My Dear Sir:—

Your kind letter of the 26th instant was received yesterday.

Your conclusion as to attending the meeting at Tammany Hall was what I should have expected, marked by a nice sense of the fitness of things.

The telegraphic despatches received late this evening would seem to remove all doubt as to the result of the election. Your signal part in the accomplishment of that result is acknowledged and appreciated by all. I hope to have the pleasure of meeting you at no distant day.

My Dear Sir:—

I have been hoping ever since the election that I might have a personal interview with you, if not before, certainly during the present month. But the objections to such a meeting suggested by you while I was at the sea-shore now exist, perhaps even with greater force than at that time. With our known pleasant personal relation a meeting would doubtless call forth many idle and annoying speculations and groundless surmises.

An interchange of thoughts with Colonel King (whose returning health is a source of great joy to me) would also be peculiarly pleasant and profitable, but here, again, there are obstacles in the way. He cannot come North, and I cannot go to Washington. Communication by letter is still open. My thoughts for the last four weeks have been earnestly turned to the formation of a cabinet. And although I must in the end be responsible for the appointments, and consequently should follow my own well-considered convictions, I cannot help saying often to myself how agreeable it would be to compare conclusions upon this or that point with Mr. Buchanan. I do not mean to trouble you with the many matters of difficulty that evidently lie in my path. So far as I have been able to form an opinion as to public sentiment and reasonable public expectation, I think I am expected to call around me gentlemen who have not hitherto occupied cabinet position, and in view of the jealousies and embarrassments which environ any other course, this expectation is in accordance with my own judgment, a judgment strengthened by the impression that it is sanctioned by views expressed by you. Regarding you with the confidence of a friend, and appreciating your disinterested patriotism as well as your wide experience and comprehensive statesmanship, I trust you will deem it neither an intrusion nor annoyance when I ask your suggestions and advice.

If not mistaken in this, you will confer a great favor by writing me, as fully as you may deem proper, as to the launching (if I may so express myself) of the incoming administration, and more especially in regard to men and things in Pennsylvania. In relation to appointments requiring prompt action after the inauguration, I shall, as far as practicable, leave Concord with purposes definitely formed, and not likely to be changed.

Should you deem that I ought not thus to tax you, burn the letter, but give me, as of yore, your good will and wishes.

I shall regard, as you will of course, whatever passes between us as in the strictest sense confidential.

My Dear Sir:—

Your favor of the 7th instant reached me last evening.

You do me no more than justice in “regarding me with the free confidence of a friend,” and I can say in all sincerity that, both for your own sake and that of the country, I most ardently desire the success of your administration. Having asked my suggestions and advice “as to the launching of the incoming administration,” I shall cheerfully give it, with all the frankness of friendship.

Your letter, I can assure you, has relieved me from no little personal anxiety. Had you offered me a seat in your cabinet one month ago, although highly gratified as I should have been with such a distinguished token of your confidence and regard, I would have declined it without a moment’s hesitation. Nothing short of an imperative and overruling sense of public duty could ever prevail upon me to pass another four years of my life in the laborious and responsible position which I formerly occupied. Within the past month, however, so many urgent appeals have been made to me from quarters entitled to the highest respect, to accept the State Department, if tendered, and this, too, as an act of public duty, in view of the present perplexed and embarrassing condition of our foreign relations, that in declining it, I should have been placed in an embarrassing position from which I have been happily relieved by your letter.

But whilst I say this in all sincerity, I cannot assent to the correctness of the general principle you have adopted, to proscribe in advance the members of all former cabinets; nor do I concur with you in opinion, that either public sentiment or public expectation requires such a sweeping ostracism. I need scarcely, therefore, say that the impression which you have derived of my opinion in favor of this measure, from I know not whom, is without foundation. I should be most unjust towards my able, enlightened and patriotic associates in the cabinet of Mr. Polk, could I have entertained such an idea. So far from it that, were I the President elect, I should deem it almost indispensable to avail myself of the sound wisdom and experienced judgment of one or more members of that cabinet, to assist me in conducting the vast and complicated machinery of the Federal Government. Neither should I be diverted from this purpose by the senseless cry of “Old Fogyism” raised by “Young America.”

I think the members of Mr. Polk’s cabinet should be placed upon the same level with the mass of their fellow-citizens, and neither in a better nor a worse condition. I am not aware that any of them, unless it may be Governor Marcy, either expects or desires a cabinet appointment; and certainly all of them will most cheerfully accord to you the perfect right of selecting the members of your own cabinet. Still, to be excluded from your consideration, merely because they had happened to belong to Mr. Polk’s cabinet, could not be very gratifying to any of them.

