ORIGIN OF THE WAR WITH MEXICO—EFFORTS OF MR. POLK’S ADMINISTRATION TO PREVENT IT.

The administration of President Polk inherited the Texas question from the preceding administration of President Tyler. The mode in which it was finally proposed to bring the republic of Texas into the American Union has been already described. When Mr. Polk became President of the United States, Texas had been for nine years practically an independent power, with a form of government modelled on that of the United States, with the exception of the fact that Texas consisted of a single State. The emigration which had flowed into it from the south-western region of the United States had made it a slaveholding country. From the time when its independence was acknowledged by the American Government, the question whether it should remain a separate nation, or be absorbed into the American Union, became a very serious one. The leading men who had gone thither, had made the revolution which claimed to have expelled, and had practically expelled, the Mexican power; and together with the great bulk of the inhabitants, they looked upon the United States as their mother country. There were great difficulties attending either of the two courses that remained open for the American Government. On the one hand, if Texas should be left as a separate nationality, to continue her war with Mexico, which still lingered after the battle of San Jacinto, that war was quite certain to end in efforts of the Texans to invade and conquer Mexico. This would have been resisted by England, and with her aid Mexico would in turn have invaded Texas. The power of England once introduced into Mexico, she would in all probability have shared the fate of India. On the other hand, the introduction of Texas into the American Union was proposed at a time when the “Abolitionists” of the North had long been pressing forward the immediate and unconditional abolition of slavery everywhere, by what they regarded as “moral means,” without any consideration for the feelings or apprehensions of the Southern people. To make a large addition to the area of slavery by the annexation of Texas, a slaveholding State, was regarded in the South as a necessary means of strengthening the political power of that section against the control of the General Government, which, it was feared, might eventually be obtained by a sectional combination of the Northern States on questions relating to the whole subject of slavery. It was a hazardous mode of meeting the dangers arising from the Northern anti-slavery agitation, because it placed the people of the South in the attitude of seeking a preponderance of political power upon a sectional issue, at a time when the people of the North were not seeking to obtain such a sectional preponderance, and when there was only an apprehension that they might do so. But at the time when President Polk succeeded to the management of this delicate matter, it was believed by him and by many of his most considerate Southern supporters, that the repose of both North and South could be, and required to be, secured by an arrangement with the executive government of Texas, before her admission into the Union, fixing the northern boundary of slavery at the Missouri compromise line of 36° 30´ north latitude, by extending that line westward. North of that line and west of Missouri, it was believed that negro labor could not be valuable, and that the negro could not encounter the climate. These were the views entertained by Mr. Buchanan when he accepted the position of Secretary of State; and he had reason to know that they were the views of Mr. Polk before his election. To Mr. Buchanan the Missouri compromise line recommended itself as a practicable mode of giving effect to the principle of equality among the States in regard to the common territories of the United States.

The precise attitude of the Texas negotiation, and the relations of the United States with Mexico, at the time when Mr. Buchanan took charge of the State Department, must now be stated, together with some reference to the previous history of the project of annexation. The first formal overture of annexation came from the government of Texas, in the time of President Van Buren, after the independence of Texas had been recognized by the United States. Mr. Van Buren declined the proposal, because he considered it inexpedient to open the constitutional questions involved, and because of our friendly relations with Mexico under existing treaties of amity and commerce. The secret treaty of annexation negotiated by Mr. Upshur under President Tyler was rejected by the Senate. Mr. Calhoun’s plan for bringing Texas into the Union as a State, through the action of Congress, was arranged by him with the government of Texas, after he became Secretary of State in March, 1844, and in the following December this plan and the correspondence with the executive government of Texas were submitted to Congress by President Tyler at the opening of the session. The motive was fully disclosed. It was plainly made known that the American executive believed that the British government was about to interpose to cause the people of Texas to abolish slavery in their country. This it was considered would leave the Southwestern States of this Union on what Mr. Calhoun described as the “exposed frontier” of a free state, into which their slaves would be induced to escape, and from which the foreign and the American abolitionists would be able to operate upon slavery in the domains of those States.^[97]

The objections urged against this measure, when the resolutions for accomplishing it were finally adopted, three days before Mr. Polk became President, were the great extent of territory which it would add to our dominions, the increase of slavery and slave representation, and its tendency to produce a war with Mexico. It could not be said, however, that under the circumstances Mexico would have a clearly just cause for war if the annexation should be accomplished, whatever she might have had at an earlier period. Texas was now actually independent of Mexico. The United States had not only recognized her independence, but had made treaties and carried on commerce with her, in entire disregard of the claim of Mexico to the sovereignty of this revolted province. And Mexico had during all this period made no attempt at reconquest. She had practically acquiesced in the recognition of Texan independence by the United States and other powers; and therefore it could not be said, after such a lapse of time, that a new and just cause for war would arise if Texas should be annexed to the American Union.^[98] There was undoubtedly much danger that Mexico would not regard the annexation in this light; and, therefore, what the new Secretary of State had to do was to conduct the whole matter, under the resolutions of Congress, so as to preserve peace, if possible.

