[579] After reading Sir Charles Vaughan’s diary, showing how hard he and Mr. Stuart found it to procure enough draught animals to take their small party from Corunna to Madrid, in September, 1808, I cannot doubt that by October the collecting of the transport for a whole army was an almost impossible task in Galicia.

[580] It may perhaps be worth while to give the composition and brigading of Moore’s army on the march from Lisbon and Elvas to Salamanca.

There marched by Coimbra and Almeida, Beresford [1/9th, 2/43rd, 2/52nd] and Fane [1/38th, 1/79th, 2/95th]. By Abrantes and Guarda went Bentinck [1/4th, 1/28th, 1/42nd, and four companies 5/60th] and Hill [1/5th, 1/32nd, 1/91st]: this column took with it one battery: it was followed by two isolated regiments, the 1/6th and 1/50th. The corps which marched from Elvas by Alcantara, under Paget, was composed of the brigades of Alten (1st and 2nd Light Battalions of the K. G. L.) and Anstruther 20th, 1/52nd, 1/95th. The 3rd Regiment joined the army from Almeida, where it was in garrison, and the 1/82nd came up late from Lisbon. It was originally intended that Bentinck and Beresford should form a division under Fraser, Anstruther and Alten a division under Paget. Of the troops which reached Salamanca the 3rd and 5/60th were sent back to Portugal.

The original brigading of Baird’s force was:—Cavalry Brigade (Lord Paget) 7th, 10th, and 15th Hussars. 1st Brigade (Warde) 1st and 3rd batts. of the 1st Foot Guards. 2nd Brigade (Manningham) 3/1st, 1/26th, 2/81st. 3rd Brigade (Leith) 51st, 2/59th, 76th. Light Brigade (R. Crawfurd) 2/43rd, 1/95th, 2/95th (detachments). The 2/14th and 2/23rd were also present, perhaps as a brigade under Mackenzie.

All these arrangements were temporary, and at Sahagun, as we shall see, the whole army was recast. A complete table of Moore’s army, with its final organization, force, and losses, will be found in the Appendix.

[581] Moore names one regiment only as an exception.

[582] Save two stray battalions, which had started last from Lisbon.

[583] There is an undertone of gloom in most of Bentinck’s very capable letters, which contrasts sharply with the very optimistic views expressed by Doyle and most of the other military agents. On Oct. 2 he ‘feels the danger forcibly’ of the want of a single commander for the Spanish armies. On Sept. 30 he remarks that ‘the Spanish troops consider themselves invincible, but that the Spanish Government ought not to be deluded by the same opinion.’ On Nov. 14 ‘he must not disguise that he thinks very unfavourably of the affairs of Spain: the Spaniards have not the means to repel the danger that threatens’: most of his letters are in more or less the same strain.

[584] Except with Castaños, from whom some sensible but rather vague advice was procured.

[585] e.g. in his letter of Nov. 19 Moore speaks of the town of Salamanca as doing its best for him: the clergy were exerting themselves, and a convent of nuns had promised him £5,000. In his Journal he has a testimonial to the fidelity with which the people of Tordesillas protected an English officer from a raiding party of French cavalry. There are some similar notes in British memoirs: e.g. ‘T.S.’ of the 71st expresses much gratitude for the kindness of the people of Peñaranda, who, when Hope’s division arrived in a drenched and frozen condition, rolled out barrels of spirits into the streets and gave every man a good dram before the regiments marched on. Some towns, e.g. Zamora and Alba de Tormes, behaved well in opposing (though without any hope of success) the French, when they did appear.

[586] As to the conduct of the Spaniards I think that the best commentary on it is that of Leith Hay (i. 80-1), who was riding all over Castile and Leon in these unhappy weeks. ‘Thus terminated a journey of about 900 miles, in which a considerable portion of the country had been traversed, under circumstances which enabled me to ascertain the sincere feeling of the people. It is but justice to say that I met with but one sentiment as to the war: that I was everywhere treated with kindness. I mention this as a creditable circumstance to the inhabitants of the Peninsula, and in contradiction to the statements often recorded, unjustly in my opinion, as to the want of faith, supineness, and perfidy of the Spanish people.... Their conduct was throughout distinguished by good faith, if it was at the same time rendered apparently equivocal from characteristic negligence, want of energy, and the deficiency of that moral power that can alone be derived from free institutions and an enlightened aristocracy.’