To apply your own metaphor, “the launching of the incoming administration” will, perhaps, be a more important and responsible duty than has ever fallen to the lot of any of your predecessors. On the selection of the navigators to assist you in conducting the vessel of State, will mainly depend the success of the voyage. No matter how able or skilful the commander may be, and without flattery, I cheerfully accord to you both ability and skill, he can do but little without the aid of able and skilful subordinates. So firmly am I convinced of this truth, that I should not fear to predict the result of your administration as soon as I shall learn who are the members of your cabinet. In former times, when the Government was comparatively in its infancy, the President himself could supervise and direct all the measures of any importance arising under our complex but most excellent system of government. Not so at present. This would no longer be possible, even if the day consisted of forty-eight instead of twenty-four hours. Hence, from absolute necessity, the members of your administration will exercise much independent power. Even in regard to those questions submitted more directly to yourself, from want of time to make minute examinations of all the facts, you must necessarily rely much upon the representations of the appropriate Secretary. My strong and earnest advice to you, therefore, is not to constitute your cabinet with a view to harmonize the opposite and fleeting factions of the day; but solely with the higher and nobler view of promoting the great interests of the country and securing the glory and lasting fame of your own administration. You occupy a proud and independent position, and enjoy a popularity which will render any able and honest Democrat popular who may be honored by your choice for a cabinet station, provided they are properly distributed over the Union. In this respect, you are placed in a more enviable position than almost any of your predecessors. It was a maxim of old Simon Snyder, the shrewd and popular Governor of our State, that the very best man ought to be selected for the office, and if not popular at the moment, he would soon render himself popular. In view of these important considerations, I would earnestly recommend to you the practice of General Washington, never finally to decide an important question until the moment which required its decision had nearly approached.

I know that a state of suspense is annoying to the human mind; but it is better to submit to this annoyance for a season than to incur the risk of a more permanent and greater evil.

You say that you will leave Concord “with purposes definitely formed and not likely to be changed.”

But is Concord the best locality in the world for acquiring reliable information and taking extended views of our whole great country? To Boston I should never resort for this purpose. Pardon me for suggesting that you ought not to have your resolution definitely fixed until after your arrival in Washington. In that city, although you will find many interested and designing politicians, there are also pure, honest and disinterested Democratic patriots.

Among this number is Colonel King, whom you so highly and justly commend. He is among the best, purest and most consistent public men I have ever known, and is also a sound judging and discreet counsellor. You might rely with implicit confidence upon his information, especially in regard to the Southern States, which I know are at the present moment tremblingly alive to the importance of your cabinet selections. I might cite the example of Mr. Polk. Although in council with General Jackson, he had early determined to offer me the State Department, yet no intimation of the kind was ever communicated to me until a short time before his arrival in Washington, and then only in an indirect manner; and in regard to all the other members of his cabinet, he was wholly uncommitted, until the time for making his selections had nearly approached.

It is true, he had strong predilections in favor of individuals before he left Tennessee, but I do not think I hazard much in saying, that had these been indulged, his administration would not have occupied so high a place as it is destined to do in the history of his country.

One opinion I must not fail to express; and this is that the cabinet ought to be a unit. I may say that this is not merely an opinion of mine, but a strong and deep conviction. It is as clear to my mind as any mathematical demonstration. Without unity no cabinet can be successful. General Jackson, penetrating as he was, did not discover this truth until compelled to dissolve his first cabinet on account of its heterogeneous and discordant materials. I undertake to predict that whoever may be the President, if he disregards this principle in the formation of his cabinet, he will have committed a fatal mistake. He who attempts to conciliate opposing factions by placing ardent and embittered representatives of each in his cabinet, will discover that he has only infused into these factions new vigor and power for mischief. Having other objects in view, distinct from the success and glory of the administration, they will be employed in strengthening the factions to which they belong, and in creating unfortunate divisions in Congress and throughout the country. It was a regard to this vital principle of unity in the formation of his cabinet which rendered Mr. Polk’s administration so successful. We were all personal and political friends, and worked together in harmony. However various our views might have been and often were upon any particular subject when entering the cabinet council, after mutual consultation and free discussion we never failed to agree at last, except on a very few questions, and on these the world never knew that we had differed.

