[120] 3rd, 6th, and 9th escadrons de marche.

[121] The Regiment of Estremadura was so weak at the outbreak of hostilities that its three battalions had only 770 men. It had been hastily brought up to 900 bayonets before entering the city.

[122] His name was Vincente Falco; he belonged to the artillery.

[123] Sir Charles Vaughan was introduced to the heroine by Palafox while he was staying in Saragossa in October. He describes her as ‘a handsome young woman of the lower class,’ and says that when he met her she was wearing on her sleeve a small shield of honour with the name ‘Zaragoza’ inscribed on it. The fact that the dead sergeant was her lover is given by Palafox in his short narrative of the siege, which ought to be a good authority enough.

[124] Napier, with all his prejudice against the Spaniards, does not venture to absolutely reject the story. ‘Romantic tales of women rallying the troops and leading them forward at the most dangerous period of the siege were current; their truth may be doubted. Yet when suddenly environed with horrors, the sensitiveness of women, driving them to a kind of frenzy, might have produced actions above the heroism of men’ (i. 45). W. Jacob, M.P., in his Travels in the South of Spain in 1809-10 (p. 123), says that he met Agostina at Seville, wearing a blue artillery tunic, with one epaulette, over a short skirt; she was present when Lord Wellesley entered Seville, and was welcomed by the Junta.

[125] Foy exaggerates considerably when he says that from July 12 onward ‘the blockade of Saragossa was complete’ (iii. 300). Reinforcements entered on several subsequent occasions.

[126] Caballero and Toreño put the distressing scenes at the hospital and the escape of the lunatics during the assault on the 4th, but Arteche seems more correct in placing them during the bombardment of the preceding day.

[127] I find in the Vaughan Papers the following note: ‘General Lefebvre-Desnouettes was residing at Cheltenham on parole, having been taken prisoner at Benavente by Lord Paget. I went to Cheltenham on May 27, 1809, for the express purpose of seeing the general. He told me that he had advanced at first with no more than 3,000 men, but that after General Verdier joined him, the French force employed against Saragossa was 15,000 men. I understood that in the attack of July 2 and the previous fighting they lost 2,000 men, and that their total loss in the whole siege was 4,000, including three generals wounded.’ Nap. Corresp. (xvii. 389, 426) calls the whole force before Saragossa on August 2, 17,300 men. But there seems to have been present in all only—

These are mainly Belmas’s figures. He mentions a battalion of the 16th of the line as present at the great assault. There must be some error here, as that regiment was not in Spain. It is probably a misprint for the 70th of the line, which is not mentioned by him as present, though it certainly was so.

[128] The story sounds theatrical, but is vouched for by good authorities, Vaughan and Palafox himself, who chose the words for the type of the reverse of the medal that was issued to the defenders of Saragossa (see Arteche, ii. 394).

[129] Napier maintains (i. 45) that the city was saved only because the French fell to pillaging, a contention which seems very unjust to the Saragossans.

[130] Perhaps his name, Fray Ignacio de Santaromana, deserves as much remembrance as that of Agostina. His conduct in a critical moment was just as inspiring and told as much as hers (see Arteche, ii. 406).

[131] Arteche accuses Belmas of giving only 505 wounded, remarking that Verdier stated the higher number of 900. But my edition of Belmas (Paris, 1836) distinctly says ‘quinze cent cinq blessés’ (ii. 64). Napier gives no figures at all: Thiers, understating French losses in his usual style, speaks of 300 dead and 900 wounded.

[132] The best known was the batallon literario, composed of the students of the University of Santiago.

[133] Oddly enough, in the Duke of Rovigo’s own Mémoires the statement is made that these troops arrived too late to fight at Rio Seco, a curious error (ii. 248).

[134] See the dispatch of July 13, to Savary, and that of the same day to King Joseph (Nap. Corresp., 14,191).

[135] Bessières’ army seems to have consisted of the following elements:—

We may add 750 men for the five batteries of artillery and the train, and so get a total strength of 13,700. Napoleon (Corresp., 14,213) called the force 15,000.