[587] Moore to Castlereagh from Salamanca, Nov. 24.

[588] Ibid., Dec. 8.

[589] Moore to Castlereagh from Salamanca, Nov. 24.

[590] Moore to Frere from Salamanca, Nov. 27.

[591] The notes and diaries of this ancient member of my own College have been of enormous use to me for side-lights on Spanish politics during 1808. His summary of his great ride from Caparrosa in Navarre to Corunna, between November 21 and December 2, is perhaps worth quoting. ‘From Caparrosa to Madrid and from Madrid to Salamanca, with the dispatches for Sir John Moore, containing the defeat of the army commanded by General Castaños, I rode post. I stayed the night at Salamanca, and at two o’clock on the following day (Nov. 29) I set out for Astorga with dispatches for Sir D. Baird, and with Sir J. Moore’s dispatches for England. I was detained only six hours at Astorga, and after riding two days and two nights on end arrived at Corunna the evening of Dec. 2. The post-horses at every relay in Spain were at this time so overworked that the journey was tiresome and painful. I had ridden 790 miles from Caparrosa to Corunna in eleven days (Nov. 21 to Dec. 2). I had a night’s rest at Agreda, Cetina, and Salamanca, and two at Madrid.’ Deducting two days in Madrid, the ride was really one of 790 miles in nine days.

[592] Moore to Hope from Salamanca, Nov. 28.

[593] There is a good, but short, account of this forced march, in bitter cold, to be found in the memoir of ‘T.S.’ of the 71st, one of Hope’s four infantry regiments. He speaks of a curious fact that I have nowhere else seen mentioned, viz. that at Peñaranda the artillery horses were so done up that Hope buried six guns, and turned their teams to help the other batteries. Apparently they were dug up a few days after by troops sent out from Salamanca, as the tale of batteries is complete when Moore resumed his march.

[594] I think that Napier (i. 287-8) somewhat exaggerates the danger which Hope ran in his march from Villacastin to Alba de Tormes. Of course if Lefebvre had been marching on Salamanca, the situation would have been dangerous: but as a matter of fact he was marching on the Guadarrama, which Hope had safely passed on the twenty-eighth. Every mile that the British moved took them further from Lefebvre’s route: his infantry was never within fifty miles of Hope’s convoy: and supposing his brigade of cavalry had got in touch with the British, it could have done nothing serious against a force of all arms in the hands of a very capable general. The ‘4,000 cavalry’ of which Napier speaks were in reality only 1,500.

[595] See James Moore’s memoir of his brother, p. 72; compare Napier, i. 292, and Lord Londonderry’s account of his own observations at Salamanca, in his History of the Peninsular War, i. 220, 221.

[596] The heavy ammunition and all the sick who could be moved were sent off on Dec. 5, under the escort of the 5/60th. See Moore’s ‘General Orders’ for that day, and Ormsby, ii. 54.

[597] Moore to Castlereagh, from Salamanca, Nov. 29.

[598] La Romana to Moore, from Leon, Nov. 30.

[599] See the ‘morning states’ for the army of Galicia on Dec. 4 and Dec. 14, in Arteche (iv. 532, 533).

[600] Martin de Garay to Moore, from Aranjuez, Nov. 28, 1808.

[601] This answer is recorded in the despairing appeal which Escalante wrote to Moore from Calzada de Baños on Nov. 7, after having started back to join the Junta. The rest of Moore’s arguments can be gathered from his own dispatches.

[602] Moore to Frere, from Salamanca, Dec. 6, 1808.

[603] See James Moore (p. 86-7), where he vilely mistranslates the letter—even rendering corte by ‘country’; and Napier (i. 291), where the same accusation is formulated.

[604] Moore to Castlereagh, from Salamanca, Dec. 5.