I have made these suggestions without a single selfish object. My purpose is to retire gradually, if possible, and gracefully from any active participation in public affairs, and to devote my time to do historical justice to the administration of Mr. Polk, as well as to myself, before the tribunal of posterity. I feel, notwithstanding, a deep and intense interest in the lasting triumph of the good old cause of Democracy and in that of its chosen standard bearer, to whose success I devoted myself with a hearty good will.

The important domestic questions being now nearly all settled, the foreign affairs of the Government, and especially the question of Cuba, will occupy the most conspicuous place in your administration. I believe Cuba can be acquired by cession upon honorable terms, and I should not desire to acquire it in any other manner. The President who shall accomplish this object will render his name illustrious, and place it on the same level with that of his great predecessor, who gave Louisiana to the Union. The best means of acquiring it, in my opinion, is to enlist the active agency of the foreign creditors of Spain, who have a direct interest in its cession to the United States. The Rothschilds, the Barings, and other large capitalists now control, to a great extent, the monarchies of continental Europe. Besides, Queen Christina, who is very avaricious and exercises great influence over her daughter, the queen of Spain, and her court, has very large possessions in the island, the value of which would be greatly enhanced by its cession to the United States. Should you desire to acquire Cuba, the choice of suitable ministers to Spain, Naples, England and France will be very important. Mr. Fillmore committed a great outrage in publishing the Cuban correspondence. Had he, however, not suppressed a material portion of my instructions to Mr. Saunders, every candid man of all parties would have admitted, without hesitation, that under the then existing circumstances it was the imperative duty of Mr. Polk to offer to make the purchase. Indeed, I think myself, it was too long delayed.

In my opinion, Mr. Clayton and Mr. Webster have involved our relations with England in serious difficulties by departing from the Monroe doctrine.

In Pennsylvania we have all been amused at the successive detachments of those whom we call guerillas, which have visited Concord to assure you that serious divisions exist among the Democracy of our State. There never was anything more unfounded. The party is now more thoroughly united than it has ever been at any period within my recollection. Whilst the contest continued between General Cass and myself, many honest Democrats, without a particle of personal or political hostility to me, preferred him and espoused his cause simply because he had been the defeated candidate. That feeling is at an end with the cause which gave it birth, and these honest Democrats as heartily despise the ——, the ——, the ——, the ——, the ——, the ——, etc., etc., as do my oldest and best friends. In truth the guerillas are now chiefs without followers. They are at present attempting to galvanize themselves at home through the expected influence of your administration. Their tools, who will nearly all be applicants for office, circulate the most favorable accounts from Concord. They were scarcely heard of previous to the October election, which was the battle of the 23d December; but if we are to believe them, they achieved the victory of the 8th January. These are the men who defeated Judge —— at the election in October, 1851, by exciting Anti-Catholic prejudices against him, and who have always been disorganizers whenever their personal interests came in conflict with the success of the party. Thank Heaven, they are now altogether powerless, and will so remain unless your administration should impart to them renewed vigor. Their principal apprehension was that you might offer me a seat in your cabinet, but for some time past they have confidently boasted that their influence had already prevented this dreaded consummation.

Their next assault will be upon my intimate friend, Judge ——, who will, I have no doubt, be strongly presented to you for a cabinet appointment. The Judge is able, honest and inflexibly firm, and did, to say the very least, as much as any individual in the State to secure our glorious triumph. I might speak in similar terms of ——. To defeat such men, they will lay hold of ——, Mr. ——, or any other individual less obnoxious to them, and make a merit of pressing him for a cabinet appointment from Pennsylvania.

They calculate largely upon the influence of General Cass, who, strangely enough, is devoted to them, although their advocacy rendered it impossible that he should ever be nominated or elected by the vote of the State.

As a private citizen, I shall take the liberty of recommending to you by letter, at the proper time, those whom I consider the best qualified candidates for different offices within our State, and you will pay such attention to my recommendations as you may think they deserve. I would not, if I could, exclude the honest friends of General Cass from a fair participation.... They are and always have been good Democrats, and are now my warm friends. But I shall ever protest against the appointment of any of the disorganizers who, professing Democracy, defeated Judge ——, and not content with advocating General Cass in preference to myself, which they had a perfect right to do, have spent their time and their money in abusing my personal character most foully and falsely.

Even ——, the editor of the ——, whose paper was almost exclusively devoted to the propagation of these slanders, to be circulated under the frank of Senator —— throughout the South, for they had no influence at home, is a hopeful candidate for office, as they profess, under your administration.