His first official duty was to answer a protest addressed to the Government of the United States by General Almonte, the Mexican minister at Washington. Mr. Buchanan’s answer was regarded by Mr. Webster as “mild and conciliatory.” It was, in substance, that Mexico had no right to complain of such a transaction between independent states; that the Government of the United States would respect all the just rights of Mexico, and hoped to bring all pending questions with her to a fair and friendly settlement; but that the annexation of Texas must now be considered as a thing done. Still, a period of sixty or seventy days must elapse before it could be known how the government of Texas had taken the passage of the joint resolutions. At that time, there were instalments of money due from Mexico to the United States, under an existing treaty, to meet claims of citizens of the United States to a large amount. These Mexico might choose to withhold; perhaps she might decree non-intercourse with the United States; but that she would go to war was not regarded as probable by the best informed persons at Washington. In the meantime, Mr. Buchanan had not only to manage the relations between the United States and Mexico, under circumstances of great delicacy, with firmness, as well as conciliation, but also to keep a watchful eye upon the course of England and France in reference to this measure. It must be remembered that Mr. Buchanan had succeeded, as Secretary of State, to the management of the Oregon question with England, as well as to the completion of the arrangements for annexing Texas to the United States. He was informed, both privately and officially, by the ministers of the United States at London and Paris, of the danger of an intervention by England and France in the affairs of Mexico; and soon after he became Secretary of State, he had some reason to apprehend that the settlement of the Oregon difficulty might be delayed for the purpose of keeping open the unsettled questions in regard to the final disposal of Texas. Mexico was at this time about to undergo one of its many revolutions, and it might become difficult to find an executive government with which to establish diplomatic relations. In this posture of affairs, an interference by either France or England, or both, might render it impracticable to carry out the annexation of Texas to the United States, and might lead to very serious complications. Writing from London on the 3d of March, at the moment when the resolutions providing for the annexation of Texas had just passed, but before they could have become known in London, Mr. McLane said, in a private letter to Mr. Buchanan:

“Allow me to add a word in regard to Mexico. I stated in an early despatch that the policy here would be to keep open our difficulties there, to await the issue of the Oregon question; and of that I have very little doubt. But why not disappoint such calculation? Even if our affairs with Great Britain are to end in a rupture, that result, with proper precaution, may be postponed until the expiration of the year’s notice. Then why not act promptly and decisively in regard to Mexico? ...... Every day is leading to machinations in Europe to interfere with the settlement of the Mexican government.”

On the 25th of March (1845,) Mr. Buchanan sent the following official despatch to Mr. King, the Minister of the United States at Paris:

Sir:—

Your Despatch, No. 11, under date of the 27th ultimo, has been received and submitted to the President. In commencing his administration, he had confidently hoped, that the government of France was animated by the same kind spirit towards the United States which inspires the Government and people of this country in all their conduct towards their ancient Revolutionary ally. This agreeable impression was made upon his mind by the emphatic declaration of his Majesty to yourself on the 4th July last, when speaking on the subject of the annexation of Texas to our Union, “that in any event no steps would be taken by his government, in the slightest degree hostile or which would give to the United States just cause of complaint.” The President was also gratified with the subsequent assurance of M. Guizot, given to yourself, that France had not acted and would not act in concert with Great Britain for the purpose of preventing annexation, but that in any course she might pursue she would proceed independently of that power. You may then judge of the surprise and regret of the President, when he discovered from your last despatch, that the governments of France and Great Britain were now acting in concert and endeavoring by a joint effort to dissuade the government and people of Texas from giving their consent to annexation. Nay, more, that so intimate has been their alliance to accomplish this purpose, that even “the instructions of the French government to its representative in Texas had been communicated to Lord Aberdeen.”

