[519] The Spanish line-of-battle was as follows:—

[520] Napier, for example, following French sources, gives Blake 12,000 men.

[521] Three battalions of the 114th of the Line, and two of the 1st of the Vistula.

[522] Suchet gives a very poor account of Alcañiz in his Mémoires. In spite of his many merits, he did not take a beating well, and slurs over this action, just as in 1812 he slurs over his defeat at Castalla. He does not even give an estimate of his killed and wounded, and has the assurance to say that he left the enemy only ‘l’opinion de la victoire’ (i. 20). Blake clearly makes too much of the French attack on his right in his dispatch.

[523] Suchet, Mémoires, p. 20.

[524] The drafts were so large that the troops of Lazan’s division, which had numbered 3,979 in May, were 5,679 in June, those of Roca rose similarly from 3,449 to 5,525. The Valencian Junta claimed to have sent in all 11,881 men to reinforce Blake, and the returns bear them out. They also gave him 2,000,000 reals in cash—about £22,000—raised by a special contribution in fifteen days. Their report says that they had sent on every armed man in the province, and that the city was only guarded by peasants armed with pikes. (Argüelles.)

[525] Suchet, Mémoires, p. 23.

[526] Von Brandt, Aus meinem Leben, i. 67.

[527] 44th of the Line, 1,069 bayonets, and 3rd of the Vistula, 964 bayonets, according to Suchet’s figures.

[528] Apparently a battalion of the 121st of the Line, the rest of which regiment was still in Navarre.

[529] The battalion of the 5th Léger belonged to Morlot’s division, the rest of which was dispersed in Navarre or absent: that of the 64th was one which Suchet had brought from Valladolid as his personal escort, and which properly belonged to the 5th Corps.

[530] Suchet says the morning was occupied in mere ‘tiraillement’ of the Spanish skirmishers and the 2nd of the Vistula. This is not borne out by the narrative of Von Brandt, of that corps. He says that the enemy came on ‘sehr lebhaft,’ that both battalions of his regiment were deeply engaged, that a regiment of Spanish dragoons in yellow [he calls it Numancia, but it was really Olivenza] charged into the skirmishing-line and nearly broke it. The 2nd of the Vistula used up all its cartridges, and lost ground. ‘Die Kavalleriezüge wurden jedoch jedesmal zurückgewiesen, aber nichtsdestoweniger verloren wir allmählich Terrain.’ The Spaniards were only driven off by a battery being drawn forward into the fighting-line. Then the fight stood still, but the regiment had suffered very heavily, and was finally drawn back and put into the reserve. (Aus meinem Leben, pp. 71-2.)

[531] The 2nd of the Vistula having been distracted to the centre, Habert had only the two battalions of the 14th of the Line, and one of the 5th Léger from the reserve.

[532] ‘Ihr Rückzug geschah in aller Ordnung und militärischer Haltung. Sie lagerten in der Nacht uns gegenüber, und hielten am anderen Morgen die Höhen von Botorrita ganz in der Nähe des Schlachtfeldes.’ [Von Brandt, i. 73.]

[533] Suchet (i. 24) says that Blake had been reinforced by 4,000 Valencians, when he fought at Belchite. This seems to have been an error, his reinforcement being Areizaga’s 6,000 men picked up at Botorrita, who were all Aragonese.

[534] He had twenty-two battalions and eight squadrons at Belchite (as he says himself, Mémoires, i. p. 34), while at Maria he had only fourteen battalions and seven squadrons.

[535] Certainly on reading Suchet’s report one would not be inclined to think that the whole matter was such a disgraceful rout as Von Brandt (i. 74-5) describes in the above paragraphs.

[536] Mémoires, p. 36.

[537] Morlot’s division had been handed over to Habert, who resigned his brigade of Laval’s division to the Polish colonel Chlopicki.

[538] See p. 292.

[539] See the letter to Colonel Bourke, Wellington Dispatches, iv. 390-400.

[540] Napier (ii. 149) calls this alternative plan of campaign ‘a movement in conjunction with Beresford, del Parque, and Romana by Salamanca.’ This is a most inappropriate description of it: about June 10, when operations might have commenced, Del Parque’s army did not yet exist. There were only three or four of Carlos d’España’s battalions at or near Rodrigo. La Romana, on the other hand, was at Orense facing Soult, and could not have reached Almeida or Rodrigo for weeks after the campaign would have begun.