I have now, from a sense of duty, written you by far the longest letter I ever wrote in my life, and have unburdened my mind of a ponderous load. I have nothing more to add, except a request that you would present me kindly to Mrs. Pierce, and believe me to be always, most respectfully,

My Dear Sir:—

Language fails me to express the sincere gratitude I feel for your kind and noble letter of the 11th inst. I cannot now reply as I ought, but lose no time in expressing my deep sense of obligation. I ought, in justice to the citizens of Pennsylvania who have visited Concord during the summer and autumn, to say that I do not recollect a single individual who has ventured to make a suggestion in relation to yourself, calculated in the slightest degree to weaken my personal regard.

It is far from my purpose to hasten to any conclusion in relation to my cabinet.

It is hardly possible that I can be more deeply impressed than I now am as to the importance of the manner in which it shall be cast, both for the interests of the country and my own comfort. I cannot, however, view the advantages of my presence at Washington in the same light with yourself, though having no object but the best interests of our party and the country; personal inclination and convenience will, if I know it, have no weight upon my course in any particular.

I must leave for a future time many things I desire to say. Do you still anticipate passing a portion of the winter at the South?

My Dear Sir:—

If not a matter of strict duty, I choose to regard it as a proper thing to explain my movements to you. A few days after the late Presidential election, I went south with my son Edmund, about whose condition as to health I had become alarmed, and am still very solicitous. In the first week of February, he took a steamer for some of the West India Islands, and I concluded it to be my duty to return to my deserted family at Albany. I arrived at Richmond, Virginia, about the 20th of February, with a disposition to pass on to the North without going through Washington. As I had never done anything at that place for which I ought to be ashamed (or rather I thought I had not), it appeared to me it would be cowardly to run around or through it. I was very much inclined to go and perchance to stop there a few days. The doubts which distracted me in regard to my course were almost entirely removed by a letter from a person whom I had never seen, suggesting that it might be well for me to be in Washington about the 20th ult. On my appearance there a rumor suddenly arose that I was certainly to be one of the new cabinet, and the same liberty was taken with the names of several other persons. I have heard in an unauthentic way that you had been wise enough to take precautions against such a use of your name. It is now generally believed here, and I believe it myself, that I may be in the cabinet of the incoming administration, and (to confess all) I have been weak enough to make up my mind to accept a seat if offered one in it. Should it be the place you filled with so much ability, I may be rash enough not to decline it. I have told you all; here I am and here I am likely to be, for a brief period at least.

I do not think you will approve of what I have done. I hope you will not severely censure me, or the judgment which will put me where I expect to be. If it is an error, either on my part or that of another, there are some circumstances to excuse it, but I have not time to present them in detail.

I hope to have a frank and free intercourse with you. I will go further, I hope to have—what I know I shall much need—the aid in some emergencies of your greater experience and better knowledge. It will give me sincere pleasure to hear from you.

Although gratified with this offer, I felt great reluctance in accepting it. Having consulted several friends, in whose judgment I have confidence, they all advised me to accept it, with a single exception (James L. Reynolds). I left Lancaster for Washington on Thursday, 7th April, wholly undecided as to my course. On Friday morning (8th April) I called upon the President, who invited me to dine with him “en famille” that day. The only strangers at the table were Mr. John Slidell and Mr. O’Conor. After the dinner was over the President invited me up to the library, where we held the following conversation:

I commenced by expressing to him my warm and grateful acknowledgments for the offer of this most important mission, and said I should feel myself under the same obligations to him whether it was accepted or declined; that at my age, and contented and happy as I was at home, I felt no disposition to change my position, and again to subject myself to the ceremonious etiquette and round of gaiety required from a minister at a foreign court.

Here the President interrupted me and said: “If this had been my only purpose in sending you abroad, I should never have offered you the mission. You know very well that we have several important questions to settle with England, and it is my intention that you shall settle them all in London. The country expects and requires your services as minister to London. You have had no competitor for this place, and when I presented your name to the cabinet they were unanimous. I think that under these circumstances I have a right to ask you to accept the mission.”

To this I replied that Mr. Polk was a wise man, and after deliberation he had determined that all important questions with foreign nations should be settled in Washington, under his own immediate supervision; that he (President Pierce) had not, perhaps, seriously considered the question.

He promptly replied that he had seriously considered the question, and had arrived at the conclusion that better terms could be obtained in London at the seat of power than through an intermediate agent in this country; and instanced the Oregon negotiation as an example.

