[270] Well. Suppl. Disp., vi. 207 (figures given for May 23), and Thiébault.

[271] Napier, i. 246; Foy, iv. 363. We have already had occasion to note the proclivity of the 2nd Swiss to desert. The 4th Swiss, who had formed the garrison of Elvas, showed exactly the same tendency.

[272] A table in the Parliamentary Papers relative to Spain and Portugal shows that the Legion received 163 recruits from this source. The 5/60th obtained a much larger number, having still over 200 Swiss with them in 1809.

[273] Wellesley to Lord Castlereagh, Sept. 9 (Well. Disp., iv. 137). In spite of Napier’s denunciation of the Bishop, Wellesley bears good witness in his favour, e.g. iv. 146.

[274] Wellesley to the Bishop of Oporto, Sept. 6: ‘I was present during the negotiation of the agreement, and by the desire of the Commander-in-chief I signed it. But I did not negotiate it, nor can I in any manner be considered responsible for its contents’ (Well. Disp., iv. 134). Wellesley to Castlereagh, Oct. 6: ‘I do not consider myself responsible in any degree for the terms in which it was framed, or for any of its provisions.’

[275] Wellesley to Mr. Stuart (Well. Disp., iv. 120). To Lord Castlereagh (iv. 118). To the Duke of Richmond (Suppl. Disp., vi. 129).

[276] Wellesley to Dalrymple (Well. Disp., iv. 138).

[277] Wellesley to Moore, Sept. 17, 1808 (Well. Disp., p. 142). Moore, as a noted Whig, was imagined not to be a persona grata at head quarters; Wellesley offers, in the most handsome way, to endeavour to smooth matters for him.

[278] This letter, written to Castlereagh from Zambujal (Well. Disp., iv. 127-32), is one of the most conclusive proofs of Wellesley’s military genius. He valued the Spanish armies at their true force. He foresaw that Bonaparte would make ‘the driving of the leopard into the sea’ a point of honour, and would send corps on corps into Spain in order to secure it. He even noted that the affairs of Central Europe, ‘of which I have no knowledge whatever,’ would be the only possible reason that might prevent the Emperor from inundating the Peninsula with his legions. He saw that the presence of the British in Leon would be the one thing that would keep the French from subduing Central Spain: a disaster in the Douro valley was the nightmare of the Emperor, as half a dozen of his dispatches show. The first news that Moore was near Valladolid drew Napoleon from Madrid in wild haste, and deferred for six months the conquest of the valley of the Guadiana.

[279] Wellesley to Moore, Oct. 8 (Well. Suppl. Disp., vi. 150, 151).

[280] The Duke of Richmond to Wellesley, Oct. 12, 1808 (Well. Suppl. Disp., vi. 633).

[281] Toreño, then acting as agent for the Asturian Junta in London, has much interesting information on this point. He saw the gibbet caricature and papers published with black edges (i. 251).

[282] The petitioners ought in fairness to have stated that this was only made in the document setting forth the armistice, and not in the definitive Convention.

[283] Not, of course, the Eliot who had defended Gibraltar so well in 1780-3, but his son, the second Lord Heathfield.

[284] Lockhart’s Life of Sir Walter Scott, ii. 226.

[285] Burrard before the Court of Inquiry (Proceedings, pp. 115, 116, 135).

[286] Dalrymple before the Court of Inquiry (Well. Disp., iv. 178, 180, 181).

[287] He calls it ‘a laboured criticism, which nevertheless left the pith of the question entirely untouched’ (Napier, i. 249). I have printed Lord Moira’s plea in an Appendix, to show that it is well-reasoned and practical.

[288] The King’s Opinion on the Convention of Cintra, paragraphs 4, 5, and 6.

[289] The proceedings terminated Dec. 27, 1808. Wellesley took up the command at Lisbon on April 25, 1809.

[290] Napier, History of the Peninsular War, i. 90.

[291] See pp. 36, 37 of this book.

[292]They were the following:—

[293] The Spanish garrisons in the Balearic Isles consisted of the following troops:—

[294] Urgel is more accessible from France than from Spain. The easiest path to it is that which, starting from Mont-Louis, crosses the Spanish frontier at Puycerda, and follows the head-water of the Segre to the foot of the hill on which the Seu stands.

[295] The population of the Principality in 1803 was 858,000 souls.