[541] See the ‘Memorandum for Lieut.-Col. Bourke’ in Wellington Dispatches, iv. 372-3.

[542] Wellesley to Mackenzie, from San Tyrso, May 21.

[543] Compare the two dispatches of Victor to Jourdan of April 25 (acknowledging the receipt of Lapisse’s division) and of May 21.

[544] See King Joseph to Napoleon, of the dates April 22 and May 24, 1809.

[545] Compare Victor to Jourdan of May 21, with the account of the combat in Appendix I of Mayne and Lillie’s Lusitanian Legion.

[546] The exact losses of the L. L. L. were—killed, three officers and 103 rank and file; wounded, five officers and 143 rank and file; missing, fifteen rank and file. Of the Idanha militia, Mayne returned the whole as missing next morning.

[547] See Wellesley to Mackenzie, May 21, and also Wellesley to Frere on the same day. Wellington Dispatches, iv. 350-1.

[548] See Jourdan’s Mémoires, p. 190.

[549] A move by which he flattered himself that he would not only ‘inquiéter les Anglais,’ but also ‘dégager le duc de Dalmatie,’ an end which no raid with 8,000 or 10,000 men to Castello Branco could possibly have accomplished. Victor to Jourdan, May 29.

[550] He suggests in a letter of June 8, that Mortier’s corps should be brought up to Plasencia to help him. But this was wholly impracticable.

[551] Victor to Jourdan, from Torremocha, May 24.

[552] Victor to Jourdan, May 29.

[553] Jourdan to Victor, June 1.

[554] Victor to Jourdan, June 8. Oddly enough he was wrong in his statement by two days, for Mayne blew up the bridge on the tenth only.

[555] June 10, Joseph to Napoleon.

[556] Cf. Joseph’s letters of June 10 and June 16 to Napoleon: but there seems to be much vacillation in his decisions.

[557] Cuesta’s replies, sent on by Bourke, are dated June 4 and June 6, i.e. ten and eight days respectively before Victor began his retreat beyond the Tagus on June 14.

[558] Wellesley writes in commenting on this plan [Wellington Dispatches, iv. 402]: ‘At all events these two detachments on the two flanks appear to me to be too weak to produce any great effect upon the movements of Victor.... I think it would be nearly certain that the Marshal would be able to defend the passage [of the Tagus] with a part only of his force, while with the other part he would beat one or both of the detachments sent round his flank. Indeed the detachment which should have been sent from La Serena toward Talavera, being between the corps of Victor and Sebastiani, could hardly escape.’ Wellesley also points out that it is useless to expect that Victor would wait in his present cantonments: at the first news of the approach of the British army he will retire to Almaraz and Arzobispo.

[559] I print as an Appendix this all-important letter to Bourke, regarding Cuesta’s three plans of campaign.

[560] Wellesley to Bourke, from Abrantes, June 14.

[561] Wellesley to Cuesta, from Abrantes, June 14.

[562] Wellesley to Castlereagh, Abrantes, June 17. The real cause of Cuesta’s angry and impracticable attitude will be shown in the next chapter.

[563] Wellesley to Frere from the same place, June 14.

[564] With regard to these regiments [5/60th, 2/87th, 1/88th], Wellesley writes in very bitter terms to Donkin on June 16, saying that the number of their stragglers was scandalous, and that the laggards were committing all manner of disorders in the rear of the army. It is fair to remember that the battalions had suffered exceptional hardships, as may be seen from the narratives of Gough of the 87th, and Grattan of the 88th.

[565] The main convoy only reached Abrantes when Wellesley had advanced to Plasencia, in Spain. See letter to the officer commanding Artillery at Castello Branco, dated July 8, from Plasencia.

[566] Cf. Wellesley to Frere, June 14, to Commissary-General Murray, June 16, both from Abrantes, and to Castlereagh, June 27.

[567] The 2/9th and 2/30th were sent to Gibraltar in May. The two squadrons of the 20th Light Dragoons and the one squadron of the 3rd Hussars of the K. G. L. were sent to Sicily at the same time.

[568] The 1/48th, 1/61st, and 23rd Light Dragoons.