Note a: The other three batts. of the 14th were with Verdier at Saragossa. This odd battalion was in the battle attached to D’Armagnac’s brigade. Merle was given Ducos’ and D’Armagnac’s brigades to make up a division.

Note b: These battalions were much weakened by detachments.

Note c: A very strong battalion: it was 1,200 strong on June 1, and must still have had 1,000 bayonets.

Note d: Both regiments were incomplete, having dropped men at Vittoria and Burgos.

[136] In the Vaughan Papers I find a ‘Journal of the operations of General Blake,’ by some officer of his staff, unnamed. It gives the force of the Galician army at Rio Seco as follows:—

This total only differs by 26 from that given by Arteche (ii. 654).

[137] The flank battalion which started the rout was the ‘Regiment of Buenos Ayres,’ a provisional corps which had been formed out of the prisoners lately returned from England, who had been captured during our unlucky South American expedition, before Whitelock’s final fiasco (see the ‘Journal of Blake’s Operations,’ in the Vaughan Papers).

[138] In accordance with the unwise practice prevailing in most Continental armies, Blake had massed the grenadier companies of all his line regiments into two battalions, to act as a select reserve.

[139] When Stuart and Vaughan passed through Medina in September, they were given many harrowing details by the local authorities.

[140] See his remarks in the document of July 21, Nap. Corresp., 14,223.

[141] See Foy (iv. 45), and Nap. Corresp., 14,192, where the Emperor goes so far as to say: ‘Si le Général Dupont éprouvait un échec, cela ait de peu de conséquence. Il n’aurait d’autre résultat que de lui faire repasser les montagnes’ (i.e. the Sierra Morena).

[142] Of Gobert’s division the 5th provisional regiment and the Irish battalion never marched south. The 6th, 7th, and 8th provisional regiments—twelve battalions—formed the column; they left one battalion at Madridejos, another at Manzanares. One more remained in the pass at the Puerto del Rey; nine and the cuirassiers (700 strong) descended into the plains. See for details Cabany’s Baylen, p. 115.

[143] Dupont considered that Savary’s intention was to stop all offensive movements whatever: ‘Le général-en-chef me fait entrevoir que nous aurons peut-être à garder notre position jusqu’à ce que Valence et Saragosse soient soumises’ (Dupont to Vedel, July 13).

[144] Dupont to Vedel, evening of July 15.

[145] Dupont’s available force at this moment consisted of the following troops. The numbers given are their original strength, from which deductions must of course be made:—

Allowing a deduction of 3,000 men for sick and previous losses, there remain 15,000 bayonets and 3,000 sabres.

[146] ‘Je vous prie, mon cher général, de vous porter le plus rapidement possible, sur Baylen, pour y faire votre jonction avec le corps qui a combattu aujourd’hui à Mengibar, et qui s’est replié sur cette ville.... J’espère que demain l’ennemi sera rejeté sur Mengibar, au delà du fleuve, et que les postes de Guarroman et de la Caroline resteront en sûreté; ils sont d’une grande importance’ (Dupont to Vedel, night of July 16). In these orders lies the foundation of the disaster.

[147] ‘J’ai reçu votre lettre de Baylen. D’après le mouvement de l’ennemi, le général Dufour a très-bien fait de regagner de vitesse sur La Caroline et sur Ste-Hélène, pour occuper la tête des gorges. Je vois avec plaisir que vous vous hâtez de vous réunir à lui, afin de combattre avec avantage.... Si vous trouvez l’ennemi à La Caroline ou sur tout autre point, tâchez de le battre, pour venir me rejoindre et repousser ce qui est devant Andujar’ (Dupont to Vedel, night of July 17).

[148] Vedel had now with him the following troops:—

Deduct 2,500 for losses in action at Mengibar and sick, and about 10,000 remain.