From this opinion I did not dissent, but asked: “What will Governor Marcy say to your determination? You have appointed him Secretary of State with my entire approbation; and I do not think he would be willing to surrender to your minister at London the settlement of these important questions, which might reflect so much honor upon himself.”

He replied, with some apparent feeling, that he himself would control this matter.

I interposed and said: “I know that you do; but I would not become the instrument of creating any unpleasant feelings between yourself and your Secretary of State by accepting the mission, even if I desired it, which is not the case.”

He replied that he did not believe this would be the case. When he had mentioned my name to the cabinet, although he did not say in express terms I should be entrusted with the settlement of these questions, yet from the general tone of his remarks they must have inferred that such was his intention. He added, that after our interview he would address a note to Governor Marcy to call and see him, and after conversing with him on the subject he would send for me.

I then mentioned to him that there appeared to me to be another insurmountable obstacle to my acceptance of the mission. I said: “In all your appointments for Pennsylvania, you have not yet selected a single individual for any office for which I recommended him. I have numerous other friends still behind who are applicants for foreign appointments; and if I were now to accept the mission to London, they might with justice say that I had appropriated the lion’s share to myself, and selfishly received it as an equivalent for their disappointment. I could not and would not place myself in this position.”

His answer was emphatic. He said: “I can assure you, if you accept the mission, Pennsylvania shall not receive one appointment more or less on that account. I shall consider yours as an appointment for the whole country; and I will not say that Pennsylvania shall not have more in case of your acceptance than if you should decline the mission.” I asked him if he was willing I should mention this conversation publicly. He said he would rather not; but that I might give the strongest assurances to my friends that such would be his course in regard to Pennsylvania appointments.

We then had a conversation respecting the individual appointments already made in Pennsylvania, which I shall not write. He told me emphatically, that when he appointed Mr. Brown collector, he believed him to be my friend, and had received assurances to that effect; although he knew that I greatly preferred Governor Porter. He also had been assured that Wynkoop was my friend, and asked if I had not recommended him; and seemed much surprised when I informed him of the course he had pursued.

I then stated, that if I should accept the mission, I could not consent to banish myself from my country for more than two years. He replied, that at the end of two years I might write to him for leave to return home, and it should be granted; adding, that if I should settle our important questions with England at an earlier period, I might return at the end of eighteen months, should I desire it.

The interview ended, and I heard nothing from the President on Friday evening, Saturday or Sunday, or until Monday morning. In the mean time, I had several conversations with particular friends, and especially with Mr. Walker (at whose house I stayed), Judge Campbell and Senator Bright, all of whom urged me to accept the mission. The latter informed me that if I did not accept it, many would attribute my refusal to a fear or an unwillingness to grapple with the important and dangerous questions pending between the United States and Great Britain.

On Sunday morning, April 10th, the Washington Union was brought to Mr. Walker’s, from which it appeared that the session of the Senate would terminate on the next day at one o’clock, the President having informed the Committee to wait upon him, that he had no further communications to make to the body. At this I was gratified. I presumed that the President, after having consulted Governor Marcy, had concluded not to transfer the negotiations to London; because it had never occurred to me that I was to go abroad on such an important mission without the confirmation of the Senate. Mr. Walker and myself had some conversation on the subject, and we agreed that it was strange the Senate had been kept so long together without submitting to them the important foreign appointments; as we both knew that in Europe, and especially in England, since the rejection of Mr. Van Buren’s appointment, a minister had not the proper prestige without the approbation of the co-ordinate branch of the Executive power.

On Sunday morning, before dinner-time, I called to see Jefferson Davis.^[6] We had much conversation on many subjects. Among other things, I told him it was strange that the foreign appointments had not been agreed upon and submitted to the Senate before their adjournment. He replied that he did not see that this could make any difference; they might be made with more deliberation during the recess. I said a man was considered but half a minister, who went abroad upon the President’s appointment alone, without the consent of the Senate, ever since the rejection of Mr. Van Buren. He said he now saw this plainly; and asked why Marcy had not informed them of it,—they trusted to him in all such matters. The conversation then turned upon other subjects; but this interview with Mr. Davis, sought for the purpose of benefiting my friend, John Slidell, who was then a candidate for the Senate, has doubtless been the cause why I was nominated and confirmed as minister to England on the next day.

On Sunday evening a friend informed Mr. Walker and myself that a private message had been sent to the Senators still in town, requesting them not to leave by the cars on Monday morning, as the President had important business to submit to them. This was undoubtedly the origin of the rumor which at the time so extensively prevailed, that the cabinet was about to be dissolved and another appointed.

