My Dear Sir:—
I have received your favor of the 17th inst., by Mr. Hamilton. From it I deeply regret to observe that you seem entirely to have misapprehended my position, which I supposed had been clearly stated in my message. I have incurred, and shall incur, any reasonable risk within the clearly prescribed line of my executive duties to prevent a collision between the army and navy of the United States and the citizens of South Carolina in defence of the forts within the harbor of Charleston. Hence I have declined for the present to reinforce these forts, relying upon the honor of South Carolinians that they will not be assaulted whilst they remain in their present condition; but that commissioners will be sent by the convention to treat with Congress on the subject. I say with Congress because, as I state in my message, “Apart from the execution of the laws, so far as this may be practicable, the Executive has no authority to decide what shall be the relations between the Federal Government and South Carolina. He has been invested with no such discretion. He possesses no power to change the relations heretofore existing between them, much less to acknowledge the independence of that State. This would be to invest a mere executive officer with the power of recognizing the dissolution of the confederacy among our thirty-three sovereign States. It bears no resemblance to the recognition of a foreign de facto government, involving no such responsibility. Any attempt to do this would, on my part, be a naked act of usurpation.”
As an executive officer of the Government, I have no power to surrender to any human authority Fort Sumter, or any of the other forts or public property in South Carolina. To do this, would on my part, as I have already said, be a naked act of usurpation. It is for Congress to decide this question, and for me to preserve the status of the public property as I found it at the commencement of the troubles.
If South Carolina should attack any of these forts, she will then become the assailant in a war against the United States. It will not then be a question of coercing a State to remain in the Union, to which I am utterly opposed, as my message proves, but it will be a question of voluntarily precipitating a conflict of arms on her part, without even consulting the only authorities which possess the power to act upon the subject. Between independent governments, if one possesses a fortress within the limits of another, and the latter should seize it without calling upon the appropriate authorities of the power in possession to surrender it, this would not only be a just cause of war, but the actual commencement of hostilities.
No authority was given, as you suppose, from myself, or from the War Department, to Governor Gist, to guard the United States arsenal in Charleston by a company of South Carolina volunteers. In this respect you have been misinformed. I have, therefore, never been more astonished in my life, than to learn from you that unless Fort Sumter be delivered into your hands, you cannot be answerable for the consequences.
It was, then, on the President’s first draft of an answer to the South Carolina commissioners, after the secession ordinance had been passed, and upon nothing that had previously occurred, that the cabinet crisis arose. On the evening of December 29th, the President’s proposed draft of an answer to the commissioners was read to the cabinet. It was not much discussed, for it was not the habit of the ministers to criticise state papers which the President had himself prepared. But on the following day, Judge Black informed Mr. Toucey, the Secretary of the Navy, of his purpose to resign, if this paper, as written by the President, should be delivered to the commissioners. The President sent for Judge Black, and handed him the paper, with a request that he modify it to suit himself, and return it immediately. Judge Black then prepared his memorandum for the President’s consideration, in which Mr. Holt and Mr. Stanton concurred. The answer, which was to be sent to the commissioners, was modified accordingly, and when sent it read as follows:[90]
Gentlemen:—
I have had the honor to receive your communication of 26th inst., together with a copy of your “full powers from the Convention of the people of South Carolina,” authorizing you to treat with the Government of the United States on various important subjects therein mentioned, and also a copy of the ordinance bearing date on the 20th inst., declaring that “the union now subsisting between South Carolina and other States, under the name of 'the United States of America,' is hereby dissolved.”
In answer to this communication, I have to say that my position as President of the United States was clearly defined in the message to Congress of the 3d instant. In that I stated that, “apart from the execution of the laws, so far as this may be practicable, the Executive has no authority to decide what shall be the relations between the Federal Government and South Carolina. He has been invested with no such discretion. He possesses no power to change the relations heretofore existing between them, much less to acknowledge the independence of that State. This would be to invest a mere executive officer with the power of recognizing the dissolution of the confederacy among our thirty-three sovereign States. It bears no resemblance to the recognition of a foreign de facto government—involving no such responsibility. Any attempt to do this would, on his part, be a naked act of usurpation. It is, therefore, my duty to submit to Congress the whole question, in all its bearings.”
Such is my opinion still. I could, therefore, meet you only as private gentlemen of the highest character, and was entirely willing to communicate to Congress any proposition you might have to make to that body upon the subject. Of this you were well aware. It was my earnest desire that such a disposition might be made of the whole subject by Congress, who alone possesses the power, as to prevent the inauguration of a civil war between the parties in regard to the possession of the Federal forts in the harbor of Charleston, and I, therefore, deeply regret that, in your opinion, “the events of the last twenty-four hours render this impossible.” In conclusion, you urge upon me “the immediate withdrawal of the troops from the harbor of Charleston,” stating that, “under present circumstances, they are a standing menace, which renders negotiation impossible, and, as our present experience shows, threatens speedily to bring to a bloody issue questions which ought to be settled with temperance and judgment.”