[149] Against Cabany’s defence of Dupont on this point there must be set the impression of almost every French witness from Napoleon downwards.

[150] Of the troops which we have recapitulated on page 182 there still remained with Dupont the whole of Barbou’s infantry, four of the five regiments of Frésia’s cavalry (the fifth had marched with Vedel), half of the 2nd Provisional Cuirassiers, and the two Swiss regiments of Reding and Preux. The original total of these corps had been 13,274. There remained about 11,000, for that number can be accounted for after the battle. The official Spanish dispatch gave 8,242 unwounded prisoners and 2,000 casualties.

[151] That the desertion was pretty general is shown by the fact that of 2,000 men of these corps only 308 were recorded as prisoners in the Spanish official returns. If 300 more had been killed and wounded, 1,400 must have deserted. Hardly any officers were among those who went over to the enemy; Schramm, their commander, was wounded.

[152] Three companies of Pannetier’s brigade.

[153] There is some dispute as to the exact hours of Vedel’s start and halt: I have adopted, more or less, those given by Cabany. Vedel himself, when examined by the court-martial, said ‘qu’il ne pouvait pas préciser l’heure,’ which is quite in keeping with the rest of his doings.

[154] Apparently they were the 1st battalion of the Irlanda regiment, and the militia of Jaen, according to the narrative of Maupoey and Goicoechea (Arteche, ii. 512).

[155] Or, according to some authorities, met Castaños at the first post-house out of Andujar, on the Baylen road.

[156] No one confesses the demoralization of the French troops more than Foy. ‘Dupont voulait combattre encore.... Mais pour exécuter des résolutions vigoureuses il fallait des soldats à conduire. Or, ces infortunés n’étaient plus des soldats; c’était un troupeau dominé par les besoins physiques, sur lequel les influences morales n’avaient plus de prise. La souffrance avait achevé d’énerver les courages.’

[157] Namely, 6,600 of La Peña’s men, 5,400 of Jones’s, and 2,500 or 3,000 of Cruz-Murgeon’s flying column.

[158] His name was Captain de Fénelon (Cabany, p. 178).

[159] It will be found in the Gazeta de Madrid of October 9, 1808. It is stated that 60,000 dollars in silver and 136,000 dollars in gold, besides much plate and jewellery, were found in the fourgons of Dupont and his staff.

[160] This total of 17,635, given in the Spanish returns, seems absolutely certain. It tallies very well with the original figures of the French divisions, when losses in the campaign are allowed for. I find in the Vaughan Papers a contemporary Spanish scrap of unknown provenance, giving somewhat different figures, as follows:—Dupont’s corps: unwounded prisoners, 6,000; killed and wounded on the field, 3,000; Swiss deserters, 1,200; sick captured in the hospitals, 400; making a total of 10,600. Whittingham, the English attaché in Castaños’ camp, gives another set:—unwounded prisoners, 5,500; killed and wounded, 2,600; Swiss deserters, 1,100; making 9,200. But both of these are confessedly rough estimates, though made on the spot. As to the other French prisoners, the Vaughan document says that 9,100 surrendered with Vedel, 800 in the passes, and 700 more in La Mancha.

[161] Battalions surrendered at Santa Cruz, and at Manzanares. But the officer in command at Madridejos refused to be cajoled, and retreated on Madrid.

[162] There had been a British attaché, Captain Whittingham, at Castaños’ head quarters. The French negotiators had tried to induce him to approve the terms of capitulation. But he very wisely refused, having no authority to do so.

[163] This will be found printed at length in the Appendix of Papers relating to Baylen.

[164] For the horrors of Cabrera, the works of three of the prisoners, Ducor of the Marines of the Guard, and Gille and Wagré of Vedel’s division, may be consulted. Their story is deeply distressing.

[165] We must deduct the seven battalions (3,500 or 4,000 men) which had been detached to the rear to watch for Vedel’s approach, and were never engaged with Dupont’s troops.

[166] See Thiébault, Expédition de Portugal, and Foy, iv. 363.