The people of Texas are sovereign and independent. Under Providence they hold their destiny in their own hands. Justice to them requires that they should have been left free to decide the question of annexation for themselves without foreign interference and without being biassed by foreign influence. Not a doubt exists but that the people of the two Republics are anxious to form a re-union. Indeed, the enthusiastic unanimity which has been displayed by the citizens of Texas in favor of annexation is unexampled in the history of nations. Little reason then had we to anticipate that whilst the two Republics were proceeding to adjust the terms for accomplishing this re-union that France in concert with Great Britain, and under the lead of that power, should interpose her efforts and influence to paralyze and obstruct the free action of the people of Texas, and thus place herself in an unfriendly attitude towards the United States.

The President leaves it to your sound discretion to decide whether you ought not to embrace a favorable opportunity to communicate, formally or informally, to the government of France, the painful disappointment which he has experienced from a review of these circumstances.

At the time when this despatch was written, the British and French agents in Texas, in conjunction with certain of the principal officials of that country, were making efforts to produce dissatisfaction with the terms of annexation proposed by the American Government. The people of Texas were by a very large proportion in favor of the annexation. The terms offered by the United States could be made the means of preventing it. Writing privately to Mr. Buchanan, on the 25th of April, Mr. King said:

...... There is scarcely any sacrifice which England would not make to prevent Texas from coming into our possession. France is acting in concert with her, so far as influence goes, but will stop there. She will make no pecuniary sacrifices. I have weighed well the contents of your last despatch, and as you give me full discretion in the matter, I have come to the conclusion that in the present threatening state of our relations with England, no good purpose could be effected by convicting M. Guizot of the gross duplicity of which he has been guilty; and especially as it is to be hoped that the question of annexation has before this been definitely settled. The notice taken of the President’s inaugural on the Oregon question in both Houses of Parliament has roused up a war spirit in that country which pervades all classes, and caused the detention of the steamer which should have left on the 4th, to take out despatches to Mr. Pakenham. As the excitement was then at its height, it was supposed that their instructions contained an ultimatum which was to yield nothing beyond the Canning proposition. Should this be the determination of that government, negotiation must cease, for to such terms we can never accede. I am induced, however, to believe, from conversations I have held with Mr. Ellis, now in Paris, who is connected with the ministry, being a brother-in-law of Lord Ripon, and himself a privy councillor, that Mr. Pakenham’s instructions will be of a conciliatory character; and that they have great hopes of being able to settle the matter upon fair and liberal terms. But of this you are probably much better informed than he is. I am still of the opinion that we should not hesitate to divide the Territory [Oregon] by fixing our northern boundary at latitude 49°. To settle the question, I would yield something more and take the southern shore of the Strait of Fuca, and thus give to England the whole of Vancouver’s Island. Such a variation of the proposition, which was rejected by Mr. Canning, would afford Sir Robert Peel ground to stand on, and might facilitate an arrangement. I fully understand the difficult position you occupy as regards this question, looking to the generally received opinion that our title to the whole of the Territory is unquestionable.

As Mr. King, under the discretion given to him, did not think it best at that moment to make a formal complaint of the conduct of the French government, it became necessary for Mr. Buchanan to encounter the intrigues of the British and French diplomatic agents in Texas to prevent the government of that country from acceding to the proposal of annexation. Satisfied that the people of Texas, with a very near approach to unanimity, desired the annexation, Mr. Buchanan, with the approbation of the President, instructed the representative of the United States in Texas, Major Donaldson, to assure the government and people of that republic that if they accepted the terms of annexation offered by the joint resolutions of the American Congress, they might rely on the United States to make fair and equitable arrangements with them on all points not covered by those resolutions. He also despatched to Texas other trustworthy persons, on whom he could rely, in an unofficial character, to watch the movements of the British and French agents, and to aid Major Donaldson in counteracting them. The Texan Congress was not in session when the resolutions of our Congress were received there. Whether action would be taken upon them with sufficient promptness to prevent foreign interference from encouraging Mexico to invade Texas, depended upon the willingness of the executive of Texas to call that body together before its usual time of assembling. That interference would be attempted by the English and French agents, the American Government was well assured. That England would take the lead in efforts to make the government and people of Texas prefer independence to annexation to the United States, and that France would second these efforts, there could be no doubt. There could be as little doubt that, whatever might be the motive of either power, there could be no solid justification for their interference between the United States and a country which had been practically independent of Mexico for nine years. There was no just ground on which any European power could assume that the United States was dealing unfairly with Mexico; and it should have been remembered that there were then pending questions between the United States and Mexico, quite independent of this matter of Texas, with which no foreign power could have the least right to interfere, and which the Government of the United States might find it necessary to settle along with the questions of Texas. Nevertheless, an intrigue was now set on foot in Texas, by the British agent, Captain Elliott, seconded by the French agent, M. Saligny, to induce the executive government of Texas to accept the guarantee of England and France that Mexico should be made to acknowledge the independence of Texas, provided that her annexation to the United States should be refused. An offer to make Texas independent was actually obtained from the power then ruling in Mexico. That this was done with the knowledge and consent of the President of Texas is true. He was, as he afterwards said, willing to have such an offer drawn from Mexico, because he believed that it would strengthen the cause of annexation and place it on higher grounds with the world. The truth is that the executive government of Texas and leading persons in that country hesitated for some time in regard to the best course to be pursued. They listened to the representations of Captain Elliott and postponed the call for the meeting of their Congress at his instigation. Elliott believed that if the Texan authorities should delay action, or even if the terms of annexation offered by the United States should now be accepted, the consummation would be defeated in the next session of the American Congress, and that in the meantime England and France would come forward and guarantee the independence of Texas. He made these representations to the President of Texas early in May, and he and M. Saligny then left the country, without making known whither they were going; and at about the same time it became known that the Texan secretary of state had suddenly departed for Europe. It was believed in Texas that Elliott had gone to the United States to confer with some of the prominent opponents of annexation, and to bring back proofs that the whole measure would be finally rejected by the Congress and people of the United States. These occurrences aroused the people of Texas to such a degree of earnestness and determination, that their executive was compelled to call the Congress together, for the purpose of summoning a convention to ratify the annexation and to form a State constitution. The meeting of the Congress was fixed for the 16th of June. When this was announced, the people of Texas in general regarded the annexation as settled, and they turned their attention to the subject of their new constitution.^[99]