[605] Stuart to Moore, from Madrid, Nov. 30.

[606] ‘I do not know that I can in any way express with less offence the entire difference of our opinions on this subject, than by forwarding what I had already written, in ignorance of the determination [to retreat] which you had already taken’ (Aranjuez, Nov. 30).

[607] He had called on Sir John a few days before, while on his way to Madrid to solicit a military post from the Junta. Moore wrote on Nov. 27 to Mr. Stuart, to say that he had seen him and that ‘he never could help having a dislike to people of this description.’

[608] Moore to Castlereagh, from Salamanca, Dec. 5.

[609] Moore to Baird, from Salamanca, Dec. 5.

[610] Moore to Baird, from Salamanca, Dec. 6. The strange grammar would seem to show that the letter was dashed off in a hurry, and never revised.

[611] Charmilly, greatly indignant, published a narrative of the whole, in which he justified himself and his character. It does not alter the main facts of the case.

[612] His muster-rolls show 33,000 troops in all, with 29,000 actually present with the colours, but Leith’s brigade and the 82nd, 2,539 men, were not up.

[613] Moore to Frere, Dec. 6. The version presented to Parliament has been somewhat expurgated: I quote from that given by James Moore.

[614] Frere to Moore, from Truxillo, Dec. 9.

[615] Frere to Moore, from Merida, Dec. 14.

[616] Moore’s plans between Dec. 6 and 10, the day on which he got news of the fall of Madrid, must be gathered from his rather meagre dispatches to Castlereagh of midnight, Dec. 5, and of Dec. 8; from his much more explicit letters to Frere on Dec. 6 and 10; from that to La Romana on Dec. 8; and most of all from the very interesting and confidential letters to Baird on Dec. 6 and 8.

His doubts as to the permanence of the outburst of enthusiasm in Madrid are plainly expressed in nearly every one of these epistles. The terrible under-estimate of Napoleon’s disposable forces is to be found in that to Castlereagh on Dec. 12, where he writes that ‘the French force in Spain may fairly be set down at 80,000 men, besides what is in Catalonia.’ Acting upon this hypothesis, it is no wonder that he was convinced that Bonaparte could not both besiege Madrid and hunt the British army.

[617] Consisting of the 51st Regiment, 59th (2nd batt.), and 76th.

[618] Except the ‘Light Brigade’ of Baird’s army which had never left Astorga, having been intended to act with the cavalry as a rearguard.

[619] The 3rd had been at Ciudad Rodrigo since Oct. 29 guarding communications.

[620] They were the 45th (1st batt.) and the 97th.

[621] See the tables in the Appendix. It seems to result that the gross total who marched from Corunna and Lisbon was 33,884, that the deduction of 3,938 sick leaves 29,946. Leith’s battalions and the 82nd were 2,539 strong, the men on detachment 1,687: this leaves 25,720 for the actual marching force.

[622] As Arteche very truly observes, the letter of La Romana cannot be safely quoted (after the fashion of James Moore on his p. 122) as approving of the retreat on Portugal. He is answering the dispatch of Dec. 6, not that of Nov. 28.

[623] Graham to Moore, from Talavera, Dec. 7-8.

[624] Moore to Castlereagh, from Salamanca, Dec. 10.

[625] There were thirty of these dragoons: with them were fifty infantry, apparently a belated detail or foraging party from Lefebvre’s corps.

[626] Berthier speaks as if Mouton were still commanding one of Soult’s divisions, but he was now gone, and Mermet’s name ought to appear.

[627] This dispatch, though often published, has been deliberately omitted (like some others) in the Correspondance de Napoléon, vol. xviii, probably because it shows the Emperor in one of his least omniscient moods.

[628] It is clear from Nap. Corresp., 14,614, 14,616-7, that Franceschi actually evacuated Valladolid and retired northwards. Napoleon at first believed that Moore had occupied the place: but 14,620 mentions that no more happened than that 100 hussars swooped down on it on Dec. 19, and carried off the intendant of the province and 300,000 reals (£3,000) from the treasury. This exploit is omitted by nearly every English writer. Only Vivian mentions it in his diary, and says that the lucky captors belonged to the 18th Hussars (Memoirs, p. 94). What became of the money?

[629] Toreño, being an Asturian, is rather indignant at Romana’s reflection on the Junta of his province, and observes (i. 324) that the Marquis did not take the trouble to ask for help from them, only writing them a single letter during his stay at Leon. But they sent him some tents, and took in some of his sick. From Galicia there was coming for him an enormous convoy with 100 wagons of English boots and clothes: but it was three weeks too late, and had only reached Lugo by Jan. 1.

[630] Romana to Moore, from Leon, Dec. 14.

[631] Possibly the two light infantry battalions (Catalonia and Barcelona) of the Baltic division.

[632] Symes to Baird, from Leon, Dec. 14. Baird, of course, forwarded the letter to Moore. I have cut down the report to one-third of its bulk, by omitting the less important parts.

[633] Moore’s diary, quoted in his brother’s memoir of him, pp. 141, 142.

[634] Compare Lord Londonderry (a participator in the charge), Vivian, Adam Neale, and on the French side, Colonel St. Chamans, Soult’s aide-de-camp. The British lost only 14 men (Vivian, p. 97).

[635] After his return from Spain in January, 1809, Paget eloped with the wife of Henry Wellesley, the younger brother of Wellington. Naturally they could not be placed together for many years, and Paget lost his chance of seeing any more of the war. But at Waterloo he gloriously vindicated his reputation as the best living British cavalry-officer.

[636] From Moore’s dispatch to La Romana, written on the twenty-third, we gather that the letter with the news about the French movements came in about six p.m.,and the second one with the report that the Spaniards had reached Mansilla about eight. The latter is acknowledged in a postscript to Moore’s reply to the former. The resolve to retreat was made between six and eight o’clock.

[637] Nap. Corresp., 14,577 [Dec. 17], orders Lasalle’s cavalry to push for Plasencia in order to get news of the British army.

[638] Napier (i. 304) says that there were 60,000 men present, but it is hard to see how such a number could have been collected on that day at Madrid; and the official account of the review in the Madrid Gazette for Dec. 23 says that 40,000 men appeared, ‘all in beautiful order, and testifying their enthusiasm by their shouts as His Majesty rode past the front of each regiment.’ The Emperor never understated his forces on such occasions: the tendency was the other way.

[639] Nap. Corresp., 14,514, to Admiral Decrès. Cf. De Pradt, p. 211.

[640] Nap. Corresp., 14,553, to Bessières, Dec. 12.

[641] In Nap. Corresp. there is no trace of movement till the twenty-second.

[642] All this can be studied in Nap. Corresp., 14,609, 14,611, 14,614. The march out towards the Escurial is fixed, by the Madrid Gazette of Dec. 23, as having begun late on the twenty-first.

[643] This error appears in Nap. Corresp., 14,614 [Dec. 22], ‘si les Anglais veulent tenir à Valladolid’; 14,616 [Dec. 23] says, ‘Les Anglais paraissent être à Valladolid, probablement avec une avant-garde.’ It is only on Dec. 27 that he writes to King Joseph that they had never been there at all, save with a flying party of 100 light cavalry.

[644] This is Napoleon’s own estimate (Nap. Corresp., 14,615). Marshal Jourdan, who was more or less in charge of the whole, as chief of the staff to King Joseph, says that there were in reality only 30,000 men in all (Mémoires Militaires, p. 130). Not only was Victor’s corps short of the division of Lapisse (which the Emperor had carried off), but Lefebvre’s was also incomplete, as two Dutch and one German battalions of Leval’s division were behind in Biscay, garrisoning Bilbao and other points. King Joseph’s Guards had also left some detachments behind, and were not up to full strength (Nap. Corresp., 14,615).

[645] Moore to Baird, from Salamanca, Dec. 6.

[646] The phrase will be found in De Pradt, p. 211.

[647] Nap. Corresp., 14,620 (Napoleon to King Joseph, Dec. 27).

[648] Oddly enough Joseph had anticipated his brother’s orders, by putting in the Madrid Gazette of that very day a notice that a British corps was in the most critical position, that its retreat was cut off, and that ‘London, so long insensible to the woes of Spain, will soon grieve over a disaster that is her own and not that of another.’

[649] Moore to La Romana, from Sahagun, night of Dec. 23-4.

[650] Moore to La Romana, from Sahagun, Dec. 24.

[651] There is a good account of this dangerous passage in Adam Neale’s Spanish Campaign of 1808.

[652] Memoir of ‘T.S.’ of the 71st Highlanders, p. 53.

[653] I am again quoting from the admirable narrative of ‘T.S.’, the private in the 71st. Compare Ormsby’s Letters, ii. 92-3, for the wanton plundering.

[654] The French did worse, as they burnt the whole castle when they occupied it during the first days of the new year. But that is no justification for the conduct of the British. For a description of the damage done see Ormsby, ii. 102, 103.

[655] General Order, issued at Benavente on Dec. 27.

[656] Five regiments (7th, 10th, and 15th Hussars, 18th Light Dragoons, 3rd K. G. L.) were being pressed by thirteen French regiments—four each of Lorges’s and Lahoussaye’s, two of Colbert’s, and three of the Guard.

[657] Moore to Castlereagh, from Benavente, Dec. 28.

[658] Recollections of Rifleman Harris, p. 171.

[659] Napoleon (Nap. Corresp., 14,623) says that the regiment of chasseurs was only 300 strong, and their loss only sixty. But the splendid regiments of the Guard cavalry had not yet fallen to this small number of sabres.

[660] He was sent to England, and long lived on parole at Cheltenham. While he was there Charles Vaughan called on him, and got from him some valuable information about the first siege of Saragossa, whose history he was then writing. In 1811 Lefebvre broke his parole and escaped to France, where Napoleon welcomed him and restored him to command.

[661] Larrey, the Emperor’s surgeon, commenting on sabre-wounds, says that no less than seventy wounded of the chasseurs came under his care on this occasion.

[662] In James Moore’s book this gallant officer appears under the English disguise of Major Bagwell, under which I did not at first recognize him (p. 181). Oddly enough Adam Neale makes the same mistake (p. 179).

[663] Nap. Corresp., 14,623 (Napoleon to Josephine, from Benavente, Dec. 31), ‘Les Anglais fuient épouvantés.’

[664] Nap. Corresp., 14,626 (Napoleon to King Joseph). Joseph is to insert in the Madrid papers letters written from these three places with descriptions of the brigandage practised by the English—‘à Leon ils ont chassé les moines.’ No English troops had ever been within thirty miles of Leon!

[665] ‘Cette affaire m’a coûté une soixantaine de mes chasseurs. Vous sentez combien cela m’a été désagréable’ (ibid.).

[666] Symes to Moore, from La Romana’s camp at Mansilla, Dec. 25.

[667] Ibid.

[668] All witnesses agree that the army of Galicia was in a most distressing condition. ‘This army was literally half naked and half starved,’ says Adam Neale. ‘A malignant fever was raging among them, and long fatigues, privation, and this mortal distemper made them appear like spectres issuing from a hospital rather than an army’ (p. 181). ‘T.S.’ describes them as ‘looking more like a large body of peasants driven from their homes, and in want of everything, than a regular army ’ (p. 56). The men fit for service are described as being no more than 5,000 strong.

[669] ‘We all wished it, but none believed it,’ writes ‘T.S.’ ‘We had been told the same at Benavente, but our movement had no appearance of a retreat in which we were to face about and make a stand: it was more like a shameful flight’ (p. 56). This undoubtedly was the prevailing view in the ranks.

[670] Moore to Castlereagh, from Astorga, Dec. 31, 1808.

[671] This plea is not to be found in any of Moore’s dispatches, but only in La Romana’s account of the interview which he sent to the Junta.

[672] ‘Abandoned from the beginning by everything Spanish, we were equal to nothing by ourselves. From a desire to do what I could, I made the movement against Soult. As a diversion it has answered completely: but as there is nothing to take advantage of it, I have risked the loss of an army to no purpose. I find no option now but to fall down to the coast as fast as I am able.... The army would, there cannot be a doubt, have distinguished itself, had the Spaniards been able to offer any resistance. But from the first it was placed in situations in which, without the possibility of doing any good, it was itself constantly risked’ (Moore to Castlereagh, from Astorga, Dec. 31).

[673] Compare Moore to Castlereagh (from Astorga, Dec. 31) with Nap. Corresp., 14,637, and with James Moore’s memoir (p. 184), and ‘T.S.’s autobiography (p. 57).

[674] These reasons will be found set forth at length in Nap. Corresp., 14,684 (to King Joseph, Jan. 11), and 14,692 (to Clarke, Jan. 13).

[675] There is a distinct allusion to the matter, however, in Fouché’s Mémoires (i. 385).

[676] For a long account of all this intrigue see the Mémoires of Chancellor Pasquier (i. 355, &c.). He says that it was discovered by Lavalette, the Postmaster-General, who sent information to the Viceroy of Italy, in consequence of which a compromising letter from Caroline Bonaparte (at Naples) to Talleyrand was seized. The reproaches which he puts into Napoleon’s mouth must, I fancy, be taken as about as authentic as an oration in Thucydides.

[677] There was also at this moment a slight recrudescence of the old agitation of the chouans in the west of France. Movable columns had to be sent out in the departments of the Mayenne and Sarthe. See Nap. Corresp., 14,871-2.

[678] This was a temporary brigade, made up of the 3rd Dutch Hussars and a provisional regiment of dragoons.

[679] 5th Dragoons and part of the regiment of Westphalian Chevaux-Légers; they belonged to the corps-cavalry of Lefebvre.

[680] The defence of Toro was headed by a stray English officer. The place was taken by D’Avenay, not by Maupetit as Arteche says. See the Mémoires of De Gonneville, i. 207.

[681] For information on these rather obscure operations consult the Mémoires of De Gonneville (of D’Avenay’s brigade) and Nap. Corresp., 14,685.

[682] There were only two battalions remaining with Loison by Jan. 10.

[683] A month after the pursuit of Moore had ended, and the battle of Corunna had been fought, the four infantry divisions of Soult’s corps which were in Galicia had still 19,000 effective bayonets for the invasion of Portugal. The three cavalry divisions were some 5,300 strong. Ney’s corps, which had hardly been engaged, had 16,000 infantry and 1,000 cavalry. There were still, therefore, 41,300 men in hand of the two corps. It is impossible to make the losses from the long pursuit in the snow and the battle of Corunna less than 4,500 or 5,000 men, when we reflect that Moore lost 6,000, of whom only 2,000 were prisoners, and that Soult suffered at least 1,500 casualties in the Corunna fighting.

[684] Nap. Corresp., 14,662. ‘Les hommes pris sur La Romana étaient horribles à voir,’ says Napoleon, who saw them at Astorga.

[685] This is made absolutely certain by his letter of Jan. 13, in which he says that ‘at Lugo I became sensible of the impossibility of reaching Vigo, which is at too great a distance.’ On starting from Astorga, then, he still thought that he might be able to embark at that port. A glance at the map shows that the march Astorga—Lugo—Vigo is two sides of a triangle. If the Vigo route was to be taken, the only rational places to turn on to it are Astorga and Ponferrada.

[686] ‘After a time the same difficulties which affect us must affect him [Soult]: therefore the rear once past Villafranca, I do not expect to be molested’ (Moore to Castlereagh, from Astorga, Dec. 31).

[687] Consisting of the 20th Foot, and the first battalions of the 28th, 52nd, 91st, and 95th.

[688] The reader should note, in the Appendix dealing with the numbers of Moore’s army, the very small proportional losses suffered by the two battalions of the Guards, the 43rd (1st batt.), 4th, 42nd, 71st, 79th, 92nd, 95th (2nd batt.), and the cavalry.