On Monday morning, at ten o’clock, I received a note from Mr. Cushing,^[7] informing me that “the President would be glad to see me at once.” I immediately repaired to the White House; and the President and myself agreed, referring to our former conversation, though not repeating it in detail, that he should send my name to the Senate. If a quorum were present, and I should be confirmed, I would go to England; if not, the matter was to be considered as ended. Thirty-three members were present, and I was confirmed. On this second occasion, our brief conversation was of the same character, so far as it proceeded, with that at our first interview. He kindly consented that I should select my own Secretary of Legation; and without a moment’s hesitation, I chose John Appleton, of Maine, who accepted the offer which I was authorized to make, and was appointed. I left Washington on Tuesday morning, April 12th.

At our last interview, I informed the President that I would soon again return to Washington to prepare myself for the performance of my important duties, because this could only be satisfactorily done in the State Department. He said he wished to be more at leisure on my return, that he might converse with me freely on the questions involved in my mission; he thought that in about ten days the great pressure for office would relax, and he would address me a note inviting me to come.

I left Washington perfectly satisfied, and resolved to use my best efforts to accomplish the objects of my mission. The time fixed upon for leaving the country was the 20th of June, so that I might relieve Mr. Ingersoll on the 1st of July.

I had given James Keenan of Greensburg a strong recommendation for appointment as consul to Glasgow. As soon as he learned my appointment as minister to England, he wrote to me on the 14th of April, stating that the annunciation of my acceptance of this mission had created a belief among my friends there that no Pennsylvanian could now be appointed to any consulship.

On the 16th of April, I wrote to him and assured him, in the language of the President, that my appointment to the English mission would not cause one appointment more or one appointment less to be given to Pennsylvania than if I had declined the mission.

In answer, I received a letter from him, dated April 21st, in which he extracts from a letter from Mr. Drum, then in Washington, to him, the following: “I have talked to the President earnestly on the subject (of his appointment to Glasgow), but evidently without making much impression. He says that it will be impossible for him to bestow important consulships on Pennsylvania who has a cabinet officer and the first and highest mission. Campbell talks in the same strain; but says he will make it his business to get something worthy of your acceptance.”

For some days before and after the receipt of this letter, I learned that different members of the cabinet, when urged for consulates for Pennsylvanians, had declared to the applicants and their friends that they could not be appointed on account of my appointment to London, and what the President had already done for the State. One notable instance of this kind occurred between Colonel Forney and Mr. Cushing. Not having heard from the President, according to his promise, I determined to go to Washington for the purpose of having an explanation with him and preparing myself for my mission. Accordingly, I left home on Tuesday, May 17th, and arrived in Washington on Wednesday morning, May 18th, remaining there until Tuesday morning, May 31st, on which day I returned home.

On Thursday morning, May 19th, I met the President, by appointment, at 9½ o’clock. Although he did not make a very clear explanation of his conversation with Mr. Drum, yet I left him satisfied that he would perform his promise in regard to Pennsylvania appointments. I had not been in Washington many days before I clearly discovered that the President and cabinet were intent upon his renomination and re-election. This I concluded from the general tendency of affairs, as well as from special communications to that effect from friends whom I shall not name. It was easy to perceive that the object in appointments was to raise up a Pierce party, wholly distinct from the former Buchanan, Cass, and Douglas parties; and I readily perceived, what I had before conjectured, the reason why my recommendations had proved of so little avail. I thought I also discovered considerable jealousy of Governor Marcy, who will probably cherish until the day of his death the anxious desire to become President. I was convinced of this jealousy at a dinner given Mr. Holmes, formerly of South Carolina, now of California, at Brown’s Hotel on Saturday, May 21st. Among the guests were Governor Marcy, Jefferson Davis, Mr. Dobbin, and Mr. Cushing. The company soon got into high good humor. In the course of the evening Mr. Davis began to jest with Governor Marcy and myself on the subject of the next Presidency, and the Governor appeared to relish the subject. After considerable bagatelle, I said I would make a speech. All wanted to hear my speech. I addressed Governor Marcy and said: “You and I ought to consider ourselves out of the list of candidates. We are both growing old, and it is a melancholy spectacle to see old men struggling in the political arena for the honors and offices of this world, as though it were to be their everlasting abode. Should you perform your duties as Secretary of State to the satisfaction of the country during the present Presidential term, and should I perform my duties in the same manner as minister to England, we ought both to be content to retire and leave the field to younger men. President Pierce is a young man, and should his administration prove to be advantageous to the country and honorable to himself, as I trust it will, there is no good reason why he should not be renominated and re-elected for a second term.” The Governor, to do him justice, appeared to take these remarks kindly and in good part, and said he was agreed. They were evidently very gratifying to Messrs. Davis, Dobbin, and Cushing. Besides, they expressed the real sentiments of my heart. When the dinner was ended, Messrs. Davis and Dobbin took my right and left arm and conducted me to my lodgings, expressing warm approbation of what I had said to Governor Marcy. I heard of this speech several times whilst I remained at Washington; and the President once alluded to it with evident satisfaction. It is certain that Governor Marcy is no favorite.