The Texan Congress, when assembled, adopted the basis of annexation proposed by the United States, and made provision for a convention to be held at Austin on the 4th of July. Captain Elliott was then convinced that further opposition would be useless. He was reported to have said: “The hunt is up. I retire and await orders from Her Majesty.” The annexation was ratified by the convention in the month of July.

There were of course no United States troops in Texas at the time of this action of its convention; but after this event it was thought best to place a small force there, and this force was to arrive in the early part of July. But before the convention had assembled, namely, in the last week in June, Mexican troops were put in motion towards the Rio Del Norte. A new election of a President was to take place in Mexico before the close of the year. Whoever might aspire to that position would find his chief means of success in stimulating the war feeling of the nation. In the latter part of July, Mr. Buchanan had left Washington for a short absence in Pennsylvania. He was recalled by the following letter from the President, inclosing one from Mr. Bancroft, the Secretary of the Navy:

My Dear Sir:—

I enclose to you a letter from Mr. Bancroft, and will add to what he has said, that the information from Mexico comes in so authentic a shape as to entitle it to entire credit. The strong probability is that a Mexican army of eight or ten thousand men are now on the western borders of Texas. Should they cross the Del Norte, as no doubt they will, our forces at present in the country will be inadequate to resist them in their march upon Texas. Orders will be issued to-day to increase our forces as far as our disposable troops will enable us to do so. The necessary despatches from your department to Major Donaldson, or (in the event that he has left the country), to the United States Consul at Galveston, will of course be prepared by Mr. Mason. I wish it were so, that while these important steps were being taken, we could have the benefit of your advice.

Before you left you requested me to inform you, if anything should occur which in my judgment would make it necessary for you to return earlier than you intended. We are in daily expectation of receiving further information from Mexico, which may, and probably will, confirm the statement given you by Mr. Bancroft. The news of the action of the convention of Texas was despatched from New Orleans to Vera Cruz by the Mexican Consul on the 15th ult., and would probably be conveyed to the city of Mexico by the 21st or 22d. Upon receiving this information, some decisive action no doubt took place.

In addition to these reasons, which make it very desirable to have the benefit of your counsel, I must confess that the developments which are taking place, as well as my daily reflections, make it, in my opinion, more and more important that we should progress without delay in the Oregon negotiation. You may consider me impatient on this subject. I do not consider that I am so, but still I have a great desire, that what is contemplated should be done as soon as it may suit your convenience. I have felt great reluctance in saying this much, because I desired not to interfere with your arrangements during the short recreation which you have taken from your arduous labors.

P. S.—If you determine to anticipate the period of your return to Washington, you will see the propriety of leaving Bedford in a way to produce no public sensation as to the cause of your departure. That it may not be known that you leave on receiving a letter from me, I will not place my frank on this letter.