[296] So called from Miquelot de Prats, the Catalan condottiere who served under Caesar Borgia. From him the light infantry, once called almogavares, got the name of miqueletes.

[297] There were 400 Spanish Guards at the fight on the Cabrillas, who must have come from the battalion at Barcelona.

[298] I cannot make out the movements of the cavalry regiment of Borbon; it was certainly at Barcelona, 600 strong, in May. But in July it had got down to Andalusia, and was marching with a strength of 401 in the army of Castaños.

[299] This force was Goulas’s Brigade of Chabran’s Division, viz.:—

[300] Schwartz’s force was:—

[That the detached squadron were cuirassiers is proved by Arteche, ii. 86. The French authorities do not give the regiment.]

Foy makes the odd mistake of saying ‘trois bataillons du deuxième Suisse,’ instead of ‘le troisième bataillon du deuxième Suisse.’ There was only one battalion of this regiment with Duhesme.

[301] One gun was lost after leaving Esparraguera by the fall of a rickety bridge over the Abrera (Arteche, ii. 93, 94). Foy and other French narrators do not mention this loss.

[302] For details see Arteche, ii. 98, 99, and Foy, iv. 150, who adds that Arbos ‘fut pillé et réduit en cendres, conformément aux usages de la guerre’(!)

[303]

[304] Napier says that the assault was delivered at seven in the evening, before dark (i. 79); but all the Spanish accounts speak of it as having taken place long after dark, though before midnight (cf. Arteche, Toreño, and Minali, quoted by the former); so does Foy (iv. 158), who fixes the hour as ‘between nine and ten.’

[305] Yet he had the hardihood to write to the Emperor that ‘after some slight skirmishing, he did not think it worth while to make a serious attack on Gerona’ (Nap. Corresp., xvii. 347).

[306] The Valais was a republic from 1802 till 1810, when it was annexed to the Empire, as the ‘department of the Simplon.’

[307] From Nap. Corresp., 14,092, 14,150, 14,151, and 14,168, we get the composition of this force. They account for the following:

There were also nine companies of gendarmerie and ‘departmental reserves.’

[308] Foy, iv. 165, 166.

[309] The Montague, of 74 guns, Captain R. W. Otway.

[310] Foy, iv. 169.

[311] Neither Toreño nor Arteche mentions the trouble caused by this tiresome old man, to whom the delay in succouring Catalonia was due. For the negotiations with him see Lord Collingwood’s correspondence (Life, ii. 291, 292), and Foy (iv. 181).

[312] The numbers of these corps before the fighting commenced in June had been:

But as the Italians, Goulas, and the cuirassiers had all been engaged several times, and had suffered serious losses, we must deduct 800 men at least, in order to get the figures of July 17. Foy gives only 6,000.

[313] Not on the twenty-fifth, as Napier says (i. 83), following apparently the dates given by Cabanes. I have followed Arteche here, as his search into times and seasons seems more careful than that of any other authority.

[314] Collingwood (Correspondence, ii. 271) calls him ‘a fat unwieldy marquess, who, if his principles are good, has a very limited ability.’

[315] For Del Palacio’s intentions see his orders to Caldagues, quoted by Arteche (ii. 622).

[316] For a good narrative of these operations see Lord Cochrane’s autobiography, i. 262-5.

[317] It is very odd, as Arteche remarks (ii. 611), that none of the contemporary Spanish narratives mention the name of Bolivar. They only speak of La Valeta and O’Donovan as heading the defence.

[318] The Barcelona Volunteers under La Valeta led; the Ultonia, under Major Henry O’Donnell, supported.

[319] See Cochrane’s autobiography, i. 266.

[320] Napier, i. 89.

[321] St. Cyr, Journal de l’Armée de Catalogne, 1808-9, p. 15.

[322] The notices of the army of Catalonia and its intended operations are not very numerous in Napoleon’s dispatches. Foy accepts Duhesme’s story that he had intended all along to raise the siege after receiving from Bayonne an order to suspend active operations (iv. 177). But it seems difficult to read this into the Emperor’s dispatches; Napoleon received the news of Baylen on Aug. 3, but did not begin pushing large reinforcements on to Catalonia till Aug. 10 (Nap. Corresp., 14,249), nor supersede Duhesme by St. Cyr till Aug. 17 (Nap. Corresp., 14,256). On Aug. 23 he concludes that Duhesme would be best placed at Barcelona, but that Reille must take Gerona with his division, which may be reinforced by that of Chabot, newly arrived at Perpignan, or even by more troops due from Italy in a few weeks. The expectation which he expresses, that Reille alone might very possibly be strong enough to capture the place, is enough to show that he did not intend to raise the siege, but (at most) to order Duhesme to strengthen Lecchi with men drawn off from the leaguer—which is a very different thing from that general’s statement of the case.