The reason for this change in your position is that, since your arrival in Washington, “an officer of the United States acting as we (you) are assured, not only without your (my) orders, has dismantled one fort and occupied another, thus altering, to a most important extent, the condition of affairs under which we (you) came.” You also allege that you came here “the representatives of an authority which could at any time within the past sixty days have taken possession of the forts in Charleston harbor, but which upon pledges given in a manner that we (you) cannot doubt, determined to trust to your (my) honor rather than to its own power.”
This brings me to a consideration of the nature of those alleged pledges, and in what manner they have been observed. In my message of the 3d of December last, I stated, in regard to the property of the United States in South Carolina, that it “has been purchased for a fair equivalent 'by the consent of the legislature of the State, for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals,' etc., and over these the authority 'to exercise exclusive legislation' has been expressly granted by the Constitution to Congress. It is not believed that any attempt will be made to expel the United States from this property by force; but, if in this I should prove to be mistaken, the officer in command of the forts has received orders to act strictly on the defensive. In such a contingency, the responsibility for consequences would rightfully rest upon the heads of the assailants.” This being the condition of the parties on Saturday, 8th December, four of the representatives from South Carolina, called upon me and requested an interview. We had an earnest conversation on the subject of these forts, and the best means of preventing a collision between the parties, for the purpose of sparing the effusion of blood. I suggested, for prudential reasons, that it would be best to put in writing what they said to me verbally. They did so accordingly, and on Monday morning the 10th instant, three of them presented to me a paper signed by all the representatives from South Carolina, with a single exception, of which the following is a copy:
“In compliance with our statement to you yesterday, we now express to you our strong convictions that neither the constituted authorities, nor any body of the people of the State of South Carolina, will either attack or molest the United States forts in the harbor of Charleston, previously to the action of the convention, and, we hope and believe, not until an offer has been made, through an accredited representative, to negotiate for an amicable arrangement of all matters between the State and the Federal Government, provided that no reinforcements shall be sent into those forts, and their relative military status shall remain as at present.
“Washington, December 9, 1860.”
And here I must, in justice to myself, remark that, at the time the paper was presented to me, I objected to the word “provided,” as it might be construed into an agreement on my part, which I never would make. They said that nothing was further from their intention; they did not so understand it, and I should not so consider it. It is evident they could enter into no reciprocal agreement with me on the subject. They did not profess to have authority to do this, and were acting in their individual character. I considered it as nothing more, in effect, than the promise of highly honorable gentlemen to exert their influence for the purpose expressed. The event has proved that they have faithfully kept this promise, although I have never since received a line from any one of them, or from any member of the convention on the subject. It is well known that it was my determination, and this I freely expressed, not to reinforce the forts in the harbor and thus produce a collision, until they had been actually attacked, or until I had certain evidence that they were about to be attacked. This paper I received most cordially, and considered it as a happy omen that peace might still be preserved, and that time might thus be gained for reflection. This is the whole foundation for the alleged pledge.
But I acted in the same manner I would have done had I entered into a positive and formal agreement with parties capable of contracting, although such an agreement would have been, on my part, from the nature of my official duties, impossible.
The world knows that I have never sent any reinforcements to the forts in Charleston harbor, and I have certainly never authorized any change to be made “in their relative military status.”
Bearing upon this subject, I refer you to an order issued by the Secretary of War, on the 11th instant, to Major Anderson, but not brought to my notice until the 21st instant. It is as follows:
“Memorandum of verbal instructions to Major Anderson, First Artillery, commanding Fort Moultrie, South Carolina:
“You are aware of the great anxiety of the Secretary of War that a collision of the troops with the people of this State shall be avoided, and of his studied determination to pursue a course with reference to the military force and forts in this harbor, which shall guard against such a collision. He has, therefore, carefully abstained from increasing the force at this point, or taking any measures which might add to the present excited state of the public mind, or which would throw any doubt on the confidence he feels that South Carolina will not attempt by violence to obtain possession of the public works, or to interfere with their occupancy. But, as the counsel of rash and impulsive persons may possibly disappoint these expectations of the Government, he deems it proper that you should be prepared with instructions to meet so unhappy a contingency. He has, therefore, directed me, verbally, to give you such instructions.