[569] 1/43rd, 1/52nd, 1/95th. Of these three units only 1/43rd had been in Robert Craufurd’s old brigade, during the march to Sahagun. The other two had been in Anstruther’s brigade of Paget’s reserve; they had therefore fought at Corunna, while Craufurd and the ‘flank brigade’ which includes the 1/43rd, had been detached from the main army and had embarked at Vigo.

[570] A and I troops. The first joined in company with Craufurd. The second only appeared much later.

[571] Writing to Castlereagh on June 30, Wellesley remarks that ‘according to your account I have 35,000 men—according to my own I have only 18,000,’ but this was before he had been joined by the 1/61st, the 23rd Dragoons, and certain details. It is certain, from the careful table of troops engaged at Talavera which is to be found in the Record Office, that somewhat over 22,000 men entered Spain, and that after deducting sick left at Plasencia and elsewhere, just 20,600 fought at Talavera.

[572] These topics occur in many dispatches to Castlereagh. Perhaps the most notable is that of May 31, 1809, written at Coimbra.

[573] Wellesley’s anxiety to make examples may be traced in the series of letters concerning a private of the 29th which occur in his July dispatches. The man had been acquitted by a court-martial on the ground of insanity, but this did not satisfy the Commander-in-chief, who sends repeated orders that the award must be revised, and the man, if possible, executed.

[574] Viz. 2nd, Tilson and Richard Stewart; 3rd, Mackenzie and Donkin; 4th, A. Campbell and Kemmis.

[575] A and I batteries R. H. A. were both late for Talavera.

[576] Joseph to Napoleon, from Talavera, July 9, 1809.

[577] Joseph to Napoleon, from Almagro, July 2, 1809.

[578] Joseph to Napoleon, from Madridejos, July 3, 1809. It is fair to the King to say that in this letter he concludes that he had better call Mortier down into New Castile if the English are really on the move.

[579] The July strength of Sebastiani’s corps, présents sous les armes, was 1st division (French) 8,118, 2nd division (Valence’s Poles) 4,784, Milhaud’s dragoons 2,249—total 15,151.

[580] Joseph to Napoleon, from Illescas, June 23: ‘Le général Sebastiani a devant lui des forces triples des siennes.’ Joseph to Napoleon, from Moral, July 1: ‘L’armée de 36,000 à 40,000 hommes qui menaçait le 4^me Corps s’est enfuie et a repassé la Sierre Morena.’

[581] For all this see Joseph to Napoleon, from Moral [July 1], and from Almagro [July 2].

[582] Victor to King Joseph, from the head quarters of the 1st Corps, Calzada, near Oropesa, June 25. Intercepted dispatch in the Record Office.

[583] Napoleon to Clarke [Minister of War], from Schönbrunn, June 12, 1809.

[584] The Emperor’s dispatch contained many rebukes to Victor for not pushing towards the North, to join hands with Soult. Jourdan very truly remarks that if the 1st Corps had been sent in that direction, King Joseph must infallibly have lost Madrid.

[585] The Emperor’s stormy dispatch came in due course, but only in September, see pp. 276-7.

[586] Doyle, as his numerous letters in the Record Office show, was such a furious partisan of the family of Palafox, that he believed that all the Spanish authorities were in a conspiracy to keep them down. He especially hated Blake.

[587] On June 9, Frere writes to tell Wellesley that if he could only have destroyed Soult at Oporto, instead of merely chasing him across the frontier, it would have been possible to secure him the post of Generalissimo at once. This chance had gone by, but ‘your friends here (among whom you may count Mr. de Garay) are doing their best for you.’ [Record Office, from Seville, June 9, 1809.]

[588] Wellington to Frere, from Abrantes, June 16, 1809.

[589] I can nowhere find the date of the transference, but it took place before July: the old regiments of Calatrava, Sagunto, Alcantara, and Pavia, which were with Venegas’s army in March, had been transferred to Cuesta’s by June, as also the new regiments of Sevilla, and Cazadores de Madrid. My most valuable source of information is an unpublished dispatch of Cuesta’s in the Madrid War Office, which gives all the names of regiments, but not their numbers.

[590] These totals may be regarded as certain, being drawn from the dispatch of Cuesta’s alluded to above, which I was fortunate enough to find at Madrid. Unfortunately no regimental figures are given, only the gross total.