My Dear Mr. Buchanan:—

You remember I told you, before you left, that Baron Gerolt^[100] predicted war on the part of Mexico. Yesterday morning, at the President’s request, I went to see him, and found him very ready to communicate all his intelligence, concealing only the name of his informant, and desiring that his own name may not be used.

His letters came by way of Havana, and Charleston, S. C., and are from Mexico city, of the date of June 28th. He vouches for the entire authenticity and good opportunities of information on the part of his correspondent.

General Arista, with three thousand men, chiefly cavalry, himself the best cavalry officer in Mexico, had been directed to move forward towards the Del Norte; but whether he had orders to cross the Del Norte was not said.

At San Louis Potosi, General Paredes, the commander-in-chief, had his general quarters, with an army of seven thousand men. These also were directed to move forward, in small divisions, towards the Del Norte.

From Mexico City, General Felisola, the old woman who was with Santa Anna in Texas, was soon to leave with three thousand men to join the army of Paredes.

Thus far positive information. It was stated by the baron as his opinion that Mexico would certainly consider the armistice with Texas broken by the action of the Texas convention; that she would shun battles and carry on an annoying guerilla warfare; that she would protract the war into a very expensive length; that she would agree to no settlement of boundary with us, but under the guarantee of European powers.

On these opinions I make no comment. The seemingly authentic news of hostile intentions has led Governor Marcy,^[101] under proper sanctions, to increase his little army in Texas, and Mr. Mason has written all the necessary letters. I do not see but that the sun rises this morning much as usual. The President, too, is in excellent spirits, and will grow fat in your absence, he sleeps so well now, and sees nothing before him but the plain, though steep and arduous path of duty.

So wishing you well,

Mr. Buchanan had already determined what course to advise the President to pursue in regard to Mexico. This was to re-establish diplomatic relations with her, by sending a minister with special instructions and authority to negotiate a settlement of all questions between the two countries, including the western boundary of Texas. To select a suitable person for this mission and send him into Mexico with an uncertainty of his being received, or of his being received and treated with, was a delicate matter. The appointment had to be made, and to be kept a profound secret, until it could be known what reception the minister would meet with. It was settled early in the autumn that this appointment should be offered to Mr. John Slidell of Louisiana. His acceptance of the position was made known to the President in September. The following private letter to Mr. Buchanan is somewhat amusing in its earnestness respecting the secrecy which had been enjoined upon the writer:^[102]

My Dear Sir:—

You can scarcely imagine how much I was surprised to-day by receiving your most kind and friendly letter of the 17th inst.

I have never at any time believed that we should have war with Mexico. I have looked upon the rhodomontades of the press and the manifestoes of secretaries, as alike having but one object in view, the presidential contest; and in this point of view I consider it of little consequence who shall be elected. He who had been most strenuous in proclaiming war as indispensable to the vindication of Mexican honor, would, when installed in the presidential chair, “roar you an ’twere any nightingale.” The truth is that although I have no very exalted idea of ...... yet I cannot imagine that any one who could possibly be elected president, could have so small a modicum of sense as to think seriously of going to war with the United States. But strong as I have been in this belief, I had not thought that the government would have been prepared so soon to receive from us an accredited agent. I think with you that they desire to settle amicably all the questions in dispute between us. But will they dare in the present distracted state of the country, to give so great a shock to what is their settled public opinion. They have stimulated popular prejudice to a degree that it may, under any appearance of disposition to treat with us, be fatal to the new administration. But of this you have infinitely the best means of judging, and I shall hold myself in readiness to receive your instructions. I feel most deeply the importance of the mission, and I confess, now that it is probable I shall soon enter upon it, I have some misgivings about it. I hope that you will not consider this as an affectation of modesty and humility. I assure you I am perfectly sincere, but will probably grow in better favor with myself when the work is fairly commenced. I am truly grateful to you for the proof of your friendship and esteem, and am flattered by the confidence reposed in me by the President. I shall endeavor to justify them. The President has enjoined on me the strictest secrecy; he even goes so far as to say that I should not communicate what he had said to me to a single human being. I have told him that I was obliged to make an exception in favor of Mrs. S., but as I could not well enter into particulars with him on this subject, pray let me explain it to you. If I had made an unreserved pledge to the President, I could not have felt myself at liberty to hint it even to my wife. I could have made no preparations for my voyage without her knowing it. We were making our arrangements to proceed shortly to Washington. If I were mysterious with her, she would be shrewd enough to guess what was in the wind. She would have some theory to guide her, because you may recollect that when you first broached this subject with me, I told you that I had no secrets for her. Now I am not one of those who believe that a woman cannot keep a secret. I know she can, for I am sure that she has never breathed a word, respecting it, to any one, not even to her mother. Besides she is living in the country, where we seldom see any one, and where there is little gossiping. Pray, explain this to the President, who might perhaps consider my disobedience of his injunction as an inauspicious omen in the opening of my diplomatic career. It is a matter of great regret to me not to have the opportunity of full personal communication with you before going to Mexico. I feel that it will be a great disadvantage, but I must rely upon your alleviating it as far as possible by your communications and instructions.... I will not fail to convey your very flattering message to Mrs. S. I think I must get her to write to you to remove an impression which I fear you have taken up. She will tell you that I am one of the best tempered men living. I have written in great haste, having barely had time to save the mail.