“You are carefully to avoid every act which would needlessly tend to provoke aggression; and, for that reason, you are not, without evident and imminent necessity, to take up any position which could be construed into the assumption of a hostile attitude; but you are to hold possession of the forts in this harbor and, if attacked, you are to defend yourself to the last extremity. The smallness of your force will not permit you, perhaps, to occupy more than one of the three forts; but an attack on, or an attempt to take possession of, either of them will be regarded as an act of hostility, and you may then put your command into either of them which you deem most proper to increase its power of resistance. You are also authorized to take similar defensive steps whenever you have tangible evidence of a design to proceed to a hostile act.
“Fort Moultrie, South Carolina, December 11, 1860.
“This is in conformity to my instructions to Major Buell.
These were the last instructions transmitted to Major Anderson before his removal to Fort Sumter, with a single exception in regard to a particular which does not, in any degree, affect the present question. Under these circumstances it is clear that Major Anderson acted upon his own responsibility, and without authority, unless, indeed, he had “tangible evidence of a design to proceed to a hostile act” on the part of the authorities of South Carolina, which has not yet been alleged. Still he is a brave and honorable officer, and justice requires that he should not be condemned without a fair hearing.
Be this as it may, when I learned that Major Anderson had left Fort Moultrie, and proceeded to Fort Sumter, my first promptings were to command him to return to his former position, and there to await the contingencies presented in his instructions. This could only have been done, with any degree of safety to the command, by the concurrence of the South Carolina authorities. But before any steps could possibly have been taken in this direction, we received information, dated on the 28th instant, that “the Palmetto flag floated out to the breeze at Castle Pinckney, and a large military force went over last night (the 27th) to Fort Moultrie.” Thus the authorities of South Carolina, without waiting or asking for any explanation, and doubtless believing, as you have expressed it, that the officer had acted not only without, but against my orders, on the very next day after the night when the removal was made, seized by a military force two of the three Federal forts in the harbor of Charleston, and have covered them under their own flag, instead of that of the United States. At this gloomy period of our history, startling events succeed each other rapidly. On the very day (the 27th instant) that possession of these two forts was taken, the Palmetto flag was raised over the Federal custom house and post office in Charleston; and on the same day every officer of the customs—collector, naval officer, surveyor, and appraisers—resigned their offices. And this, although it was well known, from the language of my message, that as an executive officer I felt myself bound to collect the revenue at the port of Charleston under the existing laws. In the harbor of Charleston we now find three forts confronting each other, over all of which the Federal flag floated only four days ago; but now, over two of them this flag has been supplanted, and the Palmetto flag has been substituted in its stead. It is under all these circumstances that I am urged immediately to withdraw the troops from the harbor of Charleston, and am informed that, without this, negotiation is impossible. This I cannot do; this I will not do. Such an idea was never thought of by me in any possible contingency. No allusion to it had ever been made in any communication between myself and any human being. But the inference is, that I am bound to withdraw the troops from the only fort remaining in the possession of the United States in the harbor of Charleston, because the officer then in command of all the forts thought proper, without instructions, to change his position from one of them to another. I cannot admit the justice of any such inference.
At this point of writing I have received information, by telegram, from Captain Humphreys, in command of the arsenal at Charleston, that “it has to-day (Sunday the 30th) been taken by force of arms.” It is estimated that the munitions of war belonging to the United States in this arsenal are worth half a million of dollars.
Comment is needless. After this information, I have only to add that, while it is my duty to defend Fort Sumter, as a portion of the public property of the United States, against hostile attacks from whatever quarter they may come, by such means as I may possess for this purpose, I do not perceive how such a defence can be construed into a menace against the city of Charleston.