[167] Compare Nap. Corresp., 13,608 and 13,620.

[168] Foy, iv. 273-4.

[169] Nap. Corresp., 14,023 (from Bayonne, May 29).

[170] For these incidents, so discreditable to the leading men of Oporto, see Foy, iv. 206, and Toreño, i. 152. Most Peninsular historians consign them to oblivion.

[171] They re-embodied the old 2nd, 12th, 21st, and 24th battalions of infantry of the line, the 6th Cazadores, and the 6th, 11th, and 12th light cavalry, as well as one or two other old corps whose numbers I cannot identify.

[172] Foy, iv. 276; Napier, i. 97.

[173] For the twelve resolutions arrived at by the council of war, see the analysis given by Thiébault, one of its members.

[174] Foy says that of twenty messages sent to Loison only one got through.

[175] The 2nd Swiss, and four companies of the 86th regiment.

[176] The column comprised the following troops:—

Deducting 1,200 for detached grenadier companies, &c., the whole was well over 7,000. For details, see Thiébault’s Expédition de Portugal.

[177] The figures of the Portuguese historian, Accursio das Neves, reproduced in Arteche (ii. 35), seem indubitable, as they go into minute accounts of the regiments and fractions of regiments present. It seems clear that the allies had nothing like the 5,000 regular troops of which Foy speaks (iv. 267-8).

[178] This fine and not unpromising scheme deserves study (see Alison’s Life of Castlereagh, i. 199-202).

[179] I cannot quite credit the story that Toreño and Arteche repeat of Pitt’s dying prophecy, that ‘Napoleon could only be overthrown by a national war, and that such a war would probably begin in Spain.’

[180] Wellesley to Castlereagh, June 29, 1808 (Well. Suppl. Disp., vi. 87).

[181] For hints on this subject see the letter of W. Wellesley Pole, a kinsman of Sir Arthur, in Wellington Supplementary Dispatches (vi. 171). ‘The desire that has been manifested at Head Quarters for active command will render it natural for all that has passed to be seen through a false medium.... The object of Head Quarters, if it has any object at all, must be to keep down the officer for whom the army has the greatest enthusiasm, and to prevent him from being called by the voice of the nation to the head of the forces upon active service, rather than to crush old officers of known incapacity and want of following.... Dalrymple is a Guardsman; Burrard is a Guardsman; their connexions are closely united to Windsor and Whitehall, and for years have not only been in the most confidential situation about Head Quarters, but have imbibed all their military notions from thence;’ &c.

[182] Born in 1755, he was a favourite of the Duke of York, and had acted as his aide-de-camp. At this moment he held a command in the Home District.

[183] Castlereagh to Wellington (Well. Disp., iv. 8, 9).

[184] Wellesley to Castlereagh, from Corunna, July 21 (Well. Disp., vi. 23-5).

[185] Napier’s statement that Wellesley found the Supreme Junta in an extravagant and irrational frame of mind is by no means borne out by the dispatches which he sent off from Oporto on July 25. They rather represent the Portuguese as in a state of pronounced depression of spirits.

[186] Wellesley to Castlereagh, from Oporto, July 25 (Well. Disp., vi. 31).

[187] For the difficulties of disembarkation see the interesting narrative of Landsheit of the 20th Dragoons, p. 248. He was himself upset in the surf.

[188] The force consisted of:—

A total of 12,626 infantry, 394 cavalry, 471 artillery = 13,491; adding forty-five men of the Staff Corps we get 13,536.

[189] To understand what Wellesley must have felt, we have only to read his rather captious letter of 1801 (Suppl. Disp., ii. 362) to his own brother concerning his merits, his promotion, and his career. The man who could so write must have felt the blow in the worst way.

[190] Well. Disp., iv. 43.

[191] Ibid., iv. 59; cf. pp. 168, 169.

[192] Ibid., iv. 168. Cf. the returns for Vimiero of men present, with the 180 horsed men brought from Ireland.