[323] The Emperor writes to Eugène Beauharnais that the 10,000 Italians, horse, foot, and artillery, must be ‘un extrait de l’armée italienne dans le cas de se faire honneur,’ the best that could be got (Dispatch 14,249, Aug. 10).

[324] Napoleon to Jerome, King of Westphalia, July 25 (Nap. Corresp., 14,230): ‘L’Autriche arme: elle nie ses armements, elle arme donc contre nous.... Puisque l’Autriche arme, il faut donc armer. Aussi j’ordonne que la Grande Armée soit renforcée. Mes troupes se réunissent à Strasbourg, Mayence, Wesel,’ &c. Compare this with the great harangue made to Metternich on August 15 (Nap. Corresp., 14,254) and with Nap. Corresp., 14,248, which discusses the co-operation of Russia in a war with Austria.

[325] Napoleon to Clarke, Aug. 3 (Nap. Corresp., 14,242).

[326] i.e. Napoleon is aware that they will never allow the army to be taken home by sea, as the capitulation provided.

[327] Napoleon to Joseph, Aug. 3 (Nap. Corresp., 14,243): ‘L’Allemagne, l’Italie, la Pologne etc., tout se lie,’ is the Emperor’s phrase.

[328] Nap. Corresp., 14,244, 14,272, 14,283.

[329] A few words as to Dupont’s fate may be added. His experiences during the next four years throw a curious light on the administration of military justice under the Empire. He, together with Vedel, Chabert, Marescot, Legendre, and the aide-de-camp Villoutreys, were arrested on returning to France, and thrown into prison. They were told to prepare for a trial before the Supreme High Court (Haute Cour Impériale), and a long series of interrogatories was administered to them. A military commission drew up a preliminary report on the case: on reading it the Emperor saw that Dupont had a fair defence to make on all the charges brought against him, with the exception of that of military incapacity. He countermanded the order for a trial, and the prisoners (after nine months of confinement) were released, but left under police surveillance. After Dupont had spent two years and a half of peace in the country-house of a relative, he was suddenly arrested at midnight on Feb. 12, 1812, and given a secret trial, not before a court of justice or a court-martial, but before a special military commission. He was allowed neither counsel nor documents, and forced to defend himself at forty-eight hours’ notice. The judges declared him guilty of having signed a capitulation containing ‘des conditions honteuses et avilissantes,’ but not of having surrendered without necessity, or of having shown cowardice or treason. Since the capitulation had been ‘contrary to the political interests of the Empire, and had compromised the safety of the State,’ while yet ‘there would be grave inconvenience in giving the accused a public trial,’ the court advised the Emperor to deprive Dupont of rank, title, and pension, and to relegate him to the country. The other accused officers might suffer the same penalties. Refusing to consider this a sufficient punishment, Napoleon shut up Dupont in the lonely fort of Joux, in the Jura, where he remained a prisoner till the fall of the Empire. Vedel and Legendre were pardoned, and afterwards served in Italy. Chabert and Villoutreys were put on half-pay.

[330] The ‘Note sur la situation actuelle de l’Espagne,’ which forms No. 14,241 of the Correspondance. It is dated at Bordeaux, Aug. 2, the very day on which Villoutreys brought the news of the capitulation.

[331]

[332] Lefebvre’s brigade, which belonged to Morlot’s division of Moncey’s corps—it had been lent to Bessières for the moment—and Reynaud’s brigade, i.e. 5,300 foot, also two cavalry regiments, making 6,000 in all.

[333] Bazancourt’s brigade of two veteran regiments (14th and 44th of the line), the last that had arrived at Saragossa.

[334] Note on the situation of Spain, Aug. 5 (Nap. Corresp., 14,245).

[335] Napoleon to Clarke, Aug. 5 (Nap. Corresp., 14,244).

[336] Napoleon to Eugène, Aug. 10 (Nap. Corresp., 14,249), and to Clarke (Nap. Corresp., 14,256).

[337] Napoleon to Clarke, Aug. 17 (Nap. Corresp., 14,256).