Mr. Slidell was at Pensacola in the middle of November (1845), prepared to embark for Vera Cruz, on his way to the City of Mexico. He was somewhat disturbed by a rumor that Mr. Buchanan was about to retire from the State Department, but this proved to be unfounded. His instructions came from Mr. Buchanan, and were received before he reached the capital of Mexico, where he arrived in the early part of December. At this time there were two unpaid instalments of money which became due from Mexico to the United States in April and September, 1844, under a convention of April 11th, 1839, and a large amount of claims of citizens of the United States against Mexico which had arisen subsequent to that convention. Mr. Slidell was now authorized to make an offer that the Government of the United States would assume the payment of all just claims of citizens of the United States against Mexico down to that time, which could be established by proofs according to the principles of right and justice, the law of nations, and the existing treaties between the two countries. He was further authorized to include in the new treaty which he was to negotiate an adjustment of the western boundary of Texas; to stipulate for the payment by the United States, in cash, of an ample equivalent for such a settlement of the boundary as the United States desired, and to agree to make the payment on the exchange of ratifications. By such a settlement, while the United States would secure incalculable advantages, Mr. Buchanan believed that Mexico would be more than indemnified for the surrender of her doubtful right to reconquer Texas, and for the establishment of the boundary which the Government of the United States intended to claim.

In the latter part of the year (1845), General Paredes procured himself to be declared President of Mexico, by a process which is described in the following private letter to Mr. Buchanan, written by Mr. Slidell from the City of Mexico:

Mr Dear Sir:—

I am sending to Vera Cruz, to be forwarded by the first merchant vessel my despatch respecting the instalments of April and September, 1844.

The facts are not as completely developed as I could have wished, but it is impossible to obtain any further information at present...... Paredes, notwithstanding his solemn protestation that he would accept no place in the government, has been elected president by a junta of notables of his own choice, and, as you may readily imagine, unanimously. The government is now really, although not in form, a military despotism. Many of the states have already given in their adhesion, and from present appearances, Paredes is likely to establish his authority throughout the republic. He seems to possess considerable energy, and he is believed to have pecuniary honesty. He will probably maintain himself for some time, if he can arrange the difficulties with the United States. Unless he does this, he will soon find himself without means to pay his troops, for the capitalists will not advance him a dollar in the present state of our relations. So soon as he was elected, I applied wholly through the consul, to the military commandant, for an escort—the cabinet was not appointed for some days after his election. The commandant replied that while Paredes was in opposition to the government, he could not furnish the escort. On the 7th inst. the Minister of Foreign Relations was appointed, when Mr. Black applied in writing for an escort, and received yesterday a reply “that public order not having been yet completely restored, the president could not spare the force necessary for an escort.” Now Puebla has submitted to the government, and nearly the whole of the army is in the capital and on the road to Vera Cruz, this answer looks very much as if the government did not wish him to leave the city, and I should not be at all surprised to receive very soon an intimation of a disposition to receive me.

General Almonte is Secretary of War, and understood to be the soul of the cabinet. The Secretary of State is Mr. Castillo y Zurgas, who was for some years chargé des affaires at Washington. I met with him at Jalapa, where I saw him much, and conversed freely with him during my stay of ten days. He is an intelligent and well educated man, and seemed to have the most friendly feelings towards the United States, and spoke without reserve of the absolute necessity of a friendly settlement of our difficulties. I have not seen him since his appointment, and avoid, indeed, all intercourse with people in any way connected with public affairs, because I am well satisfied that any manifestation of a disposition to approach the new government would only tend to procrastination, if not defeat my object. I think that I shall have a better chance of succeeding than with the former government, for Paredes has the nerve to carry through any arrangement that he may consider expedient, and calculated to promote his continuance in power.