With great personal regard, I remain, yours very respectfully,
In all that related to this cabinet crisis of December 29th, I can see nothing but the prompt action of a wise statesman and a patriotic President, in preventing a disruption of his cabinet upon a draft of a State paper, in which expressions had been used that might have given rise to inferences which the President never intended should be drawn. Among all Mr. Buchanan’s claims to stand in history as a great man, be the criticisms made by the three members of his cabinet on his proposed answer to the South Carolina commissioners more or less important, there is no one act which better entitles him to that rank, than the sacrifice which he made on this occasion of all pride of opinion in respect to the best mode of doing what he and his advisers alike meant to do, in order that the country might not, at this critical juncture, be deprived of the services of men whose services were important to her, and in order that the Government of the Union might not be placed in a false position. He had formed no new policy on the subject of secession, or any new views of his public duty. He never had but one policy, from the beginning of the secession movement to the 4th of March, 1861. Of that policy no concession of the right of secession, or of any claim founded on it, ever formed a part.[91]
The next thing that happened was, that after the reading in the Senate of the President’s special message of January 8th, Mr. Jefferson Davis produced and had read in the Senate, a copy of the commissioners' insulting letter. “Such,” says Mr. Buchanan, “was the temper of that body at the time, that it was received and read, and entered upon their journal...... It is worth notice, that whilst this letter of the commissioners was published at length in the Congressional Globe, among the proceedings of the Senate, their previous letter to the President of the 28th of December, and his answer thereto of the 31st, were never published in this so-called official register, although copies of both had accompanied his special message. By this means, the offensive letter was scattered broadcast over the country, whilst the letter of the President, to which this professed to be an answer, was buried in one of the numerous and long after published volumes of executive documents.”[92] The story related to the unknown diarist, as he says, by Senator Douglas, implies that the commissioners, at some time between the 31st of December and the 2d of January, wrote an uncourteous and improper reply to the President’s letter of December 31st, and then substituted for it a courteous and proper one, which they submitted to “the President’s agents,” who approved of it and sent it to the White House! That the President, through any agent, had signified to the commissioners that he was disposed to accede to their demands, if presented in courteous and proper terms, is an assertion that is contradicted by the whole tenor of his letter of December 31st, and by his uniform and steady refusal to entertain the proposition of an executive surrender of the forts to South Carolina. Down to the moment when the commissioners received the President’s letter of December 31st, he had no occasion to make with them any condition relating to the manner of their reply; and to suppose that at any time he meant to allow his compliance with their demands to turn upon the language in which they presented them, is simply absurd. What he may have signified to them was, that he would refer their demands to Congress; not that he would entertain and act upon them himself. This we know that he did, at the personal interview on the 28th of December; and he did it in order “to bring the whole subject before the representatives of the people in such a manner as to cause them to express an authoritative opinion on secession and the other dangerous questions then before the country, and adopt such measures for their peaceable adjustment as might possibly reclaim even South Carolina herself; but whether or not, might prevent the other cotton States from following her evil and rash example.”[93] The President did not expect that Congress would authorize him to surrender the forts; but he did believe that it would be beneficial to have Congress declare that the whole doctrine of secession was one that could not be accepted by any department of the Federal Government, as he had declared that it could not be accepted by the Executive. The South Carolina commissioners, in their letter of December 28th, claimed that the State has “resumed the powers she delegated to the Government of the United States, and has declared her perfect sovereignty and independence;” that unless Major Anderson’s removal to Fort Sumter was explained in a satisfactory manner, they must suspend all discussion of the arrangements by which the mutual interests of this independent State and the United States could be adjusted; and then, as a preliminary to any negotiation, they urged the immediate withdrawal of the troops from the harbor of Charleston, with a distinct intimation of a “bloody issue” if this should be refused. The President was thus brought to the alternatives of an Executive admission of the independence of South Carolina, by reason of her secession, and a withdrawal of the troops as a consequence, or a bloody issue of questions that ought to be settled amicably. The President’s answer of the 31st of December, being a rejection of what was demanded of him, although entirely courteous, so irritated the commissioners that they wrote the reply which he returned to them.[94] The truth is, that this reply contained so many offensive and unfounded imputations of past bad faith on the part of the President, that it was impossible for him to receive it. The grossest of these imputations I have already dealt with.
The diarist of the North American Review has related another story, on the authority of a person whose name, as well as his own, he conceals, which imputes to Major Anderson a motive of a most extraordinary character, for taking possession of Fort Sumter. We thus have the anonymous fortified by the anonymous—ignotum per ignotum—as the historical basis of belief. The statement is that the diarist’s informant, who had just come from Montgomery and had passed through Charleston, where he conversed with Major Anderson, told the diarist, on the 6th of March (1861), in Washington, that Anderson intended to be governed in his future course by the course of his own State of Kentucky; that if Kentucky should secede, Anderson would unhesitatingly obey the orders of a Confederate secretary of war; that he meant to retain the control of the position primarily in the interests of his own State of Kentucky; and that for this reason he removed from Fort Moultrie where he was liable to be controlled by the authorities of South Carolina.[95] The diarist took his informant to President Lincoln, who heard the tale repeated, but parried it by one or two of his characteristic jests, and the diarist was disappointed in not being able to divine how Mr. Lincoln was affected by the narrative. It will require something more than this kind of unsupported and unauthenticated nonsense to destroy Major Anderson’s reputation as a loyal officer of the United States. What he might have done with his commission, in case Kentucky had joined the Southern Confederacy, is one thing. What he would have done with Fort Sumter is a very different matter. His answer to a letter of General Dix does not accord with the account of his intentions given by the unknown informant of the unknown diarist.[96]