[591] Wellesley to Frere, Wellington Dispatches, iv. 524.

[592] That of Charles Stewart (Lord Londonderry) on pp. 382-3 of the first volume of his History of the Peninsular War.

[593] As to the equipment of the Spaniards, the following quotation from Leslie (p. 135) may be worth giving: ‘Their uniforms were of every variety of colour, the equipment and appointments of the most inferior description. One could not but lament these defects, for the men were remarkably fine, possessing all the essential qualities to make good soldiers—courage, patience, and soberness. Their officers, in general, were the very reverse! The line infantry were in blue uniforms with red facings. The Provincial Corps, called “Volunteers,” were mostly dressed in the brown Spanish cloth of the country, with green or yellow facings. Some had chakoes, others broad-brimmed hats with the rim turned up at one side: all had cap-plates of tin announcing their designation. Some had belts, others none. They had no pouches, but a broad belt of soft leather, in which were placed a row of tin tubes, each holding a cartridge, with a fold of leather to cover them, fastened round the waist. The cavalry were heavy and light dragoons, with some regiments of Hussars. Some were tolerably well dressed, in blue or yellow uniforms with red facings. Some had boots, but more long leather leggings, coming up above the knee. The horses were small, active, and hardy, of the Spanish Barbary breed.’

[594] They estimated him at only 10,000 men, but he had really 20,000, Wellesley to Castlereagh, July 15, from Plasencia.

[595] Soult had written [from Puebla de Senabria, June 25]: ‘Je me propose de reposer les troupes trois ou quatre jours: pendant ce temps elles se prépareront des subsistances, on raccommodera la chaussure, les chevaux seront ferrés, et je menacerai de nouveau le Portugal: peut-être même je ferai faire une incursion vers Bragance, afin d’opérer une diversion qui ne peut pas manquer de produire quelque effet.... Je me fais précéder à Zamora (où je compte être rendu le 2 juillet) par l’ordonnateur Le Noble, qui doit réclamer près l’intendant-général de l’armée des moyens en tout genre qui me manquent—tel que l’habillement, chaussure, ambulance, officiers de santé, administration, transport militaire, payeurs, argent pour solde et dépenses extraordinaires, postes etc. J’ai l’honneur de supplier Votre Majesté de daigner donner des ordres pour qu’il soit fait droit a ses demandes: mes besoins sont très grands.... Il y a plus de cinq mois que je n’ai reçu ni ordre, ni nouvelle, ni secours, par conséquent je dois manquer de beaucoup de choses.’

[596] Wellesley’s views at this moment appear in his correspondence, e.g. to Mr. Villiers, July 8: ‘I defy Soult to do Beresford or Portugal any injury as long as his army is in its present situation—or any amelioration of that situation which can be produced in a short period of time.’ To Beresford, July 9: ‘I have no apprehension that Soult will be able to do anything with his corps for some time, but I think that column ought to be watched.’ To Beresford, July 14: ‘I do not believe that Ney has quitted Galicia, at least we have not heard that he has. Soult can do nothing against Portugal, for he is in a most miserable state, without arms, artillery or ammunition, stores, &c.’

[597] Wellesley to Beresford, July 9: ‘I have not forgotten either the Puerto de Baños or the Puerto de Perales, and have called upon Cuesta to occupy both. The former is already held, and the latter will be so in a day or two.’ [This was unfortunately not to be the case.]

[598] I cannot discover the names of the two very weak battalions, the smallest in Cuesta’s army, which were detached for this purpose under Del Reino. They are not the same as the two battalions which joined Wilson (Merida and 3rd of Seville).

[599] Wellesley to Frere, July 13: ‘You will see, in the accompanying letter, an account of my endeavour to prevail on General Cuesta to make a detachment upon Avila. I agree with you that it would be a great advantage from a military point of view ... but I must at the same time inform you that I do not consider the movement to be necessary as a military measure.’ Frere and Wellesley had hoped that Albuquerque might be placed in command of this large detachment, and might distinguish himself at its head.

[600] Battalions of Merida (1,170 bayonets) and 3rd of Seville (810 bayonets).

[601] All these details as to the joint plan are better expressed in Cuesta’s Apologetic Manifesto, published after his resignation, than in Wellesley’s Dispatches to Castlereagh and Frere.