Although at the date of this letter it appeared probable that Paredes would receive the general submission of the people of Mexico, and that he must be regarded as at least the de facto President, it could not be considered that a counter-revolution of some kind was not likely to take place. The Mexican Congress was to assemble on the 1st of January (1846). Before Mr. Buchanan had received Mr. Slidell’s private letter of January 10th, he sent to Mr. Slidell the following official despatch:

Sir:—

I have the honor to transmit herewith your commission as Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States of America to the Mexican Republic, under the appointment made by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.

Your despatches, Nos. 2 and 3, under date respectively, the 30th November and 17th December, have been received; and I shall await the arrival of others by the Porpoise with much solicitude. Should the Mexican government, by finally refusing to receive you, consummate the act of folly and bad faith of which they have afforded such strong indications, nothing will then remain for this Government but to take the redress of the wrongs of its citizens into its own hands.

In the event of such a refusal, the course which you have determined to pursue is the proper one. You ought, in your own language, so to conduct yourself as to throw the whole odium of the failure of the negotiation upon the Mexican government; point out in the most temperate manner the inevitable consequences of so unheard of a violation of all the usages which govern the intercourse between civilized nations, and declare your intention to remain in Mexico until you can receive instructions adapted to the exigencies of the case. This sojourn will afford you an honorable opportunity to watch the course of events, and avail yourself of any favorable circumstances which, in the mean time, may occur. Should a revolution have taken place before the first of January, the day appointed for the meeting of Congress, an event which you deemed probable; or should a change of ministry have been effected, which you considered almost certain; this delay will enable you to ascertain the views and wishes of the new government or administration. The desire of the President is that you should conduct yourself with such wisdom and firmness in the crisis, that the voice of the American people shall be unanimous in favor of redressing the wrongs of our much injured and long suffering claimants.

It would seem to be the desire of the Mexican government to evade the redress of the real injuries of our citizens, by confining the negotiation to the adjustment of a pecuniary indemnity for its imaginary rights over Texas. This cannot be tolerated. The two subjects must proceed hand in hand. They can never be separated. It is evidently with the view of thus limiting the negotiation, that the Mexican authorities have been quibbling about the mere form of your credentials; without even asking whether you had instructions and full powers to adjust the Texan boundary. The advice of the Council of Government seems to have been dictated by the same spirit. They do not advise the Mexican government to refuse to receive you; but, assuming the fact that the government had agreed to receive a plenipotentiary to treat upon the subject of Texas alone, they infer that it is not bound to receive an envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary without this limitation.

In the mean time, the President, in anticipation of the final refusal of the Mexican government to receive you, has ordered the army of Texas to advance and take a position on the left bank of the Rio Grande, and has directed that a strong fleet shall be immediately assembled in the Gulf of Mexico. He will thus be prepared to act with vigor and promptitude the moment that Congress shall give him the authority.

This despatch will not be transmitted to you by the Mississippi. That vessel will be detained at Pensacola for the purpose of conveying to you instructions with the least possible delay, after we shall have heard from you by the Porpoise; and of bringing you home in case this shall become necessary.

By your despatch No. 2, written at Vera Cruz, you ask for an explanation of my instructions relative to the claim of Texas on that portion of New Mexico east of the Del Norte; and you state the manner in which you propose to treat the subject in the absence of any such explanation. I need say nothing in relation to your inquiry; but merely to state that you have taken the proper view of the question, and that the course which you intend to pursue meets the approbation of the President.

It is now necessary to recur to the military movement referred to in this despatch. In August, 1845, General Zachary Taylor was encamped at Corpus Christi, in Texas, in command of a small American force of fifteen hundred troops. In the following November, his force was recruited to about four thousand men. On the 8th of March, 1846, acting under the President’s orders, given in anticipation of a refusal of the Mexican authorities to receive or to treat with Mr. Slidell, Taylor moved towards the Rio Grande, and on the 28th his little army reached the banks of that river, opposite the town of Matamoras. In a despatch written on the 12th of March to Mr. Slidell, Mr. Buchanan said:

It is not deemed necessary to modify the instructions which you have already received, except in a single particular; and this arises from the late revolution effected in the government of the Mexican Republic by General Paredes. I am directed by the President to instruct you not to leave that republic, until you shall have made a formal demand to be received by the new government. The government of Paredes came into existence not by a regular constitutional succession, but in consequence of a military revolution by which the subsisting constitutional authorities were subverted. It cannot be considered as a mere continuation of the government of Herrera. On the contrary, the form of government has been entirely changed, as well as all the high functionaries at the head of the administration. The two governments are certainly not so identical that the refusal of the one to receive you ought to be considered conclusive evidence that such would be the determination of the other. It would be difficult, on such a presumption, in regard to so feeble and distracted a country as Mexico, to satisfy the American people that all had been done which ought to have been done to avoid the necessity of resorting to hostilities.