I found the State Department in a wretched condition. Everything had been left by Mr. Webster topsy turvy; and Mr. Everett was not Secretary long enough to have it put in proper order; and whilst in that position he was constantly occupied with pressing and important business. Governor Marcy told me that he had not been able, since his appointment, to devote one single hour together to his proper official duties. His time had been constantly taken up with office-seekers and cabinet councils. It is certain that during Mr. Polk’s administration he had paid but little attention to our foreign affairs; and it is equally certain that he went into the Department without much knowledge of its appropriate duties. But he is a strong-minded and clear-headed man; and, although slow in his perceptions, is sound in his judgment. He may, and I trust will, succeed; but yet he has much to learn.

Soon after I arrived in Washington on this visit, I began seriously to doubt whether the President would eventually entrust to me the settlement of the important questions at London, according to his promise, without which I should not have consented to go abroad. I discovered that the customary and necessary notice in such cases had not been given to the British government, of the President’s intention and desire to transfer the negotiations to London, and that I would go there with instructions and authority to settle all the questions between the two governments, and thus prepare them for the opening of these negotiations upon my arrival.

After I had been in Washington some days, busily engaged in the State Department in preparing myself for the duties of my mission, Mr. Marcy showed me the project of a treaty which had nearly been completed by Mr. Everett and Mr. Crampton, the British minister, before Mr. Fillmore’s term had expired, creating reciprocal free trade in certain enumerated articles, between the United States and the British North American provinces, with the exception of Newfoundland, and regulating the fisheries. Mr. Marcy appeared anxious to conclude this treaty, though he did not say so in terms. He said that Mr. Crampton urged its conclusion; and he himself apprehended that if it were not concluded speedily, there would be great danger of collision between the two countries on the fishing grounds. I might have answered, but did not, that the treaty could not be ratified until after the meeting of the Senate in December; and that in the mean time it might be concluded at London in connection with the Central American questions. I did say that the great lever which would force the British government to do us justice in Central America was their anxious desire to obtain reciprocal free trade for their North American possessions, and thus preserve their allegiance and ward off the danger of their annexation to the United States. My communications on the extent and character of my mission were with the President himself, and not with Governor Marcy; and I was determined they should so remain. The President had informed me that he had, as he promised, conversed with the Governor, and found him entirely willing that I should have the settlement of the important questions at London.

The circumstances to which I have referred appeared to me to be significant. I conversed with the President fully and freely on each of the three questions, viz: The reciprocal trade, the fisheries, and that of Central America; and endeavored to convince him of the necessity of settling them all together. He seemed to be strongly impressed with my remarks, and said that he had conversed with a Senator then in Washington, (I presume Mr. Toucey, though he did not mention the name,) who had informed him that he thought that the Senate would have great difficulty in ratifying any treaty which did not embrace all the subjects pending between us and England; and that for this very reason there had been considerable opposition in the body to the ratification of the Claims Convention, though in itself unexceptionable.

The President said nothing from which an inference could be fairly drawn that he had changed his mind as to the place where the negotiation should be conducted; and yet he did not speak in as strong and unequivocal terms on the subject as I could have desired. Under all the circumstances, I left Washington, on the 31st of May, without accepting my commission, which had been prepared for me and was in the State Department. On the 5th of June I received a letter from Governor Marcy, dated on the first, requesting me to put on paper my exposition of the Clayton and Bulwer treaty. In this he says nothing about my instructions on any of the questions between this country and England, nor does he intimate that he desires my opinion for any particular purpose. On the 7th of June I answered his letter. In the concluding portion of my letter, I took the occasion to say: “The truth is that our relations with England are in a critical condition. Throw all the questions together into hotchpot, and I think they can all be settled amicably and honorably. The desire of Great Britain to establish free trade between the United States and her North American possessions, and by this means retain these possessions in their allegiance, may be used as the powerful lever to force her to abandon her pretensions in Central America; and yet it must be admitted that, in her history, she has never voluntarily abandoned any important commercial position on which she has once planted her foot. It cannot be her interest to go to war with us, and she must know that it is clearly her interest to settle all the questions between us, and have a smooth sea hereafter. If the Central American question, which is the dangerous question, should not be settled, we shall probably have war with England before the close of the present administration. Should she persist in her unjust and grasping policy on the North American continent and the adjacent islands, this will be inevitable at some future day; and although we are not very well prepared for it at the present moment, it is not probable that we shall for many years be in a better condition.”