[602] Cuesta’s and Wellesley’s accounts of their joint plan on the whole agree wonderfully well.

[603] See Wellington to Castlereagh, from Ramalhal, Sept. 1808.

[604] ‘The general sentiment of the army appears to be contempt for the Junta and the present form of government, great confidence in Cuesta, and a belief that he is too powerful for the Junta, and will overturn that government. This sentiment appears to be so general that I conceive that the Duke of Albuquerque must entertain it equally with others: but I have not seen him.’ Wellesley to Frere from Plasencia, July 13.

[605] Wellesley to Castlereagh, Talavera, Aug. 1.

[606] Wellesley to his brother the Marquis Wellesley, Deleytosa, Aug. 8.

[607] See Jourdan’s Mémoires, and his letter to Soult of July 17, in which no sign whatever appears of the knowledge of the advance of the British from Portugal.

[608] That food was coming in, but no transport, is clearly proved by Wellesley’s letter to the Junta of Plasencia on July 18: ‘Upon entering Spain I expected to derive that assistance in provisions and other means [i.e. transport] which an army invariably receives from the country in which it is stationed, more particularly when it has been sent to aid the people of that country. I have not been disappointed in the expectation that I had formed of receiving supplies of provisions, and I am much obliged to the Junta for the pains they have taken. I am convinced that they did everything in their power to procure us the other means we required [transport], although I am sorry to say that we have not received them.’

[609] See pp. 443 and 459.

[610] Wellesley to Frere, Plasencia, July 16.

[611] Wellesley to O’Donoju, Plasencia, July 16.

[612] The 1/61st Foot and 23rd Light Dragoons.

[613] ‘And,’ adds Lord Munster, from whom this quotation is taken (p. 199), ‘it is my belief that they would have continued till now if we had not aided them.’

[614] Londonderry, i. 392.

[615] Lord Munster, p. 200.

[616] Wellesley to Sherbrooke, Talavera, July 24.

[617] Wellesley to Castlereagh, July 24.

[618] Wellesley to Beresford, from Plasencia, July 14.

[619] Wellesley to Frere, Talavera, July 25.

[620] Ibid.; and also Wellesley to O’Donoju, July 25.

[621] Cf. Arteche, vi. 358, with Wellesley’s remarks on the inexplicable eagerness of Cuesta to be in Madrid on an early day.

[622] Soult to Joseph, July 13. Compare with this Jourdan to Soult of July 17, the reply to these modest demands.

[623] Jourdan to Soult, July 17, 1809, from Madrid.

[624] ‘Le roi pense, comme vous, qu’il est important de s’emparer de Ciudad Rodrigo; cette place servira de place d’armes aux troupes qui seront dans le cas d’entrer en Portugal.’—Ibid.

[625] Compare Le Noble’s account of Soult’s proposals (pp. 312-3) with Jourdan’s Mémoires, and with the Vie Militaire du Général Foy, p. 83.

[626] For the controversy about the expected date of Soult’s arrival at Plasencia, see Joseph’s and Jourdan’s letter to Napoleon, in Ducasse’s Mémoires du Roi Joseph, and on the other side Le Noble’s Campagne de 1809.

[627] The whole consisted of:

[628] ‘The cavalry regiment of Villaviciosa, drawn up in an enclosure with but one exit, was penned in by the enemy and cut to pieces without a possibility of escape. A British officer of engineers, present with them, saved himself by his English horse taking at a leap the barrier which the Spanish horses were incapable of clearing.’ Lord Munster, p. 208.

[629] He had six regiments of Latour-Maubourg’s dragoons, 3,200 sabres, four regiments of Merlin’s Division, 1,007 sabres, two regiments of Beaumont’s (corps-cavalry of 1st Corps) 980—a total of over 5,000 men.

[630] Wellesley to O’Donoju, from Cazalegas, July 25.

[631] Lord Munster, p. 210.

[632] Several eye-witnesses declare that Lapisse’s division escaped notice owing to a curious chance. Before abandoning the further bank of the Alberche, Mackenzie’s troops had set fire to the huts which Victor’s corps had constructed on the Cazalegas heights, during their long stay in that position. The smoke from the burning was driven along the slopes and the river bottom by the wind, and screened one of the fords from the British observers in the woods; over this ford came Lapisse’s unsuspected advance.