On your return to the United States, energetic measures against Mexico would at once be recommended by the President; and these might fail to obtain the support of Congress, if it could be asserted that the existing government had not refused to receive our minister. It would not be a sufficient answer to such an allegation that the government of Herrera had refused to receive you, and that you were therefore justified in leaving the country after a short delay, because, in the meantime, the government of Paredes had not voluntarily offered to reverse the decision of his predecessor.

The President believes that, for the purpose of making this demand, you ought to return to the City of Mexico, if this be practicable, consistently with the national honor. It was prudent for you to leave it during the pendency of the late revolution, but this reason no longer continues. Under existing circumstances your presence there ought to be productive of the most beneficial consequences......

The time when you shall ask to be received by the government of Paredes is left to your own discretion. The President thinks this ought to be done speedily, unless good reasons exist to the contrary. Your demand ought to be couched in strong but respectful language. It can no longer be resisted on the ridiculous pretence that your appointment has not been confirmed by the Senate......

In regard to the time of your departure from the Mexican Republic, the President is willing to extend your discretion. In the present distracted condition of that republic, it is impossible for those at a distance to decide as correctly what ought to be your course, in this particular, as you can for yourself upon the spot. The intelligence which you have communicated, “that the department of Sinaloa has declared its independence;” “that the garrison of Mazatlan has pronounced against Paredes;” and “that the authorities of the departments of Nuevo Leon, Tamaulipas, Chihuahua, Michoacan, and Queretero have protested in strong terms against the usurpation of Paredes; and refusing to continue in the exercise of their functions, have dissolved,” may well exercise an influence on your decision. Indeed, you suppose “that appearances justify the belief that Paredes will not be able to sustain himself until the meeting of the constituent congress; that his government will perish from inanition, if from no other cause. In this critical posture of Mexican affairs, it will be for yourself to decide the question of the time of your departure according to events as they may occur. If, after you shall have fulfilled your instructions, you should indulge a reasonable hope, that by continuing in Mexico, you could thus best subserve the interests of your country, then you ought to remain, provided this can be done with honor. The President reposes entire confidence in your patriotism and discretion, and knows that no temporary inconvenience to yourself will prevent you from performing your duty. It may be that when prepared to take your departure another revolution might be impending, the result of which would enable you, by a timely interposition, to accomplish the great objects of your mission. Besides, in the present distracted condition of Mexico, it is of importance that we should have an able and discreet agent in that country to watch the progress of events, and to communicate information on which this department could rely. Jalapa is probably not so favorable a position for observation as the City of Mexico.

We have received information from different quarters, in corroboration of your statement, that there may be a design on the part of several European powers to establish a monarchy in Mexico. It is supposed that the clergy would generally favor such a project, and that a considerable party already exists among the people, which would give it their countenance and support. It is believed by many that this party will continue to increase in consequence of the successive revolutions which may afflict that country, until at length a majority of the people will be willing to throw themselves into the arms of a monarch for security and protection. Indeed, rumor has already indicated the king, in the person of the Spanish Prince Henry, the son of Francisco de Paula, the rejected suitor of Queen Isabella.

These may be, and probably are, idle speculations; but they come to us in such a shape that they ought not to be wholly disregarded. It will be your duty to exercise your utmost vigilance in detecting this plot and its ramifications, if any such exists......

This despatch will be transmitted to you by the Mississippi (which is placed at your disposal), and will be delivered to you by an officer of that vessel. There will always be a vessel of war at Vera Cruz, ready to bear your despatches or yourself to the United States.

In conclusion I would remark that it is impossible, at this distance from the scene of action, to anticipate all the contingencies which may occur in a country in a state of revolution, as Mexico is at present, and to provide for cases of sudden emergency. Much must necessarily be left to the discretion of the envoy, who, on the spot, can take advantage of circumstances as they may arise: and the President is happy in believing that you possess all the qualifications necessary for the crisis.

P. S.—To provide for possible contingencies, two letters of credence are transmitted to you: the one directed to General Paredes by name, and the other to the President of the Mexican Republic.

The government of Paredes refused to receive Mr. Slidell, and he consequently retired from Mexico to New Orleans, and on the 9th of April he wrote thence to Mr. Buchanan the following private letter: