of my successor, and will either hasten or retard my surrender of my place, as to him may seem best. Should he prefer to delay the appointment of my successor until after the adjournment of Congress, I could return on leave of absence, as he once kindly permitted me to do, and leave my Secretary, Mr. Martin, as chargé des affaires. He is, as you know, well qualified to discharge the duties, and on his account I should be pleased to give to him the advantages of the position. You will confer with the President and let me know what course will be most acceptable to him, and I will then make my request accordingly. If a vacancy occurs at Turin by the resignation of Wickliff, could you not lend a helping hand to Dr. Martin? The place will not, I presume, be sought for by any of the prominent politicians, and Martin’s information and experience peculiarly fits him to be useful. He is, withal, very poor; and even if my successor consented to retain him here, his condition would be greatly altered for the worse, as with me he lives without expense. Serve him if you can; at any rate, save us from that miserable toady ——.

I altogether approve of the President’s refusal to submit the Oregon question to arbitration, as proposed by the British government. The objections enumerated by you are all sufficient, but, in addition, it could not escape your observation that, by the terms of submission, whether referred to a crowned head or to private individuals, the result would, in all probability, have been to deprive us of all the country north of the Columbia, simply upon the ground that actual possession should not be disturbed. Information on which I can rely convinces me that Lord Aberdeen, when he directed the offer to be made, did not expect it to be accepted. His object was, first, to induce the European governments to believe that they were anxious to settle the question upon just terms, and, secondly, to gain time, as they calculated on Sir Robert Peel’s measure inducing the American people to force their Government to give way on the Oregon question that they may receive the advantages it holds out to them.^[93] I know the calculation is altogether erroneous, and that, as you say, the people are ahead of the Government on the question. Still, such is the impression made in England by Pakenham’s despatches, the speeches of some of our prominent men, and the tone of our opposition press generally. I have my doubts whether Pakenham is as yet instructed to make a proposition for a compromise, but it will be made; and will, I think, be such as we should not hesitate to accept, unless the perpetual navigation of the Columbia is insisted upon. This I would not grant without an equivalent in the navigation of the St. Lawrence; but there seems to be a propriety in allowing the use of the river for a term of years, not to exceed ten, to enable the Northwest Fur Company gradually to withdraw an interest which has grown up under the treaty of joint occupancy. The President will certainly act with prudence by submitting the proposition, whatever it may be (unless altogether inadmissible), to the Senate, for the advice in advance of that body. Cass, Allen and Company will find that no political capital can be made by arraying themselves against an arrangement which makes the 49th parallel the boundary, but yielding the whole of Vancouver’s Island, and the use for a few years of the Columbia River. The good sense of the whole country will approve of such a settlement. I am not at all surprised to hear that Calhoun is anxious to free himself from the odium of voting against the notice, regardless of the dilemma in which he has involved his devoted adherents in the House. If the Senate amends the House resolutions, my life upon it, they will receive Calhoun’s vote; and all chivalry will exclaim: Behold the great statesman, whose wise and prudent course has alone saved the nation from the horrors of war. The speech of Colonel Benton was excellent, and proves him to be a statesman indeed. Still, I do not, I am sorry to say, approve of his opposition to an increase of our navy. If we hope to command the respect of the powers of Europe, we must put ourselves in a position not only to repel all aggression, but, if needs be, to act on the offensive. They are all jealous of our rapid growth and prosperity, and would, if they dared, unite to retard or destroy it. We should hasten to repair our forts, build some new ones, and add to our little navy ten or twelve war steamers.

Such preparation, although it involves expense, would in all probability save us millions, as it would effectually put down all attempts to wrest the Island of Cuba from Spain, or to establish a monarchy in Mexico. I highly approve of the views taken by Bancroft; he promises to make an able and efficient Secretary of the Navy, and I hope he will retain his place and give up, if he has thought of it, all idea of a foreign mission. —— —— is here on his return home; he is no doubt an amiable man, but weak beyond description. Such a representative at such a court was calculated to do us a positive injury; we require to have there one of our ablest men. Berlin is of much less importance; in truth, to keep a minister there is scarcely worth the expense. Donalson is a good appointment; I wish it had been for St. Petersburg. I am fully aware that diplomatic situations are in great demand, and that the President is worried with applications from second and even third-rate men for the most important stations. I trust, however, that no commonplace men may be sent to London, Paris or St. Petersburg. My residence abroad has convinced me that the respect in which our country is held very much depends on the character and standing of its representative; and I greatly doubt the policy of making removals when the incumbent possesses talent and information, and from a long residence has acquired facilities for obtaining useful information which a new man, whatever his ability, it may be will require years to obtain. This I know runs counter to your theory of rotation in office; which may be correct as respects office at home, but should not, I think, apply to those held abroad. I once gave you my opinion of Wheaton. I see no reason to change that opinion. He is peculiarly well qualified to represent his country with advantage. Could he not be sent to St. Petersburg? He has grown old in diplomacy without growing rich, and at his period of life will find it exceedingly difficult to engage in any pursuit, other than that he has so long followed, with a prospect of securing to his family a decent support. I should feel truly gratified if you would bring him to the attention of the President. I am much gratified to learn that harmony prevails in the Cabinet; a break up would do much mischief. Retain your place regardless of all minor annoyances. The country requires your services to bring to a successful termination the important and delicate question of Oregon. You have the confidence of all parties; and I heartily believe that in the present state of things the President could not find a man capable of supplying your place. Stay where you are, settle the Oregon question, and great shall be your reward. Tender my respects to my friends Sturgeon and General Cameron, also to Walker, Mason and Benton.