[338] Except of course the brigade of fusiliers and the three cavalry regiments which were already in Spain.

[339] Or 98,000 to be exact, unless Reille’s force in Roussillon be added.

[340] Savary had left the army on Aug. 4, and returned to France.

[341] See his Mémoires (pp. 66, 67) for the situation at this date.

[342] He arrived at Irun on Aug. 30 (Madrid Gazette, Sept. 17th, 1808).

[343] Proclamation of the Council, dated Aug. 1, published Aug. 2 in the Gazette. There is an original copy of the broadsheet in the Vaughan Papers.

[344] On Aug. 9 the reader is invited to believe that Roussillon has risen against Napoleon, and that the peasantry have stormed its frontier-fortress of Bellegarde.

[345] i.e. Woolwich.

[346] It is hard to agree with Napier’s verdict that ‘The Council was not wanting to itself; the individuals comprising it did not hesitate to seize the reins of power when the French had departed, and the prudence with which they preserved tranquillity in the capital, and prevented all reaction, proves that they were not without merit, and forms a striking contrast to the conduct of the provincial Juntas, under whose savage sway every kind of excess was committed and even encouraged’ (Napier, i. 299).

[347] All these quotations come from the documents inserted by Toreño in his fifth book (i. 262).

[348] See page 69.

[349] Lord Collingwood’s Correspondence, ii. 98.

[350] Arteche, ii. 124.

[351] Toreño, i. 264.

[352] This story is told by Lord Collingwood, in an official dispatch to Castlereagh, dated July 29. He states that he knows that the colloquy took place, and clearly had the information from Castaños himself (Collingwood Correspondence, ii. 199).

[353] Tiradores de España, Provincial de Cadiz, Carmona, Baylen, Navas de Tolosa, 3rd and 5th Volunteers of Seville.

[354] See Arteche, iii. 118.

[355] First cousin to Charles IV, being the son of the Infante Luis, and brother of Godoy’s unfortunate wife.

[356] Napier is wrong in hinting that Canning lent himself to the Sicilian scheme (i. 177, 178) in order to disoblige Castlereagh. Collingwood’s dispatches show that he opposed it, as much as did Dalrymple, and thereby won approval from his government (Collingwood Correspondence, ii. 216, 217).

[357] He sailed on Nov. 4 (Madrid Gazette).

[358] Note the federalist views of the Aragonese Miguel Principe, quoted by Arteche (ii. 121).

[359] Both Florida Blanca and Jovellanos were in favour of making Madrid the meeting-place. The Andalusians defeated them.

[360] He was born in 1743.

[361] For a complete list of the names and professions of the members of the Junta, see the Appendix.

[362] See the letters of Doyle quoted in Napier, i. 287.

[363] Joseph Bonaparte to Napoleon, Sept. 5, 1808.

[364] I find the story of Cuesta’s projected coup d’état (in Toreño, i. 267), which was supposed to rest on the authority of Castaños alone, completely corroborated in Sir Charles Vaughan’s private diary. On Sept. 15 Vaughan, while passing through Segovia, met Cuesta, who told him ‘that two measures were absolutely necessary: (1) the abolition of the provincial Juntas, and the restoration of the ancient authority of the Captains-General and Real Audiencia; (2) The exercise of military force over the Junta at Ocaña (i.e. the supreme ‘Central Junta’) sufficient to compel them to elect an executive council of three or five persons to be placed at the head of different departments, and to be responsible to the nation at large.’ This is precisely what Cuesta proposed to Castaños.

[365] So Toreño. Arteche says that he was to concentrate at Aranda.

[366] His very elaborate vindication of himself can be read in his pamphlet of September, 1808, which was translated into English in the same winter, and reprinted in London. It contains a good account of the Bayonne business, and many valuable state papers.

[367] For these documents see the Madrid Gazette of Oct. 4.

[368] Manifesto of the Junta to the Spanish people, Oct. 26.

[369] Madrid Gazette of Oct. 18, p. 1,301.

[370] Napier is not quite correct in saying (i. 293) that ‘Leon never raised a single soldier for the cause.’ It had three battalions of volunteers (2,400 men) at Rio Seco, and raised four more at Leon, Zamora, Ledesma, and Benavente in September (Madrid Gazette, Sept. 28). But this was a poor contribution for a kingdom of four provinces and 620,000 souls.