I also say in this letter to Governor Marcy, that “bad as the treaty (the Clayton and Bulwer treaty) is, the President cannot annul it. This would be beyond his power, and the attempt would startle the whole world. In one respect it may be employed to great advantage. The question of the Colony of the Bay of Islands is the dangerous question. It affects the national honor. From all the consideration I can give the subject, the establishment of this Colony is a clear violation of the Clayton and Bulwer treaty. Under it we can insist upon the withdrawal of Great Britain from the Bay of Islands. Without it we could only interpose the Monroe doctrine against this colony, which has never yet been sanctioned by Congress, though as an individual citizen of the United States, I would fight for it to-morrow, so far as all North America is concerned, and would do my best to maintain it throughout South America.”

This letter of mine to Governor Marcy, up till the present moment, June 25, has elicited no response. It may be seen at length in this book.

Having at length determined to ascertain what were the President’s present intentions in regard to the character of my mission, I addressed him a letter, of which the following is a copy, on the 14th June.

My Dear Sir:—

I have this moment received yours of the 11th instant, and now enclose you Mr. Appleton’s resignation. I cannot imagine how I neglected to do this before. It will be very difficult to supply his place.

If you have changed your mind in regard to the place where our important negotiations with England shall be conducted, you would confer a great favor upon me by informing me of this immediately. I stated to you, in our first conversation on the subject, that Mr. Polk, after due deliberation, had determined that such negotiations should be conducted under his own eye at Washington; and it would not give me the slightest uneasiness to learn, that upon reconsideration, such had become your determination. I should, however, consider it a fatal policy to divide the questions. After a careful examination and study of all these questions, and their mutual bearings upon each other and upon the interest of the two countries, I am fully convinced that they can only be satisfactorily adjusted all together. Indeed, from what you said to me of your conversation with a Senator, and from what I have since learned, I believe it would be difficult to obtain the consent of two-thirds of the Senate to any partial treaty. The South, whether correctly or not, will probably be averse to a reciprocity treaty confined to the British North American possessions; and it would be easy for hostile demagogues to proclaim, however unjustly, that the interests of the South had been bartered away for the fisheries. But the South might and probably would be reconciled to such a treaty, if it embraced a final and satisfactory adjustment of the questions in Central America.

If you have changed your mind, and I can imagine many reasons for this, independently of the pressure of the British minister to secure that which is so highly prized by his government,—then, I would respectfully suggest that you might inform Mr. Crampton, you are ready and willing to negotiate upon the subject of the fisheries and reciprocal trade; but this in connection with our Central American difficulties;—that you desire to put an end to all the embarrassing and dangerous questions between the two governments, and thus best promote the most friendly relations hereafter;—and that you will proceed immediately with the negotiation and bring it to as speedy a conclusion as possible, whenever he shall have received the necessary instructions. Indeed, the treaty in regard to reciprocal trade and the fisheries might, in the mean time, be perfected, with a distinct understanding, however, that its final execution should be postponed until the Central American questions had been adjusted. In that event, as I informed you when at Washington, if you should so desire, I shall be most cordially willing to go there as a private individual, and render you all the assistance in my power. I know as well as I live, that it would be vain for me to go to London to settle a question peculiarly distasteful to the British government, after they had obtained, at Washington, that which they so ardently desire.

I write this actuated solely by a desire to serve your administration and the country. I shall not be mortified, in the slightest degree, should you determine to settle all the questions in Washington. Whether [you do so] or not, your administration shall not have a better friend in the country than myself, nor one more ardently desirous of its success; and I can render it far more essential service as a private citizen at home than as a minister to London.

With my kindest regards for Mrs. Pierce, and Mrs. Means,

P.S.—I should esteem it a personal favor to hear from you as soon as may be convenient.