5 We may remark in passing, that the practice of making the chairman of the board also chairman of the half-yearly meetings, is a very injudicious one. The directors are the servants of the proprietary; and meet them from time to time to render an account of their stewardship. That the chief of these servants, whose proceedings are about to be examined, should himself act as chief of the jury is absurd. Obviously, the business of each meeting should be conducted by some one independently chosen for the purpose; as the Speaker is chosen by the House of Commons.
And here this allusion to the preference-share system, introduces us to a fact which may fitly close this detail of private interests and questionable practices—a fact serving at once to illustrate the subtlety and concert of railway officialism, and the power it can exert. That this fact may be fully appreciated, it must be premised, that though preference-shares do not usually carry votes, they are sometimes specially endowed with them; and further, that they occasionally remain unpaid up until the expiration of a time after which no further calls can be legally made. In the case in question, a large number of £50 preference-shares had thus long stood with but £5 paid. Promoters of extensions, &c., had here a fine opportunity of getting great power in the Company at small cost; and, as we shall see, they duly availed themselves of it. Already had their party twice tried to thrust the proprietors into a new undertaking of great magnitude. Twice had they entailed on them an expensive and harassing contest. A third time, notwithstanding a professed relinquishment of it, they {81} brought forward substantially the same scheme, and were defeated only by a small majority. The following extracts from the division lists we take from the statement of one of the